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THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945

EDITED BY LYMAN P. VAN SLYKE

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Editor's Preface

By late 1944, an Allied victory over Germany and Japan was only a matter of time. In the Pacific, United States forces were ashore on the Philippines, the Japanese fleet was on the bottom, and bombers were already in the air on regular raids against the Home Islands. In China, Japan's last large-scale offensive was ending, but only after the ease of its success had exposed to full view the conditions plaguing China. The story is a familiar one: the barely disguised civil struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists; the decision of both parties to save themselves for the future rather than prosecute a war that was being won anyway; the corruption, inefficiency, and war-weariness of the National Government in Chungking; and the corrosive inflation that was already eating away Chiang Kai-shek's economic and political support.

Two problems confronted the United States in late 1944: the final defeat of Japan, and the postwar settlement in China. Though ultimately doomed, Japan still commanded land forces capable of inflicting a heavy toll on her adversaries; the United States hoped to reduce this toll to an absolute minimum. After the war, the United States hoped to make a unified China the center of stability in Asia; if Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists were to try to keep China weak and divided, this objective would be hard to achieve. Both problems—winning the war and securing the peace—seemed to depend on Chinese unity, which in turn depended to a considerable extent on the strength, nature, and intentions of the Chinese Communist Party.

With these questions in mind, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department undertook a general survey of Chinese Communism as a military and political force. The resulting report, entitled *The Chinese Communist Movement* and based on “over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books,” was complete by early June of 1945.

A few ditto copies, classified Secret, were submitted to the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, Brigadier General Paul E. Peabody, a staff officer with virtually no experience in the Far East who had taken over as head of MIS in January after returning from a tour as Military Attaché in London. Despite the "Statement of Report and Conclusions" prepared by the compiling team, General Peabody drew up his own covering statement, dated July 5, 1945, giving his personal views on the report and its policy implications. (See Appendix A.)

Dust gathered on the report, and on General Peabody's views, until the strident summer of 1949, when the impending collapse of the Nationalist regime led to a new wave of controversy about America's role in China. On August 5, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson transmitted to President Truman a weighty volume entitled *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*.¹ In his Letter of Transmittal, Acheson argued that the United States had done all it could, that the Nationalists were losing because of their own shortcomings, and that the situation in China after 1944 had been beyond America's effective influence. In effect, said Acheson, there were no real alternatives open to the United States except disengagement or massive, direct, and open-ended participation in the Chinese civil war, a course of action General George C. Marshall had seen to be fraught with danger, if indeed it was within the nation's capacity.

Critics of the Administration disputed these views, and bitterly indicted the White Paper both as a dishonest presentation of facts and as an expression of wrongheaded policy. On August 19, Representative Walter H. Judd (R., Minn.), a longtime admirer and vocal advocate of Chiang Kai-shek, attacked the White Paper from the floor of the House, charging its compilers with sixteen instances of omission, distortion, or falsification.² His first and most important charge was that the State Department had deliberately omitted the Peabody summary, a copy of which he had somehow obtained. He implied—and the implication was widely accepted—that General Peabody's personal interpretations were the official conclusions of the report.

In replying to these charges, Acheson asserted that neither the

¹ This volume, which was immediately dubbed "the China White Paper" and is best known by this name, has recently been reissued by Stanford University Press with an index and with a new Introduction by the present editor.

² *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 95, Pt. 9 (Aug. 19, 1949), pp. 11881-82. On August 24, he entered the entire Peabody summary in the *Congressional Record*.

report nor Peabody's summary had been sent to the State Department. "It is my understanding," he went on, "that this summary represented the views of the officer who wrote it and not of the War Department, and was therefore not circulated. The point of view expressed in the summary appears to differ in some important respects from the views expressed in the report itself."³ Acheson proceeded to declassify the entire document, but nothing more was heard of it until two years later, when the Peabody summary was referred to in the Senate hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations.⁴ On this occasion, both the summary and the report itself were entered in the record, being printed as Part 7A, Appendix II, of the transcript of these hearings. It is this document, with minor editorial modifications described below, that is reproduced here.

Dean Acheson was right that *The Chinese Communist Movement* could have supported other interpretations as easily as those of General Peabody. Indeed, the tone of the report is decidedly ambiguous. It scored the Nationalist Government as an inefficient dictatorship that had alienated nearly every sector in society, but at the same time vigorously acknowledged the regime's formal legitimacy, impeccable international status, and overwhelming material superiority. It reproached the Communists for their continuing commitment to Communism, their aggressive expansionism, and their cynical use of the united front sanction, but went on to recognize the excellence of their leadership, their effective use of limited resources against Japan, and their ability to win genuine mass support. This ambiguity—rooted in Chinese reality, and not simply in the language of the report—is clear, for example, in the following statement (p. 87): "Here the matter rested. Chiang Kai-shek spoke from the point of view of a traditionalist who insists on his legal rights. The Communists insisted on their revolutionary right to question the moral value of the Government's legal rights."

Thus, though the report is clearly anti-Communist and anti-Russian in overall bias, it is by no means so hostile in its assessment of the Chinese Communist Party as Representative Judd and others suggested—nor was the White Paper quite so naïve. Ironically, one thing

³ *Department of State Bulletin* (Sept. 5, 1949), p. 351.

⁴ U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, *Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations*, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952), 14 vols.

that made *The Chinese Communist Movement* unsuitable to critics of the Truman Administration was that its political assessments of both the Nationalists and the Communists were drawn largely from the reports of the very men the critics were attacking: the State Department's most experienced China hands and such independent observers as Edgar Snow.

It is not to reopen old controversies that *The Chinese Communist Movement* is being published now, but as a convenient and remarkably objective summary of the Communist movement during the Sino-Japanese War, and as a source of specific military, political, and economic information about Communist-held areas in this period.

For all we read about the "Yenan spirit" and the "guerrilla mentality," our understanding of Chinese Communism during the war years is still inadequate for at least three reasons. First, our control of the sources—knowing what exists and how to find what is needed—is still very limited. No studies have tapped all sources of materials; most have relied on no more than two or three. Second, here as so often in the study of China, our attention has been focused on the rulers at the capital and on the realm as a whole: on Yen-an, Mao Tse-tung, and the general lines of Communist policy. But there is a vast difference between policy and performance, the center and the regions. Third, there has been a tendency to use data indiscriminately: for example, to lump data from Shen-Kan-Ning in 1943 together with earlier information from the New Fourth Army area and later material from Shantung, or alternatively to generalize from the study of a single region. Both practices submerge important differences of time and place.

To some extent, *The Chinese Communist Movement* is relevant to each of these problems. Classified United States military intelligence reports have been little used, and derive from a kind of expertise that is rare among writers on China.⁵ Further, the report makes an effort, with varying success, to look beyond Communist policy to its effects in action. And finally, the report distinguishes carefully among the various Communist-controlled areas, and is throughout attentive to chronology.

Not all of *The Chinese Communist Movement*, of course, is of

⁵ Lamentably, most of this material is still classified and remains encased in both steel and red tape at the National Records Center near Washington. As we have seen, only a political accident led to the declassification of the present report.

equal value. The first two chapters cover familiar ground in a more or less perfunctory fashion; the last chapter ("International Implications") is largely speculative and concerned with issues of uneven importance. Even in Chapters III through VII, the heart of the report, there are defects of emphasis and coverage, notably with respect to the important *cheng-feng* (rectification) movement of the early 1940's and the inner history of the Party. There remains the possibility that further research will cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the information in these chapters. But all in all, the report must be adjudged an outstanding piece of work for its time, and a valuable source for students of China today.

In conclusion, a word about the editing. First, I have corrected obvious errors in spelling, punctuation, and romanization, and have made occasional minor stylistic changes in the interests of clarity. In general, where the original is clear but less than perfect in syntax or the like, I have let it stand. Second, I have supplied in the form of footnotes such attributions as could easily be determined and such additional comments as seemed to me useful. It was impossible to track down all the references in the text, but enough has been done, I think, to show the nature of the sources used. Third, I have omitted three appendixes of the original report: the 1928 party statutes of the Chinese Communist Party, the directory of the Chinese Communist Party and Border Region Government, and "Who's Who in Communist China." The first is peripheral to the report's main emphasis on the Sino-Japanese War; the other two contain too many errors and omissions and too much unconfirmed information to be worth including. Finally, I have made some small changes in organization to make the sequence more coherent. These changes involved breaking up one long section into three chapters, consolidating some short sections, and putting part of one section ("International Implications") at the end as a separate chapter. The map on p. xii was drawn specifically for this edition; the tables and charts are as in the original.

L.P.V.S.



MAP OF CHINA

Showing the location of Communist regions

The map opposite shows the approximate boundaries of regions claimed by the CCP, with shaded areas indicating zones of most stable control or most extensive operations. Intervening and surrounding territories are guerrilla areas, contested by Japanese, puppet, or Nationalist forces. Comparison with a topographic map will show a close correspondence between the shaded areas and areas of the most difficult terrain (mountains, marshland, etc.).

The regions are as follows:

NORTH CHINA

1. Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia (Shen-Kan-Ning)
2. Shansi-Suiyuan (Chin-Sui)
3. Shansi-Chahar-Hopei (Chin-Ch'a-Chi)
4. Shansi-Hopei-Honan
5. Hopei-Shantung-Honan } (Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü)
6. Shantung

CENTRAL CHINA

7. North Anhwei (Huai-pei)
8. North Kiangsu (Su-pei)
9. Central Kiangsu (Su-chung)
10. South Anhwei (Huai-nan)
11. South Kiangsu (Su-nan)
12. Central Anhwei (Wan-chung)
13. East Chekiang (Che-tung)
14. Hupeh-Hunan-Anhwei (O-Yü-Wan)

SOUTH CHINA

15. Kwangtung (Tung-chiang)
16. Hainan (Ch'iung-yai)

No such map can be very accurate, since Communist-controlled areas constantly fluctuated in size and location. This map has been prepared from CCP sources dated August and October 1944. See Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (New York: Holt, 1945), map facing p. 122; and *K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-ch'i chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'uang* (Peking: Jen-min, 1953), *passim*.—Ed.

Introduction

STATEMENT OF REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS

The Chinese Communists *are* Communists. They are the most effectively organized group in China.

The “democracy” which the Chinese Communists sponsor represents “Soviet democracy” on the pattern of the Soviet Union rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a “democracy” more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) than is the so-called “one-party dictatorship” of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People’s National Party). This is indicated by the fact that there have always been several groups in opposition to the Government in Kuomintang-controlled China, and in spite of severe Government restrictions on freedom of assembly and speech these opposition groups have always managed to make their voices heard. Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while small parties friendly to the CCP are permitted to exist in Communist-controlled China, real opposition groups are summarily suppressed as “traitors.” If the Communists’ charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be more true of the Communists if they ever attain supreme power in China.

The Kuomintang is a national party. The CCP on the other hand is international; it is part of the international Communist movement which has been sponsored by the Soviet Union since 1919 when the Communist International was established. Although the Communist International has been dissolved, the CCP still follows the Soviet Russian “party line.”

During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale* in the 1920's, the Kuomintang and the CCP cooperated with each other. The Communists promised to support the revolutionary program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, egged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. The Kuomintang, therefore, in 1927 turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia. The ensuing civil war between the armies of the two parties bore all the marks of bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars.

In 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. What saved it was the acceptance by the Kuomintang of the idea of a united front with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea, which applied to Communists in all countries, had been developed in Moscow as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies. Under the terms of the united front agreement in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves in 1937 to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish the Chinese Soviet Republic, to support the National Government, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

This pledge was never kept. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. As a sign of its trust and goodwill the Government even established a new army composed of Communists, the New Fourth Army, to operate between Nanking and Shanghai. The leaders of the Kuomintang spoke highly of the Communist forces during the first year of the war. There was considerable cooperation between the armies of the two parties in fighting Japan. The Communist armies, however, refused to stay within their assigned defense areas. While the Kuomintang armies, in obedience to orders from the Supreme Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang defense zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them the exceedingly limited resources of their base areas they were called "traitors" by the Communists. Whenever they refused to permit the Communists to set up, in Kuomintang areas, their own separate civil administration which flouted the

authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from Yen-an, the capital of the Chinese Communists, the Communists called the Kuomintang troops "anti-democratic" and "experts in dissension." These tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought against both the Communists and the Japanese for the defense of their bases.

This internecine strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-à-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would, in their opinion, obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

The expansion of Communist areas demonstrates the remarkable military and political skill of the Chinese Communists. But it has created an explosive situation between the Kuomintang and the CCP. The Kuomintang leaders feel that the Communists have cheated them in that they have used the united front as a means of fighting the Kuomintang rather than the Japanese. The Communists feel that they have been justified in their policy since the Kuomintang has, in their opinion, never intended to grant them legal rights and has been waiting for the end of the war against Japan to renew the civil war against the Communists.

As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the CCP; a "settlement" which will be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it may ultimately settle the question of which party shall rule; (2) institution of a National Assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.

Many observers believe that neither of these latter two alternatives is feasible of execution. Both the Kuomintang and the CCP aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, has proposed the National

Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and the re-establishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved as long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance with this command conditional to any political settlement between the Kuomintang and the CCP.

The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established. While at present the Communists do not permit Kuomintang armies and anti-Communist Kuomintang members in their areas of control, they insist that the Kuomintang, in fulfillment of its promise to institute democracy, should permit Communists to operate freely in Kuomintang-controlled areas and should allow Communist armies to operate in Kuomintang defense zones. Following this practice, the coalition government, if established, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would accord legal status to present Kuomintang areas. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

Here the matter rests (4 June 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National Assembly versus the "coalition government." Both parties are insisting on their own plans. It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement depends greatly upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. For were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on. Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The

Soviet press is strongly denouncing the “reactionaries” in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. It seems possible, however, that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the re-establishment of a “united front” between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia’s experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war.

The Chinese Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the Japanese lines in North and Central China. Economically their activities have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops, and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing the Communists have prevented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of North and Central China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the peasantry, to increase agricultural production, and to develop handicraft industries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their relatively simple requirements.

Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak and undeveloped. Railroads are non-existent, roads and motor transport are practically non-existent, communication facilities — radio, telegraph, telephone — are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat,

and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.

In October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The Communists claim in a press report of 17 May 1945 that their regular forces have been increased to 910,000. This increase has probably been achieved by incorporating part of the militia, which numbers more than 2,000,000 men, into the regular forces. The degree to which this increase of strength represents an actual increase in fighting potential depends, however, upon the number of rifles available: the militiamen have an undetermined number of old rifles. Rifles were available for only slightly more than half of the regular forces in October 1944.

The Communist Army is a volunteer force of comparatively young men in excellent physical condition, adequately clothed and fed. The troops are fairly well trained for their type of guerrilla warfare, and have considerable experience in it. Observers report a high level of general intelligence, and morale is very high. Lack of equipment constitutes the most serious problem of the Communists.

Up to the present time, the scale of effort of the Communists has been extensive and of serious concern to the Japanese, but does not represent the maximum of which the Communists are capable. Operations have generally been purposely restricted in order to conserve arms and to avoid provoking the Japanese to strengthen the barriers protecting their lines of communications, which would further restrict Communist movement. Part of the Communist forces have also been engaged in fighting the Chungking forces rather than the Japanese.

Improvement in the Communist strategic position, either by receipt of supplies or by an operation which would destroy the strategic initiative of the Japanese in China, would doubtless result in an all-out effort on the part of the Communists. Their forces are not capable of decisive independent operations to drive out the Japanese, but are capable of rendering strong support to an Allied operation against the Japanese in China.

1. Characterization of the Chinese Communists

MOST EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZED GROUP IN CHINA

A question of first importance in connection with the Chinese Communists is: how effective are they in comparison with the Nationalists of the Chungking Government, as an instrument for developing China into a strong, progressive nation? The answer to this question has almost uniformly been in favor of the Chinese Communists.

An American observer stated recently after his first meetings with the Chinese Communist leaders in Yen-an, the Chinese Communist capital, that "they are displaying a degree of initiative and planning ability which I have never before encountered in China." This observer has had long experience in China. Another American who visited Yen-an at the end of 1944, summed up his impressions of the Chinese Communists by stating that he found himself "continually trying to find out just how Chinese these people are," and in another report commented, "Their manners, habits of thought, and direct handling of problems seem more American than oriental." He noted the open, direct, and friendly relations between the officials and the people. He saw no signs of desperate poverty. He emphasized that there is no defeatism, but rather confidence. "There is no war weariness . . . There is a surprising political consciousness . . . There is no tension in the local situation . . . There is no feeling of restraint or suppression . . . The leaders make excellent personal impressions. The military men look and act like capable military men." All of this contrasts sharply with conditions in Chungking-controlled China. The foregoing observer concluded: "I think now that further study and observation will confirm that what is seen at Yen-an is a well integrated movement, with a political and economic program, which it is successfully carrying out under competent leaders. And that while

the Kuomintang¹ has lost its early revolutionary character and with that loss disintegrated, the Communist Party, because of the struggle it has had to continue, has kept its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and moderate maturity. One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily be killed.”²

Practically all impartial observers emphasized that the Chinese Communists comprise the most efficient, politically well-organized, disciplined, and constructive group in China today. This opinion is well supported by facts. It is largely because of their political and military skill, superior organization, and progressive attitude, which has won for them a popular support no other party or group in China can equal, that they have been expanding their influence throughout the past seven years. This expansion has now reached the point where many of the best informed observers believe that no anti-Communist group in China can longer hope to eliminate them. Some of the keenest observers go so far as to predict the ultimate ascendancy of the Chinese Communists in China “if the present reactionary groups in Chungking are allowed to continue in power.” The present trend is definitely in favor of the Communists. The growth of Communist power has been perhaps the most outstanding factor in the development in China during the past two years. It has led several of our observers to question whether we are not “backing the wrong horse” in China.

HOW RED THE RED?

If the Chinese Communists should develop into the leading political power in China, how would this affect American and British interests in the Far East; could we continue to deal with China as an independent nation, or would a Communist China find its political and economic interests to be linked, predominantly, with those of Soviet Russia?

There is no clear answer. The majority of Allied observers agree, however, that there seems to be little to fear on this account, because “the Chinese Communists are not Communists,” they have given up

¹ The Kuomintang (National People's Party) is the Chungking Government Party.

² All but the first quotation in this paragraph are drawn from the reports of John S. Service. See U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944: China* (Washington, 1967), pp. 518–20, 556.—Ed.

their socialist revolutionary tenets and have become mere “reformers” who can in no way be compared with the Bolsheviks of the Soviet Union. Thus the British Ambassador to China said in 1938 that the Chinese Communists are really Keir Hardeians,³ and he added that it was regrettable that their name unnecessarily frightened conservatives. More recently Brooks Atkinson, *New York Times* correspondent in China, expressing a widely held opinion, has emphasized that although the Chinese Communists “began as followers of the Russian system, they abandoned their sovietization program about eight years ago when they concluded that China was not ready for socialism and would not be for at least a half century . . . Their system now might be described as agrarian or peasant democracy, or as a farm labor party . . .” An American official report from Chungking, also reflecting a widely held opinion, states that “it is unfortunate that the present day Communist Party [in China] bears that name. As a misnomer it conjures up all the hatred of the capitalistic nations—a bogey of yesterday—the ‘Red Menace’ that almost lost us Russia as an ally in this war. The [Chinese] Communists adhere more closely to the basic . . . fundamentals of Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Three principles—Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood’—than does the Kuomintang.” Finally, Molotov, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, subscribed to this opinion when he stated during the summer of 1944 that Chinese Communism was not Soviet Communism, and that when the Chinese Communists achieved a greater degree of economic prosperity they would no longer be Communists.⁴

If mere statements constitute proof, we have here ample proof that the Chinese Communists are not Communists but Democrats. There are, however, some who object strongly to this viewpoint. Edgar Snow, for instance, one of America’s foremost sympathizers with the Chinese Communists who is considered by many an authority on them, wrote in 1941 that some Chinese publicists, foreign diplomats, missionaries, and other pro-China people “did their best [during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war] to convince the world that the Chinese Communists were ‘not real Communists’ . . . Some think that

³ The Keir Hardeians were nineteenth-century constitutionalist labor reformers in Great Britain.

⁴ Molotov made this comment to Patrick J. Hurley, with Stalin and Ambassador Averell Harriman in attendance, on April 15, 1944, as Hurley was on his way to China to take up his duties as Special Representative of the President. See *China White Paper*, pp. 94–98, and *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 253–56.—Ed.

because the Chinese Reds are now fighting for democracy and national independence they cannot be bolsheviks but are 'only a peasant reform party.' How all these people reconcile such interpretations with the Chinese C. P.'s loyal adherence to the Comintern I do not know. But if I understand Mao Tse-tung [the leader of the Chinese Communist Party] correctly he would not be bothered about these aspersions cast upon his Marxism. He would chuckle and say that if it would solve the contradiction in the sentiments of liberals who want to be known as pro-China but anti-Stalin they might call him anything they liked—as long as they did something to . . . [help] China and the [Communist] Eighth Route Army to win victories. My personal feeling in the matter is that liberals who build up hopes that the Communists of China are 'different' and 'only reformers' who have abandoned revolutionary methods to achieve their program are doomed to ultimate disillusionment. These men are nationalists because they are in a nationalist united-front phase of revolution, and they are perhaps strong enough in their own right not to fear becoming submerged as puppets of anybody. But their religion remains international socialism and if conditions change they may adopt whatever methods they believe necessary in order 'to stay on the locomotive of history.'"⁵

A Dutch refugee, who soon after Pearl Harbor escaped from Peiping through Communist areas in North China, stated that he gained a decided impression "that the Chinese Communist leaders, such as Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te [C-in-C of the Chinese Communist army], and in general the teachers, doctors, commissars, etc., are devoted Communists as we [Westerners] understand it, but this does not mean that they are convinced that their communistic ideas can be applied to China at present."

A study of the writings of the Chinese Communist leaders themselves fully supports the above analysis. They themselves do not

⁵ This quotation comes from Snow, *The Battle for Asia* (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 290–91. At the point of the first indicated ellipsis, Snow wrote, "and Chiang Kai-shek himself recently told a German correspondent that there were 'no Communists in China.' The British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, once said to me that the Chinese Communists were really Keir Hardeians—nineteenth-century agrarian democrats—and that it was regrettable their name unnecessarily frightened conservatives." The compilers apparently used this source extensively: Snow had entitled Part VIII of his book "How Red the Red?," the same caption used for this section.—*Ed.*

agree with the contention of some of our observers that they are not "real" Communists. In his booklet *New Democracy*, published in January 1941, Mao Tse-tung has given a frank and accurate outline of the tenets and policies of the Chinese Communist Party. A reading of this booklet is as essential to an understanding of the Chinese Communists as is reading *China's Destiny*, by Chiang Kai-shek, to an understanding of the Kuomintang Nationalists. The following condensation of the *New Democracy* provides a basis for comparing, and judging the accuracy of, the various and conflicting characterizations of the Chinese Communist offered by foreign observers.

China's revolution is part of the world revolution. But the Chinese revolution must pass through two stages: first, the change of our colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society; second, the establishment of a socialist society. The first is our present goal, a new bourgeois-democratic revolution. But do not confuse this with the bourgeois-democratic revolution in capitalist countries. Although the objective of the first stage of our revolution is the destruction of feudalism and imperialism and the development of capitalism, it is certainly not the establishment of a capitalist society dictated by the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, our objective is to establish a New Democracy based on an alliance of several revolutionary classes, but led wholly or partially by the proletariat. After the accomplishment of this first stage, the revolution will be developed into the second stage—the establishment of a socialist society in China.

The outline of and basis for the New Democracy is found in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress in 1924, long forgotten by the present Kuomintang. This Manifesto embodies Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. It provides for democratic, representative government from lower grades to the higher, and for free universal suffrage. The same Manifesto lays out our economic platform. Big banks, industries and monopolistic enterprises are to be owned by the Republic, non-monopolistic private enterprises are to be free. Large landholdings are to be distributed to land-tilling peasants to hold as their own private, not communal, property.

Now there are some "obstinate elements of the bourgeoisie" [the reactionary Kuomintang elements] who come forward and say: "Well, since you [Chinese] Communists have put aside the social system of socialism for a later stage, and since you have declared 'The Three Principles of the People are a necessity today, and our party is willing to struggle for their thorough realization,' why then don't you pack up your Communism for a while?" This only shows the lack of common sense on the part of some bourgeois elements, for they should know from the history of the Chinese revolution that without the guidance of Communism, even the democratic revolution in China cannot be a success, not to mention the final stage of the revolution, socialism. Once Communism is "packed up" China will face

ruin. The world now depends on Communism for its salvation, and so does China.

We Chinese Communists must not neglect establishing a united front with the Chinese bourgeoisie, which still maintains to a certain degree the revolutionary characteristic of opposing imperialism as well as the bureaucratic warlord government of its own country [the Kuomintang dictatorship]. But it must be remembered that the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, even in the process of revolution, is never willing to break with the imperialists completely, nor to overthrow imperialism and feudalism thoroughly. For instance, from 1927 to 1936 the bourgeois elements surrendered to the imperialists,⁶ and allied themselves with the feudal forces and opposed the revolutionary people. Again, during the present anti-Japanese war, a part of the big bourgeoisie, represented by Wang Ching-wei, surrendered to the enemy, illustrating a new betrayal of that class. "In view of this, is it not a dream to expect that China can establish a [democratic] bourgeois society ruled by her own bourgeoisie?" The bourgeois revolution needs the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance. It was with regard to this kind of united front between the Communists and the bourgeoisie that Sun Yat-sen said: "Communism is the good friend of the Three Principles of the People."

The "obstinate elements" are practicing their principle of "one party" [the Kuomintang doctrine] and denying the united front today, so they utter such fatal absurdities as renunciation of Communism. "To tell you frankly, it is useless to urge us [Chinese Communists] to 'pack up.' It is much better to urge us to make a contest. If there is somebody who beats us in the race, we shall admit that it is our fate. If not, you had better 'pack up' your anti-democratic, 'one-principle' style as early as possible . . . Whoever prepares to oppose the Communists has to prepare to be crushed."

Our [Communist] kind of democratic revolution is a great blow to imperialism and is therefore opposed by the imperialists. On the other hand, it is permitted by socialism and is assisted by the Socialist State and the international socialist proletariat. It is the result of the Russian October Revolution which, as Stalin said in 1918, ". . . promotes the liberation work of the Western and Eastern oppressed peoples, and attracts them into the common, victorious anti-imperialist course . . ."

Mao Tse-tung concludes: "We [Chinese] cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union or from the victory of the anti-capitalist struggles of the proletariat of Japan, Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany . . . [The aid of] the Soviet Union [is] an indispensable condition for the final victory of China's war of resistance . . ." And, again, ". . . If we forsake the policy of allying with the Soviet Union and

⁶ A reference to the change in China's policy after Chiang Kai-shek broke away from the anti-imperialist, pro-Soviet Russian Kuomintang-Communist government at Hankow during 1926. The new Kuomintang Government established by Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking adopted a friendly policy toward Great Britain and the United States and other imperialist and capitalist nations. It broke off relations with Soviet Russia.

cooperate with imperialism instead, then the word 'revolution' may be cancelled, and the Three Principles of the People will become a reactionary doctrine."

China's revolutionary policy must therefore be (1) alliance with the Soviet Union; (2) cooperation between the bourgeoisie and the Chinese Communists; (3) protection and assistance to the peasants and workers.

That this policy has not been changed even though the Comintern was dissolved in May 1943, was confirmed by Mao Tse-tung in the summer of 1944 when he told a British correspondent, then visiting Yen-an, that "the Chinese Communist Party has not changed its fundamental policy which is 'New Democracy' . . ." General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Chinese Communist Army, made a special point of emphasizing, after the dissolution of the Communist International, that the "Chinese Communists are Marx-Leninists . . . The Chinese Communists will certainly continue to apply and develop Marxism-Leninism dialectically in accordance with our own conditions."

This does not, of course, prevent the Chinese Communists from taking a very strong pro-American attitude at present, and offering us full cooperation both in the war against Japan and in the postwar period. This is fully in line with Mao Tse-tung's statement in *New Democracy* that the Chinese Communist "revolution, due to the variations in the condition of the enemy [meaning the capitalist nations and the Chinese "big bourgeoisie"] and in the conditions of this alliance [between the Chinese Communists and the bourgeoisie] may be divided into a certain number of stages during its process, but no change will occur in its fundamental character, which will be the same until the arrival of the socialist revolution."

Strategic considerations may make it desirable for America to establish military cooperation with the Chinese Communists. Because of their political control over large areas of eastern China, it may also become desirable for us to establish some kind of official diplomatic relations with them. But it is obvious from the foregoing that it is completely unrealistic to deal with the Chinese Communists on the assumption that they are not Communists. If we speculate that it will take "at least half a century" before the Communists have achieved the objective of their present democratic bourgeois revolution, we may just as well speculate that it will take only five or ten years. We may even speculate that this democratic trend in Communist China may in time become so strong that the Communists can no longer

control it and use it as a means of introducing communism in China. The Communists themselves realize this, and have stated that the only "danger" is that the country may "go democratic."

However, all that we know is that at present the democratic movement in Communist China is fully controlled by the Communists in fulfillment of the policy expressed in Mao Tse-tung's *New Democracy*. We have no reason to suppose that their policy has changed. In the words of Wang Chia-hsiang, at present Director of the Political Department of the Eighteenth Group Army: The Chinese Communists "will never abandon their ideals and the theories of Marxism and Leninism . . . The whole program of the Chinese Communist Party consists of two parts: (1) the maximum program, for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism, and for racial emancipation through the elimination of classes; (2) the minimum, immediate program of the national democratic revolution . . ."

2. Outline History of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1921–1937

PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST COOPERATION, 1923–27

The Chinese Communist movement found its origin in the student movement of 1919, which reflected Chinese indignation against the decision of the “Big Four” at the Versailles Conference to concede to Japan all the rights which Germany held in Shantung province before the outbreak of the first World War. It led to a new awakening of national consciousness, particularly among the Chinese literati, and focused the attention of the students on the need of organized resistance against imperialist aggression, and of instituting reforms in the Chinese political and social system to start China on the road to modern progress. While most of the students entering political work enrolled with the Kuomintang, the Nationalist party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, many became imbued with Marxian doctrines and established small Socialist societies, which formed the nucleus of proletarian political organization in China. Many Chinese went to Moscow and Irkutsk to investigate the Soviet system of government. Many became Communists and entered Russian universities.

Then, in 1920, Soviet Russia determined to organize the Communist Movement in Asia. This decision was accepted at the Baku Congress of Nations of the Orient (Sept. 1920), presided over by Zinoviev, President of the Executive Committee of the Third or Communist International (Comintern). In the same year Lenin sent his secretary, Maring, to China as the first delegate of the Comintern in China. Maring secretly organized the Chinese Communist Party as a branch of the Communist International. In May 1921 the foundation meeting of the CCP was held in Shanghai.¹ It was attended by 12 Chinese delegates, among them Mao Tse-tung, the present leader

¹ The First Congress of the CCP was held in July 1921, not in May. Two Comintern representatives, Voitinsky and Maring, were apparently in Shanghai

of the Communist Party in China. The first Central Party Committee established in Shanghai included Ch'en Tu-hsiu, scion of an Anhwei mandarin family and one of the foremost literary figures in China of his time. He was elected General Secretary of the Party. Another member of the Central Committee was Ch'en Kung-po, the present leader of the Nanking puppet government. CCP branches were also organized during 1921 and 1922 in several foreign countries. Among the founders were: in France, Chou En-lai, one of the most important Communist leaders today; in Germany, Chu Te, present C-in-C of the Chinese Communist armies; in Japan, Chou Fu-hai, at present one of the chief collaborators with Japan in the Nanking puppet government. The CCP was organized as a secret society. It started its activities by conducting an intensive campaign among students in Peking and laborers in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

The first of the Communist Party's problems was the question of its relations to the bourgeois Nationalist Kuomintang. Cooperation with the Nationalists was considered essential, since the Comintern program was based on Lenin's thesis that, in the imperialist epoch, the national liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries could be led to merge with the mainstream of the international proletarian revolutionary movement. After Sun Yat-sen had rejected the idea of a two-party Kuomintang-Communist alliance, Chinese Communists began at the end of 1922 to enter the Kuomintang while secretly maintaining their membership in the Communist Party.² It was not until May 1926 that they appeared on the Kuomintang registration lists as Communists, after Chiang Kai-shek in an effort to counteract subversive activities of the Communists, had prevailed upon the Kuomintang to accept a ruling that the CCP should cease to be a secret organization and that a list of Communist members should be filed with the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

In 1922 the Soviet Government sent Adolf Joffe to China with the

at the time, but according to Chang Kuo-t'ao did not attend any of the meetings. The rather naïve simplicity of the organizational program would tend to confirm Chang. See Ch'en Kung-po, *The Communist Movement in China*, ed. with an Introduction by C. Martin Wilbur (New York: Columbia University, 1960), Introduction, pp. 18, 27-28.—*Ed.*

² This was done with the understanding and consent of Sun Yat-sen. Although some CCP members joined the KMT secretly, many others were well known.—*Ed.*

delicate mission of establishing official diplomatic relations with the internationally recognized Chinese Government in Peking while at the same time arranging for Soviet support of the revolutionary movement of the Kuomintang, which aimed at overthrowing the Peking Government. He did not meet with immediate success in Peking, but during a meeting with Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai (Jan. 1923) he was able to arrange an *Entente Cordiale* between Soviet Russia and the Kuomintang. In talking with Chinese, Joffe made a point of "admitting" that what was in operation in Russia was not Communism. When a Chinese asked him whether Communism could be realized in Russia in ten years' time, Joffe said "No." "In twenty years?" "No." "In a hundred years?" "Perhaps," said Joffe. Joffe's method of assuaging Chinese fears of the "Red Menace" bears a strong resemblance to present Chinese Communist methods in regard to America. General Ch'en I, Acting Commander of the (Communist) New Fourth Army, said to an American official observer in Yen-an (Sept. 1944): "... It will be many years before (Communism) can possibly be adopted in China. It may take 100 years or more for China to achieve a state of democracy such as exists today in the United States ..."

Joffe returned to Russia and was succeeded by Leo Karakhan, the foremost Soviet expert in Oriental diplomacy, who in 1924 obtained official recognition of the Soviet Union from the Peking Government. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, having failed after repeated efforts to obtain any promise of aid from either Britain or America, wrote to Karakhan in Peking requesting him to send a representative with whom Sun might discuss mutual relations. Karakhan sent Michael Borodin, who arrived in October 1923 in Canton, where Sun had established a Kuomintang government. Soviet Russia now maintained two types of relations with China. The Soviet Government dealt with the Government in Peking on the basis of normal diplomatic relations. The Communist International dealt with the Kuomintang. Borodin's task was to reorganize and pump new life into the Kuomintang.

The first Kuomintang Party Congress in January 1924 endorsed the admission of Chinese Communists into the Kuomintang on condition that they accept Kuomintang principles. Great numbers of Communists now joined the Kuomintang while still secretly maintaining their Communist Party membership. With Soviet Russian money and backing they organized and directed the Hong Kong strike against the British. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers left Hong Kong.

The trade and shipping of the colony were practically brought to a standstill. The workers from Hong Kong were quartered in Canton where they served as a powerful weapon in the hands of the Communists against the Chinese merchants and the Kuomintang "reactionaries." The Communists likewise organized a nation-wide anti-British boycott and anti-foreign demonstrations and strikes in Shanghai and Canton. These led to clashes with British and French police and military forces—the "May 30 incident" (1925) in Shanghai, and the "June 23 incident" (1925) in Canton. The rapidly growing influence of the Communists alarmed many Chinese, however, and in August 1924 the first violent outbreaks occurred between pro- and anti-communist groups in Canton. Nevertheless, since Soviet Russia was the only power willing to support the Kuomintang, the Nationalists became increasingly dependent upon her aid. Because of this the Kuomintang had to accept Borodin's advice, even though many objected to the Russian-Chinese Communist influence. Borodin rose to the position of a quasi-dictator.

He saw that the first task was to reorganize the Kuomintang and forthwith reconstructed it along the lines of the Communist Party in Soviet Russia. Borodin was able to have young and hardy men, most of them Chinese Communists or men sympathetic toward the Communists, appointed to pivotal positions in the Kuomintang machine and in the new Nationalist army under Chiang Kai-shek. This army was being trained by Russian advisors, headed by General Galen (Vassily Blücher) at the Whampoa Military Academy. Auxiliary societies were also organized to strengthen the Kuomintang, such as the "Federation of Farmers, Workers, Soldiers, and Students to Promote the Revolutionary Movement," "The Youth Movement," etc. In all of these the Chinese Communists obtained the leadership. Borodin also brought from Russia experts for each type of organization who trained the Chinese to assume new leadership in the Kuomintang.

In the years that followed, up to the spring of 1927, the revolutionary movement swept like wildfire over south and central China. It was focused on two immediate objectives: first, the undermining of the influence of the imperialist powers in China, foremost among them Great Britain; second, the defeat of the independent warlords and the forces of the Peking Government. Before the advancing Nationalist armies, Kuomintang propaganda agents infiltrated into the areas of the opposing forces. They concentrated their attention on

organizing the impoverished peasants and laborers, and while the peasants were encouraged to loot and burn the estates of their landlords, strikes and boycotts were organized in the large industrial cities where foreign economic interests were concentrated. The Chinese Communists played the dominant role in organizing this popular unrest. It greatly contributed to the success of the Nationalist armies, since it disrupted the administration and the economic life in strategic areas of the opposing forces. Before the end of 1926 the revolutionary armies had reached the Yangtze River. The Kuomintang government was transferred to Hankow in November 1926.

The tensions within the Kuomintang between pro- and anti-Communist groups had approached the breaking point. In the course of 1926 most of the Nationalists realized that the Communists were gaining the leadership over the revolution. The strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and violent acts of the mass organizations, which in 1924–25 had been directed primarily against British nationals and interests, in the course of 1926 became increasingly focused on Chinese social classes with vested interests as well. This in turn led to a realization among the Chinese Nationalists that the Chinese revolution under Soviet Russian-Chinese Communist influence was rapidly turning into a social class war, or a Communist revolution, instead of a nationalist-democratic revolution as originally envisaged by Sun Yat-sen. The rapid increase of Communist influence was shown by the growth of the membership of the CCP from less than 1,000 in 1926 to 60,000 in April 1927.³

Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang had never favored a course like this, and in 1926 Chiang began to take an open stand against the Communists.⁴ By the end of the year he had completely disassociated himself from the leftist Kuomintang government in Hankow. His headquarters at Nanch'ang (Kiangsi) assumed the status of a rival government, challenging the authority of the Hankow regime. While the Kuomintang leftists and the Communists rallied under Borodin, the conservatives rallied under Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang's

³ These figures are somewhat distorted. The membership of the CCP (exclusive of the Young Communist League) was about 1,000 prior to the May 30 Movement of 1925. Thereafter, rapid growth took place.—*Ed.*

⁴ Chiang Kai-shek together with the leftist leader Wang Ching-wei had assumed leadership of the Kuomintang following Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925. At the beginning of the Northern Expedition from Canton in the spring of 1926, Chiang was appointed C-in-C of the Nationalist forces.

forces occupied greater Shanghai in March 1927, Chiang received from Chinese banking groups assurances of financial support which relieved him from any need of further reliance on Soviet Russia. After this it was only a matter of months before the power of the Hankow government was broken. Many of the political and military leaders of the Hankow regime shifted their loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek.

While Chiang Kai-shek initiated the policy of suppression of the Chinese Communists by force (beginning with the labor massacre in Shanghai, April 1927), neither he nor the conservative Kuomintang groups were chiefly responsible for the disintegration of Communist influence in the Hankow government. This was caused primarily by a split between leftist Kuomintang leaders and Communists, in the course of the first half of 1927. After Great Britain had signed, in February 1927, an agreement with the Hankow government for the restitution of the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang, several leftist Kuomintang leaders wanted to adopt a friendly policy toward Great Britain. Borodin opposed this. Opposition was also developing among leftist leaders against the Communist-sponsored policy of land confiscation, which was assuming increasingly violent forms. In May 1927 these confiscations led to anti-Communist riots among troops of the Hankow government at Changsha, and after this the movement against the Communists spread throughout China. Borodin lost his hold over the Hankow government and was treated with increasing distrust.

The anti-Communist movement also spread to North China, where the so-called Christian General, Feng Yü-hsiang, had been won over and converted to Communism.⁵ The Peking Government took drastic action against Soviet Russia. On 6 April 1927, armed with a warrant countersigned by the Dean of the Diplomatic Body, Chinese police and troops entered the Legation Quarter and raided the Soviet Embassy. Many documents were confiscated proving that Soviet diplomatic officials were actively supporting the Chinese Communists. On the same day, the Peking Government broke off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.

The final break with Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists

⁵ This very much overstates the extent to which Feng was "won over." In fact, he soon made his peace with the KMT. See James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang* (Stanford, 1966), pp. 241-54; and Wilbur and How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927* (New York: Columbia, 1956), pp. 318-66.—Ed.

came in July 1927 after an Indian representative of the Third International, M. N. Roy, had revealed a Soviet plot which practically amounted to ousting the Kuomintang from power. Roy confided to Wang Ching-wei, the Koumintang leader in Hankow that he and Borodin had received orders from Stalin to instruct the CCP to push the policy of land confiscation. Stalin had also advised the reorganization of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee with a view to increasing the proportion of pro-Communist labor and peasant leaders. The CCP was advised to build up a regular army of its own of 20,000 men, in addition to forming a force of peasants' and workers' detachments, 50,000 strong, to be used against the loyal Kuomintang forces. Following this, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at Hankow formally adopted a resolution on 15 July for the expulsion of the Communists.⁶ At this meeting Borodin's resignation was also accepted. With the growing anti-Communist movement, the Communist Party in Soviet Russia had begun a strong propaganda attack on the Kuomintang and the Hankow government; in view of this the leftist leaders in Hankow found the *entente* between the Kuomintang and Moscow impracticable.

At the end of 1927 Chiang Kai-shek had formed, at Nanking, a new Kuomintang government which started military operations against the leftist government at Hankow. Hankow fell to the Nanking forces in November 1927. In December, Chiang ordered all Soviet Consulates in Central and South China to be closed. By the end of the year, thousands of Communists and their sympathizers among farmers and laborers had been killed throughout China. Most of the Communists had been routed from the large cities. Their labor and peasant unions had been dissolved. While many Communists fled to Russia, those remaining in China either went into hiding in the foreign concessions in the treaty ports or fled into rural districts to rally the support of the peasants. The period of Kuomintang-Communist cooperation was closed.

PERIOD OF KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST CIVIL WAR, 1927-1936

When the great anti-Communist reaction set in during 1927, the Communists at first planned to occupy some of the larger cities and use them as bases from which to counter the armed opposition of the

⁶ In August 1927, the left-wing Kuomintang government in Hankow declared the CCP an illegal organization.

Kuomintang. They had become greatly impressed by their past successes and especially by the power they had wielded through the unions of peasants and workers. There were about 10,000,000 members in the peasant unions and nearly 3,000,000 workers in trade unions in 1927, and they counted upon these as effective instruments to maintain the power of the CCP. Some Communist leaders, among them Ch'en Tu-hsiu, did not consider the peasants' and workers' unions sufficiently strong to fight the well-armed forces of the Kuomintang without the support of an army, and therefore advised a policy of caution. But the majority of Communist leaders, following orders from Moscow, decided on a policy of "direct action," that is, in the words of the Comintern, "to unfold mass political strikes and demonstrations, to expand the partisan warfare . . . and to turn the militarist war into class civil war" for the establishment of the rule of the "Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Delegate Councils," or Soviets.

In August 1927 Ch'en Tu-hsiu was ousted from the leadership of the CCP for his objection to this insurrectionist policy. In 1929 he was expelled from the Party and subsequently joined the small Trotskyist Left Opposition that developed in China during the early 1930's. He was succeeded as head of the CCP by Li Li-san, who was assisted, among others, by Chou En-lai in the Political Bureau of the Party.⁷ The Comintern appointed Lominadze to succeed Borodin, and after him Heinz Neumann, to guide the Chinese Communists in organizing the insurrectionary movement for taking possession of city bases.

Until the end of 1930 the main attention of the Communists was focused on gaining control of such cities as Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, and other industrial and trading centers. While the Communists were comparatively successful in rural areas, where they established several bases and built up relatively strong peasant armies, they wasted the strength of these armies in costly attacks upon the cities. The majority of the Communists, though anxious to make use of the peasants in attacks upon the cities, actually despised the peasants, for they feared that the Communist movement might "degenerate" into a peasant movement. They considered this as contrary to the aims of the international Communist movement, which was to

⁷ The compilers omit the period from August 1927 to the Sixth CCP Congress (July-September 1928), held in Moscow, when Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was the Secretary-General of the Party. Actually, Ch'ü did not have much power after February, when the Comintern announced a new line on China.—*Ed.*

establish “proletarian hegemony,” not “peasant hegemony.” The peasant armies were scornfully referred to as “lumpenproletariat.”

Futile attempts were made in 1927 to occupy Nanch'ang, Swatow, and Canton. Communist soldier and labor forces actually held Canton for three days in December 1927 before they were driven out by the combined armies of the Nationalists (Generals Li Chi-shen, Chang Fa-k'uei, and Hsüeh Yüeh). Some 600 people were reported killed during the days of the “Canton Commune,” as the short-lived Communist regime was called. But after the Communists had been driven out, the Nationalists massacred thousands of the city's population (according to one account 5,700 men and women) in an effort to eradicate all Communists and Leftists. This was the pattern followed in all the cities and rural areas under Nationalist control. The Communist-sponsored labor and peasant movement was literally killed in blood purges of hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants. Few were killed in the actual fighting between Communist and Kuomintang forces, in comparison with those killed in Kuomintang massacres.

The result was that the Communist labor movement of the 1920's collapsed within a few months. No one dared to belong to a Communist labor or peasant union. In spite of this the Communists continued their efforts to keep the labor movement alive. When the Kuomintang began to organize labor unions of its own, the Communists started a program of forming secret “red” unions in opposition to the “yellow” unions of the Kuomintang. But in their efforts to incite the workers to strikes and armed uprisings they alienated the workers, because of the terrible retribution from the Kuomintang authorities which every one of these uprisings caused. At the end of 1928 the Communists had to admit that “the trade union organizations have shrunk to almost nothing. The Party organizations in the cities are scattered and smashed. In the whole country there is not one healthy nucleus of industrial workers.” In the summer of 1930, a Communist source claimed that there were some 64,000 members in the “red” trade union federation, but the totals for the principal cities amounted only to some 5,700. The rest were scattered throughout the countryside. These figures showed the staggering defeat of the peasant and worker union movement, which had been 13,000,000 strong in 1927. In the same year, 1930, Chou En-lai stated that the CCP numbered 120,000, among them only 2,000 factory workers.

The policy of “direct action” had proved a complete failure. Li

Li-san was made the scapegoat. He was ousted from his position as head of the CCP by the Comintern headquarters in Moscow and was replaced in January 1931 by Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), a special protégé of the Comintern.

Attention was shifted to the hitherto despised peasants, who from this time came to play the dominant role in the Chinese Communist movement. With this shift in policy, which gained Moscow's approval, the emphasis in the Chinese Communist movement was also directed toward the strengthening of the Red Army, rather than the development of peasant and labor unions, and the employment of this army in protecting Communist rural areas rather than in attacking the Kuomintang strongholds in the cities.

The Chinese Communist army had a humble beginning. When the anti-Communist terror began in 1927, scattered peasant and worker detachments in the Kuomintang labor corps fled to the hills and assumed the role of partisan bands. They joined with local bandits and with a few companies and regiments of Kuomintang soldiers who had mutinied and taken refuge in the mountains. From the fusion of these elements there emerged in 1927 and 1928 a number of Red armies. The first and most important of these, the "First Peasants' and Workers' Army," was formed by Mao Tse-tung, who had fled from Hankow where he had served as the head of the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang. In 1927, with a motley force of peasants, bandits, workers, and soldiers he led the so-called Autumn Crop Uprising in Hunan, aimed at occupying Changsha and other larger Hunan cities. When it failed, he led what was left of his band to the mountain stronghold of Chingkangshan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border.⁸ At this time his force numbered only about 1,000. Here the first Soviet in China was set up in November 1927 (in Ch'a-ling), and the first Soviet Government was elected. In this Soviet the Communists promoted a more democratic program, with a moderate policy based on slow but regular development, and with emphasis on agrarian reform.

It was Mao Tse-tung who dictated this policy of moderation. He was aware that the Communists were not strong enough to launch attacks upon the cities and that their campaign for land confiscations,

⁸ These episodes have been carefully re-examined by Roy Hofheinz, Jr., "The Autumn Harvest Insurrection," *China Quarterly*, No. 32 (Oct.-Dec. 1967), pp. 37-87.—*Ed.*

strikes, and widespread upheavals would only serve to intensify the Kuomintang terror and weaken the Communist forces in China. Born of a peasant family, he realized that China's strength was in her rural population, not in the insignificant industrial proletariat in the cities. He believed that only a movement for rural rehabilitation, combined with gradual elimination of the excessive abuses in the system of land ownership, could win for the Communists a widespread following among the Chinese people. Because of this he disagreed with the Comintern policy of centering attention on the conquest of the cities. He also opposed the policy of looting and burning the property of landlords, and urged a moderate policy in regard to land confiscation. He made an arbitrary distinction between big landlords and rich peasants. While he favored confiscation of the land of the big landlords, he counselled leniency toward the rich peasants. Until the Communists were strong enough to take charge of the political and economic administration of the country themselves they were still, in Mao Tse-tung's opinion, dependent upon the landlords and merchants, for they alone knew the intricate system of rural administration, and they controlled the tax collection, the money market, and the trade. No matter how evil was the rule of the landlords, they were the only group with sufficient education to keep the administration and economy of the country running. To kill the landlords or to cause them to flee was tantamount to introducing anarchy, for whereas the ignorant peasants could loot and burn and confiscate the land of the landlords, they could not survey the land and re-divide it equitably, nor could they set up and run rural administration and economy by themselves.

The answer to these problems was the establishment of Soviets. But these Chinese Soviets could not entirely follow the pattern of the Russian Soviets, which provides a platform for discussion and the right of voting for workers and peasants only, for the establishment and maintenance of a Soviet government of the proletariat. In China the basis of the Soviet had to be broadened to include the landlords and other moneyed classes. In this respect the Chinese Soviets became more democratic than the Russian. The landlords were even admitted into the Party.

This policy of moderation was by no means adopted by all Chinese Soviet districts. Landlords, together with their families and their large retinue of tax collectors, police agents, court runners, servants, and friends were killed in most Soviet areas. In many cases the Communists perpetrated mass executions on a scale comparable to the Kuo-

mintang massacres. But in the Kiangsi-Fukien area (the largest Communist base area) where Mao Tse-tung led the Soviet movement, his policy of moderation was practiced. It bore fruit in that in time many landlords came to cooperate with the Communists. Communist sources stated in 1931 that two-thirds of the Soviet Government in China was in the hands of rich peasants and that rich peasants were also in all the Party posts. Since they often favored their own interests at the expense of the poor peasants, Communist leaders complained frequently about their influence. Even Mao Tse-tung complained in 1934 that "Many landlords and rich peasants put on a revolutionary coloration. They are very active and rely on their historical advantages—'they can speak well and write well'—and consequently in the first period they steal the fruits of the agrarian revolution . . ." Party leaders frequently disciplined the landlords by seizing their land and imposing fines on them. On the whole, however, the system of democratic cooperation between landlords and peasants in the Soviet central district (Kiangsi) worked well. It should be emphasized that landlord participation in the Party and in the Soviet governments—both central and local governments—was permitted only as a temporary expedient during the "first period," or the "bourgeois-democratic period" of the revolution, until such time as the masses should be sufficiently educated to take over control by the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship.

Because he counselled moderation and a "go slow" policy, Mao Tse-tung earned the disfavor of Moscow. Soon after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising he was repudiated by the Central Committee of the CCP and dismissed from the Politburo, and also from the Party Front Committee. It was not until Mao's peasant movement had proved to be the only successful Communist movement that he was again accepted into the grace of the Party and rose to its highest leadership. It is not known when he succeeded Ch'en Shao-yü as Party leader. However, in September 1933 Ch'en himself referred to Mao Tse-tung as "President of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars."

The Chinese Soviet movement and the Chinese Red Army began under purely Chinese leadership. They did not, in fact, obtain Moscow's approval till after the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July 1928. Following this the Sixth Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in July and August 1928, gave its approval of the agrarian movement. But the Party, obeying Mos-

cow's dictates, persisted for two more years in its policy of using the peasant movement and peasant armies for the conquest of city bases.

In May 1928, Chu Te joined Mao Tse-tung at Chinggangshan with the remnant, less than 2,000 strong, of the forces which had participated in the attack on Swatow.⁹ Mao and Chu combined their forces into the famous Fourth Red Army, of which Chu became commander and Mao political commissar. Another army, the 11th Red Army, was formed out of the remnant of the forces which took part in the Canton uprising. Uprisings in southern Kiangsi, around Chi-an, in the spring of 1928 led to the formation of still another army, the Third Red Army. More troops arrived at Chinggangshan in the winter of 1928, following uprisings and mutinies in General Ho Chien's Kuomintang army in Hunan, and out of these emerged the famous Fifth Red Army under P'eng Te-huai, a former Kuomintang officer. In the winter of 1927 other Communist armies were formed in eastern Hupeh under Ho Lung and in eastern Hupeh and southern Honan under Hsü Hai-tung. At the same time Soviet bases were established along the north-eastern edge of Kiangsi, on the border of Fukien.

The armies at Chinggangshan broke through the cordon of Kuomintang troops at the beginning of 1929 and spread over southern Kiangsi and western Fukien. In the course of 1929 and 1930 Communist power was consolidated in these areas as well as in large sectors of northern Kiangsi and Hunan. The army was constantly enlarged, drawing its recruits partly from the peasantry, partly from troops who left the Kuomintang army. By the beginning of 1930 Soviet power had been sufficiently consolidated in Kiangsi to permit the establishment of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government. The Red armies in Kiangsi, Hunan, and Fukien were united into the First Front Army with Chu Te as C-in-C and Mao Tse-tung as Political Commissar.

With this growth of power, however, the Comintern and Li Li-san pressed for an early attack upon Changsha and Hankow to win the first large city bases. All available forces were concentrated upon Changsha, and the Fifth Red Army under P'eng Te-huai actually succeeded in occupying the city on 28 July 1930. But the Commu-

⁹ Chu Te's force comprised the remnants of the Kuomintang 20th Division under Ho Lung, and of the 4th Army (under Chang Fa-k'uei), and Yeh T'ing's Division of the 11th Army, which had revolted on 30 July 1927 and occupied Nanch'ang for a few days. Driven out of Nanch'ang, this force marched south and attacked Swatow, where it was defeated.

nists were soon driven back with heavy casualties. In this battle of Changsha, the foreign powers offered active support to the Kuomintang forces. American, British, Japanese, and Italian gunboats, having evacuated foreigners, steamed up the Hsiang River and bombarded the occupied city.

The attack on Changsha marked the last attempt during the 1930's on the part of the Chinese Communists to invade any of the large cities. It also marked the end of the "Li Li-san line," as Mao Tse-tung scornfully called it—the Chinese policy laid down by the Comintern of "direct attack" upon Kuomintang forces.

In the years that followed the tactics of guerrilla warfare as developed by Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung became standard for the Red Army. It was based on four principles: (1) When the enemy advances, we retreat. (2) When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them. (3) When the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack. (4) When the enemy retreats, we pursue.¹⁰

The warnings of Mao Tse-tung against the policy of "direct attack" were now amply justified. The attack on Changsha fully aroused the Kuomintang to the danger of the growing Communist power. Chiang Kai-shek began to pour reinforcements into Hunan and Kiangsi, and in December 1930, he began the "First Bandit Extermination Campaign" against the Red Army in Kiangsi. According to Mao Tse-tung, the Kuomintang forces totalled over 100,000 troops, but were defeated in little more than a month by 40,000 Communist troops. In May 1931 the Kuomintang launched its Second Extermination Campaign with forces exceeding 200,000 troops under General Ho Ying-ch'in. It, too, was quickly defeated. In June 1931 Chiang himself took command of the Third Campaign with an army of 300,000 men.¹¹ He was assisted by Generals Ho Ying-ch'in, Chu Shao-liang, and Ch'en Ming-shu. By September this campaign had been successfully countered by the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek withdrew his troops.

The Red Army now entered a period of comparative peace. It had gained strength through the capture of vast quantities of modern equipment from the Kuomintang armies. The Red armies established their capital deep in the hills of south Kiangsi in the village of Juichin and there, on 7 November 1931, they proclaimed the creation of the

¹⁰ This dictum is found in "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," January 5, 1940; see *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), I, 124.—Ed.

¹¹ According to Mao Tse-tung.

“Chinese Soviet Republic.” The First All-China Soviet Congress was called in December 1931, and the Central Soviet Government was established with Mao Tse-tung as chairman. Chu Te was elected C-in-C of the Red Army. “The Soviet Government in China,” read the Constitution adopted by the First Congress, “declares its readiness to form a revolutionary united front with the world proletariat and all oppressed nations, and proclaims the Soviet Union, the land of proletarian dictatorship, to be its loyal ally.”¹²

In the same month in which the First All-China Soviet Congress was held, over 20,000 troops of the 28th Route Army of the Kuomintang revolted in Kiangsi and joined the Reds; they were reorganized into the Fifth Army Corps. The Red Army, now having a strength of five Army Corps, began small offensives of its own. It expanded into southern Fukien and northern Kwangtung. In this same year, 1931, Red forces became active in Shensi province, where two years later a new Soviet base was established. This, the smallest of all Soviet bases, was destined to become the refuge of all Communist forces in China.

The pattern of the Communists’ control in Kiangsi and neighboring provinces resembled their control in present Japanese-occupied areas. While Kuomintang troops held the roads and the main cities, defended by thousands of pillboxes, barbed wire and trenches, the Communists held surrounding rural areas. While the size of these areas was constantly changing with the fortunes of war, the Communists laid claim in 1932–33 to 70 of Kiangsi’s 81 *hsien* (counties). The most important Red Army area, the “Central Soviet District,” comprised 17 *hsien* astride the Kiangsi-Fukien border, with a total population of 3,000,000. The other Soviet districts, in the Hupeh-Hunan, Hunan-Kiangsi, NE Kiangsi, Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei, and Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi border areas, were all smaller, less stable, and more frequently compelled to dissolve under the pressure of repeated attacks.

The Red Armies themselves varied no less in size and strength, both in their more or less regular formations and in the auxiliary corps of peasant Red Guards. In 1932 it was estimated that the grand total of all Red armies operating in all districts was 151,000, of whom only 97,500 had rifles. In 1934, at the beginning of the Nationalist Fifth Extermination Campaign, the Red Army in the Kiangsi-Fukien areas

¹² The quotation is from Art. 17. The full text may be found in Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), pp. 220–24.—Ed.

numbered 180,000 with perhaps 200,000 partisans and Red Guards.¹³ But altogether the Reds had only about 100,000 rifles. Ho Lung's forces in the Hupeh-Hunan area numbered about 10,000. The other scattered forces were even smaller.

That these insignificant peasant forces could hold out for seven years in central China, against Kuomintang forces two to seven times their number and vastly superior in armaments, is strong testimony to the capable leadership of the Communist commanders and the loyalty they enjoyed from the people. It also goes to prove the remarkable endurance and fine soldierly quality of the Chinese peasant soldier when and if he is lead by capable officers, which has been commented upon by many American military observers.

The continued growth of Communist power, however, prompted the Nationalists to renew their efforts to win back Kiangsi. In April 1933 they began the Fourth Extermination Campaign against the Communists. Chiang Kai-shek appointed his best field commander, General Ch'en Ch'eng, to direct the campaign. On the recommendation of the late General von Seeckt (former Chief of Staff of the German army and for a time chief military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek) Ch'en Ch'eng began the use of the blockhouse and fortification system against the Communists. But this campaign failed like all the previous ones. Ch'en Ch'eng is said to have stated that fighting the Reds was a "life-time job" and a "life sentence."

Finally, in October 1933, the Fifth and last Extermination Campaign was launched. Communist sources claimed that Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 900,000 troops, of whom perhaps 400,000 actively took part in the campaign in Kiangsi-Fukien and Honan-Anhwei-Hupeh. This time Chiang Kai-shek built hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands of small fortifications, with interconnecting fields of machine-gun or artillery fire. His defensive-offensive strategy diminished the Reds' superiority in maneuvering, and emphasized the disadvantages of their smaller numbers and lack of resources. The Reds were unable to resist the slow advance of the Kuomintang forces which in effect ringed them in within a wall which gradually moved closer around their central base.

Nevertheless the Fifth Campaign proved inconclusive. The Kuomintang won back Kiangsi, but it failed to exterminate the Red Army.

¹³ One Communist source claimed 350,000 "Red Army regulars" in 1933, and about 600,000 partisans. These figures, however, seem too high.

In January 1934 the Second All-China Soviet Congress convened at Juichin, and it was decided to transfer the Red Army to a new base. Preparations were made soon afterward for the "Long March." It began on 16 October 1934, just a year after Chiang Kai-shek launched his Fifth Campaign. The main forces of the Red Army, about 90,000 men, concentrated in southern Kiangsi, broke through the Kuomintang lines of fortifications in Hunan and Kwangtung, put the enemy to flight, and then started its long march westward.

The price in life paid for the reconquest of Kiangsi reached a staggering figure. The Red Army, according to Chou En-lai, suffered 60,000 casualties during the Fifth Extermination Campaign. There is no figure available for the Nationalist losses. But the military casualties were nothing compared with civilian casualties. The Kuomintang is reported to have admitted that about 1,000,000 people, mostly peasants, were killed or starved to death during the Fifth Campaign. T'ang Yü-jen, Secretary of the Kuomintang Central Political Council, stated in May 1934 that 9,000,000 people had been killed in Kiangsi during the period of Kuomintang-Communist civil war. The Chinese Postal Administration estimated the population of Kiangsi as 27,560,000 in 1926, the Kuomintang Government estimated it as 20,320,000 in 1936—a decrease of 7,240,000.

After the breakthrough into Kwangtung and Hunan, the Red Army, accompanied by thousands of peasants, marched through Kwangtung and Hunan. It was under constant attack. By the time it reached Kweichow it had lost one-third of its troops. Prevented by Kuomintang forces from marching north for a crossing of the Yangtze River, the Red Army turned southward and in May 1935 entered Yunnan, where Chiang Kai-shek and Governor Lung Yün were preparing to ambush them. They passed within 10 miles of Kunming in their march toward a crossing of the Yangtze River. After a famous forced march of 85 miles in 24 hours to avoid and deceive the Nationalist forces, they suddenly descended on the Chou-p'ing Fort at the Yangtze River, disarmed the unsuspecting Nationalist garrison, and secured a crossing of the river.

Thence they marched through the Lolo (aborigines) forest and mountain country in western Szechwan and Sikang. Befriending the Lolos and obtaining their aid as guides, they made a rapid march toward the Ta-tu River, where they defeated the forces of the Szechwan warlord, Gen. Liu Wen-hui, at An-jen-ch'ang in present Sikang.

While part of the army forced a crossing of the river at this point, the main body marched 130 miles west along the Ta-tu gorges and forced a crossing of the river over an old iron bridge. The crossing of the Ta-tu bridge has gone down as one of the most famous exploits of the Chinese Red Army, for it was done under constant attack by Kuomintang airplanes trying to bomb the bridge.¹⁴ The bridge also had to be conquered from well-emplaced opposing forces. Many a Chinese rebel army had met its end attempting to cross the turgid Ta-tu River in face of enemy opposition. Here the last of the T'ai-p'ing rebels, an army of 100,000, had been surrounded and destroyed in the 1860's. The Red Army was the first to have lived through a crossing of the Ta-tu while under fire.

From the Ta-tu River the Red forces continued their hurried march over the high mountains of western Szechwan. At Sung-p'an in north-western Szechwan they finally paused for a rest (July 1935). The original force of 90,000 now numbered 45,000. Here the Reds reached a Soviet base which had been established in 1933 by partisan forces under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien of the Honan-Hupeh-Anhui Soviet district. Defeated by Kuomintang forces, they had marched across Honan and Shensi to Szechwan. When the Kiangsi Reds arrived in Sung-p'an, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien commanded a force of 50,000, so that the combined Red force in western Szechwan in July 1935 was nearly 100,000.

In August 1935 the main force from Kiangsi, the First Front Army, continued its march northward. Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien remained behind with Hsü's Fourth Front Army in Szechwan for another year, to be joined by Ho Lung's Second Front Army before undertaking a march northward to Shensi. With the First Front Army went Commanders Lin Piao, P'eng Te-huai, Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, and a majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Party.¹⁵ Under incredible difficulties, the Red forces marched through

¹⁴ The Chinese Communists were under machine-gun fire as they crossed the Ta-tu River, but did not have to contend with Nationalist air power, which was not present. See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 182-89.—*Ed.*

¹⁵ There is no mention here of the conflict between Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t'ao which took place at this time. The issues are still not fully understood, but involved the final destination of the Long March, united front strategy, and power relations within the Party (Chang had not been present at the Tsun-i Conference, when Mao seized control of the Party, and was not prepared to accept the verdict of that irregular meeting). The division of forces described here was one of the results of this conflict.—*Ed.*

the grassland of southeastern Tsinghai, thence fighting their way through Kansu against the combined forces of the Kuomintang, the Moslems, and the "Tungpei" (northeastern) warlords in Shensi.

On 20 October 1935, one year after the start of the Long March, the Reds entered the Soviet base in northern Shensi, just below the Great Wall, and made contact with the Red armies of Shensi, 5,000 strong, under Liu Chih-tan. The Red forces had marched 6,000 miles from their base in Kiangsi-Fukien. At their entry into Shensi they numbered less than 20,000. A year later, when Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien brought the forces from Szechwan to north Shensi, the combined Red Army totalled 90,000. At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, it numbered 100,000.

The Red Army had given a brilliant account of itself. It is doubtful, however, that it could have continued to maintain itself if Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had pursued his policy of military annihilation of the Red forces. The only Soviet base which remained in 1936, the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border area, was one of the poorest, most arid regions in China. At the end of 1936 the Generalissimo was preparing a new "blockhouse-fortress" campaign around the Soviet base in Shensi along the lines of the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi. Had he decided to open this campaign, the Communist forces would almost certainly have been either "exterminated" or forced to begin a new "long march," probably across Mongolia to Soviet Russia.

What saved them was the growth of the united front movement against Japan, and the acceptance by the Generalissimo at the beginning of 1937 of an all-party alliance in China for united resistance against Japan.

3. Growth and Decline of the United Front, 1935–1939

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND COMINTERN SPONSORS OF THE UNITED FRONT MOVEMENT

The first suggestion of the united front idea in China came from the Chinese Communists following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In April 1932 the Chinese Communists “declared war” on Japan. This was probably an effort to exploit the anti-Japanese sentiment in the Kuomintang armies, as a means of diverting their interest in continuing the anti-Communist campaigns. On 10 January 1933 the Chinese Red Army offered a united front to any armed force that would join it in battle against Japan. This offer was in line with the directive of the 12th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, September 1932. In regard to the Communist Party of China it directed, among other things, that it should “mobilize the masses under the slogan of the national revolutionary struggle against the Japanese and other imperialists and for the independence and integrity of China,” and should work for the establishment of “an elected people’s government.”

These first suggestions for a united front in China did not, however, contemplate the inclusion of the Kuomintang. The program of the CCP as laid down after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria committed the Party to continue its fight for the “overthrow of the Kuomintang as the government of national betrayal” and at the same time to promote a movement for a “national revolutionary war of the armed nation against [Japan].” The Chinese Communists made it plain that they expected to emerge as the ultimate victors not only over the Kuomintang but also over Japan, for the Party declared in 1932 that “only the Soviet Government and the Red Army of China can . . . lead the national revolutionary war against the Japanese and other imperialisms and achieve full national liberation.” In his report

to the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July–August 1935, Ch'en Shao-yü made it plain that up to that time the Chinese Communists still did not contemplate any united front with the Kuomintang.

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The Soviet Union was, however, adopting a different policy toward the Kuomintang, and in the end the Chinese Communists changed theirs to conform to that of Soviet Russia. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a threat to Soviet Russia as much as to China proper; in addition, the Soviet Union felt the threat of the rising tide of anti-Communist sentiment throughout the Western world. Therefore it became the object of Soviet diplomacy to ward off any possible attack on the Soviet Union. In the midst of her first Five-Year Plan, and seething with internal political unrest as a result of the Trotsky opposition and kulak resistance to the collectivization campaign, Soviet Russia was in no position to take a strong stand against the aggressive nations on her frontiers in Europe and Asia. The Special Far Eastern Army of the Soviet Union was, in 1932, only three years old, and it had, so far, little industrial basis. The first Five-Year Plan, 1928–1933, aimed only to establish an industrial base in western Siberia. The industrial development of eastern Siberia was projected for the second Five-Year Plan. Soviet Russia needed time.

These factors induced Soviet Russia to give up, in 1928, her policy of inciting world-wide unrest. She became increasingly a sponsor of international peace. The Communist International accordingly lent its support by serving as an instrument to neutralize the growing anti-Soviet movement in capitalist countries, and to focus the attention of all groups in the democracies on the growing danger of fascism instead of communism. The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International (1928) gave the first hint of their methods of attaining these objectives, the development by the Communist proletariat of a “temporary cooperation with the bourgeoisie.” This was the first indication of the Soviet-sponsored world-wide united front movement.¹

In regard to the Far East, this policy at first found its expression in the discontinuance of active Soviet participation in the internal political struggle in China, and likewise in a considerable decrease in direct support of the CCP by the Comintern. When, for instance, Mr.

¹ The Comintern's shift in line came somewhat later, in 1934–35. This shift was formalized at the time of the Seventh Comintern Congress (August 1935). After the Trotsky opposition had been overcome in 1927–28, Stalin swung back toward the left, and this remained the general line until well after the rise of Hitler.—*Ed.*

and Mrs. Noulens were arrested in Shanghai in 1932 and convicted in Nanking as chief Far Eastern agents of the Comintern, the complete evidence which the Chinese police produced showed that total outpayments for the whole Orient (not just China) had at most not exceeded the equivalent of about U.S. \$15,000 per month. This was a pittance compared with the amounts expended during the time of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance. After 1928 the Comintern acted mainly as the directing agent, not the supporting agent, of the Communist Party of China. Following the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, Soviet Russia began to temporize with Japan while at the same time adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the National Government in China. The crisis in Manchuria also made the Kuomintang somewhat more favorably disposed toward Soviet Russia. Diplomatic relations between China and Soviet Russia were re-established in December 1932.

It would seem that both Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists believed in 1932 that Soviet China would soon emerge as the victor over Kuomintang China. The Comintern was at this time playing up the Chinese Communist movement as gaining tremendous victories, and although most of this was pure propaganda, the Chinese Red Army had proved its ability to defeat Kuomintang armies, and the new Soviet base in Kiangsi and Fukien was entering a period of considerable expansion.

However, by 1935 the world situation was developing unfavorably for the Soviet Union and Communism in general. Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese aggression were in the ascendancy. The power of the German Communist Party had been smashed by the rise of Hitler. The Chinese Red Army had been forced out of its base areas in central China. The tide against Communism and the Soviet Union was rising in all capitalist countries, with the fascist countries taking the lead in fomenting this anti-Communist movement. The fascist countries, therefore, became the chief threat to the Soviet Union and the Communist world movement. Drastic measures were considered necessary by Communists all over the world to save the situation.

When the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International met in Moscow in July-August 1935, the united front idea was carefully developed. Among the many speeches and resolutions, the following extracts suffice to indicate the methods and aims of the united front. The "Communist International puts itself at the head of the campaign for the defense of peace and the Soviet Union." "If, thanks

to the struggle for peace of the Soviet Union and the toilers of all capitalist countries, war can be delayed . . . this also will better enable the proletariat to strengthen its position in the capitalist countries, to strengthen the power of the Soviet Union . . .” While the united front movement aimed chiefly at establishing unity between all working class organizations, a prominent speaker at the Congress emphasized that “. . . under certain conditions we [Communists] can and must bend our efforts to the task of drawing these parties and organizations [i.e., non-Communist organizations, rich peasants, big businessmen, petty shopkeepers, etc.] . . . to the side of the anti-fascist people’s front, despite their bourgeois leadership.” Since fascism was the immediate threat, the point was to create a united front between the Soviet Union and the capitalist democracies to oppose fascism and thereby weaken the anti-Communist, anti-Soviet Union movement in the world. However, whatever the “temporary cooperation” with the bourgeoisie which the Communists might arrange, it “must never lead to renouncing the class struggle, i.e., it cannot and must not ever be a reformist cooperation. It is the more necessary to stress this because the bourgeoisie . . . even if it is compelled at a given moment to take up arms in defense of national independence . . . is always ready to go over to the camp of the adversary in face of the danger of the war being converted into a people’s war and of a mighty upsurge of the masses.” This point was, as we have seen (pp. 11–14), endorsed and developed by Mao Tse-tung in his outline of the policy of the CCP in his booklet, *New Democracy*.

While the Communists were urged to unite temporarily with the democratic elements and even with “big business” in the capitalist countries, it was emphasized that this did not mean that the Communists would become bourgeois-democrats. “We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the democracy of the toilers . . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate.” This became a cardinal point in the united front movement of the Chinese Communists. While they offered their support even to the reactionary Kuomintang, they became the foremost advocates of democracy in China—but with the purpose of turning the democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

In regard to China, the Congress adopted a resolution stating that the CCP and the Chinese Red Army “must exert every effort to ex-

tend the front of the struggle for national liberation and to draw into it all the national forces that are ready to repulse the robber campaign of the Japanese and other imperialists." Ch'en Shao-yü explained in his report to the Congress that this was to be achieved by the organization of "an All-China United People's Government of National Defense and an All-China United Anti-Japanese National Defense Army."

The Congress elected Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t'ao, and Mao Tse-tung members of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, with Po Ku [Ch'in Panghsien—*Ed.*] and Kang Sin [K'ang Sheng—*Ed.*] as alternate members. China and Soviet Russia had an equal (and the largest) number of representatives on the Executive Committee, which shows the great importance attached to the Communist movement in China. Ch'en Shao-yü was elected a member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee along with Stalin and 17 other members.

The united front principles of the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern were soon put into practice by the Chinese Communists. During the time of the Long March (1935) they had tried in vain to build up a united front with the dissident Nationalist groups more or less opposed to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang dictatorship. Foremost among these groups were the Kuomintang liberals (Dr. Sun Fo, Mme. Sun Yat-sen, and others), the Kuominchün (National People's Army) under Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang, the Kwangsi Military Clique under Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, and the Northeastern Army (Manchurian) under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang. The failure of the united front movement in 1935 was not because of lack of response. The popular sentiment in China was strongly in favor of discontinuing the Government's anti-Communist campaign and concentrating the nation's united power against Japan. But none of the dissident Nationalist groups dared in 1935 to subscribe openly to the Communist idea of a united front. In so far as any one could see at that time the Chinese Communists were on the losing side. The Kuomintang was winning.

Following the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International the Chinese Communists changed their tactics. In January 1936 Mao Tse-tung publicly offered "the hand of friendship" to Chiang Kai-shek if he would take up arms against Japan.² To those who ex-

² The first tentative move in the direction of Chiang Kai-shek came not in January but in May 1936. Willingness to cooperate with Chiang against Japan

pressed doubts concerning the avowed democratic spirit and sincerity of the Communists in offering a united front, Mao Tse-tung replied in August 1936 that the "Workers' and Peasants' Government had been renamed the People's Soviet Government" and that "the former laws about workers' control and leadership in the various enterprises have been repealed. The workers have been advised not to put up demands which may be in excess of what can be granted . . . In the non-Soviet districts it is our intention not to accentuate the anti-capitalist struggle, though we are in favor of improving the standard of living of the workers . . ." On 26 August 1936, the Chinese Communist Party wrote the Kuomintang that "We are prepared to form a strong revolutionary united front with you as was the case during . . . the great Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 . . . [That] is the only proper way to save our country today . . ."³

THE SIAN INCIDENT; FORMATION OF THE UNITED FRONT⁴

Chiang Kai-shek was still not willing to accept the united front idea, but many of his field commanders were. The army opposing the Communists in the Northwest was composed of two groups. One group consisted of regular Nanking, or Central Army troops; this was the First Army under General Hu Tsung-nan, an inveterate foe of the Communists. The other group comprised former independent provincial armies, the Northeastern ("Tungpei"—Manchurian) Army under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang, C-in-C of the "Bandit Suppres-

was not explicitly stated until summer. The chronology of the CCP's shifts in policy, and their relation to the Comintern line is discussed in my *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History* (Stanford, 1967), pp. 48-75.—*Ed.*

³ The first of these quotations by Mao may be found in "To Messrs. Chang Nai-ch'i, Tao Heng-chih, Chow Tao-fen and Shen Chun-ju, Members of the All-China National Salvation League," in *China: The March Toward Unity* (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937), pp. 75-76. The second is contained in "Chung-kuo Kung-chan-tang chih Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang shu" ["A Letter from the Chinese Communist Party to the Chinese Nationalist Party"] in CCP Central Committee, ed., *Kuan-yü t'ung-i chan-hsien—i-nien-lai wo-men ti k'ang-Jih chiu-wang chu-chang* [Regarding the United Front—Our Proposals During the Past Year for Opposition to Japan and National Salvation], (n.p., January 1937), p. 17b. Also in *Kommunisticheskii internatsional*, No. 18 (December 29, 1936), pp. 79-84. Neither of these writings is contained in Mao's *Selected Works*.—*Ed.*

⁴ A recent effort to reconstruct the Sian Incident and the events leading up to it is contained in *Enemies and Friends*, pp. 75-92. Chiang and his staff arrived on 4 December, not 7 December. Otherwise, this much-abbreviated account is substantially accurate.—*Ed.*

sion Commission," and the Northwestern Army ("Hsipei"—mainly Shensi provincials) under General Yang Hu-ch'eng. This latter group, comprising about 170,000 troops, strongly opposed continuing the anti-Communist campaign. A virtual truce with the Communists existed in their sectors, and they offered no support to the First Army in its campaign against the Communists. Partly as a result of this, the First Army suffered a severe defeat during November 1936.

A strong wave of nationalist feeling was sweeping through China at this time. The Japanese were continuing their invasion of Suiyuan province of Inner Mongolia, which they had started in the spring of 1936, and they were expanding their influence in eastern Hopeh (including Peiping and Tientsin) and in Tsingtao. The anti-Japanese agitation among the Chinese people and army rose to a new high pitch. The danger from the Japanese seemed much greater than that from the Communists, confined as they were to the semi-wastelands of north Shensi and adjacent areas in Kansu and Ninghsia. In November, Chang Hsüeh-liang appealed to the Generalissimo to permit him to shift the Northeastern Army to the Suiyuan front to take up the defense against the Japanese.

The Generalissimo, however, insisted upon continuing the anti-Communist campaign. He had been preparing for several months for the Sixth Extermination campaign, planning to use the same block-house-fortress tactics as in the Fifth Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934. After Hu Tsung-nan's defeat in November 1936 Chiang Kai-shek became convinced that the only requirement for final success against the Communists was unity among the army groups opposing them. It was for this purpose that Chiang together with his whole personal staff arrived at army headquarters in Sian on 7 December 1936. He talked to the Tungpei and Hsipei commanders and tried to persuade them to "destroy the Reds." "I told them," said Chiang in his own diary, "that the bandit-suppression campaign had been prosecuted to such a stage that it would require only the last five minutes to achieve the final success."

Finding no response to this viewpoint, Chiang then decided to summon a General Staff Congress on 10 December. At this Congress final plans were formally adopted to push ahead with the Sixth Campaign. It was announced that a general mobilization order for the Tungpei, Hsipei, and Nanking troops in Kansu and Shensi was to be published on the 12th. It was also openly stated that if Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang refused to comply with these orders his troops would be dis-

armed by Nanking forces, and he himself would be dismissed from his command. On the 11th, Chang Hsüeh-liang conferred with the commanders of the Tungpei and Hsipei armies. They agreed to take matters into their own hands. Early in the morning of 12 December, Sian was occupied by their troops. Chiang's personal staff (including many of the highest Government officials), the Governors of Shensi and Kansu, and a number of members of Chiang's secret police (the "Blueshirts") were arrested. A detachment of Tungpei and Hsipei troops went to the Lin-t'ung hot springs, 10 miles from Sian, where the Generalissimo was staying. He was captured and brought back to Sian where he became the involuntary guest of Marshal Chang and Gen. Yang Hu-ch'eng.

On the same day the rebel headquarters at Sian issued a circular telegram to the Chinese Government and people demanding among other things reorganization of the Government to admit all parties, an end to civil war and immediate adoption of a policy of armed resistance against Japan, the guarantee to the people of liberty of assembly and pardon of political prisoners. The Communists announced their support of this program. On the 14th the rebels announced from Sian that all orders for war against the Red Army were cancelled and that an anti-Japanese Army had been formed comprising Tungpei, Hsipei, and Red Army troops.

It is unnecessary to go into details on the events of the following days in Sian. Suffice it to state that Chiang Kai-shek for the first time in 10 years met with Communist delegates, among them Chou En-lai. Chou greeted him as C-in-C. Several conferences were held between 17 and 25 December between Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsüeh-liang, Yang Hu-ch'eng, and the Communist delegates. Meanwhile negotiations were carried on between Sian and Nanking for an agreement on the Government's policy toward the rebels, the Communists, and Japan, and for the release of the Generalissimo. Among others, T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, arrived in Sian on 20 December. As a member of the liberal "American" group in the Kuomintang, which sympathized with the united front movement, he was favored by the rebels. On the 22nd Mme. Chiang Kai-shek also arrived in Sian. So also did Gen. Tai Li, the head of the "Blue Shirts." No details of the discussions have ever been officially released, but it seems certain that the rebels and the Communists received assurances from Chiang Kai-shek that the civil war would be stopped, and that Chiang would give his support to the united front movement. This

being the case, the Communists and Chang Hsüeh-liang offered him their support. The Tungpei army officers were unwilling, however, to release Chiang. They demanded his death. The Communists dissuaded them. W. H. Donald, Chiang's Australian advisor, who was the first to arrive in Sian from Nanking to arrange for the Generalissimo's release, and who took a prominent part in the negotiations, has stated that Chou En-lai "was actually the one man who enabled Chiang to depart unharmed from the 1936 Sian kidnapping."

On 25 December Chiang Kai-shek flew back to Nanking accompanied by Chang Hsüeh-liang. Chang Hsüeh-liang went with the Generalissimo to the capital to "await punishment." It was a typical Chinese gesture aimed at giving the Generalissimo "face" after his humiliating experience in Sian. Chang has been held a prisoner ever since.

The sequel to this was the conclusion of the united front agreement, or rather "understanding" (no signed agreement seems to have been made). In March 1937 the Kuomintang, while announcing that it would continue its policy to "uproot the Communists," laid down its formal terms for accepting the Communists' submission: (1) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the Government's Central Army under direct control of the Military Affairs Commission (National Military Council); (2) Dissolution of the Soviet Republic; (3) Cessation of all Communist propaganda; (4) Suspension of the class struggle. No written agreement seems to have been made for the recognition or legalization of the Communist party.⁵ The Chinese Communists formally acceded to these terms on 15 March 1937.⁶

The Chinese Communists did not, however, accede without Soviet Russian approval. In the Moscow magazine *Bolshevik* of 15 April 1937, Ch'en Shao-yü, member of the Presidium of the Comintern,

⁵ The documents concerning the united front negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists have never been published. It seems, however, that the Communists believed for a time that the Kuomintang had extended legal recognition of the CCP. Mao Tse-tung said at the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, 12 Oct. 1938: "... The next day [25 Sept. 1937] the Kuomintang, the Central Government, and the highest leader of the National Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, made public the conversation in which the legal existence of the Communist Party of China was recognized and a united front for national salvation was formed."

⁶ I do not know the source of this date. The CCP sent a telegram to the KMT on the occasion of a session of its Central Executive Committee (10 Feb. 1937) offering to make these very concessions. During the spring, actual negotiations between the two parties were in progress.—*Ed.*

presented an article giving Moscow's answer to Kuomintang's demands. Ch'en stated that Moscow would be willing to see the Chinese Red Army turned into a National Revolutionary Army, retaining its corps of officers and political workers, and to have it incorporated into a "Chinese United National Revolutionary Army, which would be subordinate to a single command." Moscow would be willing to see the Soviet power in China turned into a "general democratic power acting in concert with the United All-China Central Government," and to regard such a development as a real change in the character of the Chinese Soviets. Ch'en indicated that Moscow was ready to accept the demand for cessation of "red propaganda" provided the phrase would be taken to mean what it says and would not be applied to all sorts of views which have little or nothing to do with real Communism. In regard to the fourth point (suspension of the class struggle), Ch'en pointed out that the class struggle produced the Communist movement and not vice versa, and that "at the present time" the Communists were doing nothing to disunite Chinese society. An official American source commented that Ch'en's article showed that the policy of the CCP not only enjoyed the support of Moscow "but was probably laid down in the Kremlin." Mao Tse-tung stated in 1938 that "the Communist International is in complete agreement with the new political line of the Communist Party of China. For the victory of the Chinese people, the Communist International has called upon all the Communist Parties of all nations to support and give aid to China's Anti-Japanese War."

Although no formal agreement seems to have been signed between the Communists and the Kuomintang,⁷ the Red Army base was designated by the Chinese Government in September 1937 as a garrison area comprising 23 *hsien* (counties) and designated as the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region.⁸

By order of the Central Government, the Red Army was reorganized as the Eighth Route Army with Chu Te and P'eng Te-huai as Commander and Vice Commander, and Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng as division commanders. Chu Te was appointed Deputy

⁷ Not having extended legal recognition of the CCP, the Kuomintang does not sign agreements with the CCP. It issues orders or demands which the Communists either accept or refuse.

⁸ Between 1937 and 1939, Central Government troops invaded and reoccupied five of these *hsien*. By November 1940, the Communists had full control over 16 *hsien* and partial control over 3 *hsien*—total 19—of which three *hsien* were in Kansu, one on the Shensi-Suiyuan border, the rest in north Shensi.

Commander of the Second War Zone (including Shansi) under the Kuomintang General Wei Li-huang, in August 1937. The Central Government also decided that the Eighth Route Army should be organized into three divisions (known as the 115th [Lin Piao], 120th [Ho Lung], and 129th [Liu Po-ch'eng] divisions), and that it should be permitted to levy troops until its strength reached 45,000 men. The Government began paying a regular subsidy to the Eighth Route Army on the basis of this number of troops (CN \$600,000 per month, the standard pay allowance for three divisions, plus a meager allowance of ammunition).⁹

Actually, however, the Eighth Route Army seems to have numbered around 100,000 men at the time. (The name of the army was later changed to Eighteenth Group Army, a name which the Communists have seldom used.)

On 22 September 1937 the Communists issued a proclamation from Yen-an formally dissolving the Soviet Republic, and affirming their adherence to Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and their unity with the Kuomintang. The next day Chiang Kai-shek gave them his approval. By that time the Japanese armies had already spread far into north China and intense fighting raged in Shanghai. In this way the united front was established. It should be added, however, that already before the Kuomintang-Communist united front had been established in September 1937, other dissident Chinese groups had joined the Government for united resistance against Japan. Thus the united front included all resistance groups in China.

UNITED FRONT ACTION, 1937-1940

Communists Expand in North and Central China

Following the occupation of Peiping on 28 July 1937, the advance of the Japanese armies through North China was exceedingly rapid. By the end of the year all the main cities and their connecting railways in Hopeh, Shansi, and the provinces of Suiyuan and Chahar in Inner Mongolia had been taken by the Japanese. Tsinan, provincial capital of Shantung, was occupied on 27 December 1937, Tsingtao on 10 January 1938.

The collapse of the Chinese provincial and Central Government armies north and east of the Yellow River was nearly complete by

⁹ This was the amount paid during the first three years of the war, until all payments were discontinued in 1940.

the end of 1937. While the Japanese set up a Chinese puppet administration, and through this and their army authorities maintained a measure of order in their occupied zones in north China, the rural areas around these zones fell prey to ravaging hordes of Japanese soldiers engaged in grain confiscations and "mopping up" operations against Communists and remnants of Chinese provincial forces, roving units of disorganized Chinese soldiers who had turned bandits, and bandit groups formed out of peasants who had collected arms on various battlefields.

It was into this "no-man's-land" that the (Communist) Eighth Route Army moved and began to restore order and unity. It fought the Japanese in cooperation with the forces of General Yen Hsi-shan (Governor of Shansi) and other non-Communist Chinese forces. For the most part, however, the Eighth Route Army fought on its own, even though it offered supporting action to other Chinese forces. The regular provincial and Central Army forces preferred to fight the Japanese from fixed positions and prepared front-line defenses. This invariably led to their defeat and cost them tremendous casualties, because they had neither air support nor the modern mechanized equipment and artillery necessary to counter the Japanese superiority in fire power. The Communists refused to fight on these terms, and concentrated on the guerrilla tactics and mobile warfare which had gained them outstanding success in the past against the superior Kuomintang forces. In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army gained a victory over two Japanese divisions in the famous battle of P'ing-hsing Kuan (Pass) in eastern Shansi, which has been described by German military journals as "a classic of mobile warfare."¹⁰ This victory delayed the Japanese in their advance toward T'ai-yüan, capital of Shansi Province. It netted the Communists considerable quantities of arms.

It was, however, not so much occasional victories over the Japanese that contributed to the supply of arms to the Communist forces, as the defeats suffered by the regular Central Army and provincial forces which opposed the Japanese in the initial stage of the war. Tens of thousands of rifles were left by fallen and fleeing Chinese soldiers on the battlefields in Shansi, Hopeh, Chahar, and Suiyuan. The Chinese Communists collected vast quantities of these abandoned arms and munitions, and used them to replenish their own supplies and to arm

¹⁰ Actually, only one division was involved, the crack Japanese Fifth Division, commanded by Lt. Gen. Itagaki Seishiro.—*Ed.*

guerrilla units and local self-defense corps which they organized among the peasants. Before the end of 1937 the Communist forces had infiltrated into and restored a measure of order in scattered guerrilla areas in northern and eastern Shansi, southern Suiyuan, southern Chahar, and central and southern Hopeh. By early spring of 1938 Eighth Route Army columns had entered Shantung east of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. This was outside the operational limits assigned to them by the National Government (north Shansi, part of Hopeh). At the same time five groups of Communist organizers were operating in the Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei area near Japanese-occupied zones. Next to the Japanese, the Communists held the dominant military power in Shansi and Hopeh.

The Eighth Route Army was, however, not the only factor in the restoration of order in North China outside Japanese-controlled areas, and the organization of guerrilla warfare and of base areas from which to carry on the struggle against Japan. When the provincial and Central Army forces fled, most of the higher government officials and the wealthy families also fled. With the advance of the Communist forces, many more wealthy families of merchants and landlords fled, fearing that they would be killed by the Communists. Most of these latter sought safety in Japanese-occupied cities. Left to themselves, the people improvised some organization. The villagers organized self-defense units against bandits, and in many places the leading men of the *hsien* (or county) called a meeting to elect a new *hsien* magistrate to replace the official who had fled. The National Salvation Association, formed by Mme. Sun Yat-sen and other patriotic leaders in 1932 as a non-partisan organization for the establishment of a united or "popular front" against Japan,¹¹ and other similar patriotic organizations, also played a considerable role in the re-establishment of order in rural areas outside Japanese-occupied zones. The Communist political agents got in touch with these patriotic societies to re-establish the *hsien* administration. The Communist Party and those patriotic societies became the nucleus for the Mobilization Committees (Tung-yuan Hui) which became the highest local government during the period of the war.

After the fall of T'ai-yüan in November 1937, some of the Shansi provincial leaders retreated with Governor Yen Hsi-shan to southern Shansi, while others fled to the Wu-t'ai Mountains in Northeastern Shansi, where the Eighth Route Army had established a base. One

¹¹ This organization was banned in Kuomintang-controlled China.

of these, Sung Shao-wen, the chairman of the Civil and Military Training Committee and of the Propaganda Section of the Shansi Provincial Government, conferred with General Nieh Jung-chen, the Communist commander of the region; together they developed the idea of forming a regional emergency government. They obtained Yen Hsi-shan's approval. This led to the famous Fu-p'ing Conference in the Wu-t'ai Mountain region of western Hopeh, 9-15 January 1934. It was a united front conference attended by 148 delegates from 39 *hsien*, representing 28 organizations. Of the 28, the Communists appear to have had predominant influence in 19 organizations. These included 7 mass organizations (composed of peasants, workers, and students), 10 military organizations and mobilization committees, the Communist Party (1 vote), and "local Communists" (1 vote). About 90 of the 148 delegates represented Communist-sponsored organizations. The Conference included delegates from Governor Yen Hsi-shan and from General Ch'eng Ch'ien, Commander of the First War Zone (including Hopeh) and concurrently Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army. Although some delegates to this Conference were Kuomintang members, the Kuomintang Party as such was, significantly, not represented.

The Fu-p'ing Conference emphasized the opportunities for guerilla warfare. Members of both the Kuomintang and the CCP spoke of the cooperation of their parties for the establishment of a free, independent, and democratic China. The Conference passed resolutions for the setting up of a "border government" comprising parts of Shansi, Hopeh, and Chahar provinces, with the status of a provincial government under the Central Government, and for the establishment of a united and armed people's self-defense army. It elected a Central Executive Committee of nine members for the new government with Sung Shao-wen, a non-partisan, as Chairman. Of the other eight members four were non-partisans, one a member of both the Kuomintang and the CCP, one a member of the Kuomintang exclusively, and two (including General Nieh Jung-chen) members of the CCP exclusively. A telegram approving the new government was received from Chiang Kai-shek on 30 January 1938; on 1 February Dr. H. H. Kung, newly appointed President of the Executive Yuan, wired the Government's confirmation.

Thus the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government (Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien-ch'ü) was established with its capital at Fu-p'ing. It was the first of several similar Communist-sponsored border governments to

be established in North and Central China. Its titular leader was a non-partisan,¹² but its real leader was the Communist General Nieh Jung-chen. In fact, an American newspaper correspondent who visited the Border Government area early in 1938 reported as his impression that the new organization was headed by General Nieh.

Democracy as Practiced by the Chinese Communists

The system of democratic united front government introduced into the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region became the model for all Communist-led areas in China. The government was organized on a non-partisan basis; political parties could be represented, but the party line of each participating party was not stressed. No member of the government administration needed to reveal his party affiliation provided he was willing to cooperate in the anti-Japanese program. The system of government emphasized the principles of democracy, self-government, and united front action against Japan by all parties and population groups. The people were rallied under the slogan: "He who has strength gives strength, he who has money gives money, he who has knowledge gives skill in the united front against Japan."

The basic unit of the political organization was the village Mobilization Committee (variously called Village Committee for Armed Resistance Against Japan, Self Defense Government, People's Resistance Committee, People's Committee). The "village" is composed of approximately 3,000 people and includes between 1,500-2,000 voters. This "village" is the "administrative village" which consists of approximately 10 normal villages. The village Mobilization Committee had its counterpart in each higher administrative unit, the *ch'ü* (town), the *hsien*, the sub-military region within each Border Region, and in the Border Region Government itself, where it was subordinate only to the Border Government Council. Members were elected and included gentry and peasants. In the village committees only local people could serve. The Mobilization Committee held the supreme executive power. It had power within its area of control to requisition man power, skilled workers, money, food, clothing, and weapons. It fed and housed all loyal troops in its area of control. It maintained guards at every village and crossroad. The local militia was under its command. It issued passports to authorized travellers,

¹² Sung Shao-wen is still chairman of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Government. Some reports list him as a Kuomintang member. By his own statement in 1938 he is a non-partisan.

and identification cards to local people. As the administration in the Communist-controlled areas became better organized, many of the functions of the Mobilization Committees were taken over by the Village Delegates' Assembly.

Parallel to the Mobilization Committees, the Communists promoted the establishment of People's Congresses (or Citizens' General Assembly). Villagers elect their own Congress from among local people, several villages elect the members of the *ch'ü* Congress, the people of the several *ch'ü* comprising a *hsien* elect the members of the *hsien* Congress, and so on up to the Border Region Congress. The Army also elects a few members to each of these Congresses. All elections are by secret ballot. It took several years, however, to develop the election system, and it was not until January 1943 that the first Congress of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, properly elected by all sub-districts, was held.

These People's Congresses provide a sounding board for public opinion. The Border Region Congress elects the members of the Border Government Council. It ratifies constitutions for various mass organizations. But in so far as is known, the several Border Region Congresses have only a limited measure of legislative power, although they claim to exercise the highest legislative power within the Border Regions. Nominally the two main Border Region governments (Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia, the only ones that have obtained official recognition from the National Government) are under the Government in Chungking and are independent of the CCP. Actually they are under the Communist Party, which holds the supreme power in all Communist-sponsored Border Regions. The Communist Party Headquarters (the Central Executive Committee and the Politbureau under the Central Executive Committee) at Yen-an is the highest policy-making organ. It is the highest authority over the Communist Army. It also plans the social, political, and economic life of the Border Regions. These plans are not, however, handed down as orders to the Border Region Congresses; instead they are submitted through a Communist or pro-Communist member of the Border Region Congress concerned for a vote.

The civil government is linked with the Communist Party and Army by the Political Commissars, who rank with the Military Commanders of each Communist army unit. They represent the Communist Party. Beside their duties in the regular army units, they are responsible for the organization of the people's militia and for the super-

vision of the political training of the Army and the people in the areas behind the enemy lines. Thanks to this dual influence each Political Commissar occupies the key position in controlling the military and civil administration of the area to which he is assigned. Thus he is able to insure that the decisions of the democratic border governments do not deviate from the policies laid down by the Communist Party. The strong influence of the Army Political Commissars over the civil government is shown by an example from the (Communist) New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu Province. A report of conditions there in 1944 states that if two villages have some dispute which they are unable to decide between themselves, and which cannot be satisfactorily decided by the regional government, the matter will finally reach the Political Commissar of the New Fourth Army who will then make the final decision. This decision will be returned to the People's Congress and it in turn will vote upon the issue. The report states that the functions of the Political Commissar in such matters might be compared with that of a Supreme Court.

From the very beginning of the Communists' expansion into North China, they took a particularly active interest in the development of mass organizations. When the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government was formed, they had already established the Farmers' National Salvation Association, Women's National Salvation Association, Workers' National Salvation Association, Young Men's National Salvation Association, the Little Vanguard, and the People's Self-Defense Corps, embracing all men between the ages of 18 and 48. Later Communist-sponsored trade unions were developed which by now (March 1945) comprise about 600,000 members in all of China. The purpose of these organizations was to educate the farmers to defend themselves and to share their wealth with the Eighth Route Army. Already by early spring of 1938, after only four months of activities, it was estimated that about 1,000,000 people out of a total of 7,000,000 people in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region had been enrolled in the mass organizations, and that half a million men had been armed and were serving in the local militia forces.

The Communists were no less active in developing the educational system. They organized courses to teach the illiterate masses 1,000 characters, which would enable them to read simple books and newspapers, and re-established schools for children, universities, and military academies. All textbooks were edited by the CCP. A vast propaganda program was set in motion, utilizing mass meetings, propa-

ganda posters, theatrical plays (probably the most effective method of indoctrinating the illiterate masses), and the dissemination of newspapers, magazines, and books. The central theme of this propaganda was anti-Japanism, but it also emphasized the meaning of the united front, democracy, and the struggle against imperialism and fascism. Eighth Route Army officers gave courses in guerrilla warfare in the towns and villages. Teachers and political propagandists were active throughout the Border Regions. "K'ai-hui" ("assemble for a meeting") became one of the most commonly heard phrases in Communist China. Every moment of spare time was used for political indoctrination, school work, and military training. The people came to see the need of these meetings, although at first some accepted them only as a wartime necessity. Questioned in 1938 by an American correspondent, the members of one Mobilization Committee said that the general opinion was that it was a good thing to give power to the people, but that in peacetime they did not want to spend so much of their time at meetings.

What in the final analysis won the people for the Communists and the Eighth Route Army was, however, not so much their political program as their economic program. The abolition of the Communist program of land confiscation, as a condition for the conclusion of the united front with the Kuomintang, did not prevent the Red leaders from making some very shrewd bids for mass support. The land of all landlords who had fled to Peiping, Tientsin, T'ai-yüan, and the other large cities in Japanese-occupied China (and most of the big landlords had fled) was guaranteed to be the owner's property, but was "temporarily" used by the new Border Government. This land was distributed among the poor and among refugees from villages which the Japanese had burned. The Border Government collected the rents and promised to repay the landlord in full whenever he returned. These rents became a large source of revenue for the new government. The property of traitors who accepted office under the Japanese was confiscated by the Border Government and distributed among the poor. All rents were arbitrarily lowered 25 per cent in some areas, more or less in others. A three-year moratorium on all debts was declared in 1938, and interest during the three-year period was fixed at only one per cent annually. The maximum interest rate for new loans was set at 10 per cent per year, which was a great reduction of the prevailing usury rates. The land of all farmers who had no animals was plowed by Eighth Route Army cavalry horses,

and the farmers were assisted by Eighth Route Army troops. Any refugees within the Border Region areas who did not have enough food to last until the harvest were fed by the Mobilization Committee. The system of requisition used by the Mobilization Committee in collecting food and cloth for the army was so organized that the burden did not fall upon the poor. In some areas each member of a family was allowed three *mou* of land (about half an acre) unassessed. In other words, in a family of five, 15 *mou* (a large holding in China) bore no assessment. All people owning more than that minimum shared public expenses proportionately to their holdings. Since more than half of the population had less than the minimum amount of land, the burden of taxation fell on the well-to-do. The Communists called this "ho-li fu-tan" (reasonable bearing of responsibility). Without in any way violating the agreement of Kuomintang to abandon their radical land program, the Communists succeeded in winning the support of a large proportion of the poorest farmers, whose land holdings became dependent upon the maintenance of the Communist-sponsored government.

A new taxation system was introduced in 1942 based on a progressive income and property tax, with rates varying from 7 per cent of income for the lowest tax paying group to 65 per cent for the highest income group. In 1943 the exemption limit was lowered and the rate on high incomes reduced. The taxes were (and still are) payable largely in grain. It should be added that although these rates favor the poor they are not discriminatory against the rich. One wealthy landlord stated in 1943 that his taxes were lower than during the old regime.

As sponsors of such an economic program in a country where the overwhelming majority of the people were debt-ridden, and impoverished by exorbitant taxes and rents, the Chinese Communists could not fail to gain a tremendous popular following. The Eighth Route Army in North China came soon to be considered the benefactor and saviour of the people not only against the Japanese, but also against the rule of landlords and the former warlords who had held supreme sway over North China. As one official American observer in Communist-controlled North China recently said, the peasant appears not only willing but even enthusiastic about paying taxes "because he is doing it for the Army, which is protecting him and his possessions, and for the first time in centuries he feels that he is getting something in return for his money or goods." It is not the ideology

of Communism as such that impresses the people. It is the practical results of Communist leadership. A Communist leader said recently: "Communism to the people means freedom—freedom to have meetings, to discuss things with the landlord and government officials, freedom to elect their own representatives. This is a way of life they have never known, and they like it for it has done things for them. This is all that they can understand. This is all Communism really means to them."

The members of the mass organizations and local militia are certain to vote in favor of almost any plan the Communists sponsor. These plans have in general proved of benefit to the people.

The fact of the existence of a state of war helped the Communists to put their economic program into practice. Because of the war the entire economic effort could readily be focused on support of the Eighth Route Army and other military forces in the Border Regions, for the defense of the people against the Japanese. Had the Japanese followed a policy of conciliation with the Chinese, and of economic reconstruction in ravaged areas, it is doubtful that the Communists could have succeeded so well as they did. There is no question that some of the Japanese military leaders genuinely desired to conciliate the people.

But their influence was not (and has never been) strong enough to enforce conciliatory behavior in the Japanese Army. When Japanese troops entered a village, one of their first demands was for women. There was usually looting, and even when there was no resistance men of military age were frequently killed. As one private observer who visited the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in 1938 stated: "If the Japanese had offered peace and security it would have been hard to rouse the peasants to patriotic self-sacrifice, but refugees going to their relatives and friends have spread throughout the country the association of the Japanese with murder, rape, and looting, and the peasant is prepared to defend his home if not his country." The Japanese reply to guerrilla war was a policy of frightfulness. It drove the people into the arms of the Communists, because they undertook to organize the rural areas for defense after the regular Chinese armies had been defeated and had fled. The people subscribed fully to the Communists' answer to those who doubted their ability to fight the superior Japanese forces: "If we don't fight, what happens? The Japanese kill us anyway. If we fight, let's see what happens." By sustaining the anti-Japanese War, the Communists won the

people's sympathy, and gained immeasurably in political and military power through popular support.

The rapid rise of Communist power in North China induced an American official in China to remark at the beginning of 1938: "Thus the net result of Japan's 'holy war' to insure the peace of the orient by stamping out communism in China has apparently been to place the Chinese Reds in a position many times more favorable than they could ever have hoped to attain under the Chinese Government as it existed before the outbreak of hostilities."

The importance which the Communists attach to their economic program as a political weapon is shown by the fact that they consider it to be basic. The democratic self-government program plays a secondary, supporting role. It brings all classes together, and forces the landlord-merchant class into active participation in, and hence support of, the economic program. For if the landlords try to obstruct the economic program the people will vote against them and the landlords may lose whatever power and influence they possess. As one observer recently put it: "The landlord-capitalist group was driven to active participation to preserve its own interests."

This economic program explains, in large part, why the Communists can operate their democratic government system with a minimum of direct participation in government organs by Communist Party members, and why, during the first two years of the united front movement, they could leave considerable areas in North China under the control of cooperating Kuomintang generals and warlords without any danger of impairment of their own power.

An example (which may in part explain why Kuomintang generals now fear to engage in united front action with the Communists) is the experience of General Wan Fu-lin, then Commander of the 53rd Army, in the central Hopeh area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. He attended the Fu-p'ing Conference with the remnants of his troops in January 1938. General Wan was an old warlord from Manchuria, but a patriotic man who refused to compromise with the Japanese and put up a stubborn (and costly) resistance along the Peiping-Hankow Railway in Hopeh province. Returning to central Hopeh from the Fu-p'ing Conference, he was accompanied by a "political director" from the Eighth Route Army. Together they organized the area and recruited a new army. The work was as much political as military. In the suppression of banditry, at that time rampant in central Hopeh, fighting was sometimes necessary. Some

bandit groups were won over and incorporated into the army, and the rest were forced to move east and north in advance of the new government forces. At the end of April 1938 only small areas in central Hopeh still contained bandits. Simultaneous with this military occupation of central Hopeh by Wan Fu-lin's forces, political organizers were sent to each village, and they arranged for the election of Mobilization Committees, the formation of units of the People's Self-Defense Corps, and other mass organizations. These mass organizations gave such support to the Communist-sponsored economic reforms that within about a year the Communists obtained the dominant position in central Hopeh. And since the new 53rd Army was recruited from the local people and obtained its political indoctrination from the Communist political director, it became as loyal to the Communists as the people as a whole. Exactly what happened to General Wan in the course of 1938 is not known. In April 1939, however, he was reported to have been "relieved" from his command. By that time the Eighth Route Army was in full control of General Wan's former areas in central Hopeh. In 1942 Wan was appointed a member of the National Military Council at Chungking. The remnants of the original (Manchurian) troops of the 53rd Army who refused to accept Communist control were driven out of North China by the Eighth Route Army. They reformed themselves as the 53rd Army in areas outside Communist control. In 1941 this army was in Hopeh. In 1944 and 1945 it fought on the Salween front. This anti-Japanese Manchurian army who had welcomed cooperation from the Communists was driven from Manchuria by the Japanese in the early 1930's, and driven from North China by the Japanese and the Communists in separate campaigns in the late 1930's. It marched clear across China toward Burma to continue its fight against Japan. There can be little wonder that experiences like this have made many leaders in the Chungking army distrustful of any united front arrangements with the Chinese Communists.

Units of Central Government forces have, on several occasions, cooperated with Communist forces in fighting the Japanese. But as a general rule, they have maintained their identity only when fighting in Central Government areas. When they have tried to fight the Japanese in Communist-sponsored border region areas they have either lost their identity through absorption into Communist forces, or been expelled from the Communist areas.

In the Border Regions it is only the Communist Party which has

a large-scale party organization. At present this organization includes over 1,200,000 party members, of whom the Communists claim that more than half are peasants. The Kuomintang is permitted to function in the Border Regions, and in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Government there are still a number of Kuomintang representatives. As late as 1943 there was even a Kuomintang office which ranked as a provincial office, but had very limited resources. Its only publication was a fortnightly paper which had a small circulation. The Kuomintang contested elections to the Border Region Congress in 1940 (the Congress was not convened until 1943) but it did not put forward any party candidates in the village elections. The Kuomintang lacks a well integrated organization in Communist areas, and since most of the initiative and most of the popular following lies with the Communist Party, it is doubtful that the Kuomintang could expand even if it adopted a liberal policy in Communist areas and tried, in this way, to compete with the Communists. Actually most Kuomintang members in the Border Region Governments are liberals.

The policy of the Communists is to have one-third Communists, one-third upper-class individuals (landlords and merchants), and one-third Kuomintang and non-party progressives elected to government posts.¹³ In 1944, of the 47 members of the Yen-an Municipal Council, seventeen were Communist party members, five Kuomintang members, twenty-one non-partisans or members of other parties and groups (or mass organizations), two Protestants, and one Catholic.

This system supports the claim of the Communists that they are maintaining a democratic, united front government. But no real opposition toward the Communists could, it appears, develop from any other party or class or group, since the electoral vote is controlled by the masses and the masses are controlled by the Communists. Anyone is free to stand as a candidate, but in practice nearly all the candidates are proposed by the mass movement associations and the choice offered the electors is usually limited. For instance, in one *hsien* which elected six representatives to the Border Region Congress, there were only eight candidates.

¹³ This was the so-called "three-thirds system (*san-san chih*). The CCP did not, itself, employ the groupings listed here, but instead called for one-third CCP members, one-third non-Party progressives, and one-third intermediate groups. The system and its operation are described in *Enemies and Friends*, pp. 142-53. In many areas, it was not carried out. Also mentioned below, p. 135.—Ed.

The Communists' control of (or loyalty from) the masses, combined with universal suffrage, is the chief cause of Communist power and political and military control. It is also the cause of their great expansion of influence, for the masses welcome the Communists as their benefactors and will support them against their former rulers. But this type of democracy has by its very nature created an atmosphere which rules out opposition and makes it nearly impossible for any other party to exist except as a minority party. A capable English observer, who is a strong sympathizer with the Chinese Communists and has lived in Communist areas since the end of 1941, recently commented upon the expansion of the influence of the Communists and their growing power in relation to the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. He stated that "If the Kuomintang doesn't reform it seems to me that there is a very big probability of China coming under exclusive Communist control, which would be a pity in many ways, as I feel that the real weakness of the democratic system here [in Communist-controlled China] is that there is not enough real discussion which comes from having no real opposition party."

In the final analysis, the democratic system in the Communist-controlled Border Regions is predominantly a "democracy of the toilers" sponsored and led by the Communist Party. Members of the middle classes are permitted to vote and are not, in so far as is known, discriminated against or persecuted. But they have lost their pre-war positions of leadership, and must now follow the masses, who are under Communist guidance. In January 1941 Mao Tse-tung said that the "bourgeois revolution" should be supported and led by the proletariat under Communist guidance. This objective has been fulfilled.

Non-Communist parties are permitted to exist if they conform to the policies of the CCP as carried out through the Communist-controlled Border Governments. Thus the Kuomintang is permitted to function in the Border Regions. But it cannot establish itself as a party competing with the CCP. Furthermore, the Kuomintang members who participate in the Border Region governments are those in sympathy with the policy laid down by the CCP. Individuals who openly voice their opposition to the CCP and work against the Communists are outlawed. Even Communists must adhere to the prescribed "party line"; Trotskyites get short shrift. When Mao Tse-tung outlined the democratic policy of the CCP in 1938 he declared: "In the new situa-

tion of the war the traitors, spies, Trotskyites, and Japanophiles . . . must be suppressed according to law without leniency.”¹⁴

This insistence upon conformity has not been abandoned in the “democratic” program, nor do the Chinese Communists appear to consider it inconsistent with their claim that they permit freedom of thought and expression. A 20-point “Practical Political Program” which was ratified by the first formal People’s Congress of the Chín-Ch’a-Chi Border Region in January 1943 included as point 6: “Guarantee freedom of speech, association, belief, press, residence; guarantee freedom from illegal arrest.” But point 17 states: “Suppress followers of Wang Ch’ing-wei, Trotskyites, and other treacherous cliques. Confiscate and use their property.” Ch’en Tu-hsiu, the former leader of the CCP, is a Trotskyite. He was released by Chiang Kai-shek from a Kuomintang prison in 1937, but he remained until his death in 1942 in controlled China, in Szechwan. In Communist China his followers are outlaws.

The system of democratic united front government as introduced by the Communists emphasizes the political role of the mass organizations and trade unions, rather than of political parties. The mass organizations, in which the Communist Party has predominant influence, sponsor plans for political and economic reform which are then put to a vote in the various People’s Congresses and government councils. There again the mass organizations and Communist sympathizers hold the controlling vote. Thanks to this system the Communist Party maintains absolute leadership. The close connection between the people and the Communist Army, and the important role of the Political Commissars of the Army as a link between the military and civil administration, provide additional safeguards for insuring the leadership of the CCP.

The Communists are able to maintain their position of control primarily because of the capable leadership and strong discipline existing within the CCP. In outlining the war-time functions of the CCP in 1938 Mao Tse-tung said: “. . . We [Communists] must have iron discipline in the Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Route Army. Discipline guarantees that we will adhere to our Party policies. Without discipline the Party cannot lead the army and the masses toward victory. . . . It is necessary to place the [Party] organization before the individual, the majority over the minority, upper

¹⁴ “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War (October 1938),” SW, II, p. 199.—*Ed.*

Party functionaries over the lower, and the Central Committee over the entire Party. This is the Party's centralized democracy."¹⁵

There is no question that the Chinese Communists have produced the best organized movement modern China has seen, and have knit the people together in support of the Communist Party and Army as no other government in modern China has been able to do. At the same time it is clear that the term "democracy," when used to describe the Communist regime, has a meaning different from the ordinary American understanding of the term. While the Chinese Communist system is not altogether a "dictatorship of the proletariat" it is far more akin to Soviet democracy, as outlined in the constitution of the Soviet Union, than to the democracy practiced in the United States and Britain.

*The High Point of the Kuomintang-Communist United Front;
The Hankow Period, 1938*

It was inevitable that the Chinese Communists, with their concept of a united front movement as involving economic reform, improvements of class relations, development of local self-government, formation of mass organizations of peasants, workers, and students, and democratic cooperation between these and all political resistance parties, should soon clash with the Kuomintang. There were many points in the Communist-sponsored program that agreed with the officially accepted policy of the Kuomintang as laid down in Sun Yat-sen's *San-min chu-i* (Three Principles of the People—Nationalism, Democracy, People's Livelihood). In a sense the Communists also became more representative of the Kuomintang's officially accepted policy than the Kuomintang itself. For whereas the Communists acted, in many respects, in conformity with the Three Principles of the People, the Kuomintang not only did not put them into practice, but was opposed to any party or group which tried to do so. It had started as the leading revolutionary party of China. It led the great Kuomintang-Communist "united front" revolution of the 1920's. But beginning in 1927, in the course of its struggle to prevent the Communists from gaining the leadership of the revolution, it ceased to be a revolutionary party. It became the leader of all the feudal, reactionary forces in China which it had originally set out to destroy. It persecuted and alienated from itself not only the Communists, but also the liberal-democratic groups within the Kuomintang and in

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.—*Ed.*

Nationalist parties outside the Kuomintang. These groups were genuinely interested in putting the Three Principles of the People into practice, not, like the Communists, as a preliminary to the introduction of communism in China, but as a means of introducing democracy as an end in itself.

The characterization of the Kuomintang given by an American official in China in 1935 is worth quoting, not only because it holds true to this day, but also because it explains much of the inter-party friction which has characterized the united front from its beginning in 1937, and become increasingly acute with the passage of time. "Chiang Kai-shek," he wrote, "is no revolutionary and therein lies the reason for the decline of the Kuomintang as a revolutionary party. If Chiang was a revolutionary at any time he lost that character the instant he came to power or before. He undoubtedly longs for a great, free, and prosperous China. But China must arrive at this state under his personal control.

"What was the reaction upon the Kuomintang of this state of affairs? It was just what might have been expected. As soon as events demonstrated that the revolution was dead as far as the leader was concerned, the revolutionary spirit among the rank and file gave up the ghost. The real revolutionaries withdrew from party activity or went South to set up the rival Canton government of 1931,¹⁶ and left control of the party to the 'practical politicians' and job seekers. The schism of 1931 left not a real revolutionary leader in the Central Kuomintang councils. All that remained at Nanking were personal henchmen of the dictator . . . Some of the old time revolutionists came back to the party after the rape of Manchuria in 1931, driven solely by their patriotic desire to unite in opposition to Japan. How they were betrayed at Nanking is a matter of history.

"To suppress whatever of the old revolutionary idea was left within the party the secret society known as the 'Blue Shirts' was organized within the party itself. This clique is supposed to be animated by but

¹⁶ This refers to the Canton dissension movement which started in April 1931. Dr. Sun Fo and many other liberals left Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. Sun, Eugene Ch'en, Tsou Lu, Wang Ching-wei (leader of the left-wing Kuomintang), T'ang Shao-yi, and other liberals established a new Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in Canton, competing with that of the Kuomintang right-wing under Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. Peace between the two groups was re-established after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, following a promise by the Nanking Government that "elected representatives of the people" were to be included in the central political organs. The Nanking leaders never kept this promise.

one purpose, complete and unquestioning support of Chiang Kai-shek as dictator. It conducts its operations after the fashion well-exemplified by the fascist parties of the West, or better still by the old American Ku Klux Klan. Murder and threat of murder are used to bring into line such party members or officials as cherish ideas inimical to the dictator.

"The Kuomintang at present strongly resembles the political machines in the United States, such as Tammany Hall or the Republican clubs of Pennsylvania. Nominally devoted to the salvation of China through the principles of Sun Yat-sen, it really concerns itself with nothing but the perpetuation in office of, and division of political perquisites among, its members."¹⁷

To the Kuomintang the united front movement meant cooperation between all Chinese against Japan, on the basis of the integration of all military forces formerly independent of the Kuomintang into the Central Army, and the subordination of all political parties to the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang-controlled Central Government. Since the Government did not extend legal recognition to parties other than the Kuomintang, it did not deal with dissident parties as such. It could not ignore their *de facto* existence, but just as it worked for the elimination of all independent armies by integrating them with the Central Army, so it worked for the elimination of independent political parties through their integration with the Kuomintang. But it was not interested in democratic reforms or, for that matter, reforms of any kind. In the words of an American observer in China, commenting upon the united front negotiations in 1937: "The Kuomintang will fight for its position of authority and its accompanying perquisites of office, trimming where it has to, compromising when it must, but determined to hold the reins to the exclusion of all other factions."

The system of the united front government as it developed in Hankow during 1938, following the evacuation of Shanghai and Nanking, was also one of compromise, which affected the power of Chiang Kai-shek and his inner circle very little. On 1 January 1938 the Central Government in Hankow was reorganized on a basis that left all key positions with the right-wing Kuomintang members. The American

¹⁷ Diligent searches of published materials and queries of contemporary participants have failed to turn up the source of this remarkable assessment. Such a blunt indictment by an American official suggests that the author never intended it to be made public.—*Ed.*

Assistant Military Attaché in China cabled that the reorganization was welcomed as a definite triumph for the conservatives and that it put at rest the rumors that the new government was to include radicals. However, on 4 January Chiang Kai-shek announced his approval of a reorganization of the National Military Council on the basis of equal participation by Communists, the "Southwest Military Group" (Kwangsi-Kwangtung), and the Kuomintang "with all equally responsible" for continued resistance. The promise, or hope, that this approval conveyed was never carried out. The formerly dissident parties were never given "equal" responsibility with the Kuomintang. But for the moment Chiang's announcement helped to offset public reaction against the reorganization of the government on a conservative basis. An American observer in Hankow stated that it also satisfied the Communists, to whom "formal recognition was not vitally important since they had actually gained control of large areas of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, Suiyuan, Chahar, Hopeh." On 5 January, the Government announced that it had appointed K'ung Ho-ch'ung, a former Communist general who surrendered to the Kuomintang forces in 1934, as commander of all mobile units operating in North China. He had left for North China in December 1937.¹⁸

In the following months several moves were taken that seemed to promise a liberalization of the Kuomintang regime. A number of former dissident leaders were given positions in the Kuomintang, the Government, and the Central Army. Several Communist leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, Chou En-lai, Lin Tsu-han, and P'eng Te-huai were "reinstated" in the Kuomintang. Chou En-lai was appointed Deputy Director of the Political Training Department of the National Military Council, and the famous Communist guerrilla fighter, General Yeh Chien-ying, present C-of-S of the Eighth Route Army, was appointed advisor to the guerrilla school which Chiang Kai-shek established in Hankow.

In February 1938 the Supreme National Defense Council was established. It was to function as a supreme political and governmental organ for the duration of the war, providing a unified civilian military control. It was not, *de jure*, a part of the government, since it was established as the war-time replacement of the Kuomintang Central Political Council, the Party organ charged with exercise of the

¹⁸ Apparently he never succeeded in taking command, at least not over the Communist forces. In 1943 he was reported to be a divisional commander in the 6th War Zone (Hupeh).

Party's sovereign powers in government. Since the composition of the Supreme National Defense Council was a war-time secret, no full list of its membership has been published. It is known, however, that right-wing Kuomintang members held the key positions. Several Communists, among them Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai, were reported to be members of the Council, although not of its Standing Committee. Already at the end of 1937 the Communists had been permitted by the Government to establish their own newspaper, the *Hsin-Hua jih-pao* (*New China Daily*), in Hankow. It was later moved to Chungking and is still published there.

Between 29 March and 1 April 1938, an Extraordinary National Congress of Kuomintang delegates was convened.¹⁹ The Communist leader, Chou En-lai, was among the 17 members of its presidium. This Congress resolved that the system of Kuomintang leadership should "be firmly established and the Party Constitution be amended accordingly." It elected Chiang Kai-shek "Tsung-ts'ai" or "Supreme Executive," of the Party. The Congress decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of a National Assembly (or National People's Congress) for the adoption of constitutional government. As a consolation to the Communists and democratic groups, who saw in this decision an attempt by the Kuomintang to maintain its dictatorial rule indefinitely, the Congress decided to convene immediately a People's Political Council, a rather powerless organization which was to function as an advisory organ to the Government. It held its first session in July 1938. While the Communist Party was not openly recognized or given official status, the Congress decided that "hereafter the people shall have absolute freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and freedom in the formation of associations, provided such activities do not interfere with the war against Japan." The Communist Party organ, *Hsin-Hua jih-pao*, expressed great satisfaction with the results of the Congress. As an interesting sidelight on the general attitude of British and Americans toward the Chinese Communists in 1938 as compared with today, it may be mentioned that one American observer in Hankow, in commenting on the results of the Congress, stated that open recognition of the

¹⁹ Two documents adopted by this Congress are published in Chinese Ministry of Information, ed., *China Handbook, 1937-1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), pp. 58-62. The more important one is entitled "Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction." For information on the People's Political Council, see *China White Paper, passim*. The San Min Chu I Youth Corps was also set up by this Congress.—Ed.

Communist Party "may possibly have been avoided for fear of possible alienation of support of China's cause by England and the United States." He could hardly have thought at that time that the American Government would one day send an American Military Observer Section to the Communist capital at Yen-an.

The united front spirit was strong in Hankow during these days, and the feeling of unity between the Chinese led them to feel more optimistic concerning the future than actual circumstances warranted. The Central Army moved from one defeat to another. The Japanese Army was moving ever deeper toward the heart of China. But the momentary relaxation of the Kuomintang dictatorship, with all its pre-war repressions of popular sentiment, and the genuinely cooperative war effort between all resistance groups in China imbued the people with the feeling that the war was worth its sacrifices. Chiang Kai-shek was hailed as the national leader who had risen above party politics, and he emerged as the symbol of the people's aspiration for unity and victory.

In the course of 1938, Mao Tse-tung developed a three-point strategy for the war which soon found acceptance among all Chinese resistance leaders and, in fact, became the theoretical basis for Chiang Kai-shek's war plans. Briefly, the theory of this plan, the "three-stage war," as Mao Tse-tung called it, was: (1) Japanese offensive, Chinese "retreat in space but advance in time"; (2) Stalemate: The Japanese offensive attains its climax at the foothills of Western China, after which it reaches a standstill. China continues to mobilize while concentrating upon guerrilla warfare to hold the Japanese and diminish Japan's war energy; (3) Japan's internal and international complications reach a breaking point. China attains her maximum mobilization, followed by large-scale counteroffensive and victory. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek predicted a long war.²⁰

Even though this plan emphasized the responsibility of the Chinese to build up their own war potential, it counted upon foreign aid especially from Soviet Russia. In his outline of the "three-stage war" Mao Tse-tung said: "On the one hand we have the increasing movement of aid to China in foreign countries, the great power of the Soviet Union and her important aid to China, etc., and on the other,

²⁰ Cf. "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," and "On Protracted War," in SW, II, pp. 79-194. Chiang's views may be found in *Resistance and Reconstruction: Messages During China's Six Years of War, 1937-1943* (New York: Harper, 1943), esp. pp. 30-84.—Ed.

the menace of another European war, the tendency towards rapprochement between Britain and Japan, and the sale of munitions and war materials to Japan, etc.”

It was not only the Communists who at this time looked primarily to Soviet Russia as their hope of victory against Japan. Their viewpoint was shared by most Chinese, including Kuomintang leaders.²¹ The Soviet Union had entered into a treaty of non-aggression with China on 21 August 1937, within a few weeks of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war.²² (This treaty is still in force.) Article I, which condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, was viewed by some as the Soviet justification for her policy of assisting China while remaining neutral. Although both the Chinese and Soviet governments denied that a secret agreement for Soviet military aid accompanied the treaty, such aid was given in a variety of forms. The Soviet Ambassador to China stated his Government's attitude at a celebration of the 21st anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, 7 November 1938, as follows: “Under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the great Chinese nation is now being united and has presented a united front to oppose the aggressor, and your struggle has won the whole-hearted sympathies of the whole Soviet people.” The emphasis on the united front is worth noting.

It is true that America, Britain, Soviet Russia, and other countries contributed considerable amounts to Chinese war relief. And an American Volunteer Aviation Corps, organized by Lt. General (then Major, Retired) Claire Lee Chennault (at that time Aviation Advisor

²¹ It was, however, not without fear that some Kuomintang leaders accepted the idea of Soviet Russian support. There was a powerful group in the Government, representing Wang Ching-wei, General Ho Ying-ch'in, and General Chang Ch'ün, which advocated that China take steps to come to an understanding with Germany and Italy. They recommended this course of action during the last session of the People's Political Council, which met from 5 to 12 July 1938. This brought about an acrimonious dispute with the Communist delegates. One of them, Ch'en Shao-yü, hotly replied that Germany and Italy were allies of Japan and that any rapprochement with them would lead to capitulation to the Japanese. The Soviet Union, Ch'en declared, is the natural ally of China. One of the Nationalist delegates thereupon demanded of Ch'en Shao-yü: “Are you a Chinese or a Russian?” A scuffle was avoided only by the intercession of more temperate elements and the appeal of the Chairman, Dr. Chang Po-ling, to remember the united front.

²² Materials on Sino-Russian relations during this period may be found in David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East* (New Haven: Yale, 1948) or in Henry Wei, *China and Soviet Russia* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956).—Ed.

to the Generalissimo), was actually fighting the Japanese in China. But Soviet Russian aid vastly surpassed that of any other country. Soviet planes were delivered to China in considerable quantities, and Soviet aviators served in the Chinese Army in a "private" capacity as volunteers. On 26 January 1938 the first recorded Chinese-employed all-Soviet Russian air raid was made on Japanese installations in Nanking. During these first years of the war Soviet Russian loans to China, in the form of barter agreements, were also considerably greater than those of any other country. Up to the time of Pearl Harbor, Soviet Russia is reported to have concluded barter agreements totalling the equivalent of US \$300,000,000, compared with US \$170,000,000 from the United States, and £18,000,000 from Great Britain. When the German military advisors headed by General von Falkenhausen were withdrawn from China in 1938 they were replaced by Soviet Russian military advisors. Not since the days of the Kuomintang-Communist revolution in the 1920's had there been so many Soviet advisors in China.²³

Although the Chinese were anxious to cultivate friendly relations with Britain and America and made several appeals to these two nations and to the League of Nations for greater support, the response from these quarters was small compared with that from the Soviet Union. The consensus of opinion in Government circles in Hankow was, according to some reports, that China's only hope lay in seeking closer collaboration with Soviet Russia. It was the compelling need of foreign aid, and the fact that Soviet Russia alone of all foreign powers was willing to extend aid in substantial quantities that influenced the Kuomintang to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Chinese Communists. Reports from Hankow at the end of 1937 stated that "the Central Government military leaders hoped that if the Communists were admitted to the government, Soviet Russia might come definitely to China's aid." The correctness of this interpretation of the Soviet attitude toward the Kuomintang was confirmed in October 1938, after the first rift in the united front. At that time the Soviet Ambassador presented Chiang Kai-shek with five demands, of which one was that the Communist Party in China should be placed on an equal footing with the Kuomintang. Another was that the Communists be admitted to the National Military Council, a

²³ See James C. Bowden, "Soviet Military Aid to Nationalist China, 1923-41," in Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 54-56.—*Ed.*

promise which Chiang had made earlier in the year but failed to fulfill. This showed that the policy of Soviet Russia toward the Kuomintang was basically the same in 1938 as in 1923-1927; Soviet Russian support of the Kuomintang was conditional upon Kuomintang cooperation with the CCP.

Soviet-Japanese relations were exceedingly tense in 1937 and 1938, partly as a result of Japanese objections against Soviet aid to China. The Changkufeng incident on the Manchurian-Siberian border in July 1938, involving heavy fighting between Japanese and Soviet forces, raised high hopes in Hankow that Russia had decided to go to war with Japan. Although these hopes were dashed by the news of the armistice on 11 August, the Chinese felt that Soviet Russia had too high a stake in China to permit Japan a free hand in the Far East.

Great as the spirit of the united front had been during the first part of 1938, it began to wane during the last months of the year. Already at the end of July the situation began to deteriorate. The Chinese Communists, availing themselves of the March 1938 resolution of the Kuomintang Congress granting freedom of speech and of formation of associations, etc., began to establish mass organizations in Hankow on the same pattern as in their guerrilla areas in North China. Within a few weeks after this Congress there appeared in Hankow the Communist-sponsored "Wuhan Youth National Salvation Corps," "The National Emancipation Vanguard," and the "Ant Society." The Kuomintang authorities looked with apprehension on the growth of these mass organizations, well remembering the effective use the Communists had made of similar organizations in the 1920's, and knowing their current use of mass organizations in North China as a means of winning popular support. These organizations were also considered a threat to the development of the newly established *San Min Chu I* Youth Corps, a mass organization sponsored by Chiang Kai-shek to bolster popular support of the Kuomintang.

At the end of July the "Blue Shirts" were reported to be working against the Communists, and this led to a Communist protest in the *Hsin-Hua jih-pao*. At the end of August the Hankow-Wuchang Defense General Headquarters ordered the dissolution of the three Communist mass organizations mentioned above. The Communists announced that the step was a breach of good faith on the part of the Government and demanded, without result, the restoration of freedom of action to the three organizations.

This first open rift, combined with a return of restrictions on the non-Kuomintang press and increasing suppression of the right of assemblage of non-Kuomintang groups, was generally interpreted as a sign of the inability of the controlling reactionary elements in the Kuomintang to get along, not only with the Communists but also with the Kwangtung-Kwangsi liberal factions, the few Kuomintang liberals, and the large number of non-political military leaders who had united with the Government. With the transfer of the seat of Government to Chungking and the fall of Hankow in October 1938, the Kuomintang seemed to return more and more to its pre-war tactics of dictatorial rule. In October following the Soviet Russian Ambassador's demands, mentioned above, Chiang Kai-shek suppressed several more Communist organizations. As a result Soviet Russia withdrew some of her aid to China. Mao Tse-tung issued a warning from Yen-an: "For the Kuomintang the most important link in the chain of progress is the democratization of its organizational form, making the party itself the people's alliance for resistance against the enemy and for national reconstruction. Judging from the present tendency of the war, if the Kuomintang does not open its doors and admit all the other patriotic parties and individuals . . . the tremendous task of resistance . . . will be too great a burden on the shoulders of the party."

The year closed with a bitter attack on Mao Tse-tung in the Central News, a Government organ, by a Kuomintang leader, Chang Chün-mai.²⁴ He attacked Mao and the Communists for failure to turn over control of the Communist area in Shensi province to the Central Government and for not allowing Chiang Kai-shek to command directly the Communist armies in the field, and to direct their training.

²⁴ Although Chang Chün-mai (Carsun Chang) was doubtless expressing an opinion fully endorsed by the KMT, he was not a member of that party. He was a leader of one of the minor parties, the National-Socialist (later called Democratic-Socialist) Party.—*Ed.*

4. The "War Within a War," 1940-1945

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF KUOMINTANG AND COMMUNIST WARTIME POLICIES TOWARD EACH OTHER

It is impossible within the limits of this study to enumerate all the incidents in the Kuomintang-Communist inter-party struggle that ensued in the years after 1938. The pattern of the struggle was set within the first 18 months of the war. It has not changed to this day. But the struggle has become more and more intense.

The Communists operated along two lines: (1) expansion of their areas of military control, in which they established their own special form of democratic united front government, patterned after the "Soviet democracy of the toilers"; (2) exertion of the utmost possible pressure upon the Kuomintang and the people in Kuomintang-controlled areas for the introduction of democracy more in the Anglo-American than in the Soviet sense of the word. This paradoxical policy of the Communists toward the two separate areas of Communist and Kuomintang China was fully in line with the united front policy as laid down by the Congress of the Communist International in Moscow, 1935, which advocated a two-fold democratic program: "We [Communists] are adherents of Soviet democracy, the democracy of the toilers [in our areas of control] . . . But in the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend every inch of bourgeois democracy, because the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat so dictate."

The basic principles of the policy of the Communists toward the Kuomintang were announced on 28 March 1938 in the *Hsin-Hua jih-pao*, Communist Party organ, as follows: "The permitting of existence to only one political party and refusing legal status to other parties is not justifiable, while the abolition of all parties and merging them into one [the Kuomintang] is impossible. Therefore, we propose the

organization of a people's revolutionary alliance under the following three principles: (1) a joint policy to be adopted by all parties, to be followed by individual parties; (2) representatives of various parties to organize a united administration to formulate an anti-Japanese program and adjust party affairs; (3) all parties participating in the alliance to retain their political and organizational independence." To this should be added a fourth, and cardinal, point, namely that the Kuomintang and the CCP would maintain their separate armies.¹ There has been no change to this day of this policy of the Communists.

The Kuomintang's answer to this policy followed two main lines of action: (1) restriction of Communist areas of military-political control; (2) suppression of Communist activities in Kuomintang-controlled areas.

The one common policy of the two parties was that the war against Japan must be continued. This was the main factor in preventing the resumption of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war on the scale of pre-war days, and the reason why both parties tried to preserve, outwardly at least, the semblance of unity. The Kuomintang Government allowed a few Communist party members to reside in Chungking and some of the other larger cities in Free China, and the Communist newspaper in Chungking was permitted to continue publication, although under Kuomintang censorship. The Communists were also granted a small representation in the People's Political Council. The Communists accepted these "favors" for what they were worth. They gave them a chance to make their voice heard in the capital, to press their demands for democratic reforms, and to maintain public interest in the united front idea. In the People's Political Council, where Chou En-lai was one of the Communist members, the Communists could, in an official capacity, present their criticism of the Kuomintang and the Government.

THE KUOMINTANG ENFORCES A MILITARY BLOCKADE OF THE COMMUNIST AREA IN THE SHEN-KAN-NING BORDER REGION, 1939

The Kuomintang-Communist inter-party relations in the capital, never friendly although moderately polite, were, however, only a

¹ Mao Tse-tung said in October 1938: "As a result of special historical conditions the Kuomintang and Communist Party have their own armies. This is not a defect but a good point. Their own armed forces enable them to effect a division of labor in the war of resistance so that each does its best to fulfill its own responsibility. They constantly help and encourage each other."

faint reflection of the two-party relations in the provinces. For it was inevitable that the opposing policies of the two parties would lead to clashes between their armed forces. As the number of clashes increased from year to year, the military situation in China became more and more "a war within a war."

In the summer of 1939 the Chungking Government began to enforce a strict military blockade of the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. It had two objectives: first, the prevention of Communist military infiltration and elimination of Communist propaganda in Free China west and south of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region; second, the closing of any possible overland route between the Chinese Communist base areas in North China on the one hand, and Sinkiang and Soviet Russia on the other. The Japanese Army blocked all routes leading north through Inner Mongolia as far as to Pao-t'ou, the western terminal of the Ping-Sui Railway. From Pao-t'ou westwards the Chungking Government generals Fu Tso-i and Kao Kuei-tzu maintained a blockade of the northern border of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. The northwestern border facing Ninghsia and Kansu provinces was blockaded by Moslem troops of the three Ma Generals² who in 1937, before the conclusion of the united front, had inflicted on the Chinese Red Army one of its worst defeats. The Moslems in Kansu and Shensi provinces were reinforced by the First Group Army of General Hu Tsung-nan, allegedly the best equipped of all the Central Army forces. It had retreated to Shensi after its defeat and withdrawal from Shanghai at the end of 1937.

Soviet Russian aid to China was still continuing at this time. Lanchow, capital of Kansu province, had become a great transportation center for Soviet supplies brought overland to the Chungking Government via Sinkiang. Since Sinkiang was under Soviet influence, the Kuomintang authorities feared an attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists to extend their influence toward Sinkiang with the view of establishing an overland route to Soviet Russia. These were some of the factors that induced the Chungking Government to impose a blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Frequent border clashes occurred. The Communists lost some districts. In time a network of pill boxes was built by the Kuomintang forces along the southern and western approaches to the Communist base in the Shan-

² Ma Hung-k'uei, Governor of Ninghsia. Ma Pu-fang, Governor of Tsinghai. Ma Pi-ch'ing, Commander of Moslem troops in Kansu; he has since been forced out of Kansu by Chiang Kai-shek.

Kan-Ning Border Region. This blockade is still maintained although it has been slightly relaxed in the past few months.³

While the foregoing were important reasons for concentrating large forces of Government troops in the Northwest, not all the troops were there to oppose the Communists. A large part of Hu Tsung-nan's First Group Army was concentrated in the area south of the Yellow River bend to guard the vital T'ung-kuan (Pass) against a Japanese offensive toward Sian.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CHUNGKING GOVERNMENT AND CHINESE
COMMUNIST FORCES FOR POSSESSION OF GUERRILLA BASES
IN EAST CHINA, 1937-1940

In the guerrilla areas of Eastern China, frequent fighting between Kuomintang and Communist forces took place. Who was the actual attacker is in many cases impossible to determine, for both parties accused each other of breaking the peace, and no neutral observers, if present at the scenes of fighting, have submitted any reports of their impressions, insofar as is known. Two examples suffice to show the Communist method of presenting their case. In a press interview with Chinese reporters on 11 September 1939 Mao Tse-tung said: "In North China, Chang Yin-wu and Chin Chi-jung are experts in dissension—the former in Hopeh and the latter in Shantung. They have become very rampant and their activities are scarcely different from those of traitors. They have spent very little time in engaging the enemy, but have devoted much time in fighting the Eighth Route Army. I obtained strong proofs in this regard, such as Chang's orders to his troops to attack the Eighth Route Army, et cetera, which we have submitted to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek."⁴

Another typical statement by the Communists reads as follows: "Early in the summer [1940], disputes in North China [between Kuomintang and Communist forces] were fortunately solved through the demarcation of areas of operations [in Shansi and Hopeh] and the door to negotiations between the Kuomintang and Communist

³ In January 1945 it was reported that 200,000 Kuomintang troops were still blockading the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Since November 1944 about 20,000 troops have been moved south, presumably to Kweichow province.

⁴ "Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, The *Sao Tang Pao* and the *Hsin Min Pao*," SW, II, p. 272. The interview is dated 16 September 1939. The first was the official Government-KMT news agency, the second was run by KMT military interests, and the third represented the national bourgeoisie and the minor parties.—*Ed.*

parties was thus reopened. Efforts were made in the following months to settle various issues, and the Eighteenth Group Army was doing its utmost to prepare the 100-regiment battle against the enemy. Unexpectedly Shih Yü-san's troops, having obtained by deceit the support of the Central [Chungking] authorities, again crossed the [Yellow] River and entered Hopeh, and launched attacks in conjunction with the enemy and puppets. Disputes arose as fighting broke out."

This Communist story about Shih Yü-san is probably true. He was shot in 1940 by the Chungking commander, General Wei Li-huang, for working with the Japanese. Another Communist account of how his areas in southern Hopeh were taken over by the Communists is given by a private foreign observer who has lived in Communist-controlled areas of North China for several years. According to his information, also derived from Communist sources, the army of Shih Yü-san in South Hopeh and Shantung was much better equipped than the Eighth Route Army forces but its leader was "distrustful of democratic mass organization." As a result he was not able to withstand a large-scale Japanese attack and the areas he occupied have now come under Eighth Route Army control.

This version accords with the explanation usually given by the Communists of how they have expanded their areas of control. Piecing together the two Communist stories about Shih Yü-san as quoted above and similar stories, each of which fits its particular case, it appears that (according to the Communists) the Japanese are in the habit of frequently attacking and defeating Kuomintang generals who have been fighting together with them against the Communists, whereupon the Communist armies move in, take over control of the rural areas, and start organizing the people for guerrilla warfare.

Exactly why the Japanese should be interested in fighting Kuomintang generals who are cooperating with them in fighting the Communists is not explained by the Communists!

The Communist versions of Kuomintang attacks upon their forces are, however, usually devoid of obvious propaganda distortion. On the other hand, Kuomintang accusations against the Communists are often so full of obvious misstatements that it frequently becomes impossible to distinguish between the grain of truth and the mass of falsehood. This has, naturally, led to a tendency among many observers to trust statements by the Chinese Communists concerning Kuomintang activities, while almost entirely disregarding those of the Kuomintang concerning the Communists. Mao Tse-tung's state-

ment about the two "experts in dissension" may be true. However, since we have definite proof that General Ch'eng Ch'ien, C-in-C of the North China war area in 1937 and 1938, and General Wan Fu-lin and his troops of the 53rd Army actively cooperated with the Communists in Hopeh, but that they later disappeared from Hopeh, the Kuomintang version of what happened to one of the "experts in dissension," Chang Yin-wu, deserves a hearing.

Chang had a good reputation before the war (and he probably still has) as an honest, simple, and upright person. The son of a Shansi peasant, he was known for his simple manners and lack of pretense. As Mayor of Peiping during the late 1920's and early 1930's he established an outstanding record for honest and progressive administration. Here is the Kuomintang version of what happened to him:

Skipping over the [Kuomintang-Communist] clashes [in Hopeh] in 1938 . . . we find that large-scale systematic operations began in June 1939 and lasted till the end of March 1940. General Chang Yin-wu was C-in-C of the Hopeh People's Armies [Chungking guerrillas] and at the same time Commissioner of the Interior of the province. His troops occupied a circular area east of Cheng-ting on the Peiping-Hankow Railway . . . It was a flat country; nevertheless the People's Armies had fought seven successful guerrilla encounters with the Japanese in this area. The Communists could and should have been useful allies.

On the night of June 21, 1939, the headquarters of the People's Armies was suddenly surrounded by two Communist regiments under Ho Lung. The battle lasted two days and two nights until Chang's ammunition was exhausted and his troops were completely disarmed. Then the battle spread over 120 kilometers and over 40,000 Communist troops were employed, under Ho Lung, Liu Po-ch'eng, and Lü Cheng-ts'ao. Chang's troops escaped to the west of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, but the 129th Division of Liu Po-cheng, the 120th Division of Ho Lung, and the Youth Guards of Lü Cheng-ts'ao followed in hot pursuit until they completed the annihilation or disbandment of the People's Army. The Communists pushed further . . .

It may be true that Chang Yin-wu was the initial attacker. But in the final instance Ho Lung seems just as responsible for the fighting as Chang Yin-wu since he drove Chang out of his war zone. And if we accept Mao Tse-tung's statement that Chang Yin-wu was an "expert in dissension" and that he fought the Eighth Route Army, it must also be agreed that Ho Lung was a more successful "expert in dissension" and fought the Kuomintang forces.

The Communists' version of the inter-party war, namely, that they have been innocent victims of Kuomintang attacks and have been forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, has been ac-

cepted quite generally among foreign Allied observers. There can be no doubt that in many cases Kuomintang troops have attacked the Communists, forcing them to make counterattacks in self-defense. In granting this it would seem, however, that simple logic would prove conclusively that the Communists have been the chief attackers against the Kuomintang forces throughout the past eight years. From its tiny original base in north Shensi, the Eighth Route Army has spread out into vast areas of the coastal provinces of North China within and beyond the Great Wall, and the New Fourth Army has spread its influence over great areas of Central China. The Communist armies could not possibly be where they are today without having been on the offensive. And it is not without significance that the expansion of Communist control has been at the expense of Kuomintang areas far more than of Japanese-occupied areas.

The contention of the Communists, that they have throughout the war been forced to fight the Kuomintang forces in self-defense, implies that in order to defend their original wartime base area in north Shensi from Kuomintang attacks, they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater part of Shansi and Hopeh. In order to defend their "united front" bases in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region from Kuomintang attacks, they had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of the greater parts of Shantung and northern Honan and establish several new "united front" bases in these areas. And in order to defend their original base of the New Fourth Army in southern Anhwei and southern Kiangsu from Kuomintang forces, the New Fourth Army had to drive the Kuomintang forces out of all of Kiangsu, great parts of Anhwei, Chekiang, Hupeh, and southern Honan. If we accept the justice of this type of self-defense, we must also concede that the Japanese were justified in conquering great parts of China, and in order to defend their homeland and China, were forced to conquer the Philippine Islands and Southeast Asia. For the Japanese, just as the Chinese Communists in regard to themselves, claim that they have been "forced" to undertake these conquests in "self-defense."

The Kuomintang and the National Government permitted the Chinese Communists considerable freedom of action at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. The Government assigned to the Communists certain war areas in which they were to cooperate with the regular Central Army troops in the defense against the Japanese. Thus north Shensi, adjacent to the Communist base in the Shen-Kan-Ning

Border Region, was assigned to the Eighth Route Army. When the Eighth Route Army penetrated into Hopeh and began to organize a united front resistance after the collapse of organized resistance by the Central Army forces, the Government also sanctioned this move.

The Communists, however, continued to expand their areas of control, and it soon became evident to the Chungking authorities that they considered it within their right to expand into any war area of Eastern China without previous permission of their C-in-C, Chiang Kai-shek, or even consultation with the National Military Council or with the Government-appointed war zone commanders. This was, of course, an open violation by the Communists of their united front agreement with the Kuomintang, for in March 1937 the Communists had formally accepted the Government's terms for a united front, among them the abolition of the Red Army "and its incorporation into the Government's Central Army under direct control of the National Military Council."

While the regular Central Army forces were distributed in the various front sectors according to the plan of the High Command in Chungking, the Communist forces moved anywhere they liked according to plans laid down in Yen-an. And wherever they went they set up their own guerrilla bases and their own type of democratic united front governments which were linked with Yen-an instead of with Chungking. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that fighting with Government forces would develop. These latter had, after all, full right to be where they were, for they were there by order of the Government. The incursion of Communist power into their base areas and the establishment of a Communist-led administration which flouted the authority of the Chungking-appointed officials reduced the size of the areas of the Chungking forces on which they were dependent for their sources of supply. The Chungking forces became enraged over this invasion of their defense sectors. They had fought against the Japanese for the defense of their guerrilla bases. They fought against the Communists for the same reason, in self-defense.

Soon after the formation of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region in January 1938 (which did not include all areas within these provinces), Eighth Route Army forces under Ho Lung moved into southeastern Shansi to the T'ai-hang Shan area. This lay outside the defense area assigned to them by the Government. Fighting broke out with the Government's forces in which the latter suffered several defeats. Intermittent fighting continued for several years.

During the latter part of 1938, Communist forces under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien invaded northeastern Shantung and began establishing guerrilla bases on the Shantung promontory south of Chefoo and Lung-k'ou and in the areas around Tsinan, the Japanese-occupied capital of the province. This area also lay outside the defense zone assigned to the Communist forces by the Central Government. Fighting broke out with Government forces under Admiral Shen Hung-lieh and General Yü Hsüeh-chung, who tried to defend their bases. This fighting continued with intermittent pauses until 1943, when the greater part of the Government's forces were withdrawn from Shantung.

After most of the Government's troops had been forced out of Hopeh province (March 1940), the 115th Division (under Lin Piao) of the Eighth Route Army, supported by several independent detachments, crossed to the south bank of the Yellow River into western Shantung. This, again, was an invasion of areas which the Government had never assigned to the Communists. Fighting with Government forces broke out. The latter were forced to retreat. Western Shantung became another Communist base.

Following this the Eighth Route Army forces invaded eastern Honan and northern Anhwei provinces (early summer 1940) where they established contact with the forces of the New Fourth Army which had extended its influence northward from the Yangtze River. In August 1940 the Eighth Route Army forces in northwestern Shantung combined with those under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien in northeastern Shantung, and under Hsü's command they launched an invasion of the southern part of the province, fighting the Chungking forces for possession of bases. In October 1940 these Eighth Route Army forces invaded northern Kiangsu. In full coordination, the Eighth Route and New Fourth armies gradually extended their areas of control in Shansi, Shantung, Hopeh, Chahar, Suiyuan, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, Chekiang, and Hupeh. The Lunghai Railway became the dividing line between the areas of operations of the two armies.

The nucleus of another Communist armed force had been organized by the New Fourth Army in South China's Kwangtung province during 1939. The leader of this force, the 3rd Detachment, was Tseng Sheng, a graduate of Chungshan University in Canton. After a short time his force was accepted into the Kwangtung Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps under the Chungking commander Hsiang Han-p'ing. The 3rd Detachment adopted the name of Hui-yang Pao-an Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Corps, indicating its area of operations in

the Hong Kong region from the coast across the Hong Kong-Canton Railway to Hui-yang (Waiyeung). But in expanding its guerrilla areas it got into trouble with the Chungking forces and in March 1940 General Hsiang declared Tseng Sheng's guerrilla corps an "unauthorized party." Other Communist forces had meanwhile begun to establish guerrilla bases on Hainan Island.

This rapid expansion of Communist influence was new evidence of the capable leadership of the Communist army commanders, political commissars, propaganda workers, and mass mobilization organizers. But when stating this it must also be admitted that the Communist tactics were not conducive to the maintenance of the united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP. To the Communists any Chungking general who refused to welcome their armies into his defense zone and who fought against them for the defense of his base areas was a "traitor" and an "expert in dissension." On the other hand, the Chungking army leaders accused the Communists of unpardonable breaches of military discipline, and of supporting the Japanese by fighting the Government forces.

The Chungking Government repeatedly asked the Communists at least to agree to a clear demarcation of defense zones, as a means of avoiding the hopeless confusion created by the intrusion of Communist armies into the defense zones of Chungking Government forces, and averting the resultant inter-party fighting. The Government finally offered the Communists all of North China north of the Yellow River (that is, the pre-1938 bed of the Yellow River) except southern Shansi, as their defense zone, provided they would withdraw the New Fourth Army to North China.

In September 1940 Chou En-lai also stated to an American observer in Chungking that although no formal agreement had been signed, a settlement had been reached with the Government "to the satisfaction of both sides" involving a clear demarcation of defense areas, the size of the Eighth Route Army, and the exact number of *hsien* to be included in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. According to Chou the Government had agreed to hand over the area north of the Yellow River to the military control of the Eighth Route Army. The Communists had accepted this. But at the very time Chou En-lai made this statement Eighth Route Army forces were successfully fighting Government forces for the possession of their guerrilla bases in southern Shantung.⁵

⁵ Information obtained in Chungking at this time was often extremely misleading. Chou En-lai let it be known that the Communists were satisfied with the

In December 1940 Generals Ho Ying-ch'in and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, C-of-S and Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army respectively, sent a telegram to General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Eighteenth Group Army [Eighth Route Army], and General Yeh T'ing, C-in-C of the New Fourth Army, in answer to their complaints about "attacks" of Kuomintang troops upon the Communists and their request that the Government order a cessation of the "attacks." The two Chungking generals said among other things:

Ever since the days when the present war broke out, the Eighteenth Group Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Second War Zone while the New Fourth Army was included in the Order of Battle of the Third War Zone immediately after the said Army was organized. They have each been given their respective operational areas, and definite operational objectives were assigned them as well. In fact you have failed to carry out the stipulations outlined in the order . . . On the contrary, your troops marched into Hopeh and Chahar without orders from the Government. Then a part of your troops were dispatched to Shantung and finally the New Fourth Army was secretly transferred from areas south of the Yangtze River to the north. As a next step, the troops which you sent to Shantung to create disturbances there were dispatched farther south and they, in coordination with other units of your forces, made a joint attack on Government troops stationed in north Kiangsu.

What we want to know is whose orders were you acting upon when you moved your troops away from your respected designated war areas and who ordered you to attack your friendly units . . . Wherever your troops went, they treated their comrade units as enemies and attacked them as such . . . Who ordered you to conduct this internecine war? . . . Your troops have succeeded in their plans of occupying territories and disorganizing Government troops to swell your own ranks and you, too, have succeeded in establishing an independent system of administration in the territory

Government's behavior. The Government also seemed satisfied, because the Communists had "more or less" agreed to the transfer of the New Fourth Army from Central to North China. Chou En-lai indicated that the Communists had agreed to this, for he said (Sept. 1940) that the remaining problem to be solved was the transfer of the New Fourth Army to North China. The Government indicated its satisfaction over this settlement by appointing Chou En-lai to the post of Vice Director of the War Areas Kuomintang Affairs Board, an organization which maintains control of Chinese political affairs in occupied provinces of China. In view of this, American observers commented that "present-day relations" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist party are highly satisfactory and that "an open break is scarcely conceivable between the two groups so long as the Communists continue to afford General Chiang Kai-shek full support in his policy of resistance." And yet, at this very time, fighting went on between Kuomintang and Communist troops in Shantung and Kiangsu, with the Communists expanding their influence in Shantung and Kiangsu instead of withdrawing to the north. Three months later in January 1941, Kuomintang and Communist troops were involved in the biggest clash of the war-period.

under your occupation. These were the actual causes of the so-called "frictions, controversies, and complications" [of which you complain to the Government] . . . All these incidents [in 1940 of which you complain] occurred either in north Kiangsu or in south Shantung, which had nothing to do whatsoever with the operational areas assigned to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army. If you could really obey orders of the Government . . . such frictions and controversies could never have occurred, a fact which is as plain as a book . . . By pursuing this policy of attacking your own countrymen in an effort to swell your own ranks you have virtually forgotten . . . that what is disadvantageous to us is advantageous to the enemy.

These statements were true. Had matters been reversed, with the CCP instead of the Kuomintang the dominant party in China in control of the Central Government, there can be little doubt that the Communists would have objected to having a Kuomintang army moving around through all the Communist anti-Japanese base areas demanding that the Communists make room for them and accept a Kuomintang-led united front administration.

THE NEW FOURTH ARMY "INCIDENT" OF JANUARY 1941⁶

By the summer of 1939 it was apparent to everyone that the revolutionary struggle between the Kuomintang and the CCP had in no way ended with the united front; the contest between the two parties for the supreme control of China was continuing in the midst of the war against Japan. The Government was, however, at a disadvantage in countering the Communist threat, for it could take only limited action. It could not afford an all-out offensive against the Communists. Such a move would have meant the collapse of resistance against Japan and the loss of the war. And it would have deprived the Government of whatever popular following it had and would have incurred the condemnation of the whole world. But while both the Kuomintang and the Communists were determined to continue the war against Japan, it became obvious that each party was fighting to win the war in its own behalf.

In September 1939 General Chang Ch'ün, then Secretary-General of the Supreme National Defense Council, stated publicly that the united front no longer existed. This did not mean that the Government had broken off relations with the Communists. It continued to deal with them and even made some concessions to them. At times

⁶ An excellent account of this incident is contained in Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, 1962), pp. 136-40.—Ed.

there was also active cooperation between the Central Army and Communist forces against the Japanese. But the relations between the Government and the Communists assumed more and more the form of a temporary alliance. The united front was recognized for what it was, a truce. In October 1939 when an American observer asked General Chu Shih-ming, at that time Director of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how he thought the differences between the Central Government and the Communists could be settled, General Chu said that he felt that when the war with Japan was over the Government would be able to "wipe out" the Communists.

In an interview with the American correspondent Mr. Edgar Snow in September 1939, Mao Tse-tung indicated that the Communists did not recognize the existence of the united front more than the Kuomintang and that they were intent upon building up their own state organization that would challenge the authority of the Kuomintang.⁷ He said: "We [Chinese Communists] claim . . . leadership over the peasants and workers, and it is of two kinds, political and organizational. In the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region and in the guerrilla districts under the Eighth Route Army we possess not only political leadership, but organizational hegemony." This was an open admission that the Communists had broken their pledge of 1937 not to maintain their own independent political organization but to recognize the authority of the National Government. In answer to Mr. Snow's question as to whether a united front really existed, and Snow's comment that General Chang Ch'ün had stated that no united front existed, Mao Tse-tung replied by referring to Hitler and Ah Q, a character in one of the stories by the famous Chinese Communist novelist Lu Hsün: "There is a certain group of people who attempt to ignore facts, like Ah Q and like Adolf Hitler. You know, Hitler said some time ago that the Soviet Union was only a name, and maintained that there was really no such country in the world. But after a while Hitler became more educated, and made some progress. On August 23, 1939, Hitler discovered not only the nominal existence of the USSR, but the reality of it."⁸ The implication of this remark was, of

⁷ The account of this very hard-hitting interview may be found in the *China Weekly Review*, 13 Jan. 1940; 20 Jan. 1940. The quotation here introduced is in the 13 Jan. issue, p. 246. It was evidently on the basis of this interview that Snow concluded that the CCP remained thoroughly communist in its ideology and ultimate goals (see above, pp. 9-10).—*Ed.*

⁸ This refers to the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact.

course, that as the power of the Chinese Communists expanded and more and more areas in China came under their control, the Kuomintang would in time be forced to seek a compromise with them.

The Communists defended their actions in establishing independent base areas on the grounds that the Kuomintang and the Government would not treat them as equals and would not accord them freedom of action within the limits of democratic rights. They pointed out that the Government refused to extend legal recognition to the CCP. It refused the Communists representation in the Government and in the National Military Council, in view of which they maintained that it was impossible for them to obtain assurance of fair treatment. The Government, furthermore, refused to mobilize the people for prolonged resistance against Japan through what was, according to the Communists, the only means possible: "the development of partisan warfare, progress in the process of national democratization, [and] the growth and development of the people's movement."

No matter how justified the Communists may have been in these contentions it was inevitable that they would antagonize the Government, which had no interest in any "process of national democratization" and which saw in the expansion of the Communists' influence only an attempt on their part to use the united front and the war against Japan as a means of increasing and consolidating their power.

The bitter anti-Communist sentiment in Government circles found its most violent expression in the New Fourth Army "incident" in January 1941. The Headquarters of the New Fourth Army at Mao-lin in southern Anhwei province was attacked on 6 January by the Chungking forces of the 9th Army under General Ku Chu-t'ung, Commander of the Third War Zone, and General Shang-kuan Yün-hsiang, Commander of all Government forces in south Anhwei province. For eight days a battle raged between the Government forces, numbering nearly 80,000 troops according to a pro-Communist source, and the New Fourth Army Headquarters force, which included 4,000 troops, about 2,000 wounded soldiers and officers, and more than 3,000 political workers, cadets, medical service people and their families. More than 2,000 New Fourth Army fighters were killed and between 3,000 and 4,000 wounded. More than 2,000, including many political workers, were taken prisoner. Commander Yeh T'ing was wounded and taken prisoner (he is still being held) and the Deputy Commander, Hsiang Ying, was killed. The Government forces

suffered more than 20,000 casualties according to the Hong Kong "Far Eastern Bulletin." It also reported that several thousand of the local residents were killed.

The New Fourth Army was created in October 1937 by order of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It was formed out of remnants of the former Red Army which had been left behind in Kiangsi and Fukien after the Communists started the Long March in the fall of 1934. As late as the summer of 1937 these forces were still defending themselves against Kuomintang forces in the lower Yangtze valley. As a sign of his support of the united front, Chiang Kai-shek ordered these Communist guerrilla units to be formed into an army. He appointed General Yeh T'ing, a pro-Communist officer, as Commander of the New Fourth, with Hsiang Ying, an experienced Communist military leader, as Vice-Commander.⁹ The army was organized in February 1938 and went into action in April. Its strength at that time was reported as 12,000 officers and men.

Its first field of operation lay south of the Yangtze River, in Kiangsi and Fukien. It was later ordered by the Government to operate in the Shanghai-Nanking area. A small force of the New Fourth was sent by General Yeh T'ing to the Tientsin-Pukow Railway front north of Nanking, without authorization from the Government. The army became especially active in the areas between Shanghai and Wu-hu (southwest of Nanking).

It made an outstanding record. On 26 June 1938 General Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have addressed a telegram to Commander Yeh T'ing, stating: "... You have enjoined upon your subordinates the determination to advance but not to retreat. This precisely manifests your loyalty to the state. This is really worthy of praise and comfort." In December 1939 General Ku Chu-t'ung, under whom the New Fourth Army operated, sent a telegram of commendation to Yeh T'ing. The New Fourth was also highly commended in 1939 by General Pai Ch'ung-hsi, the Deputy C-of-S of the Chinese Army. Like the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth received support in money and ammunition from the Central Government. The relations between the New Fourth and the Kuomintang¹ armies in the lower Yangtze were comparatively good.

The New Fourth, however, adopted the same tactics in Central

⁹ It is unclear why the report refers to Yeh T'ing as "a pro-Communist officer." He was widely known to be a Party member, and had taken part in both the Nanch'ang uprising (August 1927) and the Canton Commune (December 1927). —Ed.

China as the Eighth Route Army used in the North. It began to introduce the familiar and successful system of united front democracy, of the same pattern the Communists were following in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and elsewhere in North China. And the people willingly rallied to the side of the New Fourth Army, partly because of its struggle against the Japanese invaders, partly because of the economic-political program it enforced in areas under its control. In no area of China had the people been more heavily burdened by the abuses of landlords, usurers, and tax and rent collectors than in the thickly populated provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang. And in no areas of China had the Kuomintang been more powerful than in these two provinces. To the common man the Kuomintang was partly responsible for the misery of his existence, for the representatives of the Kuomintang, the Government, and Central Army in most villages and towns were the close associates, friends, and protectors of the landlords. Many of them were landlords themselves. In its struggle against the abuses of the native landlord class and the Kuomintang, as well as against the Japanese, the New Fourth Army brought liberation to thousands.

As new areas were brought under its control, the New Fourth Army recruited more soldiers and began to arm the people. By 1939 its strength grew to 35,000. By May 1940 it had grown to over 100,000 troops. In addition some 500,000 guerrillas and local militia were operating under its command on both sides of the lower Yangtze. By January 1941 the regular army numbered 125,000 troops, according to one report. The New Fourth was beginning to assume the same kind of independence in its areas of control as the Eighth Route Army enjoyed in North China. In September 1940 the New Fourth Army was operating in various districts of Anhwei, Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Hupeh. Thus it had not only expanded far beyond its operational base in the Third War Zone, assigned to it by the Government, but had invaded the Fifth War Zone in Anhwei and Hupeh where it began to compete with the Government's forces for operational bases.

This led to friction and clashes with Government troops who refused to evacuate their base areas to make room for the New Fourth. The Communist propaganda presented this as a case of Kuomintang "attacks" upon Communist troops and Kuomintang collaboration with the Japanese. The Government's viewpoint has been stated in the preceding section of this study; the behavior of the New Fourth Army was in violation of every agreement the Communists had made with the Government.

At the beginning of 1940 most of the New Fourth Army troops were south of the Yangtze River. In line with the informal agreement of 1940, referred to above for the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army to North China, units of the New Fourth began to cross to the north bank of the Yangtze River during the latter part of 1940. By the end of 1940 they were reported to have transferred about three-fourths of their troops to the north side of the Yangtze and were proceeding north. The Government authorities, however, considered that the Communists were too slow in moving. On 9 December 1940 the National Military Council issued orders specifically directing the New Fourth Army to abandon its positions in the lower Yangtze region and remove northward to join the Eighth Route Army in Hopeh.

In acknowledging the receipt of this order General Yeh T'ing was reported to have requested CN\$500,000 for a mobilization fund and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition from the Government. Communist sources stated in December 1940 that the Government had made "certain grants" in money and ammunition after receipt of this request. At the same time the Eighth Route Army leaders reminded the Government that its allotments for their troops were several months in arrears and that they required increased supplies of equipment for military action against the Japanese forces. This latter request was ignored by the Government. By the end of December, the local Commanders of the Government forces in Anhwei and Kiangsu had become convinced that the New Fourth and Eighth Route Army leaders were not sincere in their promises to move north. Not only was Yeh T'ing remaining with his headquarters staff south of the Yangtze, but both New Fourth and Eighth Route Army forces were pressing their campaigns in north Kiangsu and south Shantung against Government troops for the possession of bases. On 6 January 1941 Government forces launched the attack, mentioned above, on General Yeh T'ing's headquarters. On 12 January 1941 the Government decreed that the New Fourth Army should be disbanded.

This attack was on such a large scale that it attracted nationwide attention. It brought an avalanche of protests against the Government from the Communists and all liberal groups in Kuomintang-controlled China, who accused the Government of intending to start a civil war and of cooperating with the Japanese against the Communists. The foreign press reflected the same sentiment. When the People's Political Council was convened in Chungking on 1 March 1941, the seven Communist delegates failed to attend. But Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu, two of the Communist representatives of the Council, sub-

mitted by letter to the Secretariat of the Council, 24 demands of the Communist Party, divided into two parts: "rehabilitation measures," and "measures for a provisional settlement."

The most important among the former included: demands for abolition of the one-party dictatorship and the introduction of democracy; realization of Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People; formation of a combined committee of various political parties, each party and clique to have one delegate, of which the Kuomintang and Communist delegates were to be chairman and vice-chairman respectively; appointment of a Communist to the Presidium of the People's Political Council; freedom of speech; release of all political prisoners; and discontinuance of Government censorship of the press.

The group of "measures for a provisional settlement" included demands for discontinuance of military attacks by Government troops against the Communists, withdrawal of the Government's "Communist Suppression Army" from Central China,¹⁰ withdrawal of the Government's order to disband the New Fourth Army, punishment of the ringleaders of the New Fourth Army incident, Government sanction of the formation of a new Communist army corps in addition to the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army ("the CCP should control a total of six armies"), lifting of the military blockade of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and official recognition of the "anti-Japanese democratic political powers behind the enemy's lines." Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te had issued a joint statement in February 1941 stating that unless the New Fourth Army were reconstituted and its leader freed, and unless it were molested no further, the united front could no longer continue.

In a speech before the People's Political Council on 6 March 1941, the Generalissimo refuted these demands. He defended the attack on the New Fourth Army and stated that acceptance of the Communists' demands meant, in effect, that the Government would commit itself not to "suppress disobedient and rebellious troops and that the Government authorities should be punished for so doing." He emphasized that the Communists' demands also implied that "the Government should establish special areas outside the sphere of its authority and restrict its power to check illegal activities."

In regard to the activities of the Communist armies, Chiang Kai-shek said that "the consistent policy of the Government has been to

¹⁰ There was no army specifically designated "Communist Suppression Army" in Central China.

nationalize our armies. That is, under the supreme command of the National Government there is but one system of individual parties or private persons . . . There can be but one source of command. Should a second presume to assert itself, it would be indistinguishable from the 'military council' of Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime . . . All that is required is a complete change in the attitude and actions of the Communist Party in no longer regarding the Eighteenth Group Army as its peculiar possession or as an instrument for the obstruction of other sections of the national forces to the detriment of resistance."

In regard to the Communists' demands for democracy, Chiang said that "the political principle of the Government is to democratize the national political system. All citizens . . . should . . . possess all due freedom of action, but sovereignty is indivisible. If a second source of political authority were to be allowed to exist outside the Government—such, for example, as might be called ' . . . a democratic authority behind the enemy lines,' mentioned in these [Communist] demands—it would not differ from the traitorous administration in Nanking and Manchuria. Although as a result of the nation's historical development there is now but one party exercising administrative power, while others of varying size and permanency are 'in opposition,' yet all parties exist in a spirit of equality . . ." ¹¹

Here the matter rested. Chiang Kai-shek spoke from the point of view of a traditionalist who insists on his legal rights. The Communists insisted on their revolutionary right to question the moral value of the Government's legal rights. Throughout the following years, in many negotiations between Kuomintang and Communist representatives for a settlement of their two-party problem, these demands and counter-demands as quoted above were repeated with monotonous sameness.

But while the two parties' representatives kept up their futile negotiations in Chungking, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army (under its Acting Commander, General Ch'en I who replaced Yeh T'ing) kept expanding their influence into Government areas, establishing new guerrilla bases wherever they went. The Chungking Government's armies were gradually being forced out of all the coastal provinces of East China north of the Yangtze River.

¹¹ These are extracts from the message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the People's Political Council (6 March 1941) in response to the various demands of the CCP. The message is contained in *The China White Paper*, pp. 526-30. The CCP position is set forth in "Order and Statement on the Southern Anwei Incident," SW, II, 451-58.—*Ed.*

A VIRTUAL TRUCE WITH THE "PUPPET" ARMIES WHILE THE
CHUNGKING-COMMUNIST FORCES CONTINUE THE
"WAR WITHIN THE WAR," 1942-1945

In the years that followed the New Fourth Army incident the Kuomintang-controlled Government in Chungking centered its attention increasingly on the problem of conserving its military strength in order to strengthen its internal position, primarily against the Communists. To this end it became less and less willing to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese. This became especially noticeable after the entry of the United States into the war.

While the Government never ceased to resist the Communists in the war areas of East China, the burden of fighting them there tended to shift more and more to the Japanese and the Chinese puppet armies. Many Chungking Government troops (although few regular Central Army or Kuomintang troops) joined the puppet army to fight the Communists with Japanese support. Before the start of the Japanese offensive in China in 1944, a virtual truce between Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops had existed for several years along some front sectors. The majority of the Chungking armies in Shantung and Kiangsu withdrew in 1943 into areas of Free China in Honan and Anhwei, leaving only a few guerrilla units behind. As a result practically all of the coastal provinces of North China came under either Communist or Japanese control. Several times since 1943 Chungking troops have fought Communist forces attempting to expand their areas in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, southern Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Kwangtung.

Meanwhile the Government has centered most of its attention on strengthening the blockade of Communist areas in the Northwest and on consolidating its power in West China. The Kuomintang had never been strong in this part of China. It felt its position endangered by a number of military leaders who, though loyal to the Government in supporting the war against Japan, felt no loyalty to the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang resumed its pre-war policy of intolerance toward all opposition groups. The reactionary elements gained supreme control, and the Government became increasingly oppressive and dictatorial. The result was that it lost most of the popular support it had enjoyed at the beginning of the war. Its intolerance has driven several of the minority groups in Chungking-controlled China to consider the formation of a political coalition against Chungking. They

seek American support for this coalition not so much as a means of overthrowing the Chungking Government as of forcing the Government to abandon its system of one-party dictatorship. Some of the minority groups within the coalition now contemplate forming a new united front with the Communists against both Chungking and Japan.

The Chinese Communists on their part have greatly expanded their areas of control since the New Fourth Army incident in 1941, partly at the expense of the Japanese but chiefly at the expense of Chungking-controlled areas. From control of about 35,000 square miles with a population of about 1,500,000 people at the beginning of 1937, the Communists have expanded their control to about 225,000 square miles with a population of about 85,000,000 people.¹² About 23,000,000 people have been added to their control in the past year alone, mostly through conquest of Chungking-controlled areas.

The Communists have also competed with the Chungking Government in winning the favor of the Chinese puppet forces, and have probably been as successful in this respect as Chungking. Just as in the case of several of the Chungking-Japanese front sectors before 1944, a virtual truce between the Communists and the Japanese has existed during the past two years on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors.

The two chief factors contributing to the growth of Communist power and prestige in the past two years have been the growing anti-Kuomintang movement in Chungking-controlled China since 1943, and the Japanese offensive against the Chungking forces in 1944. Communist forces fought Chungking forces during the Japanese offensive last year. The latest information available indicates that they are at present fighting Chungking in several areas of East China.

The Chinese war effort against Japan became obscured by the intense inter-party rivalry going on in the midst of war. The history of this inter-party struggle, against the background of the war against Japan, presents both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in a most unfavorable light.

The Chungking Government's policy of conserving its military strength led it to keep many of its best armies away from the front in East China, and although some of its better armies were stationed in front areas, many of the front line troops represented military units

¹² The Communists claim at present that they control 520,000 sq. miles with a population of about 100,000,000. These figures are considered too high, especially the figure for areas controlled. [See below, p. 141.—*Ed.*]

which were undesirable to the Kuomintang; some were the troops of warlords, like P'ang Ping-hsün and Wu Hua-wen, others of Nationalist leaders who had formerly fought against Chiang Kai-shek, like Li Tsung-jen of the Kwangsi Military Clique, Yü Hsüeh-chung of the former Manchurian (Tungpei) Army, and Hsüeh Yüeh of the Kwangtung Military Clique.

After the United States entered the war and American military aid was extended to China, Chungking's unwillingness to commit its best armies to fight the Japanese became even more apparent. American observers came to believe that many leading Chinese Government officials felt that China had done her part in fighting Japan and that it was henceforth up to the United States and Britain to defeat Japan. American officials in China repeatedly complained in their reports about the Chinese Government's lack of interest even in supporting the American war effort in China, and emphasized that Chinese troops "that could be used for the protection of our air bases are stationed elsewhere to blockade Chinese Communist areas." In September 1943 General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Secretary-General of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, agreed with an American observer in Chungking that it was "unfortunate" that so many Government troops were immobilized because of the Chinese Communists. He said that "about 20 divisions of good soldiers" were "prevented from fighting Japan."

The prevailing attitude among many Chinese is well illustrated by the following examples. American officers have observed how Chinese troops stationed at American air bases have frequently refused to shoot at Japanese raiding planes. Asked by an American officer for the reason for this behavior, a Chinese officer at Lao-ho-k'ou air base in Hupeh answered (November 1944): "Well you see, if we shot down a Jap plane, the Japs would be angry and would take revenge and return and bomb the city and do a lot of damage." Another Chinese officer expressed the opinion that "it is not necessary for the Chinese to take up an offensive against the Japs because soon the United States forces will surround Japan and then the Japs will have to retreat without fighting, and so it is better to leave them (Japs) alone, and get along as best we can as we are."

This remark not only shows the reliance which many Chinese have come to place upon the United States to relieve China of the presence of the Japanese, but also indicates the method by which the Japanese

will withdraw from China according to the speculation of some Chinese. In August 1944 the *National Herald*, an English-language newspaper in Chungking (reputedly sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), expressed an opinion on this subject which is quite generally held among Chinese: "As we have already had occasion to point out in these columns before, the Japanese militarists will in all probability give up the struggle when Japan Proper has been invaded and they have been crushingly defeated by the Allies in their homeland. However, if the Japanese should keep on fighting on the Asiatic mainland even after their homeland has been occupied, the Allies of course must carry out a land campaign in China . . . Some Americans are right in saying that 'most infantry work can be done by the Chinese . . .' Nevertheless, the fact remains that the use of the newest weapons of war cannot be learned in a few days or weeks. By the time when it will be possible to bring these weapons to China in large quantities it will be too slow a process to teach the millions of Chinese troops how to use them . . . The best way, we believe, is for the United States to send a large expeditionary force—say, 1,000,000 men—to China as soon as landings in this country can be effected and immediately start to drive the Japanese into the sea."

This question of the withdrawal of the Japanese has occupied the thoughts of many Chinese leaders both in Chungking and in Yen-an for many years, especially since the American Forces in the Pacific started their offensive against the Japanese. The ports on the China coast, the cities along the Yangtze River, the railroads, the mines, and the great agricultural plains in the coastal provinces of Central and North China comprise the heart of China. Their repossession means, to the Chungking Government, the consummation of victory over Japan. These areas, now held by the Japanese, are also essential to the Kuomintang as a base for carrying on the post-war struggle against the Communists.

The Chinese Communists, at present confined to scattered rural areas, also look forward to establishing their control over as many of these Japanese-occupied areas, cities, and transportation lines as possible. Control over these would not only give them the fruits of the victory over Japan, but also place them in an almost indomitable position vis-à-vis the Kuomintang.

Since many Chinese expect that the Japanese will withdraw without fighting from great parts of the areas they now hold in China, the

question of whether these areas will go to Chungking or Yen-an depends largely on which of the two armies, Chungking's or Yen-an's, will be the first to move in and take over control.

This vital question has led to an intense competition between the Kuomintang and the Communists in preparing for the re-occupation of Japanese-controlled areas. Their attention has been centered on the Chinese puppet troops whom the Japanese have employed in increasing numbers, especially since the beginning of 1942. They are used mainly as garrison forces, together with Japanese troops, to maintain order in Japanese areas and guard them against attacks from either Chungking or Chinese Communist forces. It is assumed by both Kuomintang and Communist leaders that these puppet forces will remain, after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, in the areas now occupied by the Japanese. The party that wins the favor of these troops may, therefore, be able to unite with the puppet forces and effect a peaceful occupation of the Japanese-controlled areas.

The puppet army is composed partly of Chinese recruited and trained by the Japanese, partly (and probably mainly) of deserters from the Chungking Government army, and partly of Communist troops. During the interminable struggle during the first four years of the war between Chungking and Communist forces in the guerrilla areas of East China it was inevitable that some of the Chungking Government commanders came to feel that they had here a common cause with Japan, for both they and the Japanese were fighting the Communists. This applies especially to the former warlords in North China who had first been swept away by the Japanese during their defense of large cities and transportation lines and thereafter, in their efforts to maintain control over rural areas, had been faced by pressure and attacks from both the Communists and the Japanese. These warlords have little feeling of loyalty to anyone. Their main concern is the preservation of their own power. The Chungking Government had little use for them and left them without adequate support to fight either the Japanese or the Communists.

The Japanese, on the other hand, were anxious to develop a puppet army to support their anti-Communist campaigns and to maintain order within their occupied areas. They offered these warlords better pay and more prestige than did the Chungking Government. Denied adequate support from Chungking and unable to cope with the Communists and the Japanese at one and the same time, many of them joined the puppet forces to serve under the Japanese. This placed

them in a far more advantageous position against the Communists whom they considered their chief enemy.

In the course of 1942 and 1943 a great number of these warlords joined the Japanese. Among them were the aforementioned General P'ang Ping-hsün, the Chungking appointed commander of the Hopeh-Chahar War Zone, and General Wu Hua-wen, who according to Japanese reports joined them with some 50,000 troops. In 1943 he was appointed commander of the puppet anti-Communist forces in Shantung.

The Chinese Communists maintain that the Chungking Government encouraged the desertion of troops to the Japanese in an effort to support the Japanese anti-Communist campaign. The composition of this anti-Communist puppet army, made up largely of troops who were disgruntled with the treatment accorded them by the Chungking Government, does not support this contention. But there are strong evidences that in the course of the mass desertions in 1942 and 1943 the Kuomintang leaders gradually developed a scheme for making use of the puppet troops, both as a means of fighting the Communists during the war and for gaining control of Japanese-occupied areas after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. An American observer in China [John S. Service, in a memo dated 13 Nov. 1943—*Ed.*], in a report on the "willingness" of Chungking military leaders to become puppets, concludes that the "creation of an anti-Communist army in North China, eventually to be used by the Kuomintang, is probably more of a fortuitous development, as far as the Kuomintang is concerned, than a deep-laid Kuomintang plot with Japanese connivance."

It was apparent to the Kuomintang leaders that the warlords who had joined the Japanese, and their poorly disciplined troops, would hardly be able to defend themselves indefinitely against the Communists after the withdrawal of the Japanese from China. They might, therefore, be willing to reaffirm their loyalty to the Kuomintang Government as soon as the Japanese withdraw from China. Meanwhile these puppet forces, operating from Japanese bases and in conjunction with Japanese troops, are in a better position than the Chungking troops to fight the Communists. The North China warlords, who had been of little use to Chungking as long as they served in the Chungking army, became invaluable to Chungking after they joined the puppets.

In December 1943 General Hsi En-sui, the Vice C-of-S of the First

War Zone (including parts of Honan and Shansi), told an American observer that the Chungking Government would use puppet troops to oppose the Communists in North China.¹³ He said that General Chang Lan-feng, a former Chungking commander, commanded the best equipped, trained, and disciplined of the puppet forces, numbering about 50,000 troops. These were stationed in east Honan. He stated that General Chang was in close touch with Chungking Government armies and that he was very helpful in supplying Chungking armies with needed supplies and information. General Hsi also mentioned other puppet forces in North China with whom the Chungking Government maintained close relations. At the same time it was reported that on many sectors along the front between Chungking and Japanese-Chinese puppet troops there existed a "virtual truce."

The Chungking Government also adopted, officially, a lenient attitude toward the puppets who were considered pro-Chungking, anti-Communist, and in a sense also anti-Japanese. In February 1943 a Chungking army spokesman declared during a press conference that the Nanking puppet army of 300,000 men "is threatening to boomerang against the Japanese," because "Free Chinese have filtered into it." In November 1943 Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared during a foreign press conference that Chinese participating in the activities of the puppet regime in China were not regarded by the Chinese Government as war criminals.

This attitude toward the puppets led to a form of indirect collaboration between the Chungking Government and Japan against the Communists. The war areas of North China became more and more divided between the Japanese or their puppets and the Chinese Communists, with the Chungking Government forces either joining the puppets to fight the Communists or withdrawing into Free China areas within the provinces of Honan and Anhwei. Here they tried to stop the penetration of the Communists westward and southward into Chungking Government territories.

In March 1943 it was reported by Chinese sources in Chungking close to the Government that the Government had lost contact with the Kiangsu provincial government and that it was "feared" that the provincial leaders had gone over to the Japanese. In September 1943 General Han Te-ch'in, the Governor of Kiangsu who was at that time

¹³ This probably refers to reports sent from Loyang by Everett F. Drumright. See *FRUS, 1943: China*, pp. 386-87; also cf. *ibid.*, p. 270. Mr. Drumright later became Ambassador to the Republic of China in Taiwan, 1958-62.—*Ed.*

a refugee at Kweiyang, stated during a press interview that "Central Government authority in Kiangsu is nonexistent due to the withdrawal of Chungking troops from north Kiangsu to Anhwei in the summer of 1945" and that "Chungking has no intention of taking action against the Communists in Kiangsu at this time. Communist forces appear to be in complete control of all points not under Japanese occupation in that part of Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River and in the entire province of Shantung." Chinese sources at Sian stated that while in Kiangsu, General Han Te-ch'in had been taken prisoner by units of the New Fourth Army following a clash late in 1941.¹⁴ He had subsequently been released and arrived at Sian in September 1943. Communist sources in Chungking confirmed this, adding that General Han Te-ch'in had been released after he had signed an agreement to withdraw his troops from eastern Kiangsu north of the Yangtze River.

Han Te-ch'in's statement that Chungking no longer controlled any part of Shantung was confirmed in October 1943, when the American observers in Chungking reported that under orders of the Generalissimo the Chungking armies in Shantung were in process of withdrawal and that no regular troops were left north of the Yellow River, except for the small area in southwestern Shansi where General Yen Hsi-shan maintains his base. The report emphasized that the important provinces of the north had thus been almost completely stripped of Chungking troops except for a few remaining guerrilla troops. The report added that the military authorities in the Sian region "apparently" occupied themselves chiefly with more close relations with the puppet forces which, when they feel it is safe, will adhere to Chungking.¹⁵

According to Communist sources, while in 1941 there were nearly 1,000,000 Chungking troops in the war areas of East China, by the summer of 1944 their number had been reduced to between 20,000 and 30,000. This presumably refers to the war areas in which the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies operate north of the Yangtze River. The Communists also maintained that time that 67 Chungking generals had gone over to the Japanese, and that no less than 62

¹⁴ Another source states that General Han Te-ch'in was captured by the New Fourth Army during an attack in northern Kiangsu on Chungking forces in June 1943.

¹⁵ This summary is apparently based on the reports of various consular officers. See *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 313-14.—*Ed.*

percent of the puppet troops were former Chungking Government troops.¹⁶ The Communists have also made a great propaganda issue of the desertion of Chungking officers and troops to the Japanese, accusing the Chungking Government itself of collaboration with the Japanese.

There is unquestionably a measure of truth in this, in that Chungking and Japan have indirectly cooperated against the Communists. But apparently this cooperation has always been through the puppets, or rather through those groups among the puppets who are anti-Communist. As far as the Chungking Government is concerned there is no indication that its cooperation with the puppets has signified any willingness to come to terms with the Japanese, except on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. On many occasions, especially since the entry of the United States into the war, the Japanese have attempted, usually through the puppets, to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government. These attempts have always ended in failure.

Failure of the attempts at peace negotiations induced the Japanese in 1944 to launch their greatest offensive in China since 1938. It was, according to their own statements in July 1944, directed against the Anglo-American "encroachment" in China, not against the "Chungking-related armies," which would be treated as friends if they would "cast off the Anglo-American yoke." The defense put up by the Chungking armies, especially by the units of the regular Kuomintang or Central Army, was according to all reports poorly planned and executed. There was considerable disunity among the Chinese commanders. But on several fronts, particularly in Hunan, the Chinese put up a stubborn defense which won the admiration of American Army observers. There is no available evidence that the Chungking Government ever considered surrendering to the Japanese during the critical days of 1944. It is important to remember this when faced with the Communist accusations against Chungking (often repeated by some official American observers in China) of "traitorous relations" with the Japanese.

Nevertheless, the policy toward the puppets combined with that of concentrating hundreds of thousands of troops in rear areas, as a reserve against the Communists and other opposition groups in Free

¹⁶ Current (April 1945) estimate of the number of puppet troops in China proper is 910,000, of which 374,000 are in the "regular" puppet army and 536,000 in the provincial and local Peace Preservation Corps.

China, had disastrous results on the morale of the Chungking armies and people. For hundreds of miles along the front, peaceful conditions prevailed for years until the outbreak of the Japanese offensive in 1944, and a flourishing smuggling trade developed which was controlled by the military authorities on both sides of the front. An American observer in Hunan reported in 1943 that "As far as the Chinese are concerned, the [Chungking] military appear to be only too pleased to continue the truce indefinitely, as they control the trade with occupied territory and are growing comfortably rich."¹⁷

The Chungking armies, in the anti-Communist blockade zone in the Northwest and elsewhere, became an intolerable burden both to the Government and the people. Many of the troops lost their fighting spirit through long inactivity. And the Government lost much of the popular support it had had because of its heavy exactions from the people to maintain these idle troops. An American observer in Shensi province reported in March 1944 that the relations between the population and the Chinese military and civil authorities in the San-yuan area in the anti-Communist blockade zone in Shensi were extremely unsatisfactory due to the imposition of onerous grain and fuel taxes, miscellaneous exactions, and the ever-increasing corruption and graft on the part of officials. He concluded that "A continuation of the present practices of the officials is likely to result in the peasants' welcoming the Communists who went to great efforts to conciliate the populace when they were in this area in 1936 and 1937. The situation in San-yuan is typical of conditions in many other areas of Shensi, Honan, Anhwei, and other provinces."¹⁸

When the Japanese launched their great offensive in 1944, the Chinese peasants in some areas turned on their own army. This was the case in Honan province particularly, where the peasants began to disarm individual Chinese soldiers one by one, and finally began to unite into roving bands looking for smaller bands of soldiers. An American observer in North China stated in November 1944 that maladministration by officers and lack of discipline of troops, which Chinese freely admit contributed to the loss by the Central Government of much of Honan to the Japanese, also create conditions favor-

¹⁷ See the report of Arthur R. Ringwalt, Consul at Kweilin, in *FRUS, 1943: China*, pp. 373-74.—*Ed.*

¹⁸ From a report by Everett F. Drumright, Second Secretary and Consul in the U.S. Embassy, on detail in Sian. San-yuan is about 40 miles north of Sian. A summary of this report is contained in *FRUS, 1944: China*, p. 384.—*Ed.*

able to the growth of Communist influence in that province.¹⁹ According to several reports, Communist guerrillas are slowly filtering in from north of the Yellow River, subduing robber bands and organizing the peasantry.

As compared with the charges made against the Kuomintang, there are few accusations on record that the Communists have had "traitorous relations" with the Japanese or their Chinese puppets. Nevertheless, when the vast amount of propaganda is eliminated from reports of conditions in Communist-Japanese front sectors, the policy and behavior of the Chinese Communists toward the Japanese appear very similar to those of the Kuomintang—no more, but no less "traitorous." Communist troops have joined the puppet army, although probably in smaller numbers than Chungking troops. While the Chungking Government appeals for the friendship of the commanders of the puppet forces, the Communists make their appeals to the soldiers. Some puppet troops have deserted the Japanese to join the Communists. Others show a decided friendliness toward the Communists. This applies especially to the puppet Peace Preservation Corps, as distinct from the "regular" puppet army in which the Chungking Government has its strongest following. The soldiers in the Peace Preservation Corps are recruited chiefly from the local population and share the general sympathy of the people for the Communists. They are usually poorly armed and serve as a police force. In areas where friendly relations exist between the Communists and the puppets there is a virtual truce, just as in the case of some of the Chungking-Chinese puppet front sectors.

A private foreign observer in Communist areas in North China reported in 1943 that puppet troops "will seldom oppose the passage of fairly strong Chinese [Communist] forces," and that "it is fairly certain that as soon as the Japanese seemed likely to be defeated almost all the puppet forces would change sides" [joining the Communists]. This referred to Hopeh and Shansi provinces especially. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Paoting, Japanese-occupied capital of Hopeh province, stated that the puppet troops in the Peace Preservation Corps "seem to have an understanding of sorts, or nonaggression pact, with the Eighth Route Army." Agents of Feng Yü-hsiang (the "Christian General") in the areas of Kiangsu province north of the Yangtze River reported in 1943 that

¹⁹ From a report by Edward E. Rice, then Second Secretary in the U.S. Embassy. The report is in *ibid.*, pp. 193-94.—*Ed.*

puppet troops and troops of the New Fourth Army in north Kiangsu do not fight each other due to the fact that many of the men of the puppet forces belong to the New Fourth Army. These men were "ordered" by the New Fourth Army to join the puppets. An American missionary, repatriated in 1943, who had lived in Japanese-occupied areas in Kiangsu province, reported that though the New Fourth Army forces in the areas between Shanghai and Nanking were effective in keeping the whole area "upset" and unpeaceful and were "a thorn in the side of the Japanese," they sought no trouble with the puppet forces of the Nanking regime.

The foregoing are a few examples among many of the friendly relations, amounting to a virtual truce, that exist in some areas between Communist and puppet forces. This development of friendly relations began simultaneously with the similar development between Chungking Government and puppet forces, that is, in the course of 1942, after the entry of the United States into the war.

In the course of 1943 insistent rumors began to circulate in Chungking-controlled China to the effect that there was a definite understanding of some sort between Nanking and Yen-an. An American observer in Shansi reported in January 1944 that a "highly placed provincial official who is reputed to be very well informed in regard to Communist affairs" had stated that the local authorities had "conclusive proof" to the effect that an agent of Wang Ching-wei's²⁰ puppet regime, said to be residing in T'ai-yüan, Shansi province, went regularly to Yen-an to maintain contact with the Communist authorities. The same informant also asserted that the Communists had an agent representing them in Nanking. During March 1944, another American observer who had spent some time in Lanchow, reported that "there are, in this area, current rumors that the Communists have made an alliance, or have come to a working agreement, with Wang Ching-wei or elements associated with his regime." Chinese sources in Chungking stated that "news was current" that the Communists had come to terms with the "enemy and their puppets" not to attack one another in North China, and that in Central China the Japanese were said to have agreed to let the New Fourth Army remain where it was "for the time being," in return for a promise that the New Fourth Army would not hinder the movement of the Japanese Army, and would not assist the Chungking Government.

The American observer in Lanchow did not wholly discredit these

²⁰ The late head of the Nanking puppet government.

rumors. He said that Wang Ching-wei and his associates were using, as a bargaining point to secure "forgiveness from Chungking, the threat of throwing in their lot with the Communists." He explained that his sources in Lanchow alleged that Wang was motivated both by fear of the treatment he might receive at the close of the war from a victorious Kuomintang Government, and by the leftist tendencies of which he had given evidence at various stages of his career.²¹

The Communists, of course, denied the truth of these rumors, just as the Chungking Government has denied similar rumors in regard to its relations with the puppets. And there is no evidence that the Communists, any more than the Kuomintang, have ever considered coming to terms with the Japanese, except on condition that the Japanese withdraw from China. But this does not preclude the possibility that they have played politics with the puppets for whatever advantages they could gain thereby. In May 1943 an American agency in Chungking, commenting on these rumors of cooperation between Yen-an and Nanking, stated that "It would be surprising, therefore [in view of the anticipated efforts of the Kuomintang to seek the liquidation of the Communist Party and its army], if the Communist Party failed to utilize opportunities to undermine the Kuomintang, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chinese Communists would cooperate with the puppet elements in order to overthrow the Central Government."

There were elements in the Kuomintang-Communist situation in 1943 which favored the Japanese and mitigated the danger of large-scale Communist attacks against them. For in 1943 inter-party relations reached the greatest crisis since the New Fourth Army incident of 1941. In the spring of 1943 the Chungking Government began to increase its troop concentrations on the frontiers of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, and the Communists in turn withdrew some of their troops from guerrilla areas in North China to the Shen-Kan-Ning area. Throughout the year there was the serious threat of an all-out Kuomintang offensive against the Communists. In 1942 and 1943,

²¹ In this connection it is of significance that it is not those reactionary leaders of the Kuomintang, who are most strongly opposed to the Communists and who have been most commonly referred to as "appeasers," that have joined the Japanese to serve under them as puppets. On the contrary, it is so-called leftist leaders like Wang Ching-wei, and ex-Communists like Ch'en Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai, who have become the outstanding puppets. The Kuomintang officials who joined Wang Ching-wei in Nanking were for the most part his personal followers. Aside from them the majority of the puppet officials came from non-Kuomintang parties and groups.

while a virtual truce existed on several of the Communist-Japanese front sectors, the Communists had concentrated their attention on expanding their areas of control into Chungking Government areas. Clashes occurred in Shansi, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh, and Chekiang, and the Communists scored several successes. The Kuomintang leaders became infuriated against the Communists for their “aggressive tactics against the Chungking forces,” and their “intensified . . . activities, endangering the security of the State and sabotaging our [the Government’s] war efforts.”

It is against this background that the following Tokyo radio announcement made in March 1944, one month before the opening of the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government and American forces in China, assumes a particular significance. “The Sino-Reds recently adopted a ‘10–20–70’ forward policy under which they use 10 percent of their power to deal with Japan, 20 percent for the protection of their bases, and the remaining 70 percent for the expansion of their influence. In order to counter . . . the new strategy mapped out by the Chinese Reds, the Chungking regime is putting into practice the dual policy of political and military pressure, carrying on political negotiations with the Communists, and simultaneously carrying out an encirclement offensive.”²²

The events of 1944 up to the present, April 1945, do not contradict this statement. A report by the Kuomintang Headquarters in Chungking in August 1944, evaluated C-3 by an American observer in Chungking, stated that “Puppet-Communist cooperation since last January is becoming clear.”²³ In substantiation of this, the report stated that “The puppets have demilitarized fortifications in Hopeh, the construction of which was primarily an anti-Communist measure.” The demilitarization of some fortifications in Hopeh province has been confirmed by the Chinese Communists, although they do

²² This charge was being made, in Kuomintang circles, at least as early as March 1941. I have investigated this issue in some detail, and believe that it is a fabrication. See my *Enemies and Friends*, pp. 157–59.—*Ed.*

²³ This refers to the following evaluation code then in use by the intelligence community.—*Ed.*

<i>Reliability of source</i>	<i>Probability of information</i>
A—Completely reliable	1—Confirmed by other sources
B—Usually reliable	2—Probably true
C—Fairly reliable	3—Possibly true
D—Not usually reliable	4—Doubtfully true
E—Unreliable	5—Improbable report
F—Reliability cannot be judged	6—Truth cannot be judged

not, of course, state that this is the result of any "understanding" or "cooperation" with the puppets. Since the Japanese consider their areas in North China as vital to their empire defense, they would hardly abandon some of their defenses in North China unless they felt reasonably assured that this move would not endanger their position vis-à-vis the Communists.

There is no indication that the Chinese Communist forces made any effort to support the Chungking Government and American forces in China during the Japanese offensive in 1944. But there is evidence showing that the same kind of "non-aggression pact," which American missionaries reported to exist between Communist and puppet troops in 1942 and 1943, continued in some front sectors in 1944. Throughout 1944 the Communists also continued their campaigns against Chungking Government forces.

An American Army officer who spent three months, from August to November 1944, with the New Fourth Army in Kiangsu and Anhwei provinces reported that the railroads in Japanese-controlled areas in Kiangsu "are not diked or walled in order to prevent attack upon them [by New Fourth Army troops]. There appears to be a tacit arrangement between the New Fourth Army and the Japanese by which, and in return for the Communists not attacking the trains and railroads, the Japanese will not construct walls and dikes along the [Tientsin-Pukow] railroad [in Kiangsu] as they have done elsewhere, and which would make crossing by the Communists next to impossible." New Fourth Army leaders told the American officer that they would not attack the Japanese railroad until "such an attack would have a strategic or tactical bearing as a part of a specific military operation." They claimed that a premature attack on this railroad would achieve little of military value, and "at the same time such would make their own operations and movements considerably more hazardous and difficult."

The American Army officer mentioned above reported on the tense situation at the Chungking Government-Communist front in Anhwei, northwest of Nanking. Several small clashes had occurred there during 1944. In January 1945 an American Army officer observer in China reported that Kuomintang troops had "attacked" the Communists in Anhwei. He did not explain whether the "attack" was necessitated as a means of self-defense. That this was the case, if the Kuomintang forces actually launched an attack, is indicated by other reports. In January 1945 Chungking Government sources, reporting on the fight-

ing in Anhwei, stated that between 2,000 to 3,000 troops of the New Fourth Army had crossed to the south bank of the Yangtze River with the aim of joining up with Communist elements in Chekiang to prepare to "greet" an American landing. Another report by an American Army observer in Anhwei (February 1945) stated that fighting between Chungking and Communist troops was taking place in northern Chekiang, and that 8,000 Communist troops had crossed to the south bank of the Yangtze River during the past few months. An American representative of the air ground aid service in Anhwei stated that progress was being made by the Communists, that they were winning over more recruits, were getting increased support from the people, and that the New Fourth Army troops could not be halted by the troops of the Chungking Government. He said that southern Chekiang and the northern Fukien coast were reported to be the objectives of the Communists. The available information seems to show clearly that, in general, it is the Communists rather than the Kuomintang who have been on the offensive.

As the Japanese campaign progressed with the Chungking forces routed in various sections of China, clashes between Chungking and Communist forces were reported by Kuomintang, Chinese Communist, American, and Japanese sources to have taken place in Suiyuan, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Chekiang, and Kwangtung, with the Communists extending their areas of control into Chungking Government areas. According to Japanese sources the Communists have successfully penetrated into western Kwangtung. A Tokyo broadcast of 19 February 1945 states that "the Chungking troops [in the area southwest of Canton] are being gradually and steadily pressed by 5,000 Yen-an troops and the armed populace is aligning with the Yen-an regime."

In October 1944 Mao Tse-tung told an American observer in Yen-an that the Communists would "recover any territory lost by the Kuomintang," and that Communist forces had already moved into east Honan from both north and south.²⁴ He intimated that the Communists would also go into Southeast China if Kuomintang control there "disintegrated." But he insisted, said the American observer, that "the Communists will not compete with the Kuomintang for territory which it still holds, and while they recognize the Japanese crushing of the Kuomintang may mean eventual advantage, the Communists

²⁴ A conversation between Mao Tse-tung and John S. Service on 9 October 1944. Reported in *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 637-38.—*Ed.*

realize that this will be outweighed by immediate disadvantages to the Allied war against Japan."

The foregoing outline of the Kuomintang-Communist fighting shows how little truth there was in this statement by Mao Tse-tung. In Honan the Communists have undoubtedly occupied some areas evacuated by the Chungking forces after their crushing defeat in 1944, but even here they have clashed with Chungking troops trying to maintain their remaining areas of control. In Anhwei, Chekiang, Hupeh, and Kwangtung, the inter-party fighting during 1944 and thus far in 1945 did not take place in areas where the control of the Chungking Government had "disintegrated" in the sense Mao Tse-tung implied, for had this been the case there would obviously have been no fighting.

The foregoing examples have not been quoted in order to belittle the value of the contribution of the Chinese Communists to the war against Japan, nor to create the impression that the virtual truce which has existed on several Communist-Japanese front sectors indicates that the Communists have shown any willingness to surrender or to stop fighting the Japanese. As the succeeding section of this study will show, there was considerable fighting between Communist and Japanese forces all through 1944, although it was not in any respect comparable to the great battles between Chungking Government and Japanese forces.

Nevertheless, all evidence leads to the conclusion that while the Communists have been on the defensive against the Japanese, they have been on the offensive against the Chungking Government. Their refusal to accept any demarcation of Chungking Government and Communist defense areas, and their policy of moving into Chungking Government defense areas whenever they feel that they are strong enough to drive out the Chungking forces, is largely responsible for diverting the Chungking Government's attention from the war against Japan and for the confusion created by the constant inter-party fighting.

Careful and dispassionate examination of the record shows that statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the behavior of the Kuomintang toward the Communists has been more moderate than that of the Communists toward the Kuomintang. Several times during the war the Kuomintang has considered invading Communist defense areas in the same way that the Communists have actually invaded several Kuomintang defense areas. Some observers have maintained

that the Kuomintang could have defeated the Communists. In October 1943, during a serious inter-party crisis, the American Military Attaché in China reported: "In point of fact, the Communists could be crushed by force of arms. They have not had any equipment from the Central Government for four years. They have not had any pay for three." Nevertheless, no general Kuomintang offensive against the Communist areas has been launched; each crisis has been resolved through the moderating influence of the Generalissimo and others affiliated with Chungking, who have maintained that a civil war must be avoided at least until the end of the war against Japan. That the Kuomintang has proved more sensitive than the Communists to this latter consideration does not necessarily prove greater virtue on the part of the Kuomintang, nor less on the part of the Communists. Certainly a powerful factor in the situation has been the attitude of the United States, which has been the chief source of vital supplies to China. Both the United States Government and the press have made it very clear to the Kuomintang that a military liquidation of the Communists, during the war with Japan, would be frowned upon by American opinion. It does not appear, on the other hand, that the Communists have had to fear similar disapproval of their activities in extending their areas at the expense of the Kuomintang.

The record indicates that neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang have expended their main efforts against the Japanese, except as both have been compelled to defend themselves. Both have done everything they could to prepare to maintain their own positions after the war. The evidence substantiates the statement made by Congressman Mansfield in his report to the Congress in January this year, after his return from his mission to China: "On the basis of information which I have been able to gather, it appears to me that both the Communists and the Kuomintang are more interested in preserving their respective parties at the present time, and have been for the past two years, than they are in carrying on the war against Japan. Each party is more interested in its own status because both feel that America will guarantee victory."²⁵

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS' WAR AGAINST JAPAN

In August 1943 General Hata, at that time C-in-C of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, said during a press interview in Nan-

²⁵ Mike Mansfield made this rather windy and rambling address on 16 Jan. 1945. *Cong. Rec.* Vol. 91, Part 1 (79th Cong., 1st Sess.), p. 280.—*Ed.*

king that in North China, "the Communist bandits . . . are the chief disturbing factors endangering peace and order. They are not only handicapping the administrative progress but also undermining the work of reconstruction of a New China. Furthermore, under the pretext of offering resistance, the Communists are actually bent upon expanding their influence for selfish purposes. In the pacification of North China, suppression of the Communists is a matter which should not be overlooked." In October 1943 a Tokyo broadcast to the home audience reported on fighting in western Hopeh province and the T'ai-hang Mountains of southeastern Shansi province. After repeating the usual claims of "destruction" of Communist bases, the Japanese announcer added the following unusual admission: "The work of detecting the fleeing enemy forces is not an easy matter even with the aid of the air units who report to us the positions of the enemy . . . Therefore, our forces are able to seek out only a small number at a time, and then pursue them. The hardships that our imperial forces are facing today may be well imagined."

To those who have followed the Japanese war communiques since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, the frequent mention of battles with "bandits," "mopping up operations," and "pacification campaigns" in North China is strong testimony to the resistance offered by the Chinese Communists. This is confirmed by neutral observers, primarily by American and British missionaries, repatriated in 1943, who have lived in Japanese-occupied cities and towns and have had ample opportunities to witness the struggle between the Communist guerrilla forces²⁶ and the Japanese Imperial Army.

This does not mean that the resistance of the Communists has been strong in terms of military power, but rather in terms of political-economic subversive activities against the Japanese. The following statements are typical of the eyewitness accounts of the repatriated missionaries, which give a picture of the pattern of Communist guerrilla warfare. In regard to the border area between Shantung and Hopeh provinces one Catholic priest stated: the Eighth Route Army forces "move from place to place constantly to elude Japanese watchfulness. Their influence is enough to cause constant worry to the Japanese, although their effectiveness remains small because they

²⁶ The Communists make a clear distinction between their regular army (Eighth Route and New Fourth armies), the guerrillas, and local militia. For convenience' sake they are all referred to in this section as "guerrilla forces" since the methods of fighting of each group follow the pattern of guerrilla warfare.

lack the necessary heavy arms . . . Their hatred of the Japanese is real, and in equal combat they put up a good show. They specialize and excel in guerrilla fighting." Another Catholic priest from Shantung stated in regard to the Eighth Route Army forces in that province: "As soldiers they are not much, because their equipment is inferior to the Japanese. In one skirmish that I witnessed in November 1942, though the Communists outnumbered the Chinese puppet troops 4-1, the Communists fled without firing a shot. But their nuisance value is considerable, since the Japanese must constantly maintain garrisons in the region."

A Protestant missionary from Shantung reported: Formerly "I just thought of them [the Communists] only as a menace but their effectiveness [in Shantung] is now [1943] an established fact. They are fighting the Japanese and spreading their doctrine. I do not know about their numbers but they must be numerous because when the Japanese start one of their expeditions to 'mop up bandits,' they have to collect from 400 to 500 soldiers before they start out. The country people suffer most from these excursions because when the Japanese appear in force, the Communists simply melt away to reappear when the danger is past. Consequently the Japanese take it out on the village people. The 'Eighth Route' Army (Communists) are well disciplined and, where they have control, the common people enjoy a measure of security and of freedom from exorbitant taxes . . . Where the Japanese are in control the taxes are lowest but personal security and freedom are much less. Their [the Communists'] propaganda is strong and is definitely Communistic when not forced by circumstances to be anti-Japanese."

A Protestant missionary from Anhwei stated: "The Chinese 'New Fourth Army' is active very near Su-hsien [in north Anhwei on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad]. They carry on guerrilla activities and prey upon the Chinese people a great deal, taxation, etc. Every so often there are battles fought, but nothing is very effective. Near to the area strictly occupied by the Japanese (along railroads, main motor roads, and principal cities) so many of the activities are just ordinary banditry and the well controlled groups are farther away." In regard to New Fourth Army activities in the Hankow area in Hupeh province one missionary from Han-yang, opposite Hankow, reported: "They [the Communists] are reported to have fought with the Japanese and even the regular 128th Chungking division in order to [obtain] local supremacy. [Their] spying system is very good. Sabo-

tage—attacking Japanese shipping on the [Yangtze] River. This is not very helpful, for a shot will be fired and then they will run and the Japanese will take the particular village." A missionary physician from Ningpo reported: "A small group (1,000 perhaps) New Fourth Army Communists appeared in April [1943] in a sector of no-man's-land which lies between Shao-hsing and Ningpo [in Chekiang province] . . . They carried out the typical program of robbing the well-to-do and befriending the poor. They were to all reports not short of weapons or funds."

These statements, which are confirmed by many other sources, show that the policy of the Communists toward the Japanese is chiefly centered on winning the confidence of the people, "befriending the poor," and in this way extending their political-economic control in areas adjacent to Japanese-occupied zones. Through this policy, which was probably the only one possible in view of their poor arms and consequent inability to attack the Japanese and defeat them by military force, they have prevented the Japanese from deriving adequate economic benefits from their military conquests. Since both the Japanese-occupied zones and adjacent areas were originally under control of the National Government (Chungking), this policy of the Chinese Communists has inevitably involved alienation of the loyalty of the people from Chungking, as the initial step in establishing their anti-Japanese base areas. It led, as we have seen, to fighting between Chungking Government and Communist forces as well as between these forces and the Japanese. But whether the fighting represented the internal inter-party war in China or the Chinese war against Japan, the net result as far as the Japanese were concerned was that they never succeeded in consolidating their power.

It should be emphasized that the Communists were by no means the only ones who organized and maintained resistance in guerrilla areas. The Japanese have frequently, as late as 1944, mentioned Chungking guerrilla forces as fighting against them in Shantung, Shansi, and Hopeh, the three most important guerrilla areas of the Chinese Communists. And foreign missionaries repatriated in 1943, who reported on conditions in these three provinces during 1941, 1942, and part of 1943, were often unable to specify whether guerrilla operations in the areas in which they had lived were led by Chungking or Communist forces. However, during the inter-party war that went on in guerrilla areas the Chungking forces in North China gradually lost out against the Communists. As of the end of

1943, the Communist forces were in unquestioned control of the Chinese resistance movement in north and southeast Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, and Kiangsu, although a few Chungking guerrilla forces were (and still are) operating in these provinces. In several other areas both Chungking and Communist troops are leading the resistance movement against the Japanese, each group within its own areas of political-military control.

The Communists' resistance has been strongest in North China since they possess their largest bases here. It has been comparatively weaker in the Central China areas controlled by the New Fourth Army, partly because the New Fourth is weaker than the Eighth Route Army, partly because it has had far more trouble than the Eighth Route Army in North China in establishing and consolidating its base areas. The Chungking armies are stronger in Central than in North China, and therefore have been able to put up a more determined resistance against the New Fourth Army's attempts to secure bases than could the provincial forces in North China against the Eighth Route Army.

During the first three years of the war the Japanese employed, against the Communists in North China, tactics somewhat similar to those which Chiang Kai-shek had used against them in Kiangsi during his first four "Extermination Campaigns," 1931-1933. They launched out from their bases along the railways in several directions, trying to occupy as many places as possible in the guerrilla base areas. From these they made strong local encirclements against the scattered Communist forces.

But the latter avoided pitched battles with the Japanese. They developed an excellent intelligence system through the local militia forces and the Village Mobilization Committees. They also developed a telephone system for rapid transmission of information about the movement of Japanese troops. The wires were stolen from Japanese lines. The telephones were taken during raids on small Japanese positions or bought in the large port cities and smuggled out to the guerrillas. Eight months after the outbreak of war the Communists claimed that they possessed a telephone system with 2,660 miles of wires and over 600 offices in Hopeh, in addition to 10 radio stations. The rural areas became honeycombed with Communist spies and observation posts. Simple-looking farmers working in the fields or bringing food to the Japanese-occupied towns watched the concentrations and movements of the Japanese forces and transmitted their informa-

tion to the guerrilla headquarters from hidden telephone posts in the fields and in the villages.

Communist intelligence agents also infiltrated into the cities, many of them obtaining employment by the Japanese as puppet officials, soldiers, police agents, servants, and laborers. The Communist secret service organization was developed by Hsieh K'ang-chih (Chao Jung, K'ang Sheng), who is variously mentioned as chief of the Central Political Protection Bureau of the CCP, head of the Central Social Affairs Department of the CCP, and concurrently director of the Intelligence Department.²⁷ Available reports confirm that the Communist secret service organization is at present one of the best organized and efficient in China, with secret centers in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, and in many of the cities and towns in rural areas of East China. Part of its work consists of gathering intelligence, and part of organizing subversive activities against the Japanese.

Through their well developed underground system, the Communists were able to avoid encounters with superior Japanese forces. They attacked their supply columns, severed their communication lines, and raided small isolated Japanese outposts. They attacked only when assured that they commanded superior strength. Like a blind colossus, the Japanese army struck out in all directions fumbling for its opponent but seldom finding him. After the Chinese Government and provincial forces in North China were defeated in large-scale battles against fortified points and along front lines, the war deteriorated, for the Japanese strategists and tacticians, into an undignified game of "hide and seek."

The realization that the Communists were turning the war into a people's war induced the Japanese to turn their armed might against the people. They adopted a policy of trying to make guerrilla areas uninhabitable. They burnt houses, carried off or destroyed the crops. Men, women, and children were killed in droves. Thousands were drafted as laborers and sent to Manchuria. By the end of 1939 the Japanese held most of the *hsien* cities in North China and motor roads connecting them. But they still could not prevent the movement of the Chinese forces. The Communists had even managed to infiltrate into areas north of Peiping, whence they moved into the wild moun-

²⁷ Best known under the name K'ang Sheng. To my knowledge, no other source gives his original name as Hsieh K'ang-chih. The authoritative biographical dictionary, *Chung-kung jen-ming lu*, lists his original name as Chang Shao-ch'ing, alias Chao Jung.—Ed.

tain region of southern Jehol. There they began to establish their first base area in "Manchukuo."

Lt. General Tada was C-in-C of the Japanese North China Expeditionary Forces at this time. In 1940 he developed the so-called "cage policy," or "fortress tactics." Deep and wide ditches or moats were dug and high walls built along the sides of the railways and highways in central and southern Hopeh in order to protect them from attacks and, more important, to blockade and to break up the Communist base areas. At the same time hundreds of miles of new roads with protecting ditches were built with the object of cutting up the guerrilla bases into small pieces which would then be destroyed one by one. The number of blockhouses along the railways and roads, manned by Japanese soldiers, was greatly increased.

This policy was an adaptation of Chiang Kai-shek's successful "fortress-blockhouse policy" used against the Communists in Kiangsi in 1934; Chiang had renewed this policy in the summer of 1939, although this time as a means of defense against and segregation of the Communists, in the military blockade of the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. The Eighth Route Army clearly saw the danger of Tada's new tactics. On 20 August 1940 it launched the so-called "Hundred Regiments Offensive" in Hopeh and Shansi which lasted for three months.²⁸ According to the Communists considerable damage was done to Japanese transportation and communication lines and to several coal mines near the railroads, including the important Ching-hsing coal mine on the Cheng-Tai Railroad in Shansi. The Communists claimed that over 20,000 Japanese were killed, over 5,000 puppet troops were killed and wounded, 281 Japanese officers and soldiers were captured, and some 18,000 puppet soldiers were captured; 2,993 Japanese forts and blockhouses were destroyed; large quantities of arms and ammunition were captured.

This was probably the largest Communist campaign of the war. It was successful in that the Japanese had to go on the defensive temporarily. They were also forced to strengthen the defense of their transportation lines and to concentrate more troops in North China. But the offensive had been costly to the Communists both in ammunition and in casualties. They were unable to keep it up without supplies.

²⁸ For an account of the Hundred Regiments Offensive, see Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism*, pp. 56-59. The "three-all" campaigns described below are treated in the same work, pp. 55-56, *passim*.—Ed.

General Tada supplemented the "fortress tactics" with what the Communists called the "butcher knife tactics," which involved concentration of an overwhelming force in a sudden attack upon strongholds or important centers in Communist base areas. These attacks developed into virtual scorched earth campaigns when tens of thousands of the civilian population were killed and thousands of villages leveled to the ground. Foreign neutral travellers in the guerrilla areas in 1942 reported that it was rare to see a village in Hopeh and Shansi which had not been at least partially destroyed. Some areas in northwest Shansi had been completely depopulated. In the districts west of Peiping it was estimated that two-thirds of all the houses had been destroyed.

With their base areas on the plain of central Hopeh chipped into small segments by the Japanese fortified roads, rapid escape from areas threatened by superior Japanese raiding columns became increasingly difficult for the Communist forces. They suffered several defeats. Tada was replaced by General Okamura in the summer of 1941. He strengthened the "fortress tactics" by digging more ditches, walls, and blockhouses, and by extending the network of fortified roads in Hopeh, Shansi, and Shantung. At the end of 1942 the Eighth Route Army estimated that the Japanese had built 9,600 miles of walls and ditches throughout North China, 29,846 blockhouses, and 9,243 forts or strongholds. In the fall of 1941 General Okamura directed an army of more than 100,000 men, according to Communist statements, in an attack upon the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. In May 1942 he launched other offensives against the Communist guerrilla bases in the T'ai-hang Mountain region of southeastern Shansi. During the latter part of 1942, similar campaigns were undertaken against Communist base areas in southern Shantung. The Communists referred to these campaigns as General Okamura's "triple" or "three-all policy," that is, kill all, burn all, and loot all. These campaigns achieved a measure of success. The Communists lost ground during 1941 and 1942 in both Hopeh and Shansi. But the Japanese campaigns were by no means conclusive. They aggravated the people's hatred of them and drove them into the arms of the Communists, who combined their efforts in fighting the Japanese with attempts to help the peasants in rehabilitating their devastated land.

The Communists had also been able to compensate for their losses of areas to the Japanese in Hopeh and Shansi by expansion into areas controlled by the Chungking Government. During the summer of

1941 they also began to expand into rural districts of eastern Hopeh. There they laid the foundation for their political organization of the areas east of Peiping and Tientsin, preparatory to using this important area for guerrilla attacks against the Tientsin-Mukden Railway and for further penetration of Communist forces into "Manchukuo."

The Communists' answer to the Japanese "fortress policy" and their annihilation campaigns was the employment of land mines, which became one of their chief weapons. Every trail in the mountains was mined. Before the villagers fled into the fields or to the hills at the approach of Japanese raiding columns they mined the approaches to their village and placed "booby traps" in their homes, streets, wells, and courtyards. This caused a large number of casualties among the Japanese. In central Hopeh they developed a new technique of underground fighting. The villagers built underground shelters where they could hide from the Japanese. Later these underground shelters were joined up by tunnels inside the village, and finally tunnels were built to connect several villages. These tunnels made it possible for the villagers and the guerrillas to escape from Japanese encirclements, and they enabled the guerrilla forces to cross underneath the fortified roads and railways and to attack the Japanese in villages which they believed to be deserted. The approaches to the tunnels were protected by land mines and "booby traps" which made the Japanese very unwilling to go near them. These tunnels played an important part in the Communist defense system during the campaigns in 1940 and 1941. Their usefulness became limited when the Japanese, according to Communist reports, started using poison gas. The anti-gas curtains which the villagers hung up at the entrances of the tunnels were not always effective.

Nevertheless, the Communists claim that their new technique placed the Japanese more and more on the defensive in the course of 1943. The Communists maintain that it became increasingly difficult for the Japanese to hold their widely-scattered *hsien* cities and to maintain the vast system of fortified roads. According to estimates published by the Eighth Route Army, 10½ Japanese divisions were tied down in opposing the Communists in North China during 1942, in addition to 3 Japanese divisions engaged by the New Fourth Army in Central China. These made up 44 percent of the total of Japanese troops in China.

This explanation does not, however, seem wholly satisfactory. It fits part of the picture, but not all. It is questionable if the Commu-

nists actually "tied down" 13½ (and later more) Japanese divisions in China. Several observers have contended with a great deal of justification that the Japanese used China, and North China in particular (since they controlled larger areas in North China than elsewhere in China), as a proving ground for their troops. The numerous "annihilation campaigns" against both the Communists and Chungking Government forces were probably designed as much for the purpose of providing training for the Japanese troops as for defeating the Chinese. China, after all, was only a stepping stone for further Japanese conquests. The army that fought and conquered in China was designed for even greater conquests in other countries. The limited resistance offered by the Chinese provided an atmosphere of real war. The Japanese suffered casualties, but probably not so many as to render the annihilation campaigns truly costly to them. Because the Communist troops usually retreated before the Japanese, few actual battles were fought during these campaigns. It was not the Communist armies that suffered so much as the people who were left prey to Japanese vengeance. The Chungking armies, when faced with these Japanese annihilation campaigns, usually tried to defend their cities and areas. And as a result the Chungking armies also suffered far greater casualties than the Communist armies.

Many of the Japanese troops that have fought the Americans in the Pacific have had years of training in China. And as experienced Japanese troops have been shifted from China to the Pacific fronts, they have been replaced in great part with new Japanese recruits for training in China. Many foreign military observers came to view these Japanese annihilation campaigns in China as training campaigns without any other significance except possibly to loot and bring in grain for the Japanese Army. They were usually marked by a Japanese advance into the Chinese bases, destruction of these bases and the crops in rural areas, followed by a retreat to the original Japanese starting point. The pattern had been repeated so many times that some military observers failed for a long time to recognize the Japanese offensive against Chungking Government forces in 1944 as anything else than one of the "usual" training campaigns.

There were several indications that the Japanese defensive policy against the Communists which began in 1943 was induced by many other factors of greater importance than the one mentioned by the Communists, namely, the effectiveness of their new technique for fighting the Japanese. With the establishment of American air bases

in China, Japanese military operations became increasingly centered on Chungking Government rather than Communist areas of control. Beginning with the Japanese spring offensive in 1942, following Lt. General (then Col.) James H. Doolittle's raid on Tokyo, which had as one of its objects the destruction of Chinese-American air bases in Chekiang, the Japanese resumed, for the first time since 1939, offensive operations against Chungking with intent of conquering additional areas. In Communist areas the Japanese "training campaigns" continued through 1943 and 1944, although on a considerably smaller scale than before. But their campaigns in Chungking Government-controlled areas assumed an increasingly serious nature far beyond the scope of mere "training" of troops.

Probably the most important factor in forcing the Japanese to reconsider their policy of large-scale annihilation campaigns into Communist areas was that the wholesale destruction of property and the mass slaughter of the people made it impossible for them to exploit the country adequately. They derived no more economic benefit than did the Communists from areas which had been laid waste. The Communists concentrated their efforts on fighting the Japanese in the guerrilla areas, the "no-man's land," between the Communist, Chungking Government, and Japanese bases in which all three groups compete for control. It was therefore the guerrilla areas that suffered the greatest destruction. And since these were nearest the Japanese zones they were also the areas in which the Japanese were most interested, the pacification of which would have yielded them the greatest economic benefits.

There is no space here to go into the details of the economic problems that the destruction in the guerrilla areas caused to the Japanese. It reduced food production in North China considerably. The effect of this had not been felt so much by the Japanese and the people in their occupied areas so long as Australian and Canadian wheat could be imported. But from the end of 1942 when imported food supplies had been exhausted, the question of food control and production became one of the main problems of the Japanese and their puppet officials in China. The devastation in guerrilla areas also created a serious labor shortage for the Japanese in China and Manchuria. The question of filling the quota of labor for Manchuria, which before the war always came from North China, became increasingly difficult. During 1943 the labor emigration to Manchuria seems to have created such a manpower shortage in North China that it led to an actual

clash between the puppet authorities in North China, trying to decrease the emigration, and the Japanese authorities trying to fill their Manchurian labor quota.

The North China Political Council announced during March 1943 that "in view of the increase in the number of laborers going to Manchuria, it would restrict the outflow . . . in order to insure . . . the agricultural production in North China." According to a Japanese statement, the emigration in 1942 from China to Manchuria was 1,086,000. This was 3 million below the number desired by the Japanese. In spite of strenuous efforts by Japanese labor recruitment agencies in North China and by the Japanese army the emigration during 1943 was considerably less than 1,000,000, probably less than 800,000. Many of the emigrants in 1942 and 1943 had been forcibly recruited from Central China. Central China had never before contributed to the Manchurian labor needs.

The emigration to Manchuria increased the acuteness of the labor shortage in Japanese-controlled areas of North China, where the demand for manpower became far above normal. There developed a shortage of farm labor because of the conscription of Chinese peasants for the puppet armies and for the construction of roads, defense walls, moats, fortifications, and other military works. Because of this there was also an industrial manpower shortage. In the end it became necessary to send laborers from Central China to North China and Inner Mongolia to fill the labor demands in those regions. And in order to relieve the food shortage in Japanese-occupied areas in North China food was imported from Central China.

Both the food and manpower shortages derived in great part from the comparative smallness of the Japanese-occupied areas. It is estimated that at the end of 1943 the total area of "Occupied" China proper, that is, the areas behind the most advanced Japanese positions, was roughly 345,000 square miles. Out of this the Japanese controlled about 82,000 square miles. The guerrilla areas ("no-man's-land") comprised about 67,000 square miles. The Communists controlled, roughly, 155,000 square miles (of which 110,000 square miles were in North China proper) comprising mostly thinly populated mountain regions. The balance, 41,000 square miles, represented Chungking-controlled areas. The Japanese-occupied and the guerrilla areas are the most fertile areas in China.

At the end of 1943 the total population of Occupied China was about 183,000,000 people. Of these about 70,000,000 lived in Japa-

nese-occupied areas, and some 43,000,000 in guerrilla areas. About 54,000,000 lived in the Communist-controlled base areas, of which about 28,000,000 lived in North China. About 16,000,000 lived in Chungking-controlled areas.

These figures explain many of the difficulties with which the Japanese were (and still are) confronted in China. In 1943, with control over a population of only about 70,000,000 people in China proper, the Japanese had available as actual manpower only some 26,000,000 people. The difficulties the Japanese have had in supplying "Manchukuo" with one million immigrant laborers per year becomes apparent when it is realized that they have had to be recruited, chiefly, from Japanese-controlled areas. For example, the total population of Hopeh and Shantung, the two provinces from which most of the immigrants to "Manchukuo" have usually come, is about 70 million, of which, however, no more than about 27 million people have lived within Japanese-controlled areas. This represents a manpower capacity of barely 10 million employable people available to the Japanese in these two provinces.

The population and size of the different areas mentioned above varied constantly, of course, with the shifting fortunes of war. At all times the Japanese were able to supplement the resources of food, raw materials, and manpower in their occupied areas by drawing partially upon the food resources and manpower in the guerrilla areas, or no-man's-land.²⁹ But since the Japanese, Communist, and Chungking Government forces were all competing with each other for control over no-man's-land, the Japanese could never derive adequate benefits from these areas.

The outbreak of war with the United States made Japan more dependent than before upon the resources of China, especially after 1942 when American sinkings of Japanese ships began to reduce Japan's ability to exploit the Southeast Asia countries. In trying to find a solution for their problems in China the Japanese recognized that their annihilation campaigns had failed to crush the resistance of the Communists and the Chungking Government. Since the military campaigns had failed in their objectives, the Japanese decided to try diplomacy. The first announcement of the "New China Policy," or as it has also been called Japan's "appeasement policy" toward China, was made in November 1942 by Mamoru Shigemitsu, at that time

²⁹ The Japanese also obtained considerable amounts of food and raw materials from the smuggling traffic with Free China.

Japanese Ambassador to the Chinese puppet government in Nanking. The chief objective of this policy was to establish better cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese in Japanese-occupied areas of China so as to maintain and possibly increase the production of food and industrial raw materials.

At the beginning of 1943 the Nanking puppet government was reorganized. Three new Ministries were created, those of Social Affairs, Food Supply, and Construction. In addition several economic control agencies for food, labor, commerce, and industry had been established during 1942. Many more were created during 1943. This emphasis on economic and social control showed not only where the Japanese and the puppets faced their greatest difficulties, but also, of course, in what fields of activity they intended to exert special efforts at rehabilitation. On 1 January 1943, the Nanking government inaugurated the "New Citizen Movement" (Hsin Kuo-min) which was to be coordinated with the "Rural Pacification Movement" inaugurated in May 1942. The task of these two movements was to increase agricultural production, to exercise thought control, to promote the cooperative movement among the peasants, and to organize student and youth organizations.

The government reorganization in Nanking at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943 also involved a change of the military affairs structure in which the puppet military leaders obtained a considerably greater influence. At the end of January 1943, the Nanking government promulgated a decree by which the provincial puppet governors and district magistrates were designated to hold concurrent positions as commanders of the provincial and local Peace Preservation Corps respectively. In the central government in Nanking, the civilian puppet leaders continued to hold the dominant power, but in the provincial governments, the puppet military leaders obtained the dominant role. This change was of considerable significance. Since most of the puppet provincial governors were military men, the combining of both political and military authority in their hands added greatly to their prestige and power. It showed that the Japanese were placing increasing confidence in the puppet military leaders rather than, as before, in the civilian puppet leaders. The responsibility for garrisoning occupied areas was more and more shifted over from Japanese to puppet troops.

This was one of the outstanding military aspects of the New China policy which the Japanese adopted at the end of 1942. The second

aspect was the shift in the use of Japanese and puppet troops. Instead of trying to hold as many fortified roads and towns as possible they concentrated on consolidating control in a few key agricultural areas. These areas were called "Model Peace Zones" and "Special Administrative Areas."

The first Model Peace Zone had been established in the summer of 1941 in the Soochow (Wu-hsien) area between Shanghai and Nanking. During the latter part of 1942 and 1943 Model Peace Zones were established along the entire railway line between Nanking and Shanghai, around Hangchow in Chekiang province, in the Wuhan (Wuchang-Hankow) area in Hupeh, in the Canton area in Kwangtung, in northeastern Hunan, in the rich Huai-hai agricultural area in northeastern Kiangsu, and around Kaifeng, capital of Honan province. The Japanese stated in August 1944 that the combined area of these Model Peace Zones was slightly more than 24,600 square miles, with a population of 13,818,000 people. In North China, Special Administrative areas were established during 1943 south of Peiping and west of Tientsin, and, in 1944, in east Hopeh.

Within the Model Peace Zones, the Japanese concentrated their military effort on clearing out the Communists and keeping them out. As areas were "pacified" in this manner, the administration and policing of them was turned over to the puppet military forces. As more Model Peace Zones were established the principle of the old strategy of breaking up Communist areas through the occupation of as many cities and towns as possible and the construction of fortified roads between these was gradually relaxed. In the course of 1943 and 1944 the Japanese voluntarily withdrew from hundreds of villages and abandoned many of their blockhouses and fortresses, which were taken over by the Communists.

In some areas the Chinese Communists tried to prevent the Japanese from consolidating their power and developing the agricultural production within the Model Peace Zones. Their principal method was to prevent the Japanese from maintaining their census system, which plays an important role in the enforcement of peace and order. In Japanese-controlled areas each Chinese is required to carry a Certificate of Residence and each household must keep hanging beside the door a small wooden board listing the persons who dwell therein. Persons without a Certificate of Residence are subject to execution as spies or bandits. Any household that fails to give the Japanese police an adequate explanation for an increase or decrease in the

household faces drastic punishment. On some occasions the Communists on arriving at a village confiscate and destroy all Residence Certificates and household census boards. Villages so treated by the Communists tend to be forced into opposition to the Japanese. The young men are then recruited by the Communist army. Food supplies are taken by the Communists to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese. The Communists thereafter afford these villages such protection as they are able to give.

There are, however, indications that the Communists have abstained from violence in many of the Model Peace Zones. One report from Kwangtung province, in February 1944, emphasized that the Communists did not constitute much danger to the Japanese "since the policy of the Reds is undoubtedly to concentrate on strengthening their own position and avoid direct action . . . with Japanese." Another report from 1943 concerning Central China emphasizes that the Communist guerrillas were welcomed by the country people in so far as was "consistent with safety wherever they go. And in view of the fact that Japanese reprisals are usually collective, the guerrillas keep this in mind in their activities and keep as far away as possible from villages" in Japanese-controlled areas.

This statement and similar ones suggest strongly that the Communists had learned, from their experiences in the late 1920's, the danger of needlessly causing bloodshed. Their policy at that time of encouraging and organizing strikes among the workers in the large cities under Kuomintang control had caused massacres of thousands of these workers by Kuomintang troops and police. The result was not only that the Communist labor movement in the cities was crushed, but that the city workers came to fear the Communists. The Japanese policy toward the villagers in areas under their control was similar to that of the Kuomintang in the 1920's and early 1930's toward the workers. The Communists, therefore, avoided inciting the Japanese needlessly into reprisals against the population in their areas of control.

A factor which undoubtedly favored the Japanese, after 1943, in consolidating their power in the Model Peace Zones and Special Administrative Areas was the increased attention which the Communists devoted, particularly in the New Fourth Army areas, to fighting Chungking Government troops. As we have seen, it was also during this time that the Communists began to compete with the Chungking Government in winning the friendship of the puppet troops. A virtual

truce existed between the Communists and the puppet forces in some of the front sectors, particularly in Kiangsu and Anhwei. This undoubtedly favored the Japanese, and in September 1943 they turned over most of their defense sectors in Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Chekiang to the puppet forces.

The new strategy of the Japanese was partially successful. The size of their areas of control within the Communist defense zones in Central and North China decreased, but conditions within these areas, especially within the Model Peace Zones, in Central China, became more orderly than before. The added attention given to agrarian improvements within these Model Peace Zones also led to an increase of production. A German source stated that, in 1942, 24 million piculs (1,320,000 short tons) of rice and 600,000 piculs (33,000 short tons) of cotton were harvested in the Model Peace Zones, which meant an increase of no less than 30 percent over the previous year. The German source stated that "the increase of production strengthens the Model [Peace] Zones in their self-sufficiency with regard to food, and also facilitates the food supply for the larger cities, especially Nanking and Shanghai." In 1943 the harvest was especially good in China, and the food production in Japanese areas of China was estimated to be about 30 percent greater than in 1942. Since the Japanese no longer pursued their annihilation campaigns as vigorously as before, there seems also to have been a greater degree of order in the guerrilla areas between Communist and Japanese base regions, especially in Central China. And it is probable that this enabled the Japanese to derive somewhat greater profit from the agricultural production in the guerrilla areas.

On the other hand, these improvements were offset by several other factors beyond the control of the Japanese. The most important factor was the decreasing confidence in a Japanese victory of the Chinese population in Japanese-occupied areas. This made the people highly distrustful of the value of the currency of the puppet regimes which was backed chiefly by Japanese bayonets. And this in turn led people to prefer exchanging their currency holdings into commodities. Hoarding of food and other commodities became even more prevalent in Japanese occupied areas than in Chungking Government areas. From 1943 on the currency inflation in Japanese-occupied areas began to rival that in Chungking areas. Hoarding and inflation became important factors in preventing a normal development of trade, and made it increasingly difficult for the Japanese to finance their vast

military and civilian undertakings in China. The inflation reached an acute stage during 1944; since that time it has been considerably worse than in Chungking areas.

Another important factor offsetting the advantages derived from increased agricultural production in the Model Peace Zones was the deterioration of the rolling stock on Japanese railways, which greatly hampered the movement of goods. Contributing factors were guerilla activities against the railways, particularly in North China, and American bombings of Japanese railway bridges. American air attacks against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze and along the China coast further diminished the flow of Japanese inter-provincial traffic in China. As a result serious food shortages developed in the large cities in the occupied areas which are the centers of Japanese military and political control.

The withdrawal of Japanese forces from several fortified points led to a considerable increase of Communist areas in 1943 and especially in 1944. The Yen-an radio announced in November 1944 that the Eighth Route Army had in 1944 "liberated" in Shantung eight county towns (*hsien* capitals), and an area of 11,100 square miles with a population of 5,000,000 people. Another announcement by the Yen-an radio stated that nearly half of the population and territory of Shantung was still in Japanese hands, and that the Japanese were holding the important communication lines and economic centers of the province. During 1944 the Eighth Route Army also began to use its growing strength in Shantung to attack the Japanese at several points. Its most notable victory was the occupation in November 1944 of Chü-hsien, an important city in southeastern Shantung on the road from Tsingtao to Süchow. Throughout the past two years there has been considerable fighting in Shantung between Communist and Chinese puppet forces. On the basis of Japanese and Communist reports there has been more fighting in Shantung than in any other Communist-Japanese front sector.

Another area where the Eighth Route Army has been particularly active against the Japanese is in Shansi province. The Yen-an radio announced in December 1944 that between January and October, the Eighth Route Army had taken 3,060 square miles of territory with a population of 259,600. The Eighth Route Army was also active in Shansi during 1944 in fighting Chungking Government forces of General Yen Hsi-shan.

Except for northeastern Hopeh and the coastal region between

Hopeh and Shantung, no large-scale fighting took place between Japanese and Eighth Route Army forces in this province during 1943 and 1944. Communist sources state that in February 1944 Eighth Route Army forces occupied a "strong point" near Hsi-feng-k'ou, one of the two important passes between Hopeh and Jehol. In the course of 1943 and 1944, the Eighth Route Army also became active in the area northeast of Peiping and along the Hopeh section of the Japanese-held Tientsin-Mukden Railroad. Eighth Route Army forces also extended their operations in Chahar and Jehol during 1944 and penetrated into Liaoning province in Manchuria. Here, however, they met such strong resistance from the Japanese and Manchurian puppet troops that the Communists stated in December 1944 that "further expansion in Manchuria is not feasible at the present time." It was reported in March 1945 that the "most important fighting" between Japanese and Communist troops in China was in east Hopeh, south Jehol, and south Liaoning, where the Japanese had started a large-scale mopping-up campaign in order to clear out the Communist positions. An American observer in Yen-an also reported that the Chinese Communists "seem to expect a strong Japanese effort to consolidate themselves in North China." The fighting in eastern Hopeh, Chahar, and Liaoning "is apparently intended to establish a *cordon sanitaire* between China and Manchuria and is being conducted with unusual determination and ferocity. The Communists claim that whole areas are being either depopulated or made into fortified areas in which the whole population is concentrated into garrisoned villages—as was done in parts of Manchuria [during the 1930's]. Large-scale Communist movement southward shows not only a growing determination [by the Communists] to control China proper, but may also be an effort to get out from under an expected Japanese attempt to crush Communist strength in North China."

In Central China there was sporadic fighting during 1943 and 1944 between New Fourth Army forces and the Japanese, but most of the fighting was between Chungking Government and New Fourth Army forces, and most of the expansion of New Fourth Army influence was into base areas of the Chungking Government forces in Central China.

The combined effects of Communist gains against both the Japanese and Chungking Government forces in the past two years have been to instill in the Communists a self-assurance and confidence about their future position in China greater than at any previous time. The great defeats suffered by the Chungking Government

forces during the Japanese campaign in 1944 have opened up for the Communists an opportunity to attempt to drive out all Chungking forces from Eastern China. This is part of the reason why there has been more fighting during the recent months between Communist and Chungking forces than between Communist and Japanese forces. An American observer in Yen-an stated in February 1945 that Communist leaders point out "on numerous occasions" that Communist planning envisages the organization of Communist guerrilla units in all areas of Eastern China "evacuated by Kuomintang forces." He also stated that "Among the Communists there is no doubt as to their ability to repeat in other parts of China their North China feats of popular organization." In March 1945 General Ch'en I, Deputy Commander of the New Fourth Army, stated to an American observer in Yen-an that the New Fourth Army had reached a strength of 300,000 regulars, and can easily be expanded to 400,000.³⁰ Other Communist leaders said: "Give us a year and we will have all of East China from the borders of Manchuria to Hainan [Island]. When that has been accomplished, the Communist forces will be at least as strong as those of the Central Government, and it will be the Kuomintang which will be blockaded."

The growing strength of the Chinese Communists is also reflected in their propaganda and in their official attitude toward the Chungking Government. They have begun to claim the role of representing the Chinese people as a whole rather than the Communist Party. At the end of April 1945, Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP at Yen-an, referred to the Government in Chungking as "the illegal so-called National Government without popular support." The following passage in his report clearly expresses the consciousness among the Chinese Communists of their emergence into a position of power rivalling and possibly surpassing that of the Kuomintang: "Chinese [Communist] liberated areas have become a democratic pattern for China, and the center of gravity for cooperation with our Allies to drive out the Japanese aggressors and to liberate the Chinese people. The troops in the liberated areas have expanded to 910,000³¹ and the people's volunteers to over 2,200,000. These troops have become the main force in the war of resistance. And as soon as they receive modern equipment they will become

³⁰ This statement was made by Ch'en I to John S. Service.—*Ed.*

³¹ In July 1944 the Communists claimed that their regular troops numbered 470,000 [see below, p. 180.—*Ed.*].

still more invincible and able finally to defeat the Japanese aggressors." It was also pointed out during this Congress, the first Communist Party Congress held since 1928, that "the power of the Chinese Communist Party, the unity and solidarity within the Party and the Party's prestige among the people of China, are higher than at any period in the past."³²

At the beginning of May 1945 the Japanese admitted the growing power of the Chinese Communists in the following broadcast report from Tokyo quoting an article in *Mainichi Shimbun*: "During the past two years . . . the Yen-an regime has stubbornly pushed a political offensive in Japanese-occupied North China. But in reality no military offensive of a major scale has been undertaken. However, [Yen-an's] . . . clever maneuver to win over the Chinese masses to its cause (is) by no means slighted. Along with the expansion of its political sphere of influence the Yen-an regime strove hard to cultivate its fighting strength through an aggressive military enlargement program, as well as a production increase movement . . . Yen-an's anti-Japanese general counter-offensive does not go beyond the scheme to strike the Japanese in the back in conjunction with the heralded American landing on the China coast."

³² Mao's political report to the Seventh Congress is entitled "On Coalition Government." See SW, IV, 255-320.—*Ed.*

5. The Political Situation in Communist Areas

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

In May 1945 the Yen-an radio announced that the CCP comprised 1,200,000 members. In comparison, the Kuomintang has 2,000,000 members. In August 1943, Chou En-lai stated that the CCP had about 800,000 members. A member of the Communist Party Headquarters in Chungking stated in July 1944 that no new members had been admitted into the Party in China since 1939. If these various statements are true, then the great increase of Party members has taken place in the past ten months, concurrent with the Communist expansion of areas of control in Central and South China.

The procedure for admission into the CCP is reported by a Communist Party member to be as follows. In a school or factory or particular locality in which there is a "cell" (*hsiao tsu*, literally "a small organization"), a person who is sympathetic to the ideas and ideals of Communism will begin to associate with and become known to others of the same general trend of thought. When such a person has come to have a firm acquaintance with several members of a cell, and they are sure of his sincerity, he will be informed of the cell's existence and, if he wishes to join, he will be supplied with an application blank on which he will enter his name, his status in society, the condition of himself and his family, etc. His application is then presented to a meeting of the cell, and a resolution is proposed and passed (or rejected) to the effect that he is to be admitted to membership in the Party.

A worker elected in this way will thenceforward be a full member, but a student or peasant will be required to go through a probationary period of several months or more before being admitted. In the case of a member of the "capitalist class" or of the Kuomintang, the cell itself will not be authorized to grant membership; after the applicant's

name has been voted on favorably, it will have to be submitted to the next higher organ of the Party for approval.

The Communist informant stated that the Party is organized on an "industrial basis," vertically rather than horizontally, that is, "steel workers in one plant who are members of the Party have no necessary connection with steel workers in another plant who are also Communists"; every Communist worker in that one plant, whatever his task, is a member of the cell or cells in that plant. A cell usually consists of about 20 people. If it becomes too large it is split to form two or more cells, so that in a large factory with a considerable Communist membership there may be several cells. Each cell represents a cross-section of the work of the factory; there is not one cell for one kind of work and another for another kind of work. Each cell has a "Secretary," a "Director of Propaganda," and a "Director of Organization." These officers, who form the Cell Committee, are not elected, but appointed by the next higher Committee in the Party, usually the *Hsien* (County) Committee. All cells are self-supporting, being financed by contributions from the members. Every member must pay into the Party treasury a percentage of his earnings. If the earnings are low the percentage is low, being somewhere between four and seven percent; if the earnings are high, the percentage is sometimes as high as 40 percent.

Liaison between the cells is accomplished through officers appointed by the *Hsien* (County) or City Committee of the Party, according to the district or city in which the cell is located. The *Hsien* Committee is in turn appointed by the Provincial Committees, which are appointed by the Central Committee in Yen-an.

The Communist informant emphasized that this control from above was essential under present conditions in China because of the danger that the Party would be inter-penetrated by Kuomintang and other counter-espionage agents. The greatest secrecy is maintained; the whole organization in Chungking-controlled China is "underground," although its objectives there are no different from those of the Chinese Communists as a whole. According to the informant these objectives are the establishment of "democracy, with free elections and freedom of speech, etc., throughout China, coupled with agrarian and other reforms." "To this end," he said, "they [the Communists] cooperate at the higher levels with members of the Democratic League and other liberal and leftist groups in China, but members of the latter are never directly or indirectly associated with one of

the cells, and on the lower or 'operation' levels there is practically no contact."

Election of a new Central Committee was one of the items on the agenda of the Seventh National Congress held in Yen-an during the latter part of April 1945. The preceding Central Committee was elected by the Sixth National Congress of the CCP, which was held in Moscow in 1928. The total membership of the Central Committee is about twenty. The Communist informant stated, however, that their names and the number of them are both secret. He said, however, that among the members were Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu, Lin Tsu-han, and Chu Te.

Because of this secrecy, the average member of the Party knows little or nothing about the organization as a whole. The greater part of the membership of the Party is in the Communist-controlled areas. When the Chinese Communist Army reaches a new *hsien*, it contacts the local cell, which it expands, or if there is no cell in existence it organizes one. The cell may be permitted to hold its own election, but usually the Cell Committee is appointed, as is the case in Chungking-controlled China.

The Communist informant stated that no knowledge of the theories of Karl Marx is required of an applicant for membership in the Party. It is only necessary that he sympathize with what he understands to be the general aims of the party, and that he be willing to obey the Party leadership. He is not even required to be literate, the informant said, describing the Party's attitude as being that the neophyte can be schooled after he enters.¹ The heads of the Propaganda "De-

¹ There is some evidence that the Chinese Communists do not encourage educated people to join the Party. Even Chinese liberals and non-party intellectuals who offer their services to the Communists have found it difficult to cooperate with them. For example, the daughter-in-law of Tai Chi-t'ao, President of the Examination Yuan of the National Government in Chungking, a well educated woman, fled from Japanese-occupied Peiping to Yen-an *en route* to Chungking. She was treated with the greatest suspicion by the Communists. It took her a year and a half to obtain a release from the Communists to proceed to Chungking, which led her to remark that it is easier to get out of Japanese-occupied areas than out of Communist areas. Meanwhile, she offered her services to the Communists while staying in Yen-an, but found them extremely uncooperative. Mr. Michael Lindsay, a British subject who has been working for the Chinese Communists during the past three years, recently told an American Army officer visiting Yen-an that "for some unknown reason" the Communists find it extremely difficult to obtain cooperation from Chinese "technical people." Because of this one of their greatest shortcomings is lack of capable technicians, teachers, and administrators. "They [the 'technical' Chinese] all run away at the first opportune moment," he said. But he added as possible explanation for this that it is difficult for any educated person who does not follow the "Party line" to work for the Communists.

partment" of the Cell, *Hsien* and Provincial Committees are responsible for the education of the members. In some places classes are held, and higher education is available in Yen-an. The local cells only conduct classes in two subjects, "political work" and "basic information." The American Embassy officer who obtained this information stated that he understood that the first of these subjects was largely an elementary education in how to keep out of the hands of the police, while the second course evidently covers the teaching of a basic number of Chinese characters, together with the rudiments of geography, history, etc.

BASE AREAS

Communist-controlled areas behind Japanese lines are generally referred to by the Communists as anti-Japanese bases. They have been set up by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. These anti-Japanese bases are officially called "Military Regions" (*Chün-ch'ü*) in Communist military communiques. Administratively, they are called either "Border Region (*Pien-ch'ü*) Governments" where full-fledged Governments are established, with elected village, *hsien* (county) and Border Region Congresses, or "Administrative Committees" (*Hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui*), where representative governments have not yet been established. In nearly all instances the military and administrative regions are identical in extent, although there are three military regions which have no Border Region Governments or Administrative Committees. The Communists, for brevity's sake, use the literary one-character names of the provinces; for example, the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region is called the Shen-Kan-Ning Pien-ch'ü, and the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region is called the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien-ch'ü. All the main base areas are divided into sub-regions, and are called either military sub-regions (or sub-districts), or just districts (when used administratively).

At the end of 1944 there were sixteen anti-Japanese bases, of which only five had full-fledged Border Region Governments, eight had Administrative Committees, and three were Military Regions where no anti-Japanese government organizations had yet been set up. They are as follows (see map, p. xii):

Border Region Governments

Under 18th Group Army:

Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia: Shen-Kan-Ning Pien-ch'ü.

Shansi-Suiyuan: Chin-Sui Pien-ch'ü.

Shansi-Hopeh-Honan: Chin-Chi-Yü Pien-ch'ü.

Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar: Chin-Ch'a-Chi Pien-ch'ü.

Hopeh-Shantung-Honan: Chi-Lu-Yü Pien-ch'ü.

Administrative Committees

Under 18th Group Army:

Shantung: Shantung hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

Under New Fourth Army:

North Kiangsu: Su-pei hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

Central Kiangsu: Su-chung hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

South Kiangsu: Su-nan hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

North Huai: Huai-pei hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

South Huai: Huai-nan hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

Central Anhwei: Wan-chung hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

Hupei-Honan-Anhwei: Yü-Wan hsing-cheng wei-yüan-hui.

Base Areas with no anti-Japanese governments

Under 18th Group Army:

Hainan Island: Hainan or Ch'üing-yai Base.

East River: Tung-chiang Base.

Under New Fourth Army:

East Chekiang: Che-tung Base.

As originally planned, the Border Region Governments were to be under the National Government in Chungking. Of the thirteen Border Region Governments and Administrative Committees which existed at the end of 1944, only two were officially recognized by the National Government—the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia and Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Governments.² The eleven other anti-Japanese governments have, therefore, no legal status. Whether legalized or not, however, the real leadership of these anti-Japanese bases is centered in the Communist Party Headquarters at Yen-an.

Within, or alongside, a Communist-controlled area there may be found "island" areas where a Kuomintang Government is still in existence. Such areas, however, are much smaller than Communist base areas, and are found only in Central China and the coastal provinces.

Along the outer edges of the Communist-controlled base areas, near the Japanese lines, the Communists mention the existence of so-called

² The Chungking Government recognized the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government in 1938. This recognition may have been rescinded later when an attempt was made by the Kuomintang to set up a conflicting government under Lu Chung-lin in Hopeh. At any rate, its present status of legality vis-à-vis the Central Government is obscure.

“revolutionary double-side” and “reactionary double-side” (local) governments. The “revolutionary double-side” governments are made up of landlords, merchants and wealthy people in the Japanese-occupied area, who are appointed by the Japanese, but are not enemies of the Communist forces. The “reactionary double-side” governments, on the other hand, are made up of wealthy individuals who have played both the Japanese and Communist sides alternately for individual gain, but are at present with the Japanese because their fortunes are dependent on Japanese control.

GOVERNMENT IN THE BORDER REGIONS


The administration in the base areas is carried on by Border Region, *Hsien* (county), *Ch'ü* (township) and village government organs. Chart No. 1, pp. 132–33, shows the general structure of the Border Region Government. Paralleling this structure is the organization of the “People’s Committee for anti-Japanese Armed Resistance,” which aids the 18th Group Army in the defense of the Border Region and is the link between the Border Region Government and the 18th Group Army.


Border Region, Hsien, and Village Governments

The highest organ of government in the base area is the Border Region Council (see Chart No. 1, p. 132). When the Border Region Council is not in session, government is carried on by the Border Region Government Committee whose members are chosen by the Council. A standing committee is also chosen by the Council to supervise the Government in its carrying out of resolutions passed by the Council. There are also the *Hsien* Council and the Village Citizens’ General Assembly whose functions within the *hsien* and village respectively are the counterpart of those of the Border Region Council.

Supervisor’s and Ch’ü Offices

The Supervisor’s Office represents the Border Region Government in supervising the affairs of several *hsien*. The *Ch’ü* (township) Office is the counterpart of the Supervisor’s Office in supervising the affairs of several villages. These two offices are purely supervisory and not administrative organs, and are generally called the “nominal offices,” while the organs of the Border Region, *Hsien*, and Village Governments are the “real offices.” Personnel for the Supervisor’s and *Ch’ü* Offices are chosen by the Border Region and *Hsien* Governments re-





Communist-sponsored government organizations are in *italic type*. All others are Communist party organizations.

spectively, except in areas behind enemy lines where communications are poor and where the personnel of the *Ch'ü* Office are selected by the *Ch'ü* People's Delegates Assembly rather than by the *Hsien* Government.

Village Government Organs

The Village Citizens' General Assembly (which includes all village inhabitants of voting age) chooses delegates to form the Village Delegates Assembly, as well as the Mayor and the Assistant Mayor who are respectively Chairman and Vice-Chairman of both the General Assembly and the Delegates Assembly. Each delegate chosen by the Citizens' General Assembly represents several persons; and if the people whom he represents are not satisfied with the way he performs his duties, they may change him at any time without waiting for the next election date. The heads of the various village committees are chosen by the Delegates Assembly from among their ranks. The Mayor and his Assistant and the heads of the village committees together form the Village Government Committee which directs the Village Office's work.

A Village Government as described above may actually govern a combination of several small villages or settlements, or a single large village. If several small villages comprise an administrative village, each small village elects a "chief delegate" to act as intermediary with the Village Officer, taking care of the interests of the particular village. If the Village Government represents only a single village, no "chief delegate" is selected.

Congresses

The Congresses of the various levels of government (Border Region People's Congress of the Border Region Government; Administrative Congress of the Supervisor's Office; and the *Hsien* People's Congress) are convened by the heads of the various government organs to stimulate democracy and realize collective leadership, according to Communist statements.

Elections

Elections are held every year for village delegates, every two years for the *Hsien* Affairs Conference, and every three years for the Border Region Council. It appears that in the more sparsely populated regions, in the village (or group of villages) one representative is

elected for every 60 persons, in the *hsien* one for every 600 to 800 persons, and in the Border Region Congress one representative for every 8,000 persons. In the more densely populated region of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region, however, one representative for 30,000 people was elected to the Border Region Congress of 1 Jan. 1943.

As early as 1940 the Communist Party decided to limit the number of Communist members in any elective government body to one-third, leaving one-third for upper class members (landlords and merchants) and one-third for Kuomintang members and non-party people.³

This self-imposed restriction has not, however, prevented the Communist Party from taking the leading role. As has been shown in the historical section of this study, in the Communist areas the Kuomintang members have no party machine to back them, and the upper-class non-party group is made up of representatives of the unorganized landlord-merchant class. The liberal intellectual members of the Government are strong supporters of the Communists, and so are the peasants and representatives of mass organizations.

The Communist Party makes a point of sponsoring most progressive plans. An individual landlord, for instance, may suggest a regulation to bring about a certain improvement in administration or in production or distribution. If it is considered worthwhile, the Communist Party endorses such a regulation, publicizing it as a Communist-sponsored measure. It is soon forgotten that the landlord originally introduced the measure, and the Communist Party receives the credit for having sponsored the regulation. For all of these reasons, there is no strong opposition party to the Communist Party, which remains indisputably the dominant political factor.

PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES FOR ANTI-JAPANESE ARMED RESISTANCE

The organization of the Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance is strictly a militia ("People's Militia") organization and works closely with the 18th Group Army. The Committees have no civil administrative functions, although they originally formed the core of the Mobilization or Administrative Committees which were the rudimentary governments later replaced by elected governments. The organization of these People's Committees for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance parallels the administrative set-up of the Border

³ See above, p. 56.—*Ed.*

Region Government. Members of the Village Committee are elected by the citizens of the village. The Village Committees elect the *Ch'ü* Committee. The several *Ch'ü* Committees within a *hsien* elect the *Hsien* Committee and so on. Although the Committees have a large measure of independence, they are subject to both government and military control.

The Committees are headed by the Village, *Ch'ü*, or *Hsien* Command Headquarters. In the village the Mayor is the head of the Command Headquarters, while the head of the village guerrilla detachment is the executive officer, and the Chairman of the Committee is next in authority. If a Communist army unit is stationed in the area, an army representative is also included in the Village Command Headquarters. The head of the *Ch'ü* government is also head of the *Ch'ü* Command Headquarters, and the *Hsien* Magistrate is head of the *Hsien* Command Headquarters; the organization of these headquarters is similar to that of the Village Command Headquarters.

The functions of the various groups within these committees are more fully discussed in the military section of this report under "The People's Militia." [See p. 187.—*Ed.*]

EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED BASE AREAS

Education in the Communist base areas is designed to further the war of resistance and train the people to improve agricultural and industrial production. There are two kinds of schools: those directly under the Communist Party for the training of Party officials and Communist Army personnel, and those under the educational departments of the various Border Region Governments. Despite this distinction, however, there is Communist influence in the schools not directly under the Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung's *New Democracy*, for instance, and Communist newspapers are used extensively in the University of Yen-an (which is under the Educational Department of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government), and primary school textbooks in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, examined by the group of visiting correspondents in the summer of 1944, were found to contain Communist propaganda.

Communist Party Schools

The Communist Party School at Yen-an is under Mao Tse-tung's direction. All Party leaders and functionaries from all over China are required to attend the school periodically for purposes of indoctrina-

tion. There is also the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University in southeast Shansi, with a branch at Suiteh, Shensi, to train officers for the Communist Armies.

University of Yen-an

This University is under the Educational Bureau of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. It was established in 1941 by the amalgamation of the North Shensi Public School, the Chinese Women's College, and the Tze-tung Youth Cadre School. The Institute of Public Administration was incorporated early in 1944. The University of Yen-an now comprises the following: (a) College of Administration, with departments of public administration, public finance, economics, and jurisprudence; (b) Lu Hsün Art College, with departments of fine arts, drama, music, and literature; (c) College of Natural Science, with departments of medicine, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, and agriculture.

In July 1944 there were 1,302 students enrolled in the University of Yen-an, according to Liu Shih, the Commissioner of Education of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region Government. They are said to spend 80% of their time in classes and study, and 20% in agricultural and industrial production. Great stress is laid upon "practical" education. According to Liu Shih, "National education cannot be isolated from life, and college and secondary education cannot be isolated from society. It will not do to depend upon textbooks alone." The Yen-an newspaper *Chieh-fang jih-pao* (*Emancipation Daily*), organ of the CCP, and other documentary materials are used in addition to textbooks.

Primary and Secondary Schools

Owing to the deficiency of equipment and materials, the schools in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are not considered adequate by normal standards. Mimeographed textbooks and hand-drawn maps are used, as well as the Communist-controlled newspaper *Mass Journal* (which is published by the so-called Cultural Association of the Border Area).⁴ Primary schools are under the Village and *Hsien* Governments, and secondary schools are under the Border Region Governments. There are also classes for adults who wish to learn to read and write, and in the army, factories, and arsenals, illiterates are urged to learn a few characters each week.

⁴ *Ta-chung wen-i* in Chinese. This was not a major publication.—Ed.

Primary school courses in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region are five years long, according to Commissioner of Education Liu Shih, and classes are held mainly in the winter so as not to interfere with production. Students are required to learn 500 characters the first year and an additional 500 the second year; these enable the student to read the *Mass Journal*.

During the winter, schools are in session all day with alternate periods of study, song, recreation, and spinning and weaving. Enrollment in the winter classes in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region is said to be over 40,000, and government officials expect to wipe out illiteracy within five years. Mass education is also carried on by means of blackboard newspapers, dramas and so-called "Transplanting Songs," which are songs and dramatizations telling the population how to improve production and keep up the anti-Japanese resistance.⁵

⁵ This refers to the *yang-ko*, a folk dance on the theme of setting out the seedlings of the new crop. It became the choreographic trademark of the CCP, and was used for a great many propaganda purposes.—*Ed.*

6. The Economic Situation in Communist Areas

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, AREA AND POPULATION

General

The Communist-controlled areas of North China embrace the north-eastern parts of Shensi and Kansu in Free China and parts of the provinces of Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung, Honan, Suiyuan and Chahar behind the Japanese lines.¹ In Central China the Communist areas are all behind the Japanese lines and include substantial portions of the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Hupeh and small areas in Chekiang and Hunan. In South China the Communists control small areas in and around the Canton delta and on Hainan island. In the occupied region the Japanese control the railways and main highways, the important navigable rivers, the large cities, the chief district cities, and the adjoining countryside. The Japanese-controlled territories separate the Communist areas one from the other and make free and easy communication between them impossible. A unified economic life within the Communist region is therefore impossible.

Economic Characteristics

In North China the central core of each Communist base is located in a rough, mountainous, or out-of-the-way region. The periphery generally extends out into the plains and more fertile agricultural areas. Between the consolidated Communist area and the Japanese-controlled area there is a region not effectively controlled by either. Millet and wheat are staple food crops. In Central and South China the Communist bases are located in more fertile territory, but are generally outside the main lines of communications and in regions cut by many waterways and divided by swamps and lakes. Rice and

¹ Ninghsia has for some reason been omitted.—*Ed.*

wheat are the staple food crops. In general the areas occupied by the Communists were the most backward and least fertile and productive regions prior to the war. Although important mineral-producing areas are within the Communist Border Regions, the important mines are controlled and operated by the Japanese. Agriculture and decaying handicraft industries were characteristic of these areas before the war. Although the Communists have made extensive efforts to reclaim land, revitalize agriculture, and revive handicraft industries, the productive capacity of the areas is still low, and there are no modern large-scale industries. Small-scale farming and handicraft industries provide the economic foundation of the areas.

Area and Population

No even approximately accurate figures on the area and population controlled by the Communists are possible, because a census has not been taken and because the dividing line between Japanese- and Communist-controlled areas is constantly changing. Communist broadcasts have claimed as much as 520,000 square miles of "liberated" territory behind the Japanese lines, but other Communist sources lay claim to little more than 150,000 square miles. Similarly, some recent Communist sources claim that they control as many as 100,000,000 people, but reports of 1943 claimed only about 52,000,000.

As careful an estimate as possible of the area and population controlled by the Communists was made in Military Intelligence Service in the spring of 1944. This estimate was as follows:

	Area, square miles	Population
North China	155,000	35,718,000
Central China	48,500	23,700,000
South China	8,300	3,000,000
Total	212,000 ²	62,418,000

After making due allowance for recent Communist advances, it seems probable that the area largely under their control is somewhere between 200,000 and 225,000 square miles and that the population largely under their control is between 70,000,000 and 85,000,000. Further details as compiled from various sources are given in Table 1.

² Apparently total area has been rounded off. The sum of the three areas as given is 211,800 sq. mi.—*Ed.*

Table 1. Area and Population of Communist Regions

Region	Claims of 1943-44		Claims of 1944-45	
	Area, square miles	Population	Area, square miles	Population
North China (18th Group Army Area):				
Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia.	(?)	2,000,000	35,000	1,580,000
Shansi-Suiyuan	9,000	1,750,000	—	3,000,000
Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh .	30,000	8,600,000	—	18,000,000*
Shansi-Hopeh-Honan . . }	33,000	13,470,000	14,000	{ 4,200,000
Hopeh-Shantung-Honan }				{ 10,800,000
Shantung	26,000	10,700,000	—	14,000,000*
Total for North China	98,000+	36,520,000	—	51,580,000
Central China (New 4th Army Area):				
Northern Kiangsu	—	—	—	3,700,000
Central Kiangsu	—	—	—	7,608,075
South Kiangsu	—	—	—	1,908,843
North Huai River	—	—	—	3,021,318
Southern Huai River . .	—	—	—	2,083,600
Central Anhwei	—	—	—	1,660,000
Eastern Chekiang	—	—	—	(?)
Hupei-Honan-Anhwei .	—	—	—	9,200,000
Total for Cent. China	(?)	15,480,000	—	30,481,836†
South China:				
East River Base	(?)	(?)	7,000	1,000,000
Hainan Island Base . . .	(?)	(?)	—	(?)
Grand total	—	52,000,000+	—	83,061,836+

* The figures for the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh and Shantung areas seem too large.
† Sic.

ECONOMIC POLICY, PROGRAM AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Economic Theory

Although the Communist leaders are admittedly Marxists and look forward to the time when a Communist society will prevail in China, they have for the present abandoned their earlier policies of land confiscation and immediate collectivism in favor of a more moderate policy designed to gain the support of the mass of the people and more suited to the situation in China. In general the theory being followed for the present is that it is impossible for China to move immediately from an agrarian society to a Communist collectivistic society. The

Communists argue that China must go through a stage of democratic industrialism based fundamentally upon private property before the time is ripe for true Communism. During this transitory period they expect to avoid the major evils that have appeared in Western capitalistic society.

The ideas of the Communist leaders are set forth in the following reported statements of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Mao states that:

Our old program of land confiscation—modified, inasmuch as the landlord got a share—was not bad at the time. The basic demand of the masses was concentrated on their desire for land. Sun Yat-sen advocated it. But it is not suitable to wartime because the landlords wish to be anti-Japanese, but a policy of confiscation may drive them into the other camp. The peasants see the simple truth that rent reduction makes it possible for the landlords to remain, and helps to isolate the Japanese. After a few experiences of land confiscation in some areas early in the war, the peasants saw that this policy ultimately harmed them. A policy of rent concessions by the landlord and guarantee of payment of rent by the tenant results in successful and genuine cooperation. This policy is not merely opportunistic: it is the only possible one. Three forms of industrialization will coexist. These are mentioned in the Manifesto of the First Kuomintang Congress. (State, large-scale private, and handicraft.) Use of cooperatives depends on locality. Here in the Northwest there will be need for handicrafts. In the large cities conditions will be different. We can work according to Sun Yat-sen. Nation-wide enterprises capable of influence on the national economy, such as railways, should be State-owned. The rest will be private. In rural and distant areas, we will need cooperatives.

Chou En-lai looks forward to an ultimate socialist collectivism but believes that will not come for a considerable length of time.

China's development will not proceed along the same lines as Soviet Russia's. There will be stages. For example, on the basis of individual production we have adopted the mutual help or labor-exchange method, rather than an immediate and drastic establishing of collectivism.³ Second, from the principle of private ownership we hope to move to the nationalization of big enterprises—communication systems, banks, war industries. Third, we shall progress from the reduction of rents and interest to the stage of land owned by the tillers, and eventually to state ownership or nationalization of the land. Fourth, on the basis of equal suffrage for all social classes,

³ It should be noted that collectivism was not introduced immediately in the Soviet Union. It was not before 1928 when Stalin felt that Soviet power had been sufficiently consolidated to permit such a drastic economic reform that collectivism was introduced in Soviet Russia. There are many similarities between the economic program of the Chinese Communists and the "New Economic Policy" of Soviet Russia as introduced in 1921.

we shall enable the majority—the laboring classes—to obtain the privilege of suffrage. The intention is to make rule by a minority less likely. . . . Fifth, under conditions of equality we shall strive for international peace and cooperation. These five points summarize what we call our New Democracy. They are also incorporated in the program of the revolutionary *San Min Chu I* as interpreted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924.

Present Economic Policies

Present policies include among others the following main points:

(a) The abandonment of land confiscation. As a result of the formation of the united front, the program of confiscation of the land of the landlords was abandoned in September 1937. Confiscations prior to that time have remained in force, but according to the Communists none have been made since then.

(b) The reduction and guarantee of rents. Although land confiscation has been abandoned, landlords have had to accept smaller rents, but in return a policy of guaranteeing the payment of these rents has been adopted. This policy has had the three-fold purpose of gaining the support of the landlords, protecting the peasants, and, by reducing the rents on land, forcing the landlords to invest their surplus capital in industry.

(c) The encouragement of cooperatives as a means of developing industry, increasing capital, promoting self-sufficiency, and raising the living standard.

(d) The encouragement of private capital in order to obtain sufficient funds to make possible the economic development of the Communist areas. The investment of private capital in industry and business has been encouraged. Profits are limited, and hoarding and profiteering are regulated, but loans are made to all types of private enterprise, especially cooperative. Recent observers indicate that small business enterprises are encouraged and that private trade flourishes in the market towns. In 1944 there were 2,579 private shops in the Yen-an area, and the number is said to be increasing every year.

(e) A program of increased production aimed at self-sufficiency, the raising of the standard of living, and the equalization of wealth. This program is popularized in the One-One Program of Mao Tse-tung, so named because of its eleven points. The pertinent economic elements of the program are as follows:

Each family is to keep one year's food supply in storage.

Each village is to have a spinning and weaving machine and a blacksmith shop.

Each village (*hsiang*) is to have a large storehouse.

Each town is to have a general merchandise store.

Each family is to have a pig and a cow.

Each family is to plant 100 trees.

Each village is to have a well and a water supply station.

(f) After the war they look forward to free trade and hope to have foreign help in the development of industry.

The following economic principles, outlined in the People's Political Council in Yen-an in 1941, set forth certain of the basic essentials of the present policy:

The Communists will urge the strict enforcement of the principle of clean and honest government and severe punishment of any functionary guilty of graft or embezzlement. They will oppose jobbery. If a Communist violates the laws, the Party is of the opinion that he should be subjected to a severe penalty. At the same time, we believe that the salary system should be based on the principle of economy and frugality. The necessary material needs of all functionaries and their dependents should be satisfied, and an adequate cultural and recreative life must be guaranteed them.

Communist representatives will urge measures intended to develop agricultural production and to mobilize the masses for their spring sowing and autumn harvesting, and help poor peasants to overcome difficulties in securing plowing animals, farm implements, fertilizers and seeds. They will propose that a further 600,000 *mou* [six *mou* equal one English acre] of untilled land be cultivated in the present year in order to increase the supply of food crops by 400,000 piculs [one picul equals 133 pounds]. Migration of people to the Border Region will be encouraged.

The Communists declare their belief that in the districts where land has been distributed, the right of private ownership of land should be guaranteed to all peasants who have acquired land. In other districts where land has not been distributed (such as Sui-te, Fu-hsien and Chin-yang), the right of ownership of land should be guaranteed to creditors. The Party declares that the rates of rent and interest must be reduced. Tenants should pay a certain amount of rent to the landlords, and debtors should pay a certain amount of interest to creditors. The Government should regulate the relationship between landlords and tenants and between creditors and debtors.

The Communist representatives will propose measures designed to develop industrial production and trade, encourage private enterprise, and protect private property. They believe the Border Region should welcome investments from outside and abroad, foster free trade, and oppose monopoly and manipulations. At the same time it should develop the cooperatives and promote the development of handicraft industry.

The People's Political Council should regulate the relationship between

employers and employees, put into practice a ten-hour working day, raise labor productivity, foster labor discipline, and adequately improve the livelihood of the workers.

The People's Political Council should devise a rational system of taxation, with the exception of the poorest section of the people, who should be exempted from taxation, a progressive tax system—in which the rate of taxation varies in accordance with the amount of property or income of the taxpayer—should be enforced, so that the costs of the anti-Japanese War are equitably borne, and by the great majority of the population. At the same time the organization of financial institutions should be improved, financial relations regulated, national currency protected. Notes issued by the Border Region Bank should be consolidated so as to facilitate the development of a healthy economy and finance.

The People's Political Council should provide vagrants with opportunity to work on the farm, secure jobs, and receive education. It should seek to correct the bad habits of functionaries and others in discriminating against vagrants. It should pursue a policy of winning over, uniting and educating Hui-min [organizations with superstitions and semifeudal practices and purposes].⁴

The Program for Increased Production and Self-Sufficiency

Because of the relative poverty of the Communist areas and the difficulty of getting supplies from the outside, a drive to increase production and make the areas self-sufficient was begun in the late 1930's. After the imposition of the blockade against the Communist areas by the Chungking Government in 1940, this program was intensified. The main methods used to increase production were as follows:

(a) Every person was to be a producer. Women were encouraged to work and to form spinning and weaving cooperatives. Townspeople, officials, students and soldiers were ordered to cultivate gardens, to work part time in industry, and in general to become self-sufficient. In pursuit of this policy, most of the army units began the reclamation of land, the cultivation of gardens, and the production of clothing and other items needed by themselves. As a result many of the army units are now practically self-sufficient. Army, government and Party members are said to be producing about 64 percent of their food and clothing in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.

(b) "Labor Heroes" were introduced as a means of encouraging people to increase their productive efforts. Persons who had made

⁴ The term "Hui-min" has been misconstrued by the original compilers. It actually refers to Chinese Moslems, considerable numbers of whom lived in Shen-Kan-Ning, and to the west, in Kansu. The CCP was here attempting to overcome the prejudice and discrimination of the Han Chinese majority. The compiler apparently confused "Hui" (Moslem) with "hui" (association).—Ed.

signal contributions were singled out for honors, and their achievements were propagandized. Idlers were encouraged to go to work and every possible device used to get them to work. In 1935 there were supposed to have been 70,000 idlers in the Yen-an area, which number was reportedly reduced to 3,967 by the beginning of 1944.

(c) Labor unions and agricultural labor brigades were also organized to increase the efficiency of labor. The organization of labor unions was begun in 1937, in the Yen-an area. The Border Regional General Labor Union was formed in 1940. It includes industrial workers, office workers and agricultural laborers. It is considered a mass organization and aims to mobilize the population in the war. Its functions are to adjust relations between employers and workers, to carry out the government production program, and to improve the general cultural condition of the workers. In general it aims to support the labor policy of the government, which includes the following points:

The improvement of livelihood, increased production and strengthening the cause of workers.

A 10-hour day for the present period with an 8-hour day as the ideal.

Respect on the part of labor for contracts and the maintenance of labor discipline.

Strengthen the organization and improve workers' education.

Increase the number of laborers.

Peasant societies have been organized to improve the condition of agricultural workers and to bargain with employers. Wages in general are paid in kind, and in many industrial establishments, meals, clothing and other items are provided.

(d) Immigrants were encouraged from other areas, particularly from the famine-stricken regions of Honan. Some 70,000 have reportedly been absorbed recently in the Yen-an area alone.

(e) An extensive program of land reclamation and agricultural improvement was put into effect. (This will be discussed in more detail below).

(f) The organization of cooperatives was actively promoted. They are of four types: industrial or producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, transportation cooperatives, and credit cooperatives, of which the first two are the most important. They have been organized extensively throughout all the Border Regions and have added materially to the productive power of the area. Industrial cooperatives

were started in 1939 with the aid of organizers of the movement from the Chungking area. However, support from Chungking was soon cut off, and the movement had to go on with little support or aid from the outside. No over-all statistics on the number of cooperatives in the Communist areas are available, but in the Yen-an area they are said to have increased from 142 in 1937 to 624 in February 1944.⁵

Achievements of the Production Program: Living Standards

In general the program of increased production seems to have been successful. Recent travelers in the various Communist regions almost universally agree that economic conditions have greatly improved over what they were in 1941. At present all of the areas are relatively self-sufficient. Food production has been increased and is fairly equitably distributed. Beggars have practically disappeared, and there are few signs of desperate poverty. Handicrafts have been revived to such a state that the most pressing needs of the civilian population and fighting forces are being met. Clothing is simple but generally adequate. The Yen-an area, one of the poorest of the Communist areas and the one which has been most severely affected by the Chungking blockade, is now said to be producing at least two-thirds of its cotton cloth requirement and to be self-sufficient in most consumer goods such as matches, soap, paper, etc. Wheat is of increasing importance in the diet, although millet is still the staple food.

Most observers seem to agree that the general living standard is equal to and in many cases superior to that in Kuomintang China. Troops in general are better fed and certainly in better physical condition than in Kuomintang China. One observer indicates the change in the standard of living of troops in the Yen-an area as shown in the following tabulation. December 1939 equals 100.

1939	100
1940	88
1941	84.2
1942	96.3
1943	125.5

Although living conditions may have improved, judged by Western standards they are still pitifully low, as can be seen from Table 2, which gives the monthly ration allowance per person established by the government in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area. In addi-

⁵ But see below, p. 162.—*Ed.*

Table 2. Data on Standard of Living in Shen-Kan-Ning
(Pounds)

	Basic mini- mum ration	Factory workers	Soldiers
Millet	48	60*	60
Meat	2.7-5.3	4	4.6
Vegetables	40	36+	48
Vegetable oils	1.3-2.2	1.3-2.2	1.3-2.2
Salt	1.3	1.3	1.3
Coal	60	60	60

* Includes 20 pounds of wheat.

tion clothing, shoes, bedclothes, soap, paper, lodgings, medical care and some other items are provided.

AGRICULTURE AND TRADE

Agriculture

As has been pointed out, agriculture forms the basis of economic life in the Communist area. In North China the important food crops are millet, wheat, sweet potatoes, *kaoliang*, soybeans, broad beans, corn, Irish potatoes and oats, while the most important commercial crops are cotton, soybeans and vegetable oil seeds. Considerable wool is also produced, and pigs, sheep and poultry are the important food-producing animals. Oxen, donkeys, mules and horses are the chief draft animals. In Central China rice becomes an important food crop, replacing millet and *kaoliang* to a considerable extent, and in South China rice is the all-important food crop. The water buffalo is the most important draft animal in Central and South China.

Since much of the area controlled by the Communists is relatively unproductive, since agricultural methods are very backward, and since the area depends upon the importation of many agricultural tools and implements, the Communists have often had serious difficulties in meeting their food requirements. Consequently they have endeavored to increase agricultural production by the following means:

(a) Land reclamation which includes the clearing and cultivation of land which has been allowed to go to waste, the reclamation of other areas through irrigation and the construction of irrigation canals or drainage ditches. The army has taken a prominent part in this reclamation program. Although no over-all figures on land reclama-

tion are available it seems certain that considerable areas have been restored to cultivation and that areas damaged by Japanese raiding expeditions have been restored.

(*b*) Agricultural education and the introduction of new methods and new crops. Each of the Border Regions maintains an agricultural experiment station which studies improved varieties of seeds and carries on education among the peasantry directed toward the improvement of agricultural methods.

(*c*) The increase and improvement of agricultural implements.

(*d*) The encouragement of livestock breeding.

(*e*) The improvement of the condition of the tenant farmer through reduction of rents, loans and exemptions from taxation.

(*f*) The formation of labor exchange groups among the farmers so as to increase village productivity and to use more economically the limited supply of agricultural implements.

(*g*) Keeping agricultural production out of the hands of the enemy by encouraging handicraft industries and discouraging the production of crops which have no food value or could not be marketed within the Communist area.

As a result of these measures, agricultural production has increased, and at the present the Communist areas are generally self-sufficient so far as food production is concerned.

Agriculture is discussed more extensively under the various Communist areas.

Trade

The Communists carry on a limited amount of trade with Chungking China and with Occupied China. The trade with Chungking is mainly from the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area, while the trade with the Japanese-occupied regions is carried on from the areas behind the Japanese lines. Since the Communist areas were deficient in cloth and most types of manufactured articles, they have attempted to acquire these through trade either with the rest of Free China or with the occupied areas. They adopted a policy in the regions behind the Japanese lines of restricting the export of food, cotton and other raw materials which would be useful to the Japanese, but did permit sufficient trade so that they could obtain cloth and finished products such as munitions, radio parts, medicines, kerosene, etc. During the early years of Japanese occupation it was relatively easy to acquire goods from the Japanese-controlled areas, but as time has gone on

the availability of manufactured products has decreased and the Japanese have imposed a more rigid blockade, with the result that the flow of essential commodities has decreased. Between 1937 and 1940 relatively free exchange of goods between the Yen-an area and the rest of Free China took place, but since that time the Central Government has imposed a partial blockade against the Communist areas. As a result, exports from the Yen-an area have been confined largely to salt and petroleum products which were needed by the rest of Free China in return for cloth, dyestuffs, etc. There was very little movement of goods from one Communist area to another because of the difficulties of transportation.

INDUSTRY AND ARMS PRODUCTION

Industry

Before the war there was no modern industry in any of the Communist-controlled areas, and because most of the people depended upon imported cloth and manufactured items the home handicraft industries had deteriorated or gone out of existence entirely. Under Communist leadership a great effort has been made to develop handicraft industries in order to make the areas self-sufficient both as to military supplies and essential civilian needs. Numerous obstacles have been encountered, including: (1) lack of equipment, (2) difficulties in obtaining raw materials, (3) lack of skilled artisans, and (4) shortage of power, practically no electrical power being available. Nevertheless considerable progress has been made through the development of cooperatives and the establishment of government factories or government subsidized industries. At present, numerous handicraft industries exist throughout the Communist region. They produce cotton, woolen and linen cloth, blankets, stockings, towels, cigarettes, matches, soap, paper, dyes, chinaware, chemicals, machine tools, etc. Although the Communist areas are still not entirely self-sufficient in the production of light consumer goods, their position has greatly improved. They are, however, still woefully weak so far as the production of machinery, chemicals, electrical equipment and all heavy industry goods are concerned. Most steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese-controlled railways.

Arsenals

Although there are a number of small arsenals scattered throughout the Communist areas, they are incapable of effectively meeting

the needs of the Communist troops, who still must depend to a considerable extent for arms and munitions upon materials captured from the enemy. No rifles, bullets or other military supplies have been received from the Central Government since 1940-41, when the sending of such supplies was stopped. The largest and best equipped arsenals are in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area and the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh area. Generally speaking, the arsenals behind the Japanese lines are of a mobile type so that they can be dismantled and moved about readily in case of raids. No complete list of arsenals is available, although there appear to be three in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, one or two small ones in the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region, two in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region, two in the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region, and a number in each of the other base areas. American fliers forced down in the New 4th Army region in Kiangsu province reported that each division had three small arsenals attached to it.

The arsenals specialize in the repair of small arms and the loading of cartridges, the manufacture of mortars and mortar ammunition, hand grenades and land mines, and the production of powder. A few of the arsenals are able to make rifles and light machine guns and repair light field guns. Among the difficulties which interfere with arms and munitions production are: (1) lack of steel, copper, brass and other necessary raw materials; (2) poor explosives (generally speaking the powder available is a locally made black powder of poor quality, although in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region a good quality powder is manufactured); (3) lack of proper equipment and machinery; and (4) lack of adequately trained technical personnel. Numerous observers agree that the armament production facilities of the area are so limited that no large scale offensive would be possible.

Industry and arms production are discussed in more detail under the various Communist areas.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

General

Transportation and communication facilities throughout the Communist areas are very poor. There are no railroads and, except in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region which is outside the Japanese-occupied area, there are no motor roads. In fact, behind the Japanese lines the Communists have deliberately destroyed roads and trails

leading into their base areas as a means of defense against the Japanese. Within the base areas trails provide the chief connecting arteries.

Roads and Trails

In the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region there are said to be about 800 miles of road which could be used by trucks or motor cars. These include the main highway from Fu-hsien north through Yen-an to Mi-chih. From Fu-hsien this road runs southward through Kuomintang-controlled territory to Sian and affords the only motor connection between the Communist area and Free China. Other motor roads include one running northwestward from Yen-an via Ching-pien to the salt-producing area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. Another runs from Ting-pien southeast to Ch'ing-yang. A fourth road reportedly runs from Ch'ing-chien on the Yen-an-Mi-chih road to Ching-pien on the Yen-an-Ting-pien road. These roads supplemented by trails constitute the main transportation routes in this area. During 1942 about 45,000 laborers are said to have been mobilized to work on road construction.

The main route leading from Yen-an to the base areas behind the Japanese lines runs northward from Yen-an to Mi-chih. From there a trail runs northeastward to Chia-hsien on the Yellow River and thence for some distance north along the west bank of the river to a ferry crossing which connects with trails leading to the headquarters of the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. From there various routes lead to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region and the Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Border Region. Communication between the base areas behind the Japanese lines is difficult because the Japanese-controlled railroads can be crossed only by armed forces or by means of tunnels.

Equipment and Methods

The few hundred miles of motorable highway are of little use to motor transport because of the almost complete absence of trucks or automobiles. One source states that there are only about 20-odd dilapidated trucks in the Yen-an area. In general, mules, donkeys and human carriers are the main means of transportation, while horses are used to transport persons. Travel is slow and difficult, throughout the Communist areas, and one member of the U.S. Army Observer Section at Yen-an indicates that during an extended field trip which

he took by horseback they were rarely able to cover more than 25 miles a day. In the area behind the Japanese lines travel is even slower because of the long delays caused in crossing the Japanese-controlled railways and highways, and in many cases it takes weeks or even months to travel a distance which would normally take only a few hours or days. In Hopeh extensive tunnel systems lead under the railways.

The government has encouraged the formation of transportation cooperatives and salt transport groups to facilitate the movement of goods in the Yen-an area. These organized groups are said to be much more efficient in transportation than private transport efforts. Salt is perhaps the most important item transported. In 1942, over 1,550 animals were reportedly employed in the transportation of salt, of which 246 belonged to cooperatives and the balance was privately owned. By 1943, 3,706 animals were employed by cooperatives and 21,337 by private owners.

Interference with Japanese Transportation

North of the Lung-Hai railway the Communists have attacked the Japanese-controlled railroads and roads so often that the Japanese have been forced to defend them with blockhouses and ditches and defense works running along the communication lines. Despite these elaborate precautions the Communists are still able to wreck trains, attack convoys and cause considerable damage to Japanese transportation. South of the Lung-Hai railway in the New Fourth Army area, the Communists have been less active in attacking communication lines. Consequently they are not protected by dykes and walls, and it is much easier for the Communists to move back and forth across them. They claim to be in a position to destroy large sections of the transportation routes in this area whenever it seems especially profitable to do so. Apart from this type of interference with communications, the Communists hold certain areas which deny to the Japanese the ready use of several potentially important highways. Among these are the through highway in eastern Shantung from Chiao-hsien via Lin-i to T'ung-shan (Suchow), the through highway from Tung-hai (Haichow) to Nan-t'ung in eastern Kiangsu, the highway from Huai-yin to Pukow via T'ien-ch'ang in western Kiangsu, the main highway from Ch'ing-yüan (Paoting) to Tientsin, and various other routes of lesser importance.

Radio

Radio communications, although they exist between most of the Communist base areas, are very slow and inadequate. Several days are usually required to transmit or receive messages from the coastal areas to Yen-an. Except in Yen-an all of the sets are powered by hand generators and the messages have to be relayed from one area to another in order to cover any extensive distance. In exceptional circumstances Yen-an can communicate with the Shantung peninsula in seven or eight hours, but this is the exception rather than the rule. The chief difficulty is lack of adequate equipment. Most of the existing equipment is old or has been patched up from materials captured from the Japanese. Efforts are being made through the U.S. Army Observer Section at Yen-an to provide shortwave radio sets so that weather data and information about American fliers forced down behind the Japanese lines can be more rapidly communicated to Yen-an.

The Yen-an radio broadcasting station, XNCR, exists only for the purpose of broadcasting to outside areas. There are no private receiving sets in Yen-an, and the broadcasts are devised primarily for foreign consumption or consumption of people outside the Communist areas.

Telegraph

There are some telegraph lines in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and there are limited telegraphic connections between the area and the Shansi-Suiyuan Border Region. So far as is known telegraphic communications are not used in other areas. A study of the whole communications situation in the Communist area is being carried on by officials attached to U.S. Army Observer Section at Yen-an.

Air Transport

Air transport between Yen-an and Free China is possible, and the U.S. Army Observer Section there has bi-weekly connection with the outside by transport plane.

Post Office

The Communists have their own postal system which is managed by the General Communications Administration. They have their own

post offices, stamps and system of postal deliveries. The Nationalist Government insists that the Communist postal authorities interfere with the functioning of the regular postal system of China.

CURRENCY AND FINANCE

Currency

Each of the Communist areas issues its own currency which circulates freely throughout the issuing region. This currency is backed in some cases by reserves of gold, silver and Chinese national currency, but in general it seems to have no great backing other than popular confidence in it. It is issued by the various Border Region banks, and in general the circulation of Chinese National Currency or of Japanese puppet currency is prohibited. However, in the areas behind the Japanese lines, puppet currency is stolen or otherwise acquired to use in commercial transactions with the areas controlled by the Japanese. An original function of the Border Region currency was to serve as a shield between Chinese National Currency and the puppet currency and so prevent the former from falling into Japanese hands.

The Border Region currency has a fair degree of stability within the issuing region. Since there is little trade between the various Border Regions, it is impossible to determine any accurate standard of value as between the various currencies. In general, however, it seems that currency of the Yen-an area is less valuable than that of some of the other areas. As a matter of fact, in all of the Border Regions money is of relatively minor importance, because wages and salaries are paid in millet or other commodities and taxes are collected in kind. Millet is in reality the standard of value in the northern areas and rice is probably the standard in the New Fourth Army areas. According to National Government sources approximately \$350,000,000 worth of this Communist currency had been issued by the end of 1943. All such currency is illegal in the eyes of the Chungking Government.

Such exchange rates between the Border Region currencies as are available are given in Table 3.

Prices and Inflation

Prices have gone up considerably in all of the Communist areas and there is unquestionably currency inflation everywhere. Inflation seems to be the worst in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region but most observers agree that inflation is not as serious as in the

Table 3. Some Exchange Rates of Communist Currencies

Date	Silver \$	CN \$	SKN \$	SS \$	SCH \$	Shan \$	New 4th \$	FRB \$	CRB \$
1937	—	1	1.21	—	—	—	—	—	—
February 1941	—	1	1.50	—	—	—	—	—	—
1941	—	4	—	—	1½-2	5	—	1	—
1943	—	1	2.20	—	—	—	—	—	—
July 1943	—	1	10	—	—	—	—	—	—
Late 1943	1	—	1,500	150	30	—	—	—	—
May 1944	1	—	1,000	—	—	—	—	—	—
Spring 1944	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	1	—
Spring 1944	—	—	—	4	1	—	—	—	—
Spring 1944	—	—	8	1	—	—	—	—	—
July 1944	—	1	10	—	—	—	—	—	—
Fall 1944	—	1	8.50*	—	—	—	—	—	—
1944	—	1	8†	—	—	—	—	—	—
1944	—	1	4-6	—	—	—	—	—	—
1944	—	—	6	1	—	—	—	—	—
Fall 1944	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
February 1945	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	4	—

Note:

Silver \$ = Chinese silver dollars.

CN \$ = Chinese National Currency.

SKN \$ = Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia.

SS \$ = Shansi-Suiyuan.

SCH \$ = Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh.

Shan \$ = In 1941 Shansi-Hopeh-Honan, but in 1945 Shantung.

New 4th \$ = New Fourth Army Area currency in Kiangsu.

FRB \$ = Japanese Puppet Federal Reserve Bank currency (North China).

CRB \$ = Japanese Puppet Central Reserve Bank currency (Nanking Gov't).

* Official.
† Unofficial.

Chungking area because salaries and wages are paid in kind to a very large extent and hence currency inflation matters very little.

Banking and Finance

A number of banks function in the various Communist areas. According to a Kuomintang source the following banks have been set up in the various Border Regions:

Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Bank.

Kwang-Hwa shang-tien (shop) in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region

Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Bank

Northwest Agricultural Bank in Shansi

Shang Tang Bank in southeast Shansi

South Hopeh Bank

Honan-Anhwei-Kiangsu Border Region Bank

Pei-hai Bank in northeast Shantung

T'ai-shan Bank in Shantung

North Kiangsu Bank

Huai-nan Bank

National Salvation Cooperative Society in Shansi

Agricultural Cooperative Society in south Shantung

Besides issuing currency, these banks make loans to the Border Region governments, to cooperatives, and to private enterprises. They also have floated the following loans or bond issues, according to Chungking sources:

(a) The \$12,000,000 Ten Year "Reconstruction Loan" issued by the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Government.

(b) The \$500,000 Fifteen Year "Relief Loan" by the office of the Administrative Commissioner for south Hopeh.

(c) The \$4,000,000 Fifteen Year "National Salvation Loan" by the Hopeh-Shansi-Chahar Border Region Government.

(d) The \$6,000,000 Ten Year "National Reconstruction Loan" by the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region Government.

(e) The \$3,000,000 "Trade Loan" by the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar Border Region Government.

(f) The lottery savings bonds issued by the Frontier Bank, each issue of which is \$1,000,000.

Interest and Loans

Generally speaking, the Communists have abolished usury and greatly reduced the interest rates throughout their territory. The various governments make loans in the form of grain, agricultural implements and machinery, equipment, etc., to farmers or industrial enterprises at very low rates of interest as a means of encouraging production. The Communists claim to have reduced interest rates in 899 *hsien* under their influence.

Taxation

Taxation seems to have been reduced, particularly upon the poorer classes, throughout the Communist areas. Most observers agree that there are only a few types of taxes and that the maximum rate is generally not over 37½ percent upon the total income. Taxes at this rate are levied only upon the richer peasants who hire others to do their work. The rate progressively lowers until the poorest people pay no taxes at all. Since 1937 a general effort has been made to introduce a progressive tax system based upon ability to pay and to be levied upon income or property. However, no uniform system seems to have been adopted throughout the whole region. Taxes are generally paid in kind. There are also rather light taxes upon business, a courvee or work tax, levies for the support of troops and various other devices aimed at collecting revenue and equalizing income.

The Communists claim that in the New Fourth Army area in Kiangsu and Anhwei taxes have been reduced by about \$200,000,000. In the T'ai-hang mountain area of southern Shansi taxes in 1944 are said to be only about half of those levied in 1941, and in most other liberated areas they also claim that taxes have been reduced. In contradiction to the above claims and to the general opinion of observers in the Communist areas, the Chungking Government contends that the Communists have introduced a multitude of new taxes and lists some 27 different types of levies to back up its contention. These include among others: anti-Japanese contributions, levies on rich families, inheritance taxes, stamp, tobacco, opium and wine taxes, enemy goods entrance tax, and marriage registration tax.

Government Income

The income of the Border Region Governments in general seems to be derived from the following sources: (1) taxation, (2) income

from government enterprises and the production of the armed forces, and (3) note issue.

THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGHSIA BORDER REGION

Agriculture—General

This is one of the poorest of all the Communist areas, although it served as the original base for the whole movement. The region consists of loess-clad hills and barren mountains with valley regions where agriculture can be pursued. Rainfall is very scanty and most of it comes in July and August, with some in June. Crop failure caused by lack of rainfall occurs every few years. The hillsides are rather barren or covered with short grass because of lack of rainfall. The most important food crop is millet followed by wheat and *kao-liang*. Irish and sweet potatoes are also important food crops and corn, soybeans, barley, flax and rye are produced. Vegetables include carrots, onions, tomatoes, cabbage and string beans, while melons, apricots and peaches are also produced. Among the commercial crops opium, cotton and tobacco should be noted.

Agricultural education. In an effort to improve agriculture the government has sent instructors among the peasants to introduce crop rotation, diversified planting and better methods of fertilization. Seeds have been supplied to the peasants by the government and loans have been made to enable them to acquire necessary equipment. Classes on agriculture and animal husbandry have been set up in rural villages and spinning and weaving have been taught to women in the villages. As a result of these efforts the cultivation of rice has been introduced into this area and the production of wheat considerably increased. More beans, corn, soybeans and cotton have also been produced.

Land reclamation. According to Communist figures, some 3,300,000 *mou* (one *mou* probably equals $\frac{1}{6}$ of an acre) of land were reclaimed between 1939 and 1943. The area reclaimed amounted to about 699,000 *mou* in 1940, 381,000 in 1942, 976,000 in 1943, and the objective in 1944 was 1,000,000 *mou*. In 1943, of the 976,000 *mou* reclaimed, 207,000 were reclaimed by the Eighth Route Army.

Food production. According to Communist figures, total cultivated land and food production (principally millet) in recent years was as follows:

Year	Food pro- duction (<i>Piculs</i> ⁶)	Cultivated land (<i>Mou</i>)
1940	—	11,742,000
1942	1,680,000	—
1943	1,840,000	13,387,000

In 1943 food production was roughly divided as follows:

	Percent		Percent
millet	24.5	flax	5.1
wheat	21.5	corn	3.7
yellow millet	1.4	potatoes	3.2
beans	11.2	cotton	1.4
buckwheat	7.1	vegetables, misc.	2.2
<i>kaoliang</i>	6.4		

The food requirements of the area are given by one Communist source as 1,620,000 piculs and by another as between 1,500,000 and 1,600,000 piculs of millet plus 230,000 piculs of other food. Production in 1943, therefore, exceeded requirements.

Cotton. The production of cotton has been particularly encouraged, apparently with good results:

Year	Area cultivated (<i>Mou</i>)	Production of cotton (<i>Piculs</i>)	Production of cotton seed (<i>Piculs</i>)
1940	15,117	—	—
1942	94,000	14,000	28,000
1943	150,288	17,300	—
1944	300,000 ⁷	—	—

The planned production for 1944 would have reached requirements, but frost damaged the crop and consequently complete self-sufficiency was not attained. The main cotton-producing districts are around Yen-ch'ang, Yen-ch'uan, and Ku-lin [*sic*; probably Yü-lin]. The first two of the three districts had about 80 per cent of the total cotton acreage in 1942. In order to encourage the production of cotton, the fields have been exempted from taxation and also loans at low rates of interest have been given to cotton producers.

Salt. Important salt fields are located in the northwestern part of

⁶ The picul probably equals 133 pounds but it may be the *shih* (market) picul of 110 pounds.
⁷ Planned.

the area in the vicinity of Ting-pien. These fields are worked especially during the season when people are not engaged in agriculture. Salt provides the largest percentage of exports from the area, and, according to one source, about \$40,000,000 worth of revenue was obtained from salt in 1942. Salt transport cooperatives have been organized to work the fields and transport the salt. Communist figures indicate that 310,000 piculs were produced in 1942 and that in 1943 between 800,000 and 900,000 piculs were produced. During this latter year some 3,706 animals belonging to transport cooperatives were involved in transporting the salt and over 21,000 belonging to private individuals.

Livestock. The Border Region Government has also encouraged the production of cattle, donkeys, mules and sheep. According to Communist figures, the following increases in livestock took place between 1940 and 1943:

Year	Cattle	Donkeys	Sheep
1940	193,283	125,054	1,725,037
1943	220,781	167,671	20,332,371

Sheep products in 1943 are given as follows: white wool 6,710 piculs; black wool 3,337; large sheepskins 71,512; small sheepskins 45,756.

Opium. During the last few years it appears that opium has been produced in the area, primarily for export to the Chungking area as a means of obtaining necessary currency for the purchase of cloth and other items. The Chungking Government claims that throughout the Communist areas, 158,000 *mou* were planted to opium in 1942. The controversy over opium has been one factor of discord between Chungking and the Communists.

Industry—General

The government at Yen-an has established a number of industrial plants; it has also encouraged the development of industrial cooperatives and has promoted private handicraft production. Military units, government officials, students and other people are also encouraged to produce items needed for their own use. Early in 1944, according to a Communist pamphlet, there were 108 government establishments in the Yen-an area as follows:

weaving	23	implements	13
coal enterprises	18	blankets and cloth	15
grain grinding mills	12	printing presses	5
chemical plants	13	miscellaneous	9

In 1939 there were 800 workers in industrial establishments, and by early 1944 there were some 12,000 workers in 70 of the government and private factories.

Cooperatives. Cooperatives have developed rapidly, reportedly increasing, according to one Communist source, from 142 in 1937 with a membership of 57,807 and a capital of \$55,225 (Border currency) to 634 in February 1944 with a membership of 182,878 and a capital of \$733,998,403. These cooperatives in 1944 were classified as follows: consumer 281, producer 114, transportation 223, credit 6. Another Communist source gives more detailed but very different figures on the cooperatives in Table 4 (values are presumably in Border currency).

Textiles. No satisfactory over-all figures on the textile industry are available. In 1941, 1,085 persons were reportedly employed by government and army units and operated 388 looms and 32 carpet machines, and 30 spinning and weaving cooperatives employed 385 persons, operating 176 looms and 12 carpet machines. In addition, 34,500 weaving workers and 75,000 spinning workers operated 12,000 locally-made looms while 68,000 hand looms were operated in various households. Total production in this year was reported as 100,000 *pi* of cloth (1 *pi* equals 32.33 meters or about 100 feet). This production was said to equal 40 percent of the requirement. At about the same time, Mao Tse-tung indicated that the total demand for cloth in the Yen-an area was 360,000 *pi* and that cloth production amounted to one-third of demand. Since that time considerable efforts have been made to increase the production of raw cotton, and some reports state that the area is now approximately self-sufficient in cloth. Woolen and linen cloth production has also been encouraged. Production in government weaving factories, which amounted to only 3,000 *pi* in 1940, increased to 15,840 by 1943.

Table 4. Data on Industrial Production in Shen-Kan-Ning

Year	Number	Members	Shares of Capital	Business Income	Production	Transportation (head of cattle)
1937	142	57,847	\$ 55,229	\$ 261,689	—	—
1938	107	66,707	75,629	391,282	—	—
1939	115	82,885	125,848	552,249	\$ 600,000	—
1940	132	123,279	332,843	1,156,435	4,131,500	—
1941	155	140,218	1,362,384	6,493,399	14,189,000	206
1942	207	143,721	9,346,876	34,932,109	23,252,600	265
1943	260	150,000	170,000,000	600,000,000	494,000,000	3,706

Iron and Steel. Shensi iron, generally speaking, is of a poor quality and all mining and refining is done by very primitive methods. The first iron foundry was established in May 1943, and it is operated by people who know very little about iron production. It has two small and three somewhat larger furnaces and employs about 200 workers. Several thousand workers are employed in digging iron ore from mines about 10 miles distant. Some steel is produced by a very primitive puddling process. Iron and steel production is inadequate, and the area has to depend very largely upon captured rails for the steel used in its arsenals. Iron is reportedly produced near Yen-an, Kan-ch'uan, and other places in Shensi. Mao says that the iron requirements of the area are 47,000 piculs a year.

Coal. In 1942 the 15 coal mines in operation are said to have produced 3,400,000 lbs. during the month of September. This, however, barely met the requirements of Yen-an. Good anthracite is produced in some areas, but lack of mechanical facilities and adequate transportation seriously limit production and distribution of coal. It has to be carried by mule and donkey to points where it is used.

Printing and paper. A local type of grass is used in the production of a rough but rather good quality paper. Several primitive paper factories are operated in the Yen-an area, and although production has increased it still does not meet adequately the needs of the area. One of the larger factories which was visited in the spring of 1944 by representatives of the press made ten reams a day. Its motive power was provided by a waterfall and horses.

Petroleum. Several oil wells are operated in the vicinity of Yen-ch'ang. The equipment is old and very unsatisfactory and the operating personnel are unacquainted with the technical aspects of oil production. Wells Nos. 1 and 2 are practically dry. Only Well No. 3 is at present functioning, and drilling on Nos. 4 and 5 has just been started. Daily output is said to be from 70 to 80 bbls. The plant produces gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, lubricating oils and candles. Most of the gasoline produced is kept to operate the few trucks in the Yen-an area. Kerosene and other byproducts are largely exported to the Chungking area.

Miscellaneous industries. Other important industries include matches, soap, chemicals and pharmaceutical supplies. There is a fairly efficient establishment for the production of the latter materials in connection with the hospital at Yen-an. It produces sodium chloride, sodium sulphate, magnesium carbonate, sulphur, medical carmon and bandages, etc.

Arsenals. Two arsenals are reported in the vicinity of Yen-an. One is located about 12 miles northwest of Yen-an at a place variously called Wen-chia-kou or Wu-ch'i-chen. The location of the other is unknown. This was visited by Colonel Barrett and various others who have described it in detail.⁸ Its power is provided by two truck motors, and it contains a heterogeneous assortment of lathes, presses, punches and machines. The steel and smokeless powder used in it is produced in other nearby plants. Forgings are hammered out by hand on anvils and a great degree of skill is shown by the blacksmiths. Most of the steel is obtained from rails torn up from the Japanese railways. Its principal product is grenade dischargers (knee mortars). It formerly produced about 100 of these per month, but because of shortage of steel it now only produces about 50. It also reloads rifle ammunition and produces bullets and primers but is largely dependent upon captured cartridge castings. It is now preparing to manufacture cartridges and hopes ultimately to be able to produce about 1,000 rounds per month. It also repairs rifles, machine guns, trench mortars, knee mortars and mountain artillery.

Another arsenal is located in northern Shensi at the village of Pan-nu-k'ou, which is somewhat south of Chia-hsien and about 13 miles west of the Yellow River. It serves the Shansi-Suiyuan area primarily. This is said to be the largest and best equipped arsenal in the Communist area. It is located in a very out-of-the-way place, and is equipped with machinery which formerly belonged to the arsenal at Taiyuan. It has a large steam generator. It is said to produce from 250 to 300 knee mortar projectiles and 10 knee mortars a week. It also reloads rifle cartridges and manufactures a few light machine guns. The reloading of cartridges is irregular because this depends largely upon the number of casings retrieved from battle. It also makes land mines and repairs weapons. Four hundred men are employed, and it operates two 10-hour shifts daily. One hundred of the men had formerly been employees in the Taiyuan arsenal.

Trade

Because of the deficiencies of this area in manufactured products, particularly cloth and munitions, it desires to obtain these products from the Chungking area. From the formation of the united front

⁸ Col. David D. Barrett, previously and later Asst. Military Attaché in China, and at this time head of the U.S. Observer Mission in Yen-an. Col. Barrett was fluent in Chinese.—*Ed.*

agreement in 1937 until 1940, some products did reach the Yen-an area and helped to meet its difficulties. However, in 1940, Chungking limited trade to such items as would benefit Chungking, and prohibited entirely the movement of arms or munitions into the Communist region. About the only products which Chungking wanted from the Yen-an area were salt and petroleum products. Consequently, the balance of trade turned strongly against Yen-an, with the result that in 1943 it had an unfavorable balance of trade amounting to CN\$150,000,000. In an effort to redress this unfavorable balance and obtain sufficient currency to acquire the imports desired, the cultivation of opium was carried on and some of it is smuggled into Chungking territory. The Yen-an government has also imposed restrictions upon all imports except cloth, iron and similar items of vital necessity, and has prohibited the importation of luxuries and nonessentials and the export of foodstuffs. The export of salt and other items is under strict government control.

Finance

Currency. The currency of this area is issued by the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Bank at Yen-an. The existing currency dates from 18 February 1941, according to Communist sources. It is illegal in the eyes of Chungking, but it is the only currency allowed to circulate in the area. According to Chungking these Border Region notes were issued much earlier than 1941, and Edgar Snow indicated that when he visited the Yen-an area in 1936 Communist notes were in circulation. The exchange rate was then CN\$1 to Yen-an \$1.21. It may be that after the formation of the united front the issuance of the Border Region currency was temporarily suspended and that the Yen-an government resumed issue in 1941 after the imposition of the blockade by Chungking. The Border Region currency is backed by gold, silver and Chinese national currency, and it seems probable that the silver was brought by the Communists to Shensi at the time of their long march from Kiangsi. One source indicates that much of the currency is in small denominations, which, because of the inflation, makes its use as an ordinary medium of exchange troublesome. Another source indicates that currency is now printed in \$200 denominations.

Inflation and prices. Observers disagree as to the degree of inflation in the Yen-an area, but all agree that it is considerable. Prices of cloth, metals and such objects which are relatively scarce are possibly

higher than in Kuomintang China, but in general prices are probably less inflated than in the rest of Free China. Regardless of the degree of inflation, most people do not suffer from it seriously because of the relative unimportance of money in the whole economy. The situation is summarized by one observer as follows:

Prices in Yen-an are as high as elsewhere in Free China but the inflation has little effect on the economic well-being of the population. Those groups which suffer most severely in Nationalist China—government employees, soldiers, teachers, students—are paid in kind in Yen-an and are under no hardship. Housing, clothing, food and a variety of other necessities are provided. Cash salary or wages have little significance except for the purchase of luxuries, and of these there are practically none. Farmers, shopkeepers, artisans and small industrialists sell their product or labor at inflated prices and accordingly are able to purchase their requirements.

Interest and loans. As soon as the Communists came into Shensi they undertook the abolition of usury and the reduction of the interest rate. As of 1936 Edgar Snow noted that the maximum rate permitted was 10 per cent and that most government loans were made at a rate of about 5 per cent. More recently the government has followed a policy of making extensive loans in the form of money, seed, agricultural implements, machinery, etc., to poor farmers, small merchants and private individuals who will enter productive enterprise. The government has also guaranteed payment of the lower rates of interest allowed, which has tended to satisfy money-lenders.

Taxation. Soon after the Communists came into Shensi they abolished the existing tax structure, canceled most taxes on the small land owners and tenant farmers and levied rather heavy taxes upon the wealthy landlords and usurers. In 1937 Mao Tse-tung proposed the introduction of a progressive tax system which would be based upon ability to pay, and some such scheme has gradually been introduced. The present tax system seems to embrace the following main features:

A tax levied on land and agricultural gains. This in general is a certain percentage of the produce of the land levied in kind, plus taxes on income from rents, animal hire, etc. The maximum is 37½ per cent on the largest incomes and progressively decreases until the poorer people pay little or no taxes at all. The families of soldiers, immigrants of less than three years' standing, and people with too low an income to maintain a decent standard of living are exempted from taxation. Those exempted are said to amount to less than 20 per cent of the population.

A commercial tax. This is said to have started in 1940 and is collected twice a year by the tax office of the local government and the local chamber of commerce. In 1943 it is said to have amounted to 13 per cent of the net profits of commercial activities.

A public service or labor tax. This consists of labor service to the government and includes the transportation of foodstuffs and salt or aid to troops such as carrying wounded soldiers, building roads, underground houses, etc.

Various forms of assistance to the army such as loans of seed, tools, food, clothing, animals, etc.

Most observers agree that taxation for the mass of the people is considerably less than in pre-Communist days.

Government revenue. In 1936 government expenditure was said to amount to about \$320,000 per month (presumably Border Region currency). At that time 40 to 50 per cent of government revenue was obtained through confiscations, another 15 to 20 per cent through voluntary contributions and the remainder through taxation, trade, government industries, and bond issue.

In 1943, according to Communist sources, total government expenditure was \$6,000,000 Border Region currency plus taxes collected in kind, which perhaps amounted to 170,000 piculs of millet. Of this income 64 per cent came from government enterprises and army production. The remainder came from taxation and note issue. The deficit was said to be 18 per cent, which was met by borrowing from the Border Region bank, i.e., by the issue of notes. The main factor in the unbalanced budget was the drain of currency to pay for imports from the rest of Free China. In 1944, 70 per cent of the government revenue was said to be derived from government and army production, and the deficit was said to be considerably less than in 1943. Income from the land tax is given as follows:

1938— 10,000 piculs of millet
1939— 50,000 piculs of millet
1940—180,000 piculs of millet
1944—160,000 piculs of millet plus 180,000 piculs of fodder.

THE SHANSI-SUIYUAN BORDER REGION

General

In general the physical characteristics of this area are similar to the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. It is probably the poorest of all the Communist areas and has made the least progress. Achieve-

ments here cannot be compared with those in any of the other Border Regions. It is a rather desolate region with a very impoverished peasantry who have not responded as rapidly to Communist leadership as has been the case elsewhere. Most of the people speak a dialect which is not very widely known and this has complicated matters. However, some developments have taken place, and even as early as 1943 some 125,000 people had been organized into the Farmers' Mass Organization and 55,000 workers into the Workers' Mass Organization. It is very important as a connecting link between the Yen-an region and the more prosperous Border Regions to the east.

Arsenals

A small arsenal is reported to be located near Hsing-hsien and another in the mountains south of Taiyuan and north of Fen-yang. Both of those are apparently small plants which specialize in the repair of small arms and the manufacture of land mines and grenades. One of them is said to manufacture black powder and the one north of Fen-yang reportedly makes a thousand land mines and two thousand grenades a month.

SHANSI-CHAHAR-HOPEH BORDER REGION

General Economic Features

The central core of this area is made up of the mountainous regions forming the border between Shansi, Chahar and Hopeh, but the base area also extends into the fertile North China plain. It is one of the most progressive and richest of the Communist areas. The economy of the mountainous regions is similar to that of the Yen-an area, but the plains include very fertile agricultural lands. The rainfall is greater than in the loess highlands and crop failures are less frequent. Wheat and millet are the most important food crops. Wheat is generally planted in October and harvested in the late spring and early summer. Important spring and summer crops are millet, *kaoliang*, corn, soybeans, sweet potatoes, peanuts and sesame. Cotton, hemp and tobacco are important commercial crops, and some wool is also produced. Vegetables include cabbage, beans, carrots and Irish potatoes, while the important fruits are pears, persimmons and melons. The alluvial plains support a large population, and it is in these regions that the intense struggle for control goes on between the Communists and Japanese. The people have suffered severely from Japanese raiding expeditions which destroy property, deplete the food

supply, reduce the domestic animals, and commandeer workers. As a consequence the area has suffered from a shortage of cattle, seeds and manpower.

Government Economic Program

The government, which includes a large number of non-Communists, has followed a very progressive policy along the following lines:

(a) Land reclamation has been pushed forward. In this regard there has been a close cooperation between the civilian population and the army, which aids in carrying out repair of damage done by the Japanese to drainage canals and irrigation ditches. A considerable amount of land has been reclaimed.

(b) To compensate for the shortage of manpower and to facilitate the general agricultural program, cultivation teams have been formed, consisting of several workers who jointly use the same implements and draft animals and who move from place to place plowing and doing agricultural work.

(c) Mass organizations have been promoted, and by 1943 about 858,000 persons were organized into farmers' groups and some 235,000 in workers' groups.

(d) Loans of seed and animals have been made to farmers, and food has been supplied to famine and devastated areas. The government maintains some food storehouses, but in general government tax grain is left stored in the local villages and is issued to troops or other persons when needed against vouchers which the taxpayer can present to the government as tax receipts.

(e) Household industries have been encouraged to supplement normal farm production and improve the self-sufficiency of the area.

(f) A policy of preventing cotton and other important industrial production from reaching the Japanese has also been enforced. Some opium is produced in the area, but its use is restricted to trade with the Japanese in exchange for necessary commodities.

(g) Finally, a very active program of agricultural research and education aimed toward the improvement of grain seeds and agricultural production has been carried on. This program is well summarized by an observer who was in the area in 1943:

A lot of agricultural research work is being done in developing new kinds of seed, methods of pest control, the introduction of new kinds of animals and so on. There are a number of experimental farms which have done some valuable work. Twenty-three irrigation schemes have been carried on with 58 miles of canal increasing the irrigated area by over 15,000 acres.

Agricultural credit is given by branches of the government bank and there are also credit cooperatives. Some work has been done on afforestation but the people have not yet been educated to the dangers of soil erosion, which is actually one of the most serious problems in North China, and progress has been very slight. A lot of trees have been planted by the rivers where people can see that the timber will be useful in the future but they do not see the point of planting on the hills.

At the end of 1941 an organization for controlling grain prices was started. The farmers usually sell their grain soon after the harvest so that there has been a very big fluctuation in grain prices which rise very high before the harvest and fall very low after. The grain control board has a capital of \$5,000,000, half from the government and half from private capital. The private capital was largely subscribed in the form of grain. The board, therefore, started with a considerable influence on prices. It has been of considerable assistance to the farmers and small merchants by being ready to buy in local markets when the price fell too low. Communications in the areas are so bad that slight excess of supply might cause a very big fall in the local market price and the farmer or small merchant might spend a long time transporting his grain by mule between markets several days' journey apart before he could obtain a reasonable price.

Industry and Arsenals

The industries in this region are in general similar to those found in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, and the same methods of production are used. One of the most notable industrial establishments of this region is an excellent chemical plant near Fou-p'ing (Fuping) which enables the area to produce the best explosives in the Communist region. It is operated by competent chemists from Peiping. Observers from the area say that the plant is to be divided into four sections which are to be located at different places throughout the base area. The area also has a small blast furnace which makes iron for military use. Two arsenals are also reported, one of which is located near Fou-p'ing. This arsenal is described as being rather similar in character to the one at Wen-chia-kou near Yen-an. Vegetable oils are also cracked to produce fuel for lamps. There is a research bureau which encourages new industrial developments.

Currency and Taxation

The currency in this area seems to have been especially well managed and apparently its value is holding up better than that in most other areas of North China. It is issued by the Northwest Farmers' Bank and originally had a backing of 60 percent national currency notes. As national currency depreciated most of this reserve was spent

in buying gold and silver, which now backs the existing currency. Some reports claim that the currency has a higher value than that of Chinese currency at present.

A progressive tax system has been introduced into certain parts of this area, very similar in nature to that described under the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. The main features are taxes on land and income. Reportedly the rates range from about 7 percent of the income of the lowest taxpaying group to 65 percent for the highest income group. There is also a tax on imports and exports. This is levied primarily to regulate trade rather than as a means of revenue. Taxes in general are payable in kind and are collected and stored locally. The policy of reducing rents and interest rates and of public loans at low interest rates is also maintained in this area.

THE SHANSI-HOPEH-HONAN BORDER REGION

*General*⁹

Much of this area is mountainous and unproductive and its population is relatively small. In general the economy resembles in most respects that of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. Tobacco is one of the most important commercial crops produced. There are important minerals in the mountains, but these have never been greatly developed, and the few that have been are under Japanese control. Despite its comparative poverty, the region is relatively self-sufficient.

Agriculture

During 1942 and 1943, the fertile agricultural regions of this area suffered from a severe famine brought on by drought and later by a plague of locusts. The government aided in meeting the famine and rehabilitating the area through a policy of rent and tax reductions and the granting of loans and the supplying of seed grains to the devastated area. Good crops in the fall of 1943 and 1944 improved the condition of the area considerably. A very active program of improving types of grains and reclamation is carried on. The agricultural experiment station has introduced a new type of corn which has greatly increased the yield. It also maintains an agricultural school which at-

⁹ Administratively, this and the following area constituted a single region, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan (Chin-Chi-Lu-Yü) Border Region. But for military and other purposes, the region was divided into Hopei-Shantung-Honan, on the North China plain, and Shansi-Hopei-Honan, in the more mountainous areas to the west. The P'ing-Han rail line was the approximate line of division between eastern and western halves.—*Ed.*

tracts students from throughout the area. During 1944, the government of the area claimed that 50,000 acres of wasteland were reclaimed and that agricultural production was greatly increased. In 1943, in this area and the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region some 2,670,000 peasants were organized in mass farmers' organizations and 23,625 workers into workers' organizations.

Industry and Arsenals

This region is particularly notable for its production of cigarettes from locally produced tobacco. The cigarettes are traded to the Japanese-controlled areas in return for sugar and cotton cloth. It also makes paper, farm tools, cotton cloth, etc. Fliers forced down in this region report that there are two small arsenals which can make mortars and mortar shells, reload cartridges, repair rifles and produce land mines and grenades. Powder in the area is said to be poor.

THE HOPEH-SHANTUNG-HONAN BORDER REGION

This area lies entirely in the alluvial plains of North China and it resembles in every respect the plains area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Border Region. It is a comparatively rich agricultural region, but suffered very severely during 1942 and 1943 from a prolonged drought followed by a plague of locusts. During the drought nearly a million and a half acres reportedly lay uncultivated, and crops of millet, *kaoliang*, wheat, corn and cotton were not over 50 percent of normal. Many people died or left the area. However, during the fall and winter of 1943-44 there was adequate rain; the government supplied grain seeds, and the resulting winter crop was fairly good. The area was plundered again during the spring and summer of 1944 by the Japanese. Despite these difficulties, over 2,500,000 acres were reportedly sown to wheat during the winter of 1944.

THE SHANTUNG BASE AREA

The Communist-controlled region in Shantung is broken up into a number of separate areas, although there has been a tendency for consolidation during the past year. The most important base is in the mountainous areas of central Shantung south of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway, with other centers in the mountainous parts of the Shantung peninsula and in the relatively swampy areas around the estuary of the old Yellow River. In general, however, the economy resembles that of the plains and mountainous areas of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh

Border Region. Some silk is produced in the mountainous areas of Shantung.

A picture of conditions in the area is given by the Austrian, Dr. Rosenthal, who is serving with the medical department of the Shantung Liberated Area.

In Shantung, private property is untouched and landlords have reduced rents by 25%. Formerly landlords got 60–70% of the produce, but now they are getting 37½%. Through seven years of armed resistance, peasants in the 8th Route and the New 4th Army bases are living in greater prosperity compared with the past. It is very obvious that the peasants are willing and actively prepared to fight for their own democratic government and against Japanese mopping-up drives. Landlords are also happy. Income from 37½% of the harvest is handsome, while there are troops fighting against Japanese pillage. Thus the majority of landlords are also backing up and supporting the democracy government.

There is dire lack of armament, but the food ration of the army is good and the fighting morale is high. There is excellent unity between the army and the democratic government. . . .

Peasants plow their land with buffaloes, cows, oxen, donkeys and mules. Staple food is millet, *kaoliang* and sweet potatoes which have low nutritious value. The output of wheat and rice is comparatively [small], but in many places there are extremely sweet pears, peaches, apples, grapes, watermelons, chestnuts and walnuts. . . . Tobacco is planted and excellent cigarettes are manufactured.

Little information is available on currency or tax policy in this area. Reduction of rents and interest rates are put into effect in newly liberated regions. Relief grains and loans at low interest are also distributed by the government. Prices are reported to be less inflated than in occupied China or in Chungking controlled areas, and one broadcast claims that the Communist currency in the area is at a premium over the puppet Federal Reserve Bank notes.

THE NEW FOURTH ARMY AREA IN KIANGSU, ANHWEI, AND CHEKIANG

This includes seven base areas in East Central China. In northern Kiangsu and Anhwei a good deal of wheat is grown, and in some respects the economy is similar to that of the North China plain, but as one proceeds south precipitation increases and rice increases in importance as a basic food crop. Because of the extensive rainfall the area is cut by numerous canals and streams, and the existence of these waterways has facilitated the development of the guerrilla bases. In general, two crops a year are produced in these areas. The winter crop consists of wheat, beans, barley, rape seed and similar commodi-

ties. Rice is the most important summer crop and is probably the main element in the diet of the people. It is planted in the spring and harvested in October and November. Silk and cotton are also produced. It is perhaps the richest of all the Communist areas, and observers who have been in the region generally agree that it is well administered and that there is close cooperation between the troops and the local population. If crops are short the ration allowance of troops is reduced. The property of landlords seems not to have been disturbed, and troops are careful to pay for supplies. The general economic well-being of the area is testified to by the fact that no rationing is imposed upon the civilian population. Along the coast peasants are encouraged to produce salt and fishermen are also encouraged.

Local Communist currency, Chinese National Currency and puppet currency are said to be used in these areas. The last is used primarily in trade with the Japanese, of which there seems to be a considerable amount. A policy of rent and interest reductions has been carried out, although the Communists have moved rather carefully in this regard because of a desire to avoid alienation of the powerful landed interests. Taxation is levied on a progressive basis with the poorer 20 percent of the farmers exempted from taxation. The highest rates, which generally do not exceed 35 percent of income, are levied on rich landlords. Revenue is said to be derived from taxes on agricultural production and on industrial and commercial activities. The tax money is reportedly divided so that seven-tenths is used for military affairs and three-tenths for civil affairs.

THE HUPEH-HONAN-ANHWEI BASE OF THE NEW FOURTH ARMY

This is in general the area around Hankow, and in recent times seems to have been extended to include parts of Hunan and Kiangsi. Its general economic characteristics are similar to the New Fourth Army areas in Kiangsu and Anhwei. A recent broadcast from Yenan summarizes the achievements in the area during 1944.

The total area of the Honan-Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi-Anhwei border region is now approximately 33,000 square miles, of which 5,500 square miles were added in 1944. The total population is 9,200,000, of which 1,500,000 were liberated last year.

There are five prefectures controlling 44 counties. The first provisional Border Region People's Congress attended by 177 delegates was held in June of last year. There are now 16 counties with a County People's Council.

Vast irrigation projects and productive measures passed by these County People's Councils have led to bumper crops never seen in the past 15 years. Fifteen million dollars in local currency were spent by the government last year for famine relief work, while 293,120 *tan*, 67,844 dollars, 78,785 labor days and 168,664 cattle days were used to aid the dependents of the army men.

The government has launched a large scale production movement which is also joined by government organs, public bodies and the army. At present the army and institutions are already self-sufficient in vegetables, firewood and coal for three months. They have altogether reclaimed 3,928 acres of wasteland and planted 1,158 acres of vegetables. There are now six cooperatives with a capital of 5,000,000, one with a capital above 5,000,000 and one with a capital of 50,000,000 in local currency.

Economic reconstruction has been mainly devoted to building and repairing of irrigation works: 1,392,963 work days spent on building of dykes, dams and irrigation canals have reclaimed 88,392 acres of land in 12 counties. In another 13 counties, 1,731,273 work days were spent on irrigation works which can irrigate 141,250 acres of land.

BASES IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE

There are two Communist base areas in Kwangtung province, one located in the Canton delta region and the other on Hainan Island. Little is known about economic developments under the Communists in either of these base areas. The East River base in the Canton delta is located in a rich rice-producing area. Rice farming and vegetable production supplemented by local handicrafts undoubtedly provide the basis of economic life in the area. The area of consolidated Communist control in Hainan Island seems to be in the rice-producing lowlands of northeastern Hainan, and rice production undoubtedly forms the basis of economic life.

CONCLUSION

The Communists control a large area and considerable population behind the Japanese lines in North and Central China. Economically their activities have been important because they have interfered with Japanese lines of communication and because they have kept cotton, food, other commercial crops, and manpower out of Japanese hands. By so doing, the Communists have prevented the Japanese from gaining the maximum advantage out of North and Central China. The areas effectively controlled by the Communists, however, constitute the poorest agricultural and industrial areas behind the Japanese lines. The Communists have endeavored, rather successfully, to revitalize the spirit of the peasantry, to increase agricultural

production, and to develop handicraft industries to meet civilian and military needs. As a result of their efforts most of the resistance bases may be said to be practically self-sufficient in terms of their relatively simple requirements.

Despite these developments, the Communist areas are economically very weak and undeveloped. Railroads are nonexistent, roads and motor transport are practically nonexistent, communication facilities—radio, telegraph, telephone—are hopelessly inadequate, and modern industry simply does not exist. Facilities for the production of weapons and munitions are small and primitive and unable adequately to meet the needs of extensive guerrilla warfare. Economically and geographically speaking, the Communist area is excellently suited to guerrilla warfare, and the relations between the peasantry and the Communist forces are good. However, the area lacks the economic strength and facilities to equip or maintain modern fighting forces capable of meeting the Japanese in open combat, and its present economic strength is not sufficient to enable existing Communist forces to maintain the pressure upon the Japanese which they could maintain if they were better equipped and supplied.

7. The Chinese Communist Army

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

General

The forces of the Chinese Communists may be classified into three general categories: the Field Forces, the Local Forces (Guerrilla Army) and the People's Militia. The Field Forces are often moved about from one area to another as the military situation demands, and they generally wear uniforms. The Local Forces, or Guerrilla Army, usually confine their operations to particular areas, and wear plain clothes. Other than this, there is little difference under the present organization of the Communist forces between the Field Forces and the Local Forces. These two forces make up the so-called regular troops of the Communist Army. Equipment and training of the former is usually slightly better than that of the latter, but both receive their orders through regular channels of command and both are supplied by regular supply organs. It is believed that both of these forces comprise the two large units of the Chinese Communists, the 18th Group Army, and the New Fourth Army. The People's Militia is composed of men and women throughout Communist-controlled areas, selected on the basis of courage, physical condition, endurance, and initiative. Unlike the two groups of regular forces above, they engage regularly in production, and perform their military duties as the occasion demands.

Fuller discussion of these three groups is contained in section 6 of this report.

The average age of general officers is approximately 40 years; of field officers, approximately 37 years; and of company officers, approximately 30 years. In general education the average of both field and company officers is about that of a middle school graduate. (The Chinese middle school corresponds to the Western high school.) Almost all officers come from the ranks, but of these about 70 percent

have received training in the Communist "Anti-Japanese Military Academy" in Suiteh, Shensi.

The average age of enlisted men is approximately 28 years.¹ Taking into consideration their general education before entering the Army and the education they received in the Army, their average level of education is approximately that of a student in lower middle school. (The Chinese lower middle school corresponds to the Western junior high school.) Their average length of service is about eight years.

Overall Strength

In October 1944 it was reliably reported that the total strength of the regular Communist forces was 475,000. Of these, 318,000 are reported as under the 18th Group Army Command, 149,999 under the New Fourth Army, and 8,000 in South China. Recent reports indicate that these forces may have been increased to as many as 910,000 troops. There is a marked difference between the actual strength of Communist forces and that authorized by the Central Government. Officially, only three Communist divisions and a so-called "Garrison Force" are recognized with a total authorized strength of about 50,000 officers and men. Expansion has been effected by increasing the number of regiments in each division, and by creating new regiments in the various military regions. The New Fourth Army was officially disbanded in 1941 and is now unrecognized by the Central Government; nevertheless, its strength is steadily increasing.

18th Group Army Strength and Distribution

General Chu Te has official status under the National Military Council of the Central Government as Commanding General of the 18th Group Army. The Deputy Commanding General is P'eng Te-huai. General Yeh Chien-ying is Chief of Staff. The 18th Group Army operates in general north of the Lung Hai railroad and east of Sian, Shensi. The six Military Regions under the 18th Group Army follow:

Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Military Region. This region contains a relatively large concentration of troops, reported as 50,000 in the Field Forces. These are all first-line troops held in this home base area to guard against possible Kuomintang or Japanese attack.

Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region. In this region there are 26,000 in

¹ The figures given here for the average age and length of service of enlisted men both seem much too high. This may refer to non-commissioned officers.—*Ed.*

the Field Forces, 5,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 31,000 regulars. There are 50,000 Militiamen in the area. The area is relatively small, and has a sparse population. The 120th Division of the 18th Group Army is in this region, commanded by General Ho Lung.

Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh Military Region. This region contains 35,000 in the Field Forces, 29,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 64,000 regular troops. There are 630,000 in the Militia. The forces of this area are large, but are probably relatively weak in the extensive plain regions (central and east Hopeh) and in the mountainous and sparsely populated North (along the North of the Great Wall). This is a well-known area because it was the first established behind Japanese lines and has been more often visited by foreigners.

Shantung Military Region. This region contains 42,000 in the Field Forces, 28,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 70,000 regulars. 500,000 Militiamen are reported in the Region. The 115th Division is stationed in the Region, with General Ch'en Kuan as its commander. The Communist forces have expanded rapidly in Shantung in the past few years, and are well organized in the whole area.

Shansi-Hopeh-Honan Military Region. In this region there are 50,000 in the Field Forces, 25,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 75,000 regulars. 320,000 Militiamen are reported. This area includes south Shansi and the T'ai-hang Mountains, where the Communists have apparently become well entrenched. The 129th Division is stationed in the Region, commanded by Liu Po-ch'eng.

Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Military Region. This area contains 17,000 in the Field Forces, 11,000 in the Local Forces, making a total of 28,000 regulars. There are 80,000 Militiamen in the Region.

New Fourth Army Strength and Distribution

The New Fourth Army is also under General Chu Te's command. General Yeh T'ing is still carried on the roll by the Communists as Commanding General of the New Fourth Army, but since his arrest by the Chungking Government during the New Fourth Army Incident in 1941, command is exercised by General Ch'en I, whose title is "Acting Army Commander." The Army operates south of the Lung-Hai Railroad, with headquarters in the Hung-tzu Lake area. No break-down for Local Forces in the New Fourth Army is available, but the total has been reported at 31,000. In regions where no figure is given for the Militia, information is not available. The eight Military Regions under New Fourth Army Command follow:

Table 5. Strength and Distribution of Chinese Communist Army

	Field forces	Local forces	Total regulars	Rifles, field forces	Rifles, local forces	Total rifles	Militia	Regiments		
								A	B	C Total
Shen-Kan-Ning	50,000	—	50,000	30,000	—	—	—	14	28	10 52
Shansi-Suiyuan	26,000	5,000	31,000	15,000	—	—	50,000	—	—	— —
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei	35,000	29,000	64,000	21,000	—	—	630,000	—	16	40 56
Shantung	42,000	28,000	70,000	25,000	—	—	500,000	13	11	13 37
Shansi-Hopei-Honan	50,000	25,000	75,000	29,000	—	—	320,000	4	6	17 27
Hopei-Shantung-Honan	17,000	11,000	28,000	11,000	—	—	80,000	3	13	11 27
Total, 8th Route Army	220,000	98,000	318,000	131,000	50,000	184,000	1,580,000	34	74	91 199
Central Kiangsu	19,000	—	—	11,000	—	—	130,000	—	—	— —
South Huai	21,000	—	—	13,000	—	—	(?)	—	—	— —
North Kiangsu	23,000	—	—	14,000	—	—	85,000	—	—	— —
North Huai	18,000	—	—	11,000	—	—	(?)	—	—	— —
Hupei-Honan-Anhwei	22,000	—	—	14,000	—	—	(?)	—	—	— —
South Kiangsu	6,000	—	—	3,000	—	—	25,000	—	—	— —
Central Anhwei	5,000	—	—	3,000	—	—	25,000	—	—	— —
East Chekiang	4,000	—	—	2,000	—	—	10,000	—	—	— —
Total, New 4th Army	118,000	31,000	149,000	71,000	16,000	93,000	550,000*	25	31	42 98
East River	3,000	—	3,000	2,000	—	2,000	—	—	—	— —
Hainan Island	5,000	—	5,000	3,000	—	3,000	—	—	—	— —
Grand Total	346,000	129,000	475,000	207,000	66,000	282,000	2,130,000	59	105	133 297

* Sic. The figures given here equal exactly one-half of this number, 275,000. The source of this estimate is not known.—Ed.

Central Kiangsu Military Region. This region contains 19,000 in the Field Forces and 130,000 in the Militia. It is the area of the 1st Division, and is bounded on the south by the Yangtze River from Ch'ung-ming Island (north of Shanghai) west to the Grand Canal, on the west by the Grand Canal to Huai-an and on the north by the She-yang River.

South Huai Military Region. This region contains the 2nd Division of the New Fourth Army, with 21,000 in the Field Forces. (See North Huai Military Region below for boundaries.)

North Kiangsu Military Region. The 3rd Division is stationed in this region, with 23,000 in the Field Forces; 85,000 Militiamen are reported. The Region is bounded on the north by a line running generally west from Lienyüankang (Lao-yao) to the Grand Canal, on the west by the Grand Canal as far south as Huai-an, and on the south by the She-yang River east to the coast.

North Huai Military Region. The two Huai Military Regions (North and South) cover an area bounded generally by a line running from Süchow, north. Kiangsu, east to the Grand Canal, then south along the Grand Canal to the Yangtze, along it to Nanking, from Nanking southwest to Ho-fei, northwest generally along the Huai-Nan Railroad to near T'ien-chia-an, thence northeast to Pengpu (Pang-fou) and north along the Tsinpu Railroad back to Süchow. The Huai River is the dividing line between the two regions, with Hung-tze Lake generally in the center. The 4th Division is stationed in the area, with 18,000 troops in the Field Forces reported.

Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Military Region. This region contains the 5th Division with 22,000 in the Field Forces. Although this division is almost completely surrounded by the Japanese forces, the Ta-pieh Mountains (on the junction of Hupei-Honan-Anhwei borders) on the east and the Ta-hung (Tung-pei) Mountains (about 120 miles NW of Hankow) on the west provide terrain favorable for the Communist troops. Parts of these mountain areas are old (pre-1934) Red districts, and the people therein are experienced in guerrilla warfare. The Region extends north of Hankow on both sides of the Ping-Han Railway to the vicinity of Hsin-yang, Honan, and south of Hankow along the Canton-Hankow Railway to Yochow (Yüeh-yang), in Hunan. On the east the region extends to the vicinity of Huang-mei in eastern Hupei, and on the west to Shasi and Ichang.

South Kiangsu Military Region. The 6th Division is stationed in this region with 6,000 in the Field Forces. 25,000 Militiamen are re-

ported. The Region is bounded on the north and west by the Yangtze River and on the south by a line running generally from Wu-hu east to the coast. In the center of the Region is T'ai Lake (between Nanking and Shanghai). The Region contains some of the largest cities in China.

Central Anhwei Military Region. The 7th Division, with 5,000 in the Field Forces, occupies this area, which is along both banks of the Yangtze from Nanking westward to Su-sung. In the northern and widest part of the Region, part of the 2nd Division is operating in the area between the Tsin-Pu and Hwai-Nan Railroads. 25,000 Militiamen are reported in the area.

East Chekiang Military Region. The forces operating in this area, about 4,000 in the Field Forces, are known as the "East Chekiang Column." They were originally the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division, 18th Group Army, which were sent to Chekiang in the fall of 1942. 10,000 Militiamen are reported. The region extends generally on both sides of the Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad to Ningpo, and south as far as Feng-hua.

East River Military Region

In this area there are 3,000 in the Field Forces. Very little is known of the troops in this area and on Hainan Island. Communist Headquarters in Yen-an appears to maintain very slight contact with them.

Hainan Island Military Region

This region contains 5,000 in the Field Forces.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

General

The organization of the Chinese Communist Army is closely linked with the political organization of the Communist Party and the political organization of the territory controlled by the Chinese Communists. The organization and administration of the People's Militia is based on the civil organization of the Military Regions, Military Districts, and Military Sub-districts. Every unit headquarters of company size and larger has a political section which is headed by a commissar. The commissar usually has received military training and in the higher units often serves as deputy commander.

The High Command

Supreme command of the Chinese Communist Army is vested in the Communist Military Council (Military Affairs Commission). This body consists of a Chairman, who in this case is the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (Mao Tse-tung); a vice-Chairman, who is the Commander in Chief of the Communist Army (Gen. Chu Te); a second vice-Chairman; a Chief of Staff; the Chiefs of departments of the General Staff; the Inspector General; and two deputies of the Inspector General.

Territorial Organization

General. The territory controlled by the Chinese Communist Army consists of a large area in North China under the jurisdiction of the 18th Group Army, a somewhat smaller area in Central China under the New Fourth Army, and two very small areas in South China and Hainan.

Area controlled by the 18th Group Army. The area controlled by the 18th Group Army is divided into six regions, as follows:

1. THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGHSIA MILITARY REGION. This region west of the Yellow River is the Main Communist Base, in which Yen-an is located.

2. THE SHANSI-SUIYÜAN MILITARY REGION. This region is divided into the Ta-ch'ing Mountain Military District (in Suiyüan) and the Chin-hsi-pei (Northwest Shansi) Military District.

3. THE SHANSI-HOPEH-CHAHAR MILITARY REGION. This region is subdivided into four Military Districts, and 13 Military Sub-districts. The four Military Districts are the following: Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning (area east of Peiping and Tientsin) P'ing-pei (area north of Peiping), Central Hopei (area southwest of Tientsin), and North Yüeh (area west and southwest of Peiping).

4. THE HOPEH-SHANTUNG-HONAN MILITARY REGION. This region is subdivided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-districts. The two Military Districts are the following: South Hopei, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan.

5. THE SHANSI-HOPEH-HONAN MILITARY REGION. This region is subdivided into two Military Districts and 13 Military Sub-districts. The two Military Districts are the following: in the east, T'ai-hang and in the west, T'ai-yueh (southwest Shansi, excluding Gen. Yen Hsi-shan's area in southeast Shansi).

6. **THE SHANTUNG MILITARY REGION.** This region is sub-divided into four Military Districts and 17 Sub-districts. The four Military Districts are the following: Po-hai (gulf) in the northwest, Chiao-tung in the northeast (Shantung promontory), Central Shantung, and Pin-hai in the southeast (coastal region south of Tsingtao).

Area Controlled by the New Fourth Army. The area which is controlled by the New Fourth Army is divided into eight Military Regions. Further sub-division of this area into Military Districts and Military Sub-districts is not known. The eight Military Regions are the following:

1. North Kiangsu Military Region.
2. Central Kiangsu Military Region.
3. South Kiangsu Military Region.
4. North Huai River Military Region.
5. South Huai River Military Region.
6. Central Anhwei Military Region.
7. East Chekiang Military Region.
8. Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Military Region.

South China. In South China there are two small Military Regions under command of the 18th Group Army. They are: East River Military Region (Canton Area), Ch'iung-yai Military Region (interior of Hainan Island).

Organization of the Army

Field forces.

1. **GENERAL.** The Field Forces and Local Forces of the regular Army are organized into the two main units of the Communist Forces, the 18th Group Army, and the New Fourth Army. The former has 3 oversized divisions in its formal organization, plus jurisdiction over the other minor units. The latter has 7 divisions and the "East Chekiang Column" under its command.

2. **DIVISIONS.** The three divisions of the 18th Group Army as originally authorized by the Central Government consisted of three brigades of two regiments each. The strength was about 14,000 officers and men per division. The exact extent to which these divisions have expanded in numbers of regiments and troops is not known. A recent report states that the divisions of both the 18th Group Army and New Fourth Army are now each organized into three brigades of three regiments. The strength of the New Fourth Army divisions ap-

pear to vary greatly and is believed to approximate the strength listed for the field forces in each of the military regions in which the divisions operate.

3. **BRIGADES.** A recent report states that there are three regiments to a brigade. The highly decentralized nature of operations would appear to make the brigade an important link in the chain of command. It probably exercises a relatively high degree of independence in both command and administrative functions.

4. **REGIMENTS.** The tactical units of the Chinese Communist Army are organized into three types of regiments: type A, type B, and type C.


The 59 type A regiments are organized as follows: a headquarters company, three rifle battalions, and a political section. The headquarters company comprises an administration section, a signal platoon, an artillery or mortar platoon, a supply platoon, a medical platoon, and a service company. The regiment has a strength of 1,763 officers and men and the following equipment: 693 rifles, 124 carbines, 82 pistols, 81 light machine guns, 6 heavy machine guns, 4 82 mm mortars, 27 light mortars and 33 horses.

There are 105 type B regiments. Type B regiments are similar to type A regiments, but they have only two rifle battalions, and they have no artillery or mortar platoon in the headquarters company. The strength of the type B regiment is 1,163 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 468 rifles, 24 carbines, 76 pistols, 36 light machine guns, 6 heavy machine guns, 18 light mortars, and 13 horses.

There are 133 type C rifle regiments. These regiments are designed to operate in flat terrain where unobserved movement of large bodies of men is difficult. Type C regiments comprise the following: a headquarters company, a political section, and from four to five rifle companies. The headquarters company consist of an administrative section, and supply, signal, medical, and service platoons. The strength of a type C regiment is 866 officers and enlisted men. Its equipment consists of 425 rifles, 20 carbines, 62 pistols, 15 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 5 light mortars, and 9 horses.

5. **BATTALIONS.** The rifle battalion consists of a headquarters, a political section, a headquarters and service company, a machine gun platoon, and three rifle companies.

6. **COMPANIES.** The rifle company consists of a headquarters, a political section, a service platoon, and three rifle platoons. Each rifle platoon has three 13- to 16-man squads. The strength of a rifle com-



Note: Class B regiments lack the artillery platoon of the HQ Co., and one rifle battalion.

CHART 2. ORGANIZATION OF CLASS A REGIMENT

pany varies from 118 to 136 officers and enlisted men. The equipment allotted to a company consists of 83 rifles, 3 light machine guns, 3 light mortars, 380 hand grenades, 81 picks, and 81 shovels.

The Local Forces, or guerrilla army. The personnel of the guerrillas is drawn from the local inhabitants. These men receive the same military and political training as do the members of the field force. They do not regularly engage in productive work. The guerrilla forces are controlled by the commander of a Region. The commanders of separate guerrilla detachments besides being responsible to the Region commander are also accountable to the local People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. It is believed that the organization of the Local Forces is patterned after that of the Field Force, but that they are not as well equipped.

The People's Militia. Every able-bodied Chinese Communist of either sex between the ages of 16 and 45, who is not a member of the regular army field forces or local forces (guerrilla) is a member of the People's Militia. (Most of the members of the People's Militia are, however, non-Communist volunteers). At each level of administration (region, district, subdistrict, county, township, and village) there is a People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance. This body, including an Anti-Japanese Service Section, Demolition Section, Training Section, and Operations Section, is subordinate to the Communist military commander and the Political Commissar of the Communist Army in the region, district, etc. The People's Committee for Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance trains and directs the operations of the following four groups which comprise the People's Militia:

1. THE YOUTH VANGUARDS. The Youth Vanguards is a group comprising inhabitants between 16 and 23 years old. Their training consists of military drill, use of weapons and first aid, as well as political indoctrination and intelligence work.

2. THE MODEL DETACHMENTS. Male graduates of the Youth Vanguards are organized into Model Detachments. This group supplies replacements to both the regular army field forces and local forces. The "local guerrilla groups," formed within the Model Detachments from those who desire particularly active service, should not be confused with the local forces above, which are composed of full-time guerrillas. Members of the People's Militia engage in production in addition to their military duties.

3. SELF-DEFENSE DETACHMENTS. This group consists of able-bodied men who are not members of any of the other groups. They are or-

Strength and Equipment
Class C Regiment

866	officers and enlisted men
425	rifles
20	carbines
62	pistols
15	light machine guns
2	heavy machine guns
5	light mortars
9	horses




CHART 3. ORGANIZATION OF CLASS C REGIMENT

ganized into small groups whose function is to protect the homes and fields in event of raids by small Japanese parties, and sabotage in the event of Japanese occupation.

4. WOMEN'S DETACHMENTS. Able-bodied women who do not belong to the Youth Vanguard are members of this group. Their organization and functions are similar to those of the Self-Defense Detachments.

Air Force

The Communists do not have any aircraft.

Navy

There is no navy as such. The Communists operate a number of armed junks off some sections of the coasts of Kiangsu and Shantung provinces which they sometimes refer to as their "Navy."

Organization of the Services

Signal communications. Signal communications in Communist China are limited by shortage of equipment and trained personnel. However, both radio and wire communications are used by the Army. The radio communications network within the Army is as follows:

The 18th Group Army Headquarters in Yen-an communicates with the various Military Region headquarters at least once a day.

The Region Headquarters communicate with each other and with the Military Districts under them.

The Military District headquarters communicate with local regimental headquarters, intelligence stations, and other units equipped with radio.

Medical service. [See p. 202.—Ed.]

TRAINING OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

General

The training policies of the Chinese Communist Army have been influenced by many factors. Training has been carried out under unusual conditions, since the Communists must be on the constant alert against possible attack by the Japanese as well as by the Kuomintang. The time devoted to training is limited, due to the fact that the troops in many areas must produce part or all of their own food and clothing in order to exist. Training equipment is of the most primitive type. Training in the combined arms is practically non-existent. Many of

the units have been forced to combine the problem of subsistence with the problem of training. One brigade was sent to an area for the purpose of making it self-sufficient. The troops would plant crops in the springtime and tend the fields until harvest. During the period there was practically no training. After harvest time an intensive program would be carried out until the following spring when the cycle would be repeated.

The training objectives of the Chinese Communists have been set forth by General Lin Piao, President of the Anti-Japanese Military Academy in Suiteh, Shensi. He points out that it is necessary for the troops to conduct training and operations simultaneously, and since the troops are scattered it becomes quite difficult to engage in the unit training of regiments or brigades. Due to the high rate of attrition in officer personnel and to the rapid expansion of the military forces, enlisted personnel have been advanced to the officer grade after a comparatively short period of service in the ranks.

The training policy is to give infantry instruction to all personnel regardless of branch of service. Little instructional effort is devoted to subjects like close order drill or company administration. The emphasis is on field training, with the tactics of close combat and guerrilla warfare being stressed. The shortage of ammunition necessitates reliance on the hand grenade and bayonet. Stealth, night fighting and ambush are accepted doctrine.

Training periods vary from two and one-half months in the forward areas to about four and one-half months in the rear areas. Troop training is the responsibility of all officers. Higher commanders indicate the general policy and the details are left to the commanders of the smaller units. Officers are instructed first, and then are expected to pass on their knowledge to the men, who use the coach and pupil method of instruction. Routine tasks of the day are utilized for training whenever practicable. For instance, troops on a routine march would be trained in the tactics of the advance guard, approach march and meeting engagement.

The competitive spirit is fostered by the publication of standings in the progress made during any training period. Formal or informal contests are held and prizes are awarded.

The Communist forces have emphasized decentralization in training. This does not make for efficiency in methods, but it seems to have been unavoidable by reason of the conditions under which the Communist forces have been forced to operate.

Training in Weapons

The rifle. The extreme shortages of ammunition have curtailed formal target practice as we know it. In many instances the trainee is allowed but three rounds of rifle ammunition for training purposes. Field manuals on rifle marksmanship are in use by Chinese Communist forces and the conventional subject matter is included in them. The only report available of an observed target practice indicates that no attempt was made to coach the pupil, and that training methods were most primitive.

Machine guns. In an observed target practice, the machine gun was emplaced and aimed, and the pupil had but to step up and pull the trigger. He then would make whatever adjustment he considered necessary.

In their official training manual on the use of machine guns, the Communists emphasize vigorous training under field conditions. They teach the doctrine of fire and movement, emphasizing the value of the machine gun as a close support weapon. The weapon is utilized in night training exercises. A knowledge and use of the terrain in the proper selection of positions is considered essential. Stress is placed on the proper methods of cover and concealment.

Hand grenades. The hand grenade has been considered the most important weapon at the disposal of the Communist forces, and appears to have been effectively employed. Termed "artillery for the soldier," the hand grenade has proved a decisive factor in many instances. As a result, training in the use of this weapon has received much emphasis. In an observed training exercise, the troops performed in a most creditable manner.

Bayonet training. Training methods in the use of the bayonet follow the conventional pattern. The use of the weapon in hand-to-hand fighting is stressed, since the absence of artillery makes victory difficult for the Communists except that which is gained by close combat.

Unit Training

Squads, sections, and companies. Extended order drill, for units up to the size of the company, receives careful attention in the theoretical and practical training of the Communist military forces. Methods of movement under fire, of deployment, close support and reliance on stealth and ambush are taught. The preponderance of unit training is given under this category by reason of the fact that it is difficult to assemble larger units exclusively for training purposes.

Regiments and brigades. It is in the training of the larger units that the Chinese Communist forces have been most deficient. A U.S. military observer reported on an exercise consisting of an approach march and a meeting engagement conducted by a brigade of two regiments. Many deficiencies were noted. There was not sufficient time given for a reconnaissance, for the designation of assembly points, for the issuance and receipt of orders or of making estimates of the situation. No use was made of concealment or of cover. Machine guns were employed without any definite fire plan in mind. Trench mortars were fired from the crest of hills without taking advantage of the cover afforded by the reverse slope of the hill. Communications were almost non-existent. Communist military leaders admit their deficiencies and acknowledge the need for further training for officers of the grade of regimental commander and above. Training in the combined arms and in staff procedure are among the more important items which must be studied before the military potential of these forces is realized to the fullest extent.

TACTICS OF THE CHINESE FORCES

General

The tactics of the Chinese Communist Army have been influenced by their low economic potential, and their operations have been aimed chiefly against Japanese military and economic consolidation and exploitation of the occupied areas.

The Offensive

Large-scale operations. Despite existing deficiencies in weapons and matériel, the Communist forces have occasionally engaged in operation of a fairly large scale. Well-organized attacks have been made against puppet troops in Shantung province recently. These attacks against the Chinese puppets appear to have been intensified in the past few months, with the probable objectives of capturing their arms and causing defection in their ranks.

Attacks against fortified areas. The Chinese Communists have engaged in offensive operations such as raids, attacks on forts, strong points, and forays into large cities.

Attacks against enemy troop concentrations. The Communists attempt to strike at the critical time when the Japanese are preparing for mopping-up operations. This causes the enemy to detach portions of his striking force and thus weaken the proposed offensive. The

favorite tactics are to strike the Japanese on the flanks and rear and then disappear before the enemy can effect a concentration of forces. The Communists have managed to capture an increasing number of prisoners in this manner.

Small-scale operations. It is in the small-scale operations that the Chinese Communist Army has dealt the most damage to the Japanese. These operations constitute the larger portion of engaged military activity. The struggle for supplies has been a motivating factor in many cases. Captured enemy matériel and supplies are needed to remedy the deficiencies confronting the Communists. In these engagements the fighting unit is seldom larger than a company, and the operations are generally of short duration. The attacks are leveled at small Japanese detachments on independent missions, isolated garrisons and villages. The tactics used are those of conventional guerrilla warfare. Stratagems, night attacks and ambush are employed in order to overcome the inferiority of numbers and weapons.

Demolitions. Demolitions on a small scale are included in the program of employed strategy. Bridges, roads, military installations and railroads are destroyed with regularity. However, the homemade black powder used in these operations often prevents the accomplishment of results commensurate with the effort and danger involved.

Use of propaganda. The Communists claim that the increasing number of prisoners captured in the past year is due as much to the effectiveness of their propaganda measures as to their increased military strength. While the peasants in the People's Militia frequently mistreat or kill Japanese prisoners, the regular army forces use the prisoners for propaganda purposes to cause defection in enemy ranks. They are given money, new clothes and good food. They are usually allowed to return if they so desire. Those who do return dispel the belief of their associates that they would be maltreated if captured; hence, according to the Communists, they surrender more easily when hard-pressed. Those who remain receive political indoctrination and usually espionage training, after which they are either returned to Japanese troops for espionage work or used to shout propaganda to the Japanese troops in blockhouses or other enemy concentrations.

The Defensive

In defending against Japanese attacks, the Communist avoid frontal clashes wherever possible. Avenues of approach are mined and booby-trapped, and the Japanese flanks, rear, and line of communi-

cations are harassed and attacked in an attempt to prevent the Japanese advance from penetrating too deeply into the base areas. Where they fail to halt a deep Japanese incursion, the food supplies and the small quantities of manufacturing machinery are either removed from the area or hidden to prevent their capture or destruction by the Japanese. Attacks are then made against the extended enemy line of communications to force a Japanese withdrawal, after which the bases are re-established.

Summary of Communist Tactics

Shortage of ammunition has had noticeable effect on the tactics of the Chinese Communists. By necessity they are forced to fight small engagements of short duration. They are precluded the use of long-range fire. In fact, some units have adopted the following rule of thumb for purposes of conservation: Rifle fire is not to be used beyond 200 yards, although more expert riflemen are allowed to fire up to 400 yards. Light machine guns may be fired 300 to 400 yards and heavy machine guns 400 to 500 yards.

Extensive use of land mines has been made recently, and hand grenades are used as much as possible.

The necessary emphasis on small-scale operations has had its effect on staff procedure as employed in larger Chinese Communist units. Communist forces have had little experience in logistics. Nevertheless, certain characteristics have been developed in their operations. They have attained a high degree of efficiency in independent actions. Their leaders have courage, initiative and self-reliance. Their troops are highly mobile. They know the terrain intimately and use it to the best advantage. They have also learned to improvise with their limited resources.

The People's Militia

General. While not actually a part of the Chinese Communist Regular Forces, the People's Militia has an important part in the continuing operations against the Japanese. The function of the Militia is to maintain peace and order in the rear areas. They are primarily concerned with the task of production, but they are capable of spontaneous guerrilla warfare. The People's Militia is a natural outgrowth of the desire of the more aggressive elements of the population to participate in active defensive operations.

Tactical doctrine. An excellent knowledge of the surrounding ter-

rain coupled with an efficient intelligence system combine to make the Militia a formidable bulwark of defense. Their tactical doctrine can be summarized by the following militia dictum:

“Appear where the enemy does not expect you; attack where he is not prepared. When the enemy attacks, avoid him; when he encamps, harass him; when he retreats, pursue him.”²

Training methods. Training is considered secondary to production and as a result it is given during the free time of the Militiamen, generally two hours during the evening. Training methods are extremely simple, but the course is varied. The following subjects are covered: fundamentals of drill, rifle marksmanship, grenade throwing, ambushing, tunnel warfare, surprise attack, harassing lines of communication and methods of reconnaissance.

Tactical employment. The People's Militia is used for the most part in active support of the regular forces. It renders valuable service in the protection of supply lines in the evacuation of the wounded.

Tunnel warfare. With customary ingenuity, village inhabitants of areas under the control of the Chinese Communist military forces have built underground defense works. Many villages have elaborate caves and tunnels. They are built as a means of escape from Japanese raiding parties. They have an additional function in the safeguarding of supplies and matériel. The tunnels have numerous narrow twists and turns both in the horizontal and vertical planes, making defense a fairly easy matter. Gas proof chambers, secret passages, and air vents are a part of the detailed construction plan.

Mine warfare. The People's Militia has used mine warfare effectively. In many areas the Japanese are reluctant to leave their blockhouses and garrisons, since roads and paths are mined nightly. Mine casings are received from local, primitive ordnance factories. The village inhabitants fill them with homemade black powder, attaching a simple detonating apparatus.

Harassing warfare. The Militia is deployed to tear down and destroy blockade walls, and to fill ditches and moats surrounding Japanese garrisoned villages. They have been instructed to waylay individuals and small groups of Japanese. They have planted spies and intelligence agents in Japanese occupied villages, and in many Japanese units.

² See above, p. 28. The repetition suggests that different officers wrote different parts of the report.—*Ed.*

Communist Army Intelligence Measures

The Chinese Communist armies have developed a unique intelligence system which has apparently been highly successful for their immediate purposes.

The People's Militia, in addition to other duties, maintains a constant vigilance in order to detect spies and traitors. It performs a valuable counterintelligence function by constantly checking the passes of individuals found within their particular locality. In general, the Communist armies could not carry on operations in their present area without the help of the People's Militia.

The Communists have planted spies in towns and villages under Japanese control. Information of impending Japanese attacks has usually been received in sufficient time to allow the proper employment of defensive measures. Many Communist agents are working in Japanese organizations. The lack of portable radio equipment, however, often prevents agents operating in the cities from getting timely information back to Chinese Communist Army Headquarters.

MILITARY WEAPONS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

General

The Chinese Communist forces are poorly armed. Their manufacturing facilities are extremely limited, and they are forced to depend almost entirely on captured weapons and equipment. The Communists have a few old and badly worn artillery pieces but no artillery ammunition. Trucks and other mechanized equipment are destroyed when captured because the lack of fuel and the lack of trained personnel precludes their use. No protective equipment is available against chemical attack, and signal and medical supplies are insufficient. The troops, all of whom are trained primarily in guerrilla tactics, depend completely on small arms and individual close-combat weapons.

Rifles and bayonets. Approximately 80 percent of their rifles have been captured from the Japanese and Chinese puppet forces. Most of these are probably the Model 38 (1905) 6.5 mm. The remainder have been obtained from the National Government forces and are for the most part 7.92 mm Mausers M 88 and M 98. Bayonets are mostly Japanese Model 30 (1897). A few that are manufactured by the Communists are of inferior quality.

Light machine guns. Most of the light machine guns are probably Japanese Model 11 (1922) 6.5 mm, although a few are Chinese 7.92

mm. Z.B. 26 "Praga" type and Belgian 6.5 mm Brownings. Heavy machine guns are Japanese Model 3 (1914) 6.5 mm and Model 92 (1932) 7.7 mm.

Grenade dischargers and hand grenades. Great faith is placed in grenade dischargers and hand grenades for close combat. About 50 percent of the grenade dischargers are Japanese M 10 (1921) 50 mm and Model 89 (1929) 50 mm. The rest are made, mostly by hand, by the Communists in their own small arsenals.

Hand grenades are used in relatively large quantities. These are made by the Communist arsenals and appear to be effective. They are the "potato masher" type consisting of a cast iron head filled with black powder and wooden handle and pull-type friction igniter with a time delay of 4 to 6 seconds.

Land mines. In recent operations extensive use has been made of crude land mines. These mines consist of spherical cast iron bodies 5.9 inches in diameter containing a high explosive filling. They are detonated by means of pull-type igniter.

Mortars and antitank guns. The Communists have a few old Japanese mortars, possibly the Model 11 (1922) 70 mm, as well as some Chinese 82 mm mortars of the Stokes-Brandt type. In 1938 they received 6 antitank guns and 120 light machine guns from the Chinese National Government, but since then have had to capture equipment from the Chinese Nationals or use weapons that have been discarded by the Nationals for salvage.

Ammunition. Ammunition supply is the most serious disadvantage to the Communists. All types of ammunition are exceedingly scarce, and the many different small arms calibers complicate the problem. Much rifle and machine gun ammunition has been reloaded in Communist arsenals but is of inferior quality. Ammunition is so scarce that practically none can be allotted for either rifle or MG training.

Individual equipment. Theoretically, the equipment of an infantry soldier consists of a rifle and bayonet, 50 rounds of ammunition, 4 hand grenades, and an entrenching tool. Actually, there is an average of one rifle per two infantrymen and a proportionate amount of other individual equipment.

UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

Uniform

In winter the Communist soldier wears the horizon blue quilted uniform, made of cotton. This uniform is light in weight but affords

great protection from the cold, and is not too bulky for efficiency. The items making up the uniform are a vest, a long coat (double breasted, high collar model), knee-length breeches and a short jacket. Some or all of these items may be worn by one soldier. Blue denim wrap puttees and the usual Chinese cloth shoe with closely stitched sole of cloth complete the outfit.

A lighter weight uniform is worn in warm weather. A typical blouse has the following characteristics: high neckline, buttons up to the neckline, turned down collar on which insignia could be attached, and a buttoned-flap patch pocket.

Insignia

Equality is the basis of the relationship in the Chinese Communist Army. There is no difference in the uniforms of "Leaders" and "Fighters" and Leaders wear no rank insignia. Their contact with the Fighters is supposed to be so intimate that their position of authority is known to all. The cap device is usually a red cloth star, although the Chinese national emblem has been officially designated for use.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

General

Before 1940 the Chinese Central Government furnished the Chinese Communist forces with some explosives, rifles, ammunition, and grain. This flow of supplies was curtailed in 1940, and halted in 1941. The Communists, therefore, in recent years have had to provide supplies and maintenance exclusively through their own efforts. They have fared best with food and clothing, while the quantity of arms, ammunition, medical supplies and other important manufactured and imported supplies has been meager.

Procurement of Supplies

General. The territorial organization forms the basis of the productive, maintenance, and repair activities of Communist China. Farmers retain sufficient produce for their needs, moving the balance to numerous widely distributed collection points.

Food. Wheat, millet, rice, other grains, vegetables, and small quantities of meat are raised wherever possible. Some of the troops aid in planting and collecting the harvests while others provide protection for these activities.

Clothing. Some clothing and uniforms are manufactured in a number of small factories.

Arms and ammunition. The Communists obtain most of their weapons and ammunition by capturing them from the Japanese, Chinese puppet, and to a lesser degree, the Central Government forces. A few arsenals are known to exist but these manufacture only small quantities of rifles, small arms ammunition, hand grenades, and land mines. Because most operations are manual, precision is low, and models antiquated. These arsenals as well as other installations provide limited repair facilities.

Distribution and Transportation of Supplies

The dispersed supply collecting points become distributing agencies from which troops in the area may draw when necessary. In the event of Japanese incursions, these stockpiles may be moved or hidden and thus saved from destruction or capture. Troops in movement may requisition supplies directly from farmers, offering "ration cards" which are redeemable by the Communist-sponsored government.

Communist forces are particularly deficient in transport. In some rear areas there is a small amount of transport by pack animals and two-wheeled carts (usually drawn by three mules) but in active areas all that troops take with them on the march is carried on their backs or slung on poles over their shoulders. Field officers are often provided with horses or mules. Motor transport is practically nonexistent.

Maintenance Requirements

A Yen-an press dispatch states that the standard allowance of the army is now four pounds of meat, one and three quarters pounds of oil and lard, forty-seven pounds of vegetables and sixty pounds of grain per man per month. This averages about three and one half pounds per man per day. Observers report that the average soldier appears healthy and well fed.

MEDICAL ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES

General

In evaluating the medical accomplishments and problems of the Chinese Communist forces the following four points and their effect upon medical care in the area have been considered:

(a) The Chinese Communist Army is primarily a guerrilla army, and its tactics and organization are based on extreme mobility. The effectiveness of the Communist forces has been due in great part

to their ability to strike and run, to infiltrate through enemy lines and harass their rear, to sabotage enemy personnel, supplies and lines of communications. Such extreme mobility directly affects medical organization.

(b) Areas under Communist control correspond rather closely with a topography of rugged hill and mountain sections, while enemy-held territory consists of plains lands and lines of communication running in the valleys between guerrilla areas. This factor is at the same time advantageous and disadvantageous medically speaking. The terrain precludes evacuation of the wounded by any method save hand-borne stretchers, or, in the case of the less severely wounded, by horse. At the same time the numerous more or less inaccessible hide-aways in the hills afford excellent sites for dispersal of hospital units.

(c) The Communist Army has on the whole succeeded exceedingly well in their determined effort to win over the peasant class. The cordial relationship between the soldiers and the local peasantry plays an important part in the army's evacuation and care of its sick and wounded.

(d) Since 1939, except for a few more or less luxury items, the Central Government has thrown a rigid blockade around the Border Regions of the Communist area. This blockade has excluded medical supplies and literature from the Communists and has resulted in improvisations, the manufacture of a few modern drugs from locally procurable products, and the utilization of Chinese drugs of questionable efficacy. Only rarely are some urgently needed items smuggled through the blockade.

Line of Evacuation of the Sick and Wounded

Company first aid man. The smallest unit having attached medical personnel is the company, and save for exceptional circumstances this is an enlisted man who has had no more than a basic first aid course or some nursing instruction. The exception occurs in the case where a company is going on a long and arduous journey as a single unit at which time a medical officer (surgeon) may be attached. The medical corps first aid man is equipped with a small cloth bag containing bandages, gauze, iodine and a pair of dressing forceps. Due to the shortage in medical supplies he carries no drugs such as morphine or sulfonamides. After an engagement the medical corpsman gives first aid and supervises the evacuation of the wounded to the Battalion Medical Station or a nearby sheltered spot, utilizing the soldiers of his company as stretcher bearers. At this point the re-

sponsibility of the company ceases. In the event that a company is out on an isolated mission cut off from rear lines of communications the disposal of the wounded is accomplished by one of two methods: first, if the wounded are few in number and the company anticipates further engagements, their uniforms are changed to civilian clothes and they are placed in the homes of the local populace who nurse them back to health and then aid them in filtering back to their units; second, if the percentage of wounded is rather high and further engagements are not anticipated, the medical corpsman remains behind with the wounded who are dispersed through the local homes, supervises their nursing and after convalescence leads them back to Communist army units. These men, though wounded, retain their arms, and in their return trip may fight guerrilla warfare for months before rejoining their army. The medical attention given the wounded under such conditions is of necessity limited and those whose lives are dependent on major surgery are lost. Food, bed rest and bandaging constitute the sum total of medical care. At times even bandages are not available.

Battalion Medical Station. This medical station lying about a mile behind the lines, staffed by one doctor and two nurses, constitutes the first point in the chain of evacuation where the wounded soldier comes under the supervision of a surgeon. No major surgery is attempted here and the main duties of the surgeon are those of redressing, giving priority of evacuation and supervising the stretcher bearers. Those lightly wounded and able to ride horses or walk are moved on to the rear in this fashion. The mode of medical care in case the battalion is cut off from further evacuation corresponds to that of the company.

Regimental Medical Station. The next in line of evacuation is the Regimental Medical Station staffed by two surgeons and four nurses whose duties are to: (1) prepare dressings and bandages for forward stations; (2) debride minor wound and ligature hemorrhaging vessels; (3) temporarily splint fractures; (4) register the wounded. This is the first point along the line where the wounded are registered. There are no beds in this medical unit, but those lightly wounded may remain here for a few days before returning to join their combat forces. Those requiring further medical attention are evacuated down the line by stretcher or horse to the next unit which is usually set up in some of the buildings of a village about five miles behind the lines.

Brigade Field Hospital. This hospital, staffed by five surgeons and

a dozen or so nurses, is the first point along the line of evacuation where major surgery, such as amputations, debridement of major wounds and removal of foreign bodies, is performed. No abdominal surgery is undertaken. Here, too, are found the first hospital beds which are put up in buildings temporarily appropriated for this purpose. The time lapse from injury to hospitalization in the Brigade Field Hospital runs from three to eight hours.

Divisional Fixed Hospital. Up to this point all medical units have been mobile, but in this hospital the first stationary organization is found. Each submilitary district normally contains two such hospitals, which are set up in villages and have an average bed capacity of one hundred and fifty. Actually the emergency expansion of such a unit is limited only by the size of the village. Usually the operating and the dressing rooms are the only permanent fixtures of the installation, the patients being distributed through the village homes as the occasion demands. The basic staff consists of five officers distributed as follows: three surgeons, one assistant to the surgeons and one pharmacist. The size of the nursing staff depends on the number of patients and the number of nurses available. In such fixed hospitals all types of surgery are performed, the extent limited only by the amount of medical supplies on hand. In the event of a Japanese push even the "fixed" hospital is sometimes forced to move, and the patients are dispersed into isolated mountain regions where they are cared for in caves. The surgeons and nurses accompany the patients and the local peasants volunteer their services as stretcher bearers to aid in the mass evacuation.

Base Medical Service

Each military Region, of which there are fourteen reported in Communist China, has as the head of its medical organization a Base Medical Service under whose jurisdiction come larger fixed hospitals (three to four), medical schools (only one of which gives training at all comparable to accepted medical institutions of the west), medical factories and nursing schools. The several Base Medical Services are theoretically under the control of the 8th Route Army Medical Department; however, the various medical organizations are very decentralized and to a great extent on their own initiative. This decentralization is readily explained on the basis of two factors: first, the Base Medical Services are to a great extent isolated from one another with poor lines of communication; second, the 8th Route

Army Medical Department, because of the stringent Kuomintang blockade, has practically nothing in the way of medical supplies to distribute to the various Base Medical Services. As a result, the two organizations are not interdependent. The larger fixed hospitals care for both the local civilian population and the more chronic military patients who, because of the necessity for prolonged hospitalization, have been evacuated to the rear from Divisional Fixed Hospitals. In certain cases where these larger hospitals are in fairly close areas, one will cater to the civilians and the other to the military.

Hospitals. On November 23, 1939, Dr. Norman Bethune, who had been sent to China under the auspices of The American Canadian League for Peace and Democracy some two years before, died of a septicemia resulting from a wound sustained while operating on the wounded in Wutai. Yen-an held a vast memorial meeting attended by all representatives of the Communist Party, Army, Government and people, and passed a resolution to enlarge the 8th Route Army Military Hospital and to change its name to the "Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital." This hospital has been moved several times and has split off into further subdivisions. At present there is the head hospital and three sections, all in the vicinity of Yen-an. The different sections are located in different areas to facilitate management, supply (growing of food, etc.) and the reception of different kinds of patients. They are all able to solve their own technical problems, but whenever medical difficulties are encountered the head hospital usually convenes consultations of all section chiefs. General consultations are held on all rare and difficult diseases with members of each section attending. Medical reports on the activities of each section are received monthly, and an interchange of professional experiences is a regular item in this relationship. All problems of medicines, medical equipment and other hospital supplies are decided on in meetings organized by the head hospital. Education work, for example, is handled by the head hospital and all three sections, some providing actual teachers for lectures in the medical school and others taking in the graduates for their internships.

Bethune Memorial International Peace Hospital. In the spring of 1943 the hospital moved to its present location at Liu Wan Chia Kou, about four miles northeast of the old walled city of Yen-an. The hospital, nestled in a small valley off the Yen River, is a community in itself with all the staff living on the premises. Every family has a small vegetable garden (including the patients who are able to work). The

Communist Party has put on a great agricultural drive during the past few years in an effort to make the country self-sufficient. The professors and their families take great pride in showing off their gardens to visitors. The wards and homes of the faculty of the hospital are caves dug out of the soft *loess* soil of the hillsides.

The hospital has six services with separate wards for each: surgical, medical, infectious diseases, obstetrical-gynecological, pediatrics and the out-patient services. Each individual ward room contains about six beds, except for the pediatrics ward where, due to the shortage of nursing personnel, the preponderance of breast feeding, and the local customs, beds are furnished the mothers of the patients so they may sleep beside the cribs. The pharmacy and the laboratory are also housed in caves, but the operating rooms are in a stone building built on a level area below the wards. Each service has one chief doctor and two assistants (out-patient department is staffed by members of the other services rotating daily); there are two pharmacists, one laboratory technician and one assistant, one superintendent of nurses, and 38 nurses.

Though civilians are accepted, the head hospital is primarily a military institution and caters to soldiers and their families. There are approximately two hundred beds of which fifty are for surgical cases.

Each hospital has a political commissar whose duties seem to be those of a sort of morale-builder, a catechizer and political instructor. In many ways he would compare with a chaplain attached to our military hospitals. The staff members are from varying walks of life and educated in various parts of the world, some in China, others in America, Germany, France, or Switzerland.

The common surgical diseases encountered are: wounds, burns, fractures, acute appendicitis, inguinal herniae, and minor rectal conditions such as hemorrhoids, rectal fissures and fistulae in ano.

The operating rooms are two in number. In the same building are preparation rooms, dressing rooms where gauze is prepared for sterilization and a small room with the instrument cabinets.

Local and spinal anaesthesia are used almost exclusively, primarily because other types are not available. It is possible to smuggle novocaine and local anaesthetics from Japanese-controlled sections of China.

In the medical service the following diseases are prevalent: tuberculosis, influenza, gastro-intestinal diseases, malaria, relapsing fever,

and some cases of kala azar. In pediatrics one encounters whooping cough, pneumonia, and gastro-intestinal diseases. Typhoid, typhus, and bacillary dysentery are the more common diseases encountered in the infectious disease wards. One can readily appreciate the difficulty of treating the above diseases when such items as the sulfonamides, neostibosan, arsenicals for intravenous use, and typhoid and typhus vaccines are not available.

Daily ward rounds are held throughout the hospital with weekly staff conferences. Charts are kept in orthodox fashion with history sheets, nursing charts, temperature charts, drug order sheets and laboratory sheets, all of which are printed locally on paper made in this region.

The running fund and expenses of the hospital, except for a small part coming from the China Defense League and the China Aid Council, comes from the Border Region Government. Another small part is supplied from the self-producing work accomplished by the hospital.

Conclusion

The medical personnel seem very much alive to the needs of the army and civilians in Communist China. Considering the difficulties encountered, U.S. observers have been favorably impressed by the accomplishments of the medical profession. The medical staffs of the local hospitals, medical school and military establishments of forward echelons are all very cognizant of their limitations in personnel and matériel. Major improvement in the medical service can only be effected by the importation of medical supplies, at present prevented by the Central Government embargo. The peasants as well as the army would probably benefit from any medical improvement in this section. This would in turn be a factor in improving the fighting qualities of the soldier, for the civilian besides being his family is also his rear echelon, growing the food and making the supplies essential to the army.

CONCLUSIONS

The consensus of opinion of U.S. observers is that the Chinese Communist Regular Army is a young, well-fed, well-clothed, battle-hardened, volunteer force in excellent physical condition, with a high level of general intelligence, and very high morale. Training of these troops may be rated as fair for their present capabilities even

though it is woefully inadequate judged by American standards. Military intelligence, for their purposes, is good. The most serious lack of the Communist forces is in equipment.

The outstanding weaknesses of the Communist forces include lack of sufficient small arms ammunition, lack of artillery, lack of engineers and other technical personnel, lack of signal equipment in general and especially of radio communication below regiment level, complicated and irregular organization, and heavy casualties among officers with consequent weakness in junior leadership.

The most pressing needs of the Chinese Communist forces are for rifle and machine gun ammunition and for an easily portable weapon capable of knocking out Japanese forts, which sometimes have brick walls. The bazooka might prove useful for this latter purpose, and could also be used against the numerous Japanese blockhouses of less formidable construction than the forts. The same weapon might be employed against Japanese rail traffic, since the Communists are often able to operate very close to important Japanese-held railroads. Rifle and machine gun ammunition required is caliber 7.92, about half Chinese and half Japanese. An urgent need is for more modern signal equipment, so designed as to be light and easily portable. Photographic equipment of the Communists is very meager. Medical supplies and hospital equipment of all kinds are urgently needed. A few supplies, such as chemical balance scales and various machine tools, would materially increase the productive capacity of Communist manufacturing plants. Many factories waste time making inferior tools which soon wear out because they are made from railway rails. The bayonets manufactured by the Communists are of soft steel and the quality is poor. This is a serious handicap because the shortage of ammunition compels Communist troops to rely heavily on bayonet charges and fighting in close quarters. The Communists have no anti-gas equipment. General Yeh Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the 18th Group Army, states that the Japanese have taken advantage of this fact to inflict over 14,000 casualties, including a number of brigade and division commanders. There is need for a definite program of tactical training and for training in combined arms. Training in weapons is deficient, partly due to lack of sufficient ammunition and partly due to faulty methods employed.

These shortcomings of the Communists are, however, offset in part by certain organizational advantages. The small units of the Communist forces, carrying the lightest possible equipment, have high mo-

bility and are well adapted to guerrilla warfare. These units are equipped and trained to operate independently. They exist off the country, apparently having full support of the populace in the areas. This facilitates quick dispersal and mobility. The organization of the forces enables coordination of the operations of these individual units, within the limits of existing communication facilities, through a centralized command. This command takes in not only the regular forces of the area, but also the local detachments and other units within the People's Militia, and the whole population enlisted in the People's Self-Defense Corps. The Communists claim that the political work throughout the army guarantees high morale, excellent discipline, and the whole-hearted support and cooperation of the people.

The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Army may be viewed in the light of the following two factors. First, the Communists are capable of continuing indefinitely the present program of harassment against the Japanese while slowly increasing their strength and supplies. Second, they are not capable of independent, decisive operations to dislodge the Japanese from North or East China unless the Japanese situation has deteriorated seriously or is on the verge of collapse.

This deterioration of the Japanese situation depends largely upon the success of the Chungking Government army in an advance against the Japanese and on a landing of Allied forces on the China coast. At present the Japanese forces are so disposed in China that a major operation against them would entail the movement of substantial troops and supplies to the threatened areas. Allied domination of the seas would confine the movement to the lines of communication available to them within China. The reinforcements which the Japanese could obtain to bolster their defense against the Allies would be drawn largely from units engaged in garrison duties along the railways. The Communists are so disposed over all of North China and a large part of Central China that they are capable of (a) widespread attacks against Japanese garrisons and concentrations to hamper their mobilization for movement and (b) attacks upon and destruction of sections of the railroads to interfere with the movements of Japanese troops and supplies. This interference will slow down Japanese movements considerably, though they will probably not stop all movements.

In tactical situations the Communists are capable of providing a local Allied force with the following forms of resistance:

To serve as advance, rear, and flank guards;
To pursue a defeated or withdrawing enemy;
To strike at or turn an enemy flank;
To plant mine fields and engage in demolitions;
To engage in ambush, surprise attacks, and night operations;
To infiltrate enemy lines, attack rear installations, and harass lines of communications;
To provide intelligence to Allied forces on local Japanese strengths, concentrations and movements.

8. International Implications of the Kuomintang-Communist Struggle

ATTITUDES OF THE KUOMINTANG TOWARD FOREIGN POWERS

There are striking differences in the attitudes of the Kuomintang and the CCP toward foreign nations. The Kuomintang is a Nationalist party. The Communist Party is international. The Kuomintang argues that Communism is a foreign doctrine incompatible with Chinese tradition and temperament. The Communists charge that the Kuomintang represents and is supported by the capitalist class which exists at the expense of the masses, and therefore adheres to foreign capitalist nations and betrays the interests of China.

In regard to the Kuomintang, there are pro- and anti-American leaders in the Party, pro- and anti-British leaders, and pro- and anti-Soviet Russian leaders. But all of them are nationalists who, in their relations with foreign countries, place the interests of China first of all. They intensely resent foreign domination. Because Great Britain formerly represented imperialist domination in China they accepted Soviet Russian aid in the 1920's to drive the British out of China. When Soviet Russia used her position in China to win a dominant position for herself, they turned against her and reestablished friendly relations with Great Britain. The CCP as developed by Soviet Russia had many of the features of a puppet organization, serving the interests of Soviet Russia. The Kuomintang turned against the Chinese Communists as well as against Soviet Russia. When Japan began to invade China, the Kuomintang was willing to accept the aid of Soviet Russia, America, and Great Britain.

The Kuomintang, of course, hailed America's entry into the war as China's salvation. It has welcomed American aid and has accepted American advisers to help the Government in Chungking to plan and organize Chinese resistance against Japan, just as it once accepted Soviet Russian advisers to organize Chinese resistance against Great

Britain. But there can be little doubt that if the leaders of the Kuomintang were ever to feel that America was trying to dominate China, they would turn against us and would accept aid from any foreign power, even from Soviet Russia, to combat our influence.

China under the Kuomintang is willing to cooperate with any and all foreign powers that are willing to treat China as an equal, and willing to respect her sovereign rights.

This is why most of the Kuomintang leaders resent and fear Soviet Russia, for in their opinion Soviet Russia has not respected Chinese sovereign rights. She has established Soviet domination over Outer Mongolia. She exerted a dominant influence in Sinkiang, and even though she withdrew her military forces and economic interests from Sinkiang in 1943, she did not prevent Outer Mongolia from supporting the anti-Chinese Kazakh rebellion in Sinkiang, which began in 1943 and still continues. An American observer in Lanchow, capital of Kansu province in the Northwest, reported that in 1942 Chinese "continually spoke of Outer Mongolia as being just as much a part of China as Manchuria, and its recovery just as important . . . This determination to reestablish control over Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was, they had no hesitation in saying, the dominant reason for the great emphasis on the development of the Northwest, particularly the Kansu corridor which is regarded because of its position as being of vital strategic importance."

The leaders of the Kuomintang have opposed any attempt to fetter China to the British imperialist world system. They have opposed China's inclusion in the Japanese imperialist system. Today they fear that it is Soviet Russia's intention to drag China into the Communist world system under Soviet Russian domination. And because the Chinese Communists have always been followers and supporters of Soviet Russia, most of the Kuomintang leaders think of the Chinese Communists as an instrument of Soviet Russian expansion into China.

The American Consul in Lanchow stated that Chinese with whom he had travelled through Kansu in 1942 commonly spoke of Great Britain as China's old enemy, Japan as her present enemy, and Soviet Russia as her future enemy. The C-of-S of the Eighth War Zone, including Kansu, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang, said in 1943 that the Chinese in the Northwest are "faced on one side by Russia, and on the other side by the [Chinese] Communists." In August 1943, just before General Hsiung Shih-hui was appointed chief of the National Planning Board (mainly concerned with post-war plans), he told an

American official that China's first problem after the war is over is "military security particularly in the north."¹

Many of the most influential Kuomintang leaders have been apprehensive about what might happen to China if Soviet Russia were to enter into the war against Japan. American observers in China reported in August 1943, during a crisis between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, that "reactionary Kuomintang circles" deeply distrusted Soviet intentions and good faith, arguing that the Chinese Communist problem should be resolved immediately by the use of force. Otherwise, they feared, if Soviet Russia entered the war against Japan, the Chinese Communists would take over North China while the Russians were sweeping through Korea and Manchuria. The tense situation in 1943 between the Kuomintang and the Communists, arising from the heavy concentration of Kuomintang troops in areas facing the Communist Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia, was explained by an American agency in China as follows: "Kuomintang provincial officials in the Northwest are strongly suspicious of Soviet Russia and fear the occupation by the Chinese Communists of parts of Kansu and Ninghsia. The Chungking Government has concentrated its forces in the Northwest not in preparation for an attack against the Chinese Communists, but rather because of fear that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists possibly intend to establish land communications between their areas of control."

This fear of Soviet Russia increased during 1944 and 1945 with the successful Russian offensive into Germany and with Soviet Russia's denunciation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan on 5 April 1945. An official American source in Chungking reported on 15 April that "Although Chinese expressed approval of Soviet denunciation of the Japanese pact, there was also a question of when and how Russia will enter the war. Informed Chinese hope that the United States will be able to deal with Japan alone and are afraid that Russia will complicate Kuomintang-Chinese Communist relations and the future status of Manchuria and North China."

Most Kuomintang leaders, foremost among them the Generalissimo, maintain their suspicious attitude toward Soviet Russia and lean heavily on American support of the Chungking Government to

¹ The conversation was with Mr. John Carter Vincent, then Counselor of Embassy in China, on 17 May 1943. *FRUS, 1943: China*, p. 63. The text is apparently in error on the date.—*Ed.*

counteract the growing power of the Chinese Communists and possible future Soviet domination of China. But some Kuomintang leaders, among them Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan and one of the leading spokesmen for the Chinese liberals, began in the course of 1944 to press for closer cooperation between the Chungking Government and Soviet Russia. They argued that it was futile to ignore the fact that after the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the greatest land power of Asia, and that it would be essential to the security of China that the Chungking Government establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia. These Kuomintang leaders also realize that the initial step toward winning Soviet Russia's good-will is the establishment of friendly relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists.

In April 1945 it was reported from Chungking that the "Sun Fo school of thought" is gaining in Chungking. "Chungking believes that unity with the [Chinese] Communists cannot be achieved unless Stalin gives the necessary orders to the Communists. If there is danger of U. S. agreeing to some deal with Russia on Manchuria in order to bring her into war against Japan, China would do better by bargaining direct with Stalin. Chiang Kai-shek so far has refused to budge from his position."

ATTITUDE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TOWARD FOREIGN POWERS

Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have consistently followed the Soviet Russian party line. In the course of the present war they have upheld every action of the Soviet Union, even though at times it has appeared difficult to reconcile these actions with the interests of China. But when the United States and Great Britain have taken somewhat similar action, the Chinese Communists have never failed to make their displeasure known. Thus they denounced the "capitalist nations" in 1938 for shipping "great quantities of munitions and war materials" to Japan. But they saw nothing wrong in Soviet Russia concluding a Neutrality Pact with Japan in 1941.

When the Soviet Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was concluded in August 1939, Mao Tse-tung said that it "strengthens the confidence of the whole of mankind in the possibility of winning freedom." He said that the pact

... has upset the plot of Chamberlain, Daladier, and others who were engaged in transactions for the international reactionary bourgeoisie and

who wished to provoke war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. The Pact was a hard blow to Japan [since it exposed the "false character" of the Anti-Comintern bloc], helped China strengthen the position of the supporters of the war of emancipation and dealt a blow to Chinese capitulators . . .

As I have already said, Chamberlain and his policy will meet with the fate described in the proverb, "He that mischief hatches, mischief catches." . . . In order to deceive the people and mobilize public opinion, both belligerent sides [Germany and Great Britain, who in the opinion of Mao Tse-tung would soon start a war against each other] will cynically declare that they are waging a just war, while others are waging an unjust war. But only a non-predatory war, a liberation war, is a just war.

In the capitalist world, in addition to the above-mentioned two big groups, there is still a third group, namely, the states of America, headed by the United States. This group, guided by its own interests, has as yet not entered into the conflict. It can still, together with the U.S.S.R., call for the preservation of peace.

American imperialists intend afterwards to appear on the scene and win for themselves a dominant position in the capitalist world . . .

In the sphere of Japanese foreign policy a struggle is taking place between two groups. The fascist military clique continues to strive to seize the whole of China and the South Seas and to squeeze Britain, America, and France out of the East. The liberal bourgeoisie on the other hand insist that concessions be made to the British, Americans, and French in order [that] the Japanese may be able to concentrate their attention on the plundering of China. At present time, the danger of an Anglo-Japanese agreement has increased. The British reactionary bourgeoisie evidently want to partition China, jointly with Japan, to give Japan political and economic assistance on the condition that Japan becomes Britain's watchdog in the East to protect its interests, to suppress the Chinese movement of national emancipation, to launch an attack on the U.S.S.R., and to restrict America's influence. Hence Japan's chief aim as regards the enslavement of China will not change . . . Britain's policy in the East is directed towards organizing a Far Eastern Munich . . .

As regards the U.S.S.R. we [Chinese] should strengthen our friendship with it, in order to establish a front of unity of both great nations, to secure still greater support . . . Relations with the United States should, generally speaking, be the same. The most reliable friends rendering us support in the capitalist countries are the broad masses of the people . . .²

The Chungking Government at this time saw little hope that America and Great Britain would come to the aid of China, and therefore hailed the Soviet-German pact as a distinct blow to Japan, and conversely an aid to China. The Kuomintang press agencies agreed with the Chinese Communists that the agreement automatically broke up

² These are extracts from an earlier version of the piece now entitled "The Identity of Interests Between the Soviet Union and All Mankind," SW, II, 275-83.—*Ed.*

the anti-Comintern pact and expressed the opinion that the Russo-German pact would allow Soviet Russia to center her attention on Japan and devote her resources more fully to the aid of China.

This proved to be a mistaken idea. Soviet Russia did not devote her resources "more fully to the aid of China." With the breakup, in the course of 1939 and 1940, of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, Soviet Russia began greatly to reduce her shipments of supplies to the Chungking Government. On 13 April 1941 Soviet Russia concluded a Neutrality Pact with Japan.

Wang Ch'ung-hui, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, bitterly attacked the Soviet Union. The American Military Attaché in China reported that Government circles in Chungking viewed the signing of the Soviet-Japanese pact with alarm.³ "The worst feature, as far as the Chinese are concerned, is the possibility that the Japanese will be able to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from Manchuria for use in settling the China incident . . . The possible effect of the pact on continuance of Russian aid to China has also caused some concern." Well-informed Chinese quarters in Chungking were also apprehensive that what they called Russia's "appeasement policy" toward Japan might induce Great Britain and the United States to follow Russia's example.

The brighter side of the picture, as far as the Chinese in Chungking were concerned, was the possibility that the pact might tempt Japan, "now that the back door in Manchuria is at least partially freed from fear of attack from Russia," to move into American, British, French, and Dutch areas in Southeast Asia "without attempting a settlement of the China incident." The American Military Attaché reported that "recent developments have led China to believe that a move south will bring on a war between the United States and Japan which, as far as China is concerned, is a consummation devoutly to be wished." By signing the Neutrality Pact with Japan, the Kuomintang leaders believed that Soviet Russia had acted against China, the United States, and Great Britain.

The CCP, however, thoroughly subscribed to Soviet Russia's move. In a statement issued in Chungking on 23 April, the Chinese Communists announced:

[The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact] is a great victory of the USSR's foreign policy. The significance of this agreement lies above all in the fact

³ At this time, the Military Attaché was Col. William Mayer.—*Ed.*

that it strengthens peace on the eastern frontiers of the USSR and guarantees the security of the development of socialist construction. This kind of peace and development of the USSR is in keeping with the interests of the working people and oppressed nations of the whole world . . .

The Soviet-Japanese pact has not restrained the aid which the USSR renders to independent and just resistance. If only the Chinese government will not use the help of the USSR against compatriots in the country, as for instance was the case in January of this year when the New Fourth Army was destroyed in the southern part of Anhwei Province . . . we are deeply convinced that the USSR . . . will continue to help China . . .

The hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR and by this treaty the USSR has not disappointed and never will disappoint China.

As regards the statement of the USSR and Japan about mutual non-aggression on Manchuria and Mongolia, this measure was necessary since so-called Manchukuo already for some time past had been used by Japan as an instrument for attacks on the USSR and for creating disorders on the frontier of the USSR and Outer Mongolia . . .

Following the USSR's statement that it will not attack Manchuria, these people [referring to Kuomintang "speculators"] began to maintain that the USSR has acted incorrectly. Such people are to say the least, craven tricksters . . .⁴

What these "craven tricksters" in the Kuomintang had objected against above everything else was Soviet Russia's pledge in a separate "Frontier Declaration" attached to the Neutrality Pact to "respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo."

After Germany's attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941, Chinese nationalist groups viewed the new war development with some optimism from China's standpoint, as it tended to confirm their long-held belief that eventually all major powers would be drawn into the conflict, to the benefit of China. Many expressed the opinion that Japan would have to "honor" her alliance with the Axis by attacking Siberia and Outer Mongolia.

The Chinese Communists adopted more or less the same attitude toward the new world situation as Communists all over the world. Their concern was for Soviet Russia's welfare, even to the point of making it clear that the Chinese Communists wished that the United States and Great Britain would employ "every means" to help "the

⁴ The CCP had much earlier anticipated the "Leninist" possibility of a Russo-Japanese arrangement. See SW, II, 281. The text of the statement quoted here is contained in *World News and Views*, No. 19 (10 May 1941), p. 301. Also cf. Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946* (New York: Columbia, 1958), pp. 132-36.—Ed.

countries fighting Germany," even if this meant leaving China to fight on as best she could. Mao Tse-tung's statement on 10 October 1941, the thirtieth anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, is typical of the attitude of the Communists: "The war which will decide the fate of the human race is today being fought ferociously on the plains of Russia between the Red Army and the fascist hordes of Hitler. All those people who want freedom, and first and foremost the great Chinese people, are wholeheartedly behind the Soviet Union, behind the Soviet-British-American anti-fascist united front." In November 1941 Mao Tse-tung stated: "In our opinion Britain and the United States must employ every means to help the countries fighting Germany. It is absolutely clear that the aspirations of the majority of Americans and Britons coincide with our own. The British and American people must display more energy in overcoming difficulties and must strengthen the world anti-fascist front."

When those statements are compared with Mao Tse-tung's statement in 1939 after the conclusion of the Russo-German non-aggression pact it becomes clear that in the opinion of the Chinese Communists whoever sides with Soviet Russia sides with the cause of freedom.

After the entry of the United States into the war against Japan, the Chinese Communists could naturally not continue to say that the "hope of the Chinese people for aid from abroad rests above all on the USSR." On 23 December 1941, the Central Committee of the CCP published a statement in the *Hsin-Hua jih-pao* in Chungking as follows:

The war in the Pacific, started for the purpose of aggression, is an unjust, predatory war on the part of Japan. On the other hand from the point of view of resistance to Japan, the United States of America and Great Britain are waging a just war in defense of independence, freedom and democracy. This new act of Japanese reaction is similar to the Japanese aggression pursued in China for ten years, and fully coincides with the aggression of the German and Italian fascists in Europe and against the Soviet Union.

The world is now divided into two fronts—the Fascist Front, waging war against aggression, and the Anti-Fascist Front, engaged in a liberation war [sic].⁵ China, Britain, the U.S.A. and other anti-Japanese countries must conclude a military alliance to bring about full military cooperation. At the same time a united front of all anti-Japanese countries and peoples

⁵ The "sic" was added by the compilers of the report. It might better have been placed after "war against," which seems clearly to be a mistranslation of "war of."—*Ed.*

in the Pacific must be formed to continue the war against Japan to final victory.

The Anti-Japanese National Front [in China] must be strengthened. The people must be afforded an opportunity to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle, as well as in the national reconstruction.

In the years that followed the Chinese Communists, like the Communists in all countries, came to stress more and more the “national” character of their revolutionary movements. When the Communist International was dissolved in May 1943, Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the revolutionary organizational form of the Communist International had become unsuited to the necessities of the revolutionary struggle. “What is needed for the present is to strengthen the Communist Parties in the various countries . . . The disbandment of the Comintern does not weaken the Communist Parties of the various countries but, on the other hand, strengthens them, making them more national and more suited to the necessities of the war against Fascism.” Mao Tse-tung stated that since the Seventh Congress in 1935 the Communist International “has not once intervened in internal questions of the Chinese Party.” The Central Committee of the CCP stated, however, that the Communist International had aided China up until it was dissolved. “What the Chinese people can never forget is that it helped the realization of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation with all its possibilities in 1924 when Dr. Sun Yat-sen was alive. Thenceforward it helped the victory of the Northern Expedition. Moreover, when the Chinese Revolution was in a most difficult situation between 1927 and 1937, it again aided the Chinese revolutionary people [the Chinese Communists]. Further on, during the six years of anti-Japanese war since 1937, it has called upon all its sections and working people in all countries to help the Chinese to oppose the aggression war of Japanese imperialism.”⁶

In the period following the dissolution of the Comintern, the Chinese Communists have tried to convince American observers of their friendly feelings toward America and the importance they attach to America’s role both in the war against Japan and in the post-war rehabilitation work in China. This became the case especially after the establishment of an American Military Observer Section in Yen-an in

⁶ *Chieh-fang jih-pao* (28 May 1943). An approximate paraphrase may be found under the title “On the Disbandment of the Communist International,” in [George] Stuart Gelder, *The Chinese Communists* (London: Gollancz, 1946), pp. 169–73. The stress in the original is much heavier upon the CCP’s autonomy than upon the services of the Comintern to the Chinese revolution.—*Ed.*

July 1944, which was approved by the National Government in Chungking. In December 1944 General Yeh Chien-ying said to an American observer visiting Yen-an that "in the past, especially during the period of civil war after 1927, the Communists' attitude toward the United States had not been particularly favorable. However, this attitude had improved to a great extent since the outbreak of the Pacific War. General impressions of the United States were now very good."⁷

In January 1945 Mao Tse-tung said: "We [Chinese Communists] hope for Allied aid but we cannot stake everything on this. We rely on our own efforts and the creative power of the [Communist] Army and the people."

During interviews on 13 March and 1 April 1945 with one of the American observers attached to the American Military Observer Section in Yen-an, Mao Tse-tung gave a detailed outline of the policy and attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the United States and the implications of American support of the Chungking Government. He stressed five things in particular: (1) China needs American aid both during and after the war; (2) the Chinese Communists will extend cooperation to the United States regardless of American action; (3) the Kuomintang cannot develop China into a stabilizing power in the Far East; (4) the Kuomintang is unable to maintain friendly relations with "Soviet Russia and other neighbors"; (5) the CCP represents the interests of the Chinese people wherefore it would be to the best interest of the United States to support the Chinese Communists; only under Communist leadership can democracy be established in China. The following extracts give the main points of Mao Tse-tung's statements:

Between the people of China and the people of the United States there are strong ties of sympathy, understanding and mutual interests . . . China's greatest post-war need is economic development . . . America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America.

[Chinese] Communist policy toward the United States is, and will remain, to seek friendly American support of democracy in China and co-operation in fighting Japan. But regardless of American action, whether or not they [the Communists] receive a single gun or bullet, the Communists

⁷ The precise source of this quotation is not known, but cf. reports by Barrett, *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 727-32 (dated 10 Dec. 1944), and by Davies, *ibid.*, pp. 752-55 (on his visit to Yen-an, 15-17 Dec. 1944).—*Ed.*

will continue to offer and practice cooperation in any manner possible to them . . . The Communists will continue to seek American friendship and understanding because it will be needed by China in the post-war period of reconstruction.

Whether or not America extends cooperation to the Communists is, of course, a matter for only America to decide. But the Communists see only advantages for the United States—in winning the war as rapidly as possible, in helping the cause of unity and democracy in China, in promoting healthy economic solution of the agrarian problem, and in winning the undying friendship of the overwhelming majority of China's people, the peasants and liberals.

The peasants are China . . . The problems of the Chinese farmer are, therefore, basic to China's future . . . There must be land reform. And democracy . . .

The Kuomintang has no contact with the agrarian masses of the population . . . Afraid of real democracy, the Kuomintang is forced to be fascistic . . . Unwilling to solve the agrarian problem it turns toward the principle of rigidly planned, State directed and controlled industrial development.

Unable, therefore, to create a solid basis for power at home or for cooperative and amicable relations with Russia and other neighbors, it concentrates on 'national defense industry' and engages in the dangerous game of power politics. The expectation of future conflicts, internal and external, is implicit in these policies . . . Under these policies, . . . the Kuomintang cannot solve China's basic internal problems, cannot lead the country to full democracy, and cannot be a stabilizing power in the Far East.

The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, is *the* party of the Chinese peasant . . . The Communist Party will be the means of bringing democracy and sound industrialization to China . . .

It is to be expected that Chiang [Kai-shek] will do everything possible to avoid compromise in which he and the groups supporting him will have to yield power and give up their dictatorship. But the road he is taking now leads straight to civil war and the Kuomintang's eventual suicide . . . When attacked we [Communists] will fight back. We are not afraid of the outcome because the people are with us.

We [Communists] are not worried about Chiang's American arms, because a conscript peasant army will not use them effectively against their brother conscripts fighting for their homes and economic and political democracy. What we are worried about is the cost to China in suffering and loss of life . . . China needs peace. But she needs democracy more, because it is fundamental to peace. And first she must drive out the Japanese. We think America, too, should be concerned, because her own interests are involved.

America does not realize her influence in China and her ability to shape events there. Chiang Kai-shek is dependent on American help. If he had not had American support, he would have either collapsed before now or

been forced to change his policies in order to unify the country and gain popular support.

There is no such thing as America not intervening in China!

You are here, as China's greatest ally. The fact of your presence is tremendous. America's intentions have been good. We recognized that when Ambassador Hurley came to Yen-an [in November 1944] and endorsed our basic . . . points [for a settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist problem] . . . [But] we don't understand why America's policy seemed to waver after its good start. Surely Chiang's motives and devious maneuvers are clear. His [recent] suggestions of 'war cabinets' and 'inter-Party conferences' did not solve any basic issues because they had absolutely no power: they were far short of anything like a coalition government [which the Communists demand]. His proposals of 'reorganizing the Communist armies' and 'placing them under American command' were provocative attempts to create misunderstanding between us [the Communists] and Americans. We are glad to accept American command, as the British have in Europe. But it must be of all Chinese armies.⁸

Mao Tse-tung's statement that the Chinese Communists will cooperate with America whether we support them or not may have been more diplomatic than realistic. A former American observer in China with close contacts with Chinese Communist leaders stated in November 1944 that the United States "is the greatest hope and the greatest fear of the Chinese Communists," because, "they recognize that if they receive American aid, even if only on equal basis with Chiang Kai-shek, they can quickly establish control over most if not all of China." This observer concluded that "if we continue to reject them [the Communists] and support an unreconstructed Chiang [Kai-shek] they see us becoming their enemy. But they would prefer to be friends."⁹

The conclusion from this observation is that the Chinese Communists, if given aid by the United States, will use this aid to oust the Kuomintang from power and unify China under their control.

The result of such a development as far as America is concerned depends much on the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Soviet Russia. A commonly held opinion on this subject was expressed by an American repatriated in 1943 from Occupied China: "Should the Communists get the upper hand in China as they nearly succeeded in doing in 1927 and are quite liable to do after this war again, seeing how widespread their armies are already in China, there

⁸ These two interviews were with John S. Service.—*Ed.*

⁹ The observer was John Paton Davies. *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 668–69. The same report is quoted on the following page.—*Ed.*

will be a united front that will challenge the world, under orders from Moscow, as soon as the Red Armies have sufficiently recovered from their losses in the present war.”

The strong attachment of the Chinese Communists to Soviet Russia is indicated in many ways besides their approval of Soviet Russia's policy no matter which way it swings. An American observer who visited Yen-an at the end of 1944 states that there is “no doubt” that a strong sentimental attachment holds for “Mother Russia,” the home of the ideology of the Chinese Communists. “At a recent showing of newsreels in Yen-an, loud applause greeted Stalin's appearance; there was none for Roosevelt, Churchill, or Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin's speeches receive prominent space in the newspapers.” The pictures of Stalin, Lenin, and Marx are seen on the walls of most public buildings. Occasionally the picture of Sun Yat-sen is placed beside these Communist “saints.” At times when American visitors have been received by the Communists, the pictures of Roosevelt and Churchill have been temporarily added to those of Stalin, Lenin, and Marx. The Soviet Russian training and background of the Chinese Communists is shown in such small details as the romanization used on their paper money. They employ the Soviet Russian romanization instead of the British-American romanization commonly used in China for Chinese characters; thus “bank” is written as “inxang” instead of “yin-hang.”¹⁰

A former American observer in China, who is convinced of the “nationalist” spirit of the Chinese Communists, stated in November 1944: “With all of their strong nationalist spirit, the Chinese Communists do not seem to fear Moscow's political dominance over them as a result of possible Russian entry into the Pacific war and invasion of Manchuria and North China. They maintain that the USSR has no expansionist intentions toward China. To the contrary, they expect Outer Mongolia to be absorbed with a Chinese federation. They do not see this or any other issue causing conflict between Russia and Chinese Communist foreign policy.” This same observer wrote that “Possible future Soviet assistance to the [Chinese] Communists is a subject on which Yen-an leaders are uncommunicative. It seems obvious, however, that they would welcome such aid for what it would mean in exterminating the Japanese and giving impetus to Communist expansion in Central and South China.”

¹⁰ This is in error on two counts. The CCP never used the Cyrillic (Russian) alphabet, but rather a modified Latin script; in this system, “x” does not represent “h” but “hsi.”—*Ed.*

The Chinese Communists have made great efforts to convince American observers that they have no relations with Soviet Russia. Mao Tse-tung said to the foreign correspondents visiting Yen-an in July 1944 that "There has been no connection between the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the USSR, either in the past or now. There was a relationship with the Communist International, but this is no longer true. There has been no connection with the Communist Party of any other country." This rather naive statement probably did not convince anyone.

In an analysis of this subject an American observer in Yen-an contradicts Mao Tse-tung's statement just cited.¹¹ "Although it will be denied, channels do exist and there is almost certainly some contact between the Chinese Communists and Moscow. This is probably through Chinese Communists in Moscow and radio at Yen-an... What contact does exist is between the two Parties, not Governments." This observer states that at present the Chinese Communists in Moscow include the former Chinese representatives to the Comintern, who have been in Russia since the beginning of the war. Among them are Li Li-san, at one time leader of the CCP, and a certain General Chao. "These men certainly are in contact with Russian Communist leaders. Another possible channel of contact is, of course, through the Communist representatives and the Soviet Embassy in Chungking. This contact, however, seems to be limited to avoid arousing Central Government suspicions." There is probably radio communication between Yen-an and Moscow, and the Communist newspaper in Yen-an receives its Tass news directly by monitoring Russian broadcasts. "Important Soviet editorials are often reprinted... These are enough to give at least the Party 'line.' The same can work in the reverse direction—from Yen-an to Moscow." He states that there is no evidence, however, that the Chinese Communists receive any supplies from Soviet Russia.

In regard to Soviet Russia, Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yen-an that Soviet participation either in the Far Eastern war or in China's post-war reconstruction depends entirely on the "circumstances of the Soviet Union."¹² He pointed out that Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding. He said that the Chinese Communists do not expect Russian help. "Furthermore, the Kuomintang be-

¹¹ In a memorandum prepared by John S. Service, 28 Sept. 1944.—*Ed.*

¹² Remarks of Mao to Maurice Votaw, an American employee of the Chinese Ministry of Information. *Ibid.*, p. 538.—*Ed.*

cause of its anti-Communist phobia is anti-Russian. Therefore, Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation is impossible. And for us to seek it would only make the situation in China worse. China is dis-unified enough already! In any case, Soviet help is not likely even if the Kuomintang wanted it." He emphasized, however, that Soviet Russia will not oppose American interests in China if Americans are "constructive and democratic."

Mao Tse-tung did not explain what he meant by this. But it seems apparent from his remark that the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia are in agreement as to what should be a "constructive and democratic" American policy in China. It may be safely assumed that he meant that the United States should support the Chinese Communists.

This assumption is supported by Mao Tse-tung's indirect answer to the following statement by Maj. General Patrick J. Hurley, American Ambassador to China. During a press conference in Washington on 2 April 1945 Ambassador Hurley said that the Chinese Communists had requested the United States to furnish them with arms. He explained that furnishing arms to an armed political party would be equivalent to recognizing it as a belligerent. And the United States, he noted, recognizes the Chungking national regime as the government of China. He emphasized that the U. S. policy in China was unity and that there would be no unity so long as there were "armed political parties and warlords strong enough to resist the Central Government."

In the subsequent weeks, Mao Tse-tung warned the United States and Great Britain not to let their diplomacy go against the "will of the Chinese people." He added that "if any foreign government helps China's reactionary group [a reference to the Kuomintang] to oppose the democratic cause . . . a gross mistake will have been committed." At the same time he stated that the Chinese Communists believe that the Pacific question cannot be settled without the participation of Soviet Russia.

When Soviet Russia denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April 1945, the Chinese Communists used the occasion to praise the Soviet policy in the Far East and to denounce the Kuomintang for having expressed its disapproval of the Neutrality Pact in 1941. The *Emancipation Daily* (*Chieh-fang jih-pao*), Communist Party organ in Yen-an, wrote in an editorial on 8 April: "If the Kuomintang authorities are sincere about correcting their mistakes, they must not continue their four-year hatred of the Soviet Union." The editorial

pointed out how the Soviet Union had adroitly used the neutrality pact with Japan to mass her forces to knock out Nazi Germany first, and recalled the "vicious ravings of China's reactionary group against the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact in the past . . . even . . . to the extent of talking about the so-called 'Tokyo-Moscow-Yenan axis.'"

At the end of April, Mao Tse-tung, in his report to the Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yenan, gave an important outline of the foreign policy of the Chinese Communists. The Yenan radio reported his speech as follows:

Mao Tse-tung said, "Speaking of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, we [Chinese Communists] are of the opinion that the Kuomintang Government must stop its attitude of enmity toward the Soviet Union and swiftly improve Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations." On behalf of the Chinese people Mao Tse-tung expressed thanks for the help which has always been rendered to China by the Soviet Government and people in China's war of liberation and expressed welcome of Marshal Stalin's speech last November rebuking the Japanese aggressors and recent denouncement of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact by the Soviet Union.

"We believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question.

"The great efforts made by the Great Powers, America and Great Britain, especially the former, in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors and the sympathy and aid rendered by their governments and peoples to China, deserve our thanks. We request the Governments of the United Nations, especially the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, to pay attention seriously to the voice of the widest masses of the Chinese people and not let their diplomatic policy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people.

"If any foreign Government helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed."

Speaking of the abrogation of the unequal treaties with China by many foreign governments and the establishment of new treaties with China on the footing of equality, Mao Tse-tung said that the Chinese people welcome such (measures of treating) the Chinese people on a footing of equality. "But," he pointed out, "China definitely cannot rely simply on equality being given by the good will of foreign governments and peoples. A real and actual footing of equality must in the main rely on the efforts of the Chinese people to build up politically, economically and culturally a new democratic country, which is independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong. China assuredly cannot gain real independence and equality according to the policy of the Kuomintang Government at present in force."

Mao Tse-tung advocated the following policies to be adopted with regard to the countries in the Far East:

"After the . . . unconditional surrender of the Japanese aggressors all democratic [groups] of the Japanese people should be aided to establish a democratic regime of the Japanese people. Without such a democratic regime of the Japanese people, thorough extermination of the Japanese Fascism and militarism would not be possible to guarantee peace in the Pacific. The decision of the Cairo Conference to grant independence to Korea is correct, and the Chinese people should help the Korean people to attain liberation.

"America has already granted independence to the Philippines. We also hope that Great Britain [will] grant independence to India, because an independent, democratic India is not only needed by the Indian people, but is also needed for world peace." Regarding Burma, Malaya, the Dutch Indies, and Annam, Mao Tse-tung said: "We hope that Great Britain, the United States, and France [will grant], after helping the local peoples to defeat the Japanese aggressor, the right to establish independent, democratic regimes to the local people in accordance with the stand of the Crimea Conference regarding liberated areas in Europe.

"With regard to Thailand she should be dealt with according to the measures of dealing with a fascist turncoat."¹³

In regard to Japan, the Chinese Communists are reported to seek a democracy "like that which they plan in China." In effect this means that they envisage a democracy in Japan more akin to "Soviet democracy" than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. An American observer in Yen-an has reported that the Chinese Communists hold it necessary to give Japan reasonable opportunities for economic recovery and stability.¹⁴ This will include freedom of participation in the economic development of China. This observer states that it is apparent that the views of the Chinese Communists are closely similar to the program of the Japanese Communist Party as set forth by Okano Susumu, leader of the Japanese Communist Party. Okano has been staying in Yen-an since 1943. Mao Tse-tung has expressed the opinion that military occupation of Japan would be necessary with the aim of forming a democratic government in Japan.

In May 1944 the Chinese Communists established in Yen-an the "Japanese People's Emancipation League." It advocates a united front of all Japanese parties with the "fundamental objective" of inducing the Japanese people to cease hostilities and overthrow the militarists.¹⁵

¹³ See "On Coalition Government," SW, III, esp. pp. 307-8.—*Ed.*

¹⁴ This view was communicated to John S. Service by Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), a high-ranking Communist. *FRUS, 1944: China*, p. 585.—*Ed.*

¹⁵ This League is discussed in some detail in Harrison Forman, *Report from Red China* (New York: Holt, 1945), pp. 104-19.—*Ed.*

The League maintains a school in Yen-an, the "Japanese Workers' and Farmers' School." The League recruits its members chiefly from Japanese prisoners of war. Out of several thousand Japanese POW's taken by the Chinese Communists during the past years, the Emancipation League has only between 400-500 members at present.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA

In order to understand Soviet Russia's attitude toward China it is essential to bear in mind that the united front world movement was developed by Moscow. Its purpose, as we have seen, was to safeguard the Soviet Union against fascist aggression and strengthen the Communist parties in the capitalist, "bourgeois" democracies, as an instrument of Soviet policy.

In no country has the united front movement succeeded better than in China. It served its purpose during the first years of the Sino-Japanese war. It then centered the attention of all Chinese political parties and military groups on the problem of fighting Japan, at a time when Soviet Russia felt itself threatened by a war with Japan which it was anxious to avoid. It saved the Chinese Communist Army from extinction and gave the CCP a more powerful position in China than it had ever enjoyed. Had Chiang Kai-shek pursued his intention of starting a new "Extermination Campaign" in 1936 against the Communists in Shensi on the pattern of the Fifth Extermination Campaign in Kiangsi in 1934, it is likely that the Chinese Red Army would have been defeated. What saved it was Chiang's approval (stimulated, of course, by the Sian kidnapping) of the united front idea.

Soviet Russia's policy in China during the first years of the war was basically the same as during the period in the 1920's of the Soviet-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale*. Soviet support to China in terms of military supplies went exclusively to the Chungking Government as long as the Kuomintang supported the Chinese Communists.¹⁶ When the united front broke up, Soviet support of Chungking was gradually withdrawn. By that time, however, the Chinese Communists had gained a powerful position in China. As a result of the break up of the united front, Chinese resistance against Japan began to diminish. By that time, however, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact elimi-

¹⁶ Russian aid to China came to an end in 1941 because of the demands imposed by the German attack and because of the logic of the neutrality pact with Japan. KMT-CCP relations had worsened well before this time, and seem to have had little to do with the Russian decision.—*Ed.*

nated the immediate danger of a Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union. America's entry into the Pacific War gave Soviet Russia an additional assurance that her Siberian frontiers were safe. On 12 December 1941, *Pravda*, in an editorial entitled "War in the Pacific," wrote that Japan's initial successes had decided nothing. The war undoubtedly will be "long and protracted," it believed, but "the Japanese aggressor has plunged into a very hazardous adventure which bodes him nothing but defeat. . . . In comparison with the United States, Japan is poor as regards resources of raw materials." *Pravda* pointed out that Japan faced the "united front" of the United States, Great Britain, and China.

While Soviet Russia ceased sending military supplies to China she continued her diplomatic relations with the Chungking Government. And her military advisers remained in China, although they were treated with increasing suspicion by the Chungking officials. During the first six years of the Sino-Japanese war Soviet Russia abstained from any action that would have substantiated Chinese suspicion that she was supporting or intended to support the Chinese Communists. Such action would not only have intensified the hatred of the Kuomintang for the Chinese Communists, which could have led to a large-scale civil war and the collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. It might conceivably have involved Soviet Russia in a war against Japan. Soviet officials maintained, outwardly, the attitude that they were not interested in the Chinese Communists and that they hoped for unity between all Chinese resistance parties. Until 1943 the Soviet press hardly mentioned the Chinese Communists.

Soviet Russia's experience in China has been that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the CCP has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. On the other hand, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists. In view of this it is only natural that Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists have always supported unity in China, "democratic" unity.

That Soviet Russia was interested in the fate of the Chinese Communists was, however, explained by American observers in Chungking in a comment on the serious situation during 1943 between the Kuomintang and the CCP. "In the background of the situation is inevitably present a deep-seated Chinese [Kuomintang] fear and suspicion of Soviet Russia and its intentions with regard both to the

Chinese Communists and the Northeastern Provinces [Manchuria] . . . That the Russians are not altogether disinterested in the Chinese Communist Party is evident from the call made in July [1943] at [several American observers by] representatives of the Soviet Embassy at Chungking who expressed Soviet concern over the possibility of civil war . . . This fear gives added reason for the Kuomintang to wish to dispose of the Communist question before the conclusion of the war in order that a post-war Kuomintang-Chinese Communist struggle for control in North China may not occur. Even should Soviet Russia remain outside the war against Japan, there would exist the possibility of Russian assistance, outright or under cover, to the Chinese Communists." The Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Chungking stated to foreign observers in the Chinese capital on 14 July 1943 that Chungking Government troops had fired on positions or outposts of the Chinese Communists in as many as ten different places "within the last few days." American observers commented that the Soviet Counselor's approach is "interesting" because so far as could be recalled, the Soviet Embassy had never before shown concern so unequivocally over what happened to the Chinese Communists.¹⁷

In August 1943 it was reported from Moscow that the Soviet press, for the first time since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, was emphasizing the role of the Chinese Communists in the Chinese war against Japan and was openly supporting their cause. At the same time the Soviet press was becoming more critical of Japan and was criticizing the Kuomintang for harboring pro-Japanese groups. The Soviet press alleged that these groups sought the destruction of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. While Chiang Kai-shek was not attacked, some of his supporters were called "traitors." This press campaign was started by the publication on 6 August 1943 in the semi-official Soviet journal *War and the Working Class* of an article by Vladimir Rogoff, for many years a Soviet correspondent in China. He charged that the "Capitulators and defeatists holding high posts

¹⁷ *FRUS, 1943: China*, pp. 282-83, 306-8, 314-16. This concern was being expressed by Russia just at the time the Chungking government was trying to reassert its control of Sinkiang and (to a lesser extent) Outer Mongolia. Russian influence was very strong in both areas. *FRUS, 1944: China* also has much information on this situation. See Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), and Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot* (East Lansing: Michigan State, 1958).—*Ed.*

in the Kuomintang . . . weaken China . . . [and] had sent large forces to the area in which the [Chinese Communist] armies were operating . . . to disarm them and wipe out the Communist Party. If these adventures are crowned with any success, anti-democratic and anti-popular elements will gain the upper hand in Chungking." He warned against civil war in China. It was not the content of the criticism in the Soviet press that was noteworthy. Similar criticism and charges against the Kuomintang had been made for years by American and British writers. It was the fact that Soviet Russia had departed from its previous press policy, which was to avoid mention of the Chinese Communists and not to make unfavorable remarks about the Kuomintang, that was significant.

It was also not without significance that in 1943 Soviet Russia withdrew her support of the Chinese regime in Sinkiang. The evacuation of Soviet military forces and advisers from Sinkiang began in May. During the rest of the year all Soviet citizens, except the consular staff, were withdrawn from Sinkiang. All Soviet technical equipment, the oil pumps and refinery equipment at the Tushan oil fields, tungsten mine equipment at Bole, and the aircraft assembly plant at T'ou-tung-ho were also withdrawn. Trade between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia came to a standstill.

Russia was fully within her rights, of course, in taking this action. It might even be argued that it was favorable to China, since the Chungking Government was anxious to gain control over Sinkiang. But the stoppage of trade and the total withdrawal of Soviet forces as well as technical advisers and material interests was significant, because its inevitable result was a rapid deterioration of the economic situation in Sinkiang which would reflect unfavorably upon the Chinese rulers. A Chungking Government official stated that while the action of Soviet Russia "means considerable political success for the Central Government, it will result in almost insolvable economic problems." And the Chungking Government's Special Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang, who resides at Tihwa, capital of Sinkiang, stated that the Chinese had attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to maintain their advisers in Sinkiang. In November 1943 he said that the Chinese wished to resume trade between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia but that the Soviet Consul General in Tihwa had stated that there is no possibility of such trade.

A statement by the Soviet Embassy representative in Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, indicates that the Soviet Russians were

aware that their withdrawal from Sinkiang would weaken the position of the Chungking Government in China's Northwest. He said in August 1943 that "Chinese policies [in Sinkiang], unless radically changed, will alienate rather than win the people. In any event, Sinkiang cannot avoid having closer economic ties with Russia than with China." He emphasized that the Tibetans, Mongols, and Moslems in the Northwest could not be won to China unless the Chinese would abandon their attitude toward "subject peoples," give up their present policy of "Sinification," and give up their efforts to govern minority groups by direct control or through support of the "feudalistic leaders" of these minority groups. He expressed the opinion that the Mohammedan question was more important than the Chinese realized and that the Chinese would be opposed by the Mohammedans until Mohammedan interests were recognized and given a more important share in local government matters.

This was, of course, a very correct evaluation of the Chinese. The intolerant attitude of the Chungking Government toward the non-Chinese groups in Sinkiang (which compose about 95 percent of the population) soon led to uprisings against the Chinese. At the end of 1943 the Kazakh nomads, the second largest population group in the province, revolted in northern Sinkiang. They received military support from Outer Mongolia. When the Chinese authorities in Tihwa protested in October 1943 to the Soviet Consul General, he denied that any disturbances had occurred. In March 1944 serious clashes developed in the Altai Mountains on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. The Chinese stated that Soviet planes bombed their provincial troops in the Altai region. Although the Chinese Military Attaché in Washington said that the Soviet Government had denied this, Dr. Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan of the National Government in Chungking (who advocates rapprochement with Russia), stated that the Soviet Ambassador to China had admitted that Soviet planes were involved in these bombings.

On 2 April 1944 the Soviet Tass news agency announced that Chinese troops had violated the border of Outer Mongolia and that Chinese planes had bombed towns and villages in Outer Mongolia and strafed Kazakhs fleeing from Sinkiang. This announcement referred to events during the latter part of 1943. According to Dr. Sun Fo, the Soviet Ambassador to China had informed the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Soviet Russia, because of its mutual assistance pact with Outer Mongolia, would have to aid Outer Mongolia if

called upon, "owing to the fact that the Sinkiang-Mongolian frontier had been crossed by Chinese planes and Kazakhs had been machine gunned." An American observer in Northwest China reported in July 1944 that he had seen a Soviet map of 1940 on which the Mongolian-Sinkiang border was shown well west of the border line on maps printed in Moscow in 1927, slicing off some 83,000 sq. miles of territory from Sinkiang to the benefit of the "Mongolian People's Republic." It seems possible, therefore, that the Outer Mongolians considered the Chinese to have violated their border while the Chinese considered themselves in legitimate Chinese territory.

In November 1944 Kazakhs, "White Russians," and Tartars revolted in I-ning in western Sinkiang. They organized a government at I-ning by setting up a Local Maintenance Committee with An Te-hai, a Turki (the Turki, Moslems, are the largest population group in Sinkiang), as Chairman, with the reported aim of establishing an East Asia Turki Republic. The new government was reported to possess its own flag, a red banner with white star and crescent and, according to one report, a hammer and sickle as well. Latest reports (10 May 1945) from official sources at Tihwa stated that the Chinese have uncovered a widespread conspiracy in Tihwa itself for seizing the city and establishing a Turki Government. Americans have been informed that the conspirators are well supplied with machine guns, rifles, and hand grenades. Tihwa was reported to have been placed under martial law by the Chinese authorities. At the same time reports said that disturbances are spreading throughout the province. A portion of the Mongol garrison at Karashar, 120 miles southwest of Tihwa, who number about 1,500, are threatening the city from a northwestern direction. Men in plain clothes from I-ning have marched south and are threatening Kashgar. "Serious trouble might develop at Kashgar. In the I-ning Valley the rebels are forcing conscription."

In the light of these events it seems that Soviet Russia will in the long run benefit from her withdrawal from Sinkiang in 1943. Previous to that time she was committed to the support of Chinese rule in Sinkiang and in 1933, 1934, 1936, and 1937, she rendered military aid to the Chinese in suppressing rebellions by various Moslem groups in the province. During this time the Chinese Governor of Sinkiang, General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, had maintained a friendly policy toward Soviet Russia and had kept himself aloof from the Chungking Government. In 1942 he accepted a rapprochement with the Chungking

Government and he and the Chungking authorities began an anti-Soviet policy in the province. The rebellions which followed the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Sinkiang have undermined Chinese rule in the province. There is at present a strong possibility that the Moslems in Sinkiang may renounce Chinese rule and establish one or several autonomous regimes of their own. All observers agree that if this were to happen these regimes would reestablish friendly relations between Sinkiang and Soviet Russia. By withdrawing her support of the Chinese in Sinkiang, Soviet Russia has not only indicated indirectly to the Moslems in the province her disapproval of the Chinese regime, but has also indicated that she is placing herself in a position to adopt a new policy in regard to Sinkiang.

In April 1944 the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa emphasized to an American that it was the policy of the Soviet Union to prevent the formation around Soviet Russia of a *cordon sanitaire* of border states. Soviet Russia was determined, he said, "that the foreign policies of border states should be friendly to the Soviet Union and free from unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers." He said that where border peoples in the past had been oppressed against their will by the large powers, as Outer Mongolia had been by the Chinese, the Soviet Union was prepared to enter into mutual assistance pacts, such as that existing with Outer Mongolia since 1936, to prevent a recurrence of oppressive acts. The remark is significant since it may be considered as giving a commonly held Soviet interpretation of Foreign Commissar Molotov's statement to Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, in August 1944. Molotov said that the Russians had many grievances against Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and that they were interested primarily in having a good neighbor to the south.

If we accept the statements of Molotov and the Soviet Vice Consul in Tihwa as indicative of Soviet policy, it would mean that Sinkiang, and probably Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also Communist-controlled North China would go the way of Outer Mongolia which has been protected by the Soviet Union for twenty years from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers." This trend of events is, of course, conditional upon whether or not the Chungking Government will readjust its relations with Soviet Russia on a basis of friendship and will accept a new united front arrangement with the Chinese Communists.

The appearance in 1943 of Soviet official and public concern for

the Chinese Communists, the beginning of a press campaign highly critical of Chungking, and the Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang were all indications of the beginning of a more active Soviet interest in the Far East. A member of the French Special Mission to Moscow stated in May 1944 that in his opinion Soviet Russia is not going to tolerate for a very long time the continuance of a "reactionary regime" in China. He felt convinced, "definitely," that when the proper time arrives the Soviet Union will take active measures against Chiang Kai-shek and his group of supporters. He said that the Soviet Union will tend to intervene in Asia rather than in Europe in the post-war period.

His comment is similar to that of Mr. XX, a former member of the Communist International and a friend of Stalin, now ostracised as a "Trotskyite." He affirmed that the development of communism in China has always been uppermost in the mind of Stalin, because a Communist China, aligned with Soviet Russia, would create an indomitable Communist world power. Stalin has always been more interested in the Chinese Communist Party than in the German Communist Party. This created considerable jealousy among the German Communists who, before Hitler smashed their Party, always considered themselves as the most important Communist Party outside of Soviet Russia. This informer stated that Stalin had been criticized by members in the Comintern for his policy in China after the failure of the policy of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in 1927. In developing the new united front policy during the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935, Stalin paid especial attention to the application of this policy in China and repeatedly emphasized the coming role of China in the Communist world movement.

The Soviet withdrawal from Sinkiang was followed in 1944 by a general withdrawal of all Soviet military advisers from the Chungking Government. The Soviet Military Attaché in Chungking stated to American observers in June 1944 that the Soviet disapproved of Chungking's policy of making relations with the U.S.S.R. worse, "and yet not cooperating with the British or Americans either." American observers, commenting on the withdrawal of Soviet military advisers, said that "the activities of Soviet military advisers in China have been so limited for such a long time that no particular significance is attached to the statement of the Russian Military Attaché that these advisers are being removed from China as 'needed for the European

fighting'; it might be an indication of Russian displeasure with the growing propaganda by Chinese officials along anti-Soviet lines, which has been particularly in evidence in various ways since the 12 April Sinkiang incident." (This "incident" was the fighting on the border between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.)

Another indication of growing Soviet displeasure with the Chungking Government was the Soviet press criticism, which during the past year has become progressively more outspoken in its condemnation of Chungking and its approval of Yen-an. In July 1944 *War and the Working Class* sharply rapped the helplessness of the Chungking Army in its war against Japan and pointed out that the Chungking Army, numbering ten times the army of Tito in Yugoslavia, was waging a losing battle whereas the latter army had shown successes against Germany. The magazine charged that Chungking should score better results and stated that the Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies were feeling the brunt of the Japanese attacks. This was, of course, a misrepresentation of the facts, because the Japanese army did not launch any large-scale attacks against the Communist armies in 1944. Instead, it concentrated its attacks against the Chungking forces.

On 18 February 1945 the Soviet government newspaper *Izvestia* was reported to have given "unqualified endorsement" to the stand of the Chinese Communists for "liquidation of the Kuomintang dictatorship and formation of a coalition government and a united supreme command of the armed forces." *Izvestia* said approvingly that "other democratic parties as well as the Communist Party also suggested the liquidation of concentration camps and fascist organizations, strengthening of friendship with the USSR and increasing ties with Britain, the United States and the other Allies." The newspaper said, "The present situation imposes especially responsible tasks upon China which the National Government and the supreme army command, regardless of their reorganization, have been unable to fulfill . . . China's allies, especially the United States, warmly support the effort of Chinese democracy to achieve national unity."

At the beginning of March 1945 the Soviet trade union organ *Trud* published an article in which it urged the organizing committee of the World Trade Union Conference in London to issue invitations to trade union representatives from Poland, Iran, and the "Special border areas of China" [Chinese Communist areas], to join the embryonic world trade union federation. American sources in Moscow

commented that "The larger political phases of the keen interest of Moscow in the international trade union movement are illuminated by the wish of the Russians to advance world standing of Communist China."

On 14 March 1945, the Soviet writer Viktor Avarin gave a lecture in Moscow entitled "The Struggle of the Chinese People for Their National Independence," in which he condemned the "reactionary elements" among the ruling circles in Chungking, discussed the weakness of the Chungking army, and lauded the Chinese Communist armies. The speaker gave sympathetic treatment of the role of the United States in China. He stated that the recall of General Stilwell was instigated by "reactionary" Chinese elements. But he pointed out that it would be an error to assume that the Stilwell recall signified a departure from the American policy of attempting to promote Chinese national unity. Ambassador Hurley's visit to Yen-an and his "mediation" in the Chungking-Communist negotiations were referred to as evidence of continuing American interest in Chinese unity. In response to a question regarding the Soviet attitude toward China, Avarin remarked that the Soviet Government's policy was based on the Leninist-Stalinist principles of the equality of all peoples. He added that the Soviet people were warmly sympathetic to the Chinese people and their struggle for national liberation and desired to help them in their aspirations.

An American source in Moscow commented that it was significant that Avarin's criticism was directed at the "reactionary" elements in the Chinese Government and the Kuomintang and not against the Government or the Kuomintang as a whole. "This may indicate that if the Soviet Union has decided on an anti-Chungking and anti-Kuomintang policy, it is not prepared at this juncture to reveal it; or that the Kremlin reckons that the situation in China is still sufficiently fluid to warrant hope for the emergence in China of a 'reformed' regime (presumably including the Communists) congenial to the Soviet Union . . . If this interpretation is correct, the Kremlin certainly will have no desire, so long as it believes the situation in China remains fluid, to condemn wholesale either the Kuomintang or the present Chinese Government."

Only a month after this lecture, however, in the middle of April, *War and the Working Class* published an article by Viktor Avarin entitled "Whither Goes China," which was one of the most severe Soviet press attacks on the Kuomintang in many years. He empha-

sized that "Representatives of the broad masses of the [Chinese] people and the democratic press still suffer persecution. In districts where power is in the hands of the Kuomintang, anti-Japanese democratic fighters are jailed. Only one party is legal—the Kuomintang. Only the Kuomintang press can write what it wants and at present, when all humanity curses the German fascist butchers we come across such lines in the Chungking paper as 'we admire the German people and the German soldiers for their valor on the battlefield.'" ¹⁸ Mr. Avarin contended that the Chungking Government was cooperating with the Japanese and that it had constructed and "presented" to the Japanese the Kwangsi-Kweichow railway by not defending it. He also mentioned that inflationary prices in Chungking-controlled China had risen from an index number of 485 to 873 since last December. He then asked: "Is this not the beginning of a counter-offensive of large bankers and reactionaries against the people and their demands for the democratization of China? The democratic public received with great anxiety the news that the negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and Chungking had produced no results."

THE AMERICAN STAKE IN THE KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE¹⁹

The problems of U.S. diplomacy in China are serious. Success or failure in solving these problems will affect the future situation not only in China but in the entire Far East; it is no exaggeration to state that it will decide the type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by acquiring the vast region beyond the Ussuri River (the present Russian Far Eastern Provinces), including the port of Vladivostok, from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Japan

¹⁸ There is no confirmation available that the Chungking press has published a statement to this effect.

¹⁹ Among the important works on this subject are the following: Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953); Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); C. F. Romanus and R. Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China, Stilwell's Command Problems, and Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953, 1956, 1959). Also the *China White Paper* and the appropriate volumes of *Foreign Relations*.—Ed.

grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China proper in the 1930's.

The Far Eastern policy of the United States has always revolved around the ideas of equality of competitive commercial opportunity in China, and of respect for the independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. The need of this policy was stated as early as 1853 by the then American Minister to China, Humphrey Marshall. He affirmed that the weakness, or dissolution, of China was a matter of national concern to the United States and that the "true policy" of the American Government must be to strengthen and sustain the Chinese Government against "either internal disorder or foreign aggression. The highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China."

Marshall arrived at this conclusion by observing a situation in China, in the 1850's, which was in many respects similar to the present one. At the outbreak of the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion (comparable in its destructiveness to the Kuomintang-Communist civil war of our time) he saw clearly that the success of the T'ai-p'ing rebels would have meant the separation of China into parts. The break up of the empire could have resulted in the dismemberment of China by foreign powers. He therefore advocated American support of the Chinese Government as a means of promoting national unity in China and preventing, or at least limiting, encroachments on Chinese territory by the powers. At the turn of the century this policy was given fuller expression in the "open door" agreements which were sponsored by America. At present the prospect of a renewal of the Kuomintang-Communist civil war, on the scale of the years before 1937, threatens China again with separation into parts and possible dismemberment by foreign powers.

The importance to the United States of supporting China's independence has been demonstrated on several occasions. During the past eighty-five years, Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers of Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China was shown at

the beginning of the present century when the United States assailed St. Petersburg with unavailing protests on the score of Russian violation of the "open door" in Manchuria. To strengthen her hand, the United States negotiated a commercial treaty with China in 1903, guaranteeing observance of the "open door" principle in all Chinese-American trade, and opening to such trade the Manchurian cities of Mukden and Antung. America's concern about Russian domination over Manchuria was shown again by the watchful attitude of this country during the Russo-Japanese war, 1904-1905. In 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt told one of his friends that "As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France²⁰ . . . that in the event of a combination against Japan . . . I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf." After the [Russo]-Japanese war, in 1908, America proposed the internationalization of the Manchurian railroads as a means of preventing Russia and Japan from establishing a monopoly over their respective zones of influence in Manchuria.

The Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 aimed at restraining the foreign powers concerned, and Japan especially, in their policies of territorial aggrandizement in China and preventing any power from gaining control over China. The United States and Great Britain took the initiative in 1922 in inducing Japan to restore full sovereignty over the province of Shantung to China.

During the time of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale* in the 1920's and the "anti-imperialist" movement at that time, Russia was successfully carrying through a policy of "freeing" China from "unhealthy domination by or linkage with other great powers" than Russia. After Chiang Kai-shek turned against Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, America strongly supported his nationalist movement for building up a strong, united and independent China. In 1928 the United States took the initiative in strengthening the prestige of the new National Government under Chiang by concluding a treaty with China recognizing the latter's complete autonomy in regard to the levying and collection of tariffs. This was the first important step in abolishing the system of unequal treaties by which the foreign powers had infringed China's sovereign rights.

Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to reestablish Chinese control over Manchuria, where Soviet Russia entertained ambitions similar to those of

²⁰ There was at this time a Franco-Russian alliance, with Germany a silent partner.

Czarist Russia brought him into conflict with Soviet Russia. In the summer of 1929 China and Soviet Russia fought pitched battles and came close to a formal declaration of war over the Chinese Eastern Railway. The American Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, tried in vain to settle the dispute through the instrumentality of the Kellogg Pact. After Soviet troops had invaded Manchuria, the Chinese Government was forced to accept peace terms from Russia which reimposed upon China essentially the same terms as those contained in the unequal treaties setting up Russia's privileges in Manchuria which China had attacked.

Soon after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Secretary Stimson eloquently reaffirmed America's Far Eastern policy as follows:

For several centuries Eastern Asia has owed its character mainly to the peaceful traditions of this great agricultural nation [China]. If the character of China should be revolutionized and through exploitation [by Japan] become militaristic and aggressive, not only Asia but the rest of the world must tremble. The United States has made a good start in the development of China's friendship. It would have been the most short-sighted folly to turn our backs upon her at the time of her most dire need.

As necessary as the defeat of Japan is to the reestablishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the years before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era; a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when Russia and the Western democracies stood facing each other in the Far East and when the period of power politics over China began between these powers. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time during the past eighty years.

To meet this situation the United States has affirmed its policy, aid to China. A recent statement prepared by the State Department reads as follows:

The principal and immediate objectives of the U.S. Government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China's full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accomplish these objectives the U.S. Government has undertaken the following

measures: (*a*) direct military assistance to China and the Chinese armed forces; (*b*) promotion of effective Sino-American military cooperation; and (*c*) encouragement to the Chinese to contribute their maximum effort in the war.

The American Government's long-range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives: (1) Political: A strong, stable and united China with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people; (2) Economic: The development of an integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between China and other countries; and (3) Cultural: Cultural and scientific cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and progress.

Our present policy was indicated already in 1844, after China had suffered her first major defeat by a Western power, Great Britain. After the first American Commissioner to China, Caleb Cushing, had signed our first treaty with China he offered to the Chinese delegate, Kiying, some models of guns and some books on military and naval tactics, and fortifications, delicately expressing the opinion that such information might be of value to China in the future. Kiying's behavior was almost prophetic. He politely declined the gifts, stating: "If at a future day there be occasion to use them, then we ought to request your Honorable Nation to assist us with the strength of its arm."

Solutions for the present problems of U.S. diplomacy in China have been offered by many observers. In April 1944, after confirmation had been received of the Kazakh rebellion in Sinkiang, an American observer into Chungking commented on American policy in regard to China as it may affect Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists as follows:

This incident [in Sinkiang] and the possibility of its repetition in other forms if the Chinese leaders continue in their present [anti-Soviet] course bring into prominence the question of Sino-Soviet relations and the position of the United States in relation to that problem. The United States in its dealings with China should: (1) avoid becoming involved in Sino-Soviet relations; (2) limit American aid to China to direct prosecution of the war against Japan; (3) show a sympathetic interest in liberal groups in China and try to fit the Chinese Communists into the war against Japan; and (4) use our tremendous influence with the Kuomintang to promote internal unity on a foundation of progressive reform. To give, either in fact or in appearance, support to the present reactionary government in China be-

yond carefully regulated and controlled aid solely for the prosecution of the war against Japan would encourage the Kuomintang in its present anti-Soviet policy. The result would be that the Chinese Communists, who probably hold the key to control of North China and possibly Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, would feel that their only hope for survival lay with Russia, and the Soviet Union would be convinced that American aims are opposed to hers and that she must protect herself by any means available, i.e. the extension of her direct power and influence.²¹

Another American observer has stated the problem of U.S. policy in China in its relation to Soviet Russia as follows: He emphasizes that many people think that the situation in China is potentially one of revolution. The "opposition against the Chungking Government," that is, the Chinese Communists, want Russian-type reorganization of the country.

If the Central Government starts organizing the peasants, there is always the possibility that the Communists might gain control of such an organization. Americans and Russians have tremendous influence in this situation. The Russians could quite easily sway the situation by sending in supplies—troops would not be necessary. The Russians could also lend diplomatic support for a Communist Manchuria. If, when a revolution starts, the Russians assist the Chinese Communists and the United States assists the Central Government, the Russians and Americans will be meeting head on. This possibility worries many people.

Care must be exercised in sending help to the Chinese Government because . . . if we send in material with 'no strings attached,' we may just be building them up so a civil war can be more easily started.

That problems of China and of Soviet influence in China, either direct or through the Chinese Communists, affect not only China but also Southeast Asia, is indicated by the following observations by an American official observer:

American cooperation with patriotic, subversive revolutionary groups of Southeastern Asia would . . . frustrate Chinese and Russian efforts through these groups to dominate their countries after the war . . . [These] groups prefer American help to help from other countries, such as China, Russia, or Great Britain whose motives they suspect . . . On the whole, China and Russia successfully influence the groups they touch. This influence is due less to genuine sympathy of these people for China and Russia than to their desperation that causes them to grasp at any aid extended to them. As long as the Chinese and Russian monopoly in these areas is not broken up, China and Russia will determine domestic and international political issues in

²¹ Report of John S. Service. *FRUS*, 1944: *China*, p. 776-77.—Ed.

these areas after the war, and Chinese and Russian domination of eastern and southeastern Asia will complicate economic adjustments in these areas and threaten legitimate American interests.²²

Among Western Allied observers in the Far East not only Americans, of course, are aware of the danger of Soviet domination in China. The British are keenly aware of it. In October 1943 a high British diplomat in London stated to a Chinese official in the presence of an American diplomat that Soviet Russia, "the most powerful or at least the most potentially powerful country in the world, is the great enigma, a part of which is whether Russia will collaborate with the rest of the world." "The latter aspect," he emphasized, "is one which Chinese should study and watch."

The problems evolving out of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle and its implications for Soviet Russian and American policies merge into the general question of how the Chinese shall be able to establish a government acceptable to both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists, a government which can deal on a basis of friendship with both America and Soviet Russia. The other question is how America shall apply its influence in China in the interest of Chinese unity.

It is obvious that the Chungking Government, as now constituted, endangers Soviet-Chinese friendship. Its strong suspicion that the Soviet Union intends to dominate China through the Chinese Communists may or may not be justified. Personal opinions on this subject are divided, although the past records of Soviet Russian-Chinese relations give little support to the contention of those who maintain that Soviet Russia has no intention to dominate China. There is, however, no question that if the Chungking Government fails to effect a compromise with the Chinese Communists whereby the National Government of China becomes representative of the Chinese Communist Party as well as other parties, Soviet Russia may in time denounce the Chungking Government and support a Communist-sponsored government in China. This would be in line with present Soviet

²² Among the most active subversive groups in Southeast Asia are the Communists. They caused the French considerable trouble in the years before the Japanese sent military forces to Indo China in 1940. The Chinese Communists are comparatively strong in Malaya. After the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1941 they pledged their allegiance to Great Britain. (So also did the Communist Party of India.) The British released the Chinese Communist prisoners in Malaya and allowed them 10 seats out of 60 in the Chinese Mobilization Committee in Singapore. This gives an indication of their strength.

policy in Poland and other eastern European countries. There is also a fairly general agreement among observers that failure to effect a Kuomintang-Communist compromise might lead to a large-scale civil war in China after Japan's defeat, possibly before. America's interest in such a compromise is obvious.

In view of this, unity between the Chinese political parties is the key to a solution of China's problems. At the instance of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang and Communist delegates met in May 1944 in an effort to find a solution of their inter-party problems.²³ On 11 May they agreed tentatively to a set of 20 proposals which included a stipulation that the Communist armies should obey the orders of the National Military Council and that the Government should agree to a reorganization of the Communist forces into three armies consisting of 12 divisions, as proposed originally by the Communist general Lin Piao during his negotiations in Chungking in November 1943. It was also tentatively agreed that the Kuomintang should recognize the legal status of the Communist Party and should lift the military blockade of Communist areas.

On 5 June 1944 the Government issued a reply in which it approved of the organization of the Communist armies into "four armies consisting of ten divisions." In other respects the Government expressed its willingness to accept the proposals mentioned above provided the Communists also agreed to them. On the preceding day, however (4 June), Lin Tsu-han, the Communist delegate in Chungking, submitted a new set of 12 proposals by the Chinese Communists which went far beyond the proposals agreed upon in May. Among other things, the Communists now requested the Government "to organize the Chinese Communist Party troops into 16 armies consisting of 47 divisions with 10,000 troops per division. As a compromise, the Government is requested to grant designations to at least five armies of 16 divisions." The Communists also requested that "during the period of war . . . the status quo be maintained in areas garrisoned by the Communist troops," and they asked the Government to recognize the legal status not only of the CCP but of all Communist Border Regions and base areas in China. The Government was, furthermore, requested to "give full material aid to the [Communist armies]," and

²³ Documents concerning these negotiations, including the position of the CCP as presented by Lin Tsu-han, are contained in the *China White Paper*, esp. pp. 530-48. Other materials are contained in *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 459-757 *passim*.—Ed.

to give the Communist armies "a share due them" of the weapons, munitions, and medicines furnished China by the Allied countries. The Government was advised to "realize democracy." At the Plenary Session of the People's Political Council, which was held in Chungking in September 1944, Lin Tsu-han added a new request of the Communists, the establishment of a Kuomintang-Communist "coalition government."

These demands were refused by the Government. In regard to the Communist demands for democracy and "guarantee of freedom" the Government pointed out that these were "empty phrases . . . because the 'Democracy' in which the Kuomintang believes and the 'Democracy' in which the Communists believed in the past or believe at the present are not necessarily the same."

The negotiations became deadlocked. To the Chungking Government leaders it became obvious that if the Government agreed to the new demands of the Communists to accord legal status to all Communist areas it would in effect give its consent to a permanent division of China into two independent parts.

In a speech before the People's Political Council session in September 1944, Chiang Kai-shek said: "If only the Chinese Communists obeyed military and political orders, the Government would make the greatest concessions to their demands . . . No nation can hope to attain an appropriate position in the family of nations if its internal administration is not unified . . . The Central Government has repeatedly made it clear that what it insists upon is a unified military command and political unity. While it means to accord equal treatment to the Eighteenth Group Army, it demands equal observance of law and discipline."

A new attempt to break the deadlock which followed the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations in June 1944 was made in November of the same year. The American Government had by this time shown its concern for bringing about unity in China. The Soviet Russian press criticism of the Kuomintang was growing increasingly antagonistic. The situation in Sinkiang was going from bad to worse as a result of the Kazakh rebellion. In the summer of 1944 Vice-President Henry A. Wallace visited Siberia, Sinkiang, and China proper. The *National Herald* in Chungking, which is believed to express the opinions of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Wallace's visit said that the Chinese hoped he would be able to help in bridging the gap separating China and Soviet Russia.

On 3 July an American observer in Chungking, in a conversation

with Dr. Sun Fo (one of the leaders of the liberal faction within the Kuomintang), advanced a suggestion that it might be helpful if Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would call together 11 independent parties and groups, including the Communists and the Kuomintang, into a High Command or Military Council and make an appeal to them to accept, along with the Generalissimo, joint responsibility for effective military operations, "to save what remains of China." This became the basis for the ensuing negotiations for an inter-party settlement. With the Japanese advance in Hunan and Kwangtung toward Kwangsi, the military situation was becoming almost desperate. Kweilin was threatened, and many felt that both Kunming and Chungking were threatened.

In August President Roosevelt appointed Donald M. Nelson, chief of the War Production Board, and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, to undertake a mission to China to discuss military and economic problems with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On 21 October 1944 General Joseph Stilwell was removed from his China-Burma-India command and was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. On 31 October Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss resigned his post in China and was succeeded at the end of November by General Hurley.

On 7 November General Hurley, accompanied by the Communist delegate Lin Tsu-han, flew to Yen-an for a two-day conference with Chinese Communist leaders.²⁴ He had been granted permission by the Generalissimo to present an offer to legalize all parties and allow the Communists to participate in the Supreme National Defense Council and in the Government. Mao Tse-tung accepted the offer "in principle" as comprising a portion of the desires of the Communists. He and Hurley drew up and signed a document which not only included Chiang's offer but also embodied the Communists' desires, among which were a coalition government and a bill of rights. On 10 November General Hurley flew back to Chungking accompanied by Chou En-lai. Ambassador Hurley took part in the ensuing negotiations between Chou En-lai and representatives of the Chungking Government.

Tentative agreements were reached providing for legalization of the CCP, giving the Communists representation in the Government and on the Supreme National Defense Council, and a fair method of distribution of military supplies to the Communist armies. But negotiations broke down on the question of command of the Chinese

²⁴ Very extensive new material on Hurley's mission to Yen-an is contained in *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 666-735, documents under file no. 1049.—*Ed.*

Communist armies. The Communists were willing to accept an American commander to coordinate their army with the Central Government army. But they refused serving under an American commander who would act under Chiang Kai-shek, the C-in-C of the China war theater. General Chu Te stated to an American observer in Yen-an that the only really practical solution is "an American C-in-C of all forces in China, strongly supported by the American government. This commander would have to be able and willing to use the whiphand over the Kuomintang through control of American supplies . . . Even under these circumstances it would be necessary not to mix the Kuomintang and Communist forces. Each should have its own task and sphere of operations." This remark indicates that, as long as the Kuomintang maintains its power, the Communists do not seek any unification of China, but a division of China into two independent parts. They aspire to American support of this plan.

The Communists' proposal for a coalition government was rejected by the Generalissimo. On 7 December 1944 Chou En-lai flew back to Yen-an.

On 16 December Mao Tse-tung, in a speech before the People's Congress of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region, reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coalition government. He said that there was little prospect of accomplishing the desired unity in China by negotiation.

On 1 January 1945 Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's speech announced his intention of calling a People's National Congress (or Assembly) in 1945. The Congress would "adopt a Constitution, which would enable the Kuomintang to transfer the power of the government to the people." On the same day, Mao Tse-tung reaffirmed the Communists' demand for a coalition government. On 24 January Chou En-lai returned to Chungking. "My present trip to Chungking," he stated, "is to propose to the National Government, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Democratic League²⁵ that . . . a conference of all parties and groups should be held. This will be a preparatory conference to the National Affairs Conference so as formally to discuss the organization and steps leading to the realization of a National Affairs Conference and a coalition government. We [Communists] consider that apart from this there is no other way to . . . overcome the present

²⁵ The league comprises several smaller political parties and non-Kuomintang military groups. [For additional information, see *Enemies and Friends*, pp. 169-84, 191-99.—Ed.]

crisis . . . It is hoped that the Government will quickly accept these proposals.”

The American Government again reaffirmed its desire for an inter-party settlement. During a press conference on 23 January, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew reminded both the Chungking Government and the Chinese Communists that the United States stands ready to use its “friendly good offices” in bringing them together. During a press interview in Chungking on 14 February, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Information, and one of the delegates in the negotiations with Chou En-lai, announced that the Government had made the following concessions to the Communists: (1) a “readiness” to recognize the CCP as a lawful political party; (2) inclusion of a high Communist official in the National Military Council; (3) inclusion of Communist representatives and representatives of other political parties in the Executive Yuan with a view to forming a “sort of wartime cabinet”; (4) establishment of a committee of three to consider reorganization of the Communist Army and the question of that Army’s supplies, “with possibly an American Army officer presiding.”

Dr. Wang said, however, that the Communists had considered these proposals unacceptable, and had brought forth a proposal to convene a conference of all political parties. “It is,” he said, “in compliance with the general idea of this request [by the Communists] that the Government has . . . consented to convening a conference of the Kuomintang, the CCP, and other parties, as well as some non-partisan independent leaders, to consider interim measures of military and political unification pending a convocation of a National Congress.” He expressed thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his “disinterested but friendly efforts” during the past negotiations with Chou En-lai in “keeping the two sides together and in helping create a better atmosphere for the negotiations.”

Chou En-lai left for Yen-an on 15 February with new Government proposals. But he told newsmen that he doubted that the Communist Party would accept the new proposals “any more readily than those rejected.” These proposals included one for the establishment of a “Committee of Political Affairs” comprising members from all parties. It would consider problems of reform transition from Kuomintang rule to constitutional all-party rule, and a unified political program for the unification of all armed forces. Chou En-lai stated during a press conference in Chungking that the Government’s “con-

cessions" to the Communists, as announced by Wang Shih-chieh, were unacceptable because "there were conditions attached." These conditions, he said, were (1) The Communist troops should be placed under the National Military Council, which the Communists regarded as tantamount to handing them over to the Kuomintang; (2) The Kuomintang "obstinately insisted" that one-party dictatorship would not be terminated. "Concretely speaking," he said, "the Government's conditions mean that there would be no legal status for the Chinese Communist Party unless Communist troops were given over to the Kuomintang Government. The proposed so-called War Cabinet under the Party-ruled Executive Yuan would have no power for final decisions of policy. One-party rule would not be abolished. The proposed committee of three [including one American] to reorganize Communist troops could only mean giving them to the Kuomintang."²⁶ On the basis of achievements, the Kuomintang troops, and not the Communist force, require reorganization." Chou En-lai, like Wang Shih-chieh, expressed thanks to Ambassador Hurley for his help in the negotiations.

Here the matter rests. No further negotiations have been held since Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking in February. The issue now is between the Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang-sponsored plan for a National Assembly. Ambassador Hurley recently stated that "the objectives of both plans appear to be generally the same; the chief differences between public statements of both parties concern procedure." The Communists insist that the coalition government should not derive its authority from the Kuomintang. Therefore, they maintain that the National Government in Chungking should "discard, immediately, the one-party dictatorship," recognize the legal status of all anti-Japanese parties and groups, and recognize the legal status of the Communist Border Regions and base areas. The coalition government would then derive its authority from the "preparatory conference," of all parties as suggested by Chou En-lai in January this year.

The Kuomintang rejects this plan. On 1 March Chiang Kai-shek announced in an address before the Preparatory Commission for Inauguration of Constitutional Government that he would propose

²⁶ The "Committee of Three" was revived at the time of Gen. George C. Marshall's mission to China, and was the main instrumentality through which a cease-fire was administered in North China during early 1946. At the highest level, the Committee of Three was composed of Gen. Chang Ch'ün (representing the National Government), Gen. Marshall, and Chou En-lai.—*Ed.*

to the Kuomintang Congress, due in May, the convocation of a National Assembly on 12 November this year. "The position of the Government," he said, "is that it is ready to admit other parties, including the Communists, as well as non-partisan leaders, to participate in the government, without, however, relinquishment by the Kuomintang of its power of ultimate decision and final responsibility until the convocation of the National Assembly . . . If the Government . . . surrenders its power of ultimate decision to a combination of political parties the result would be unending friction and tears, leading to a collapse of the central authorities. Bear in mind that in such a contingency, unlike in other countries [where parliaments or congresses exist], there exists in our country at present no responsible body representing the people for a government to appeal to. I repeat, whether by accident or design the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading the country during the turbulent last decade and more. It will return the supreme power to the people through the instrumentality of the National Assembly, and in the meanwhile it will be ready to admit other parties to a share in the government, but it definitely cannot abdicate to a loose combination of parties [a reference to the Communist-sponsored plan for a "preparatory conference"]. Such a surrender would not mean returning power to the people. We must emerge from the war with a United Army. The Communists should not keep a separate army . . ."

The last sentence gives a clue to the main and important difference between the Communist plan for a coalition government and the Kuomintang plan for a National Assembly, for the Communists insist on maintaining their army independent of the Central Army. It now becomes apparent that what the Communists mean by a coalition government is not the establishment of a national government with sovereign rights over all of China, but rather some sort of loose federation between independent parts of China divided between the Kuomintang, the Communists, and other parties and groups, including Mongolians, Tibetans, and the Moslems of Northwest China. The parties would decide on policies of common interest in the councils of the coalition government, these policies to be executed separately by the CCP, the Kuomintang and other independent parties within their respective areas of control.

This type of a federation might be feasible if China were to be divided between the Kuomintang and the CCP with a clearly defined border demarcation between the two parts. This study has, how-

ever, shown that whereas the Chungking Government has throughout the war tried to persuade the Communists to accept a demarcation of defense areas between Kuomintang and Communist troops, the Communists have persistently rejected these suggestions. An American Embassy observer in Yen-an stated in October 1944 that a statement by Chou En-lai indicates that the Communists "are now not merely seeking recognition of their present forces and Communist-controlled governments, but of all future ones which may be set up."²⁷

A federative coalition government established under such conditions would obviously not lead to unity. There is no indication that the Communists would not continue to insist, as they have throughout the war, that the Kuomintang forces evacuate any area into which Communist forces penetrate. If they refuse, they are accused by the Communists of being "uncooperative," "traitors," "experts in dissension." Under such conditions the plan for a coalition government could never lead to the establishment of a strong central government in China. It would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas of control would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties. But there is nothing indicating that this would mean that the Communists would accord a legal status to present Kuomintang areas.

Little if anything could be gained under these circumstances by extending American aid to the Chinese Communists. The Kuomintang would no doubt resent American aid to the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless the "reactionary" Kuomintang has never stipulated to the United States that if we were to extend aid to both the Kuomintang and the CCP our military commander in China "must," to reverse the statement of General Chu Te, C-in-C of the Communist army, be "willing to use the whiphand over the Chinese Communists." But it is clear that were we to aid the "democratic" Chinese Communists they would expect us to use our "whiphand" against the Kuomintang. This being the case, it is obvious that if the United States started arming both the Kuomintang and Communist armies, we would run the risk of encouraging civil war in China rather than restraining it. This would be a repetition of the tactics employed by several foreign nations, who desired to keep China weak, during the

²⁷ John S. Service drew this inference from a public address made by Chou En-lai in Yen-an on October 10, 1944. The words are those of Service. *FRUS*, 1944: *China*, pp. 718-19.—*Ed.*

first two decades of the Chinese Revolution. They sold and gave arms to all Chinese warlords, knowing that this would lead to civil war.

It is in this light that General Wedemeyer's recent press statement of the American Army's policy in China must be understood. It was given on the day of Chou En-lai's departure from Chungking, 15 February. "My policy," he said, "is this, that we will not give any assistance to any individual, to any activity, to any organization within the Chinese theater [except to the Central Government] . . . Obviously we get requests from time to time for assistance from various sources but I am ordered to support the Central Government and I am going to do that to the best of my ability." This policy was confirmed by Ambassador Hurley during a press interview in Washington on 2 April.

There is, obviously, no other recourse for the moment. But all-out support of the Chungking Government with "no strings attached" will not solve the problem. We are facing a situation, it must be candidly admitted, where we are backing a government in China which, though it may be militarily stronger than any other independent Chinese regime, has lost much of its popular following. It is still the same widely hated political "machine" which the aforementioned American observer described in 1935, and the same men who were in power then are in power today. The difference is that the Chinese Communists of today constitute a greater challenge to the Kuomintang's rule than it has ever faced since the days in 1928 when it established itself as the National Government of China.

Mao Tse-tung recently said to an American observer in Yen-an, when commenting on the probability of the Kuomintang leaders planning a civil war against the Communists: "Chiang [Kai-shek] could not whip us during the civil war when we were a hundred times weaker. What chance has he now?" He was undoubtedly right. In recent references to armed clashes between Kuomintang and Communist troops, it has been repeatedly stated that the Kuomintang troops are losing because "the populace join the Communists."

It is not only the populace which shows a tendency to join the Communists. Within the past year, several of the military and political leaders in Chungking China who, though not members of the Government except in a purely nominal way, are affiliated with it in the war against Japan, have shown a tendency to cooperate with the Communists rather than the Kuomintang. The corruption of the Government administration and its almost total disregard for any con-

structive reforms, together with the unwillingness of Kuomintang leaders in the Government to share power with any but well-trusted party members, have alienated practically all the political parties and groups who offered their support to the Government in 1937 at the outbreak of the war. There are also many progressive and liberal leaders within the Kuomintang who strongly object to the policy of the present ruling clique.

In April 1944 Dr. Sun Fo, who is the chief spokesman for the discontented groups within the Kuomintang, said during a speech at the Central Training Institute of the Kuomintang: "There must be a fundamental readjustment of methods within the Kuomintang itself . . . If we had realized the principle of democracy during the past twenty years, the democratic spirit of the party would now be an inspiration to the rest of the country. Unfortunately we have failed to do so . . . The Kuomintang has no right to monopoly of political activity. We have now developed from a system of party dictatorship to one of personal dictatorship [a reference to Chiang Kai-shek] and while claiming to be a democratic country we have no democracy even inside the Party . . . Suggestions have been made that I make complaints against the Government and the Party directly and privately. I have done this many times without effect. People accuse me of being a talkative idealist, but if I do not say these things no one else will and I say them for China's sake. Unless I say these things now and unless China goes democratic now it will be too late."²⁸

All observers agree that the greatest cause of the exceedingly poor showing made by the Chungking forces last year during their defense against the Japanese was the hostility of the people toward their own army and the hopeless disunity between the regular Kuomintang or Central Army and the Provincial armies. Marshal Li Chi-shen of the Kwangsi Military Group, one of the outstanding liberal leaders in China and a strong advocate of a democratic government, said in July 1944: "[The] drift toward dictatorship and departure from democratic principles has brought about the inevitable result: the seizure of power by a small clique, and taxation, which is levied on the people as a whole, is used arbitrarily to maintain the clique in power to the detriment of the people, thus weakening the power of national resistance . . . Because of misappropriation of government funds, the treatment of the soldiers is disgraceful to the extent that they have

²⁸ During the course of 1944, Sun Fo presented a number of speeches and articles highly critical of the KMT. Criticism of Chiang Kai-shek himself was veiled but unmistakable. See *FRUS, 1944: China*, pp. 357ff.—*Ed.*

now neither the strength nor the will to fight . . . The masses of the people are now ready and willing to assist the enemy. There is a slogan quite popular among the people of Honan: 'We should prefer to be slaughtered by the Japanese than to endure the tyranny of [the Kuomintang] General T'ang En-po.' A similar situation exists in the Ninth War Zone [including Honan and parts of neighboring provinces] . . ."

Among various discontented groups in West China, in the provinces controlled by the Chungking Government, there is today a strong tendency to form a new united front. But unlike the movement of 1937, this new united front is developing against the Kuomintang and the Chungking Government. It includes several leading scholars, the powerful Szechwan warlords and several other military groups, seven small political parties united in the Democratic League, and a number of non-partisan leaders. The movement has considerable popular support from small shopkeepers, small manufacturers and "petit bourgeoisie," who are angry about inflation, corruption and increasing monopoly of business by the Kuomintang. It is also supported by some enlightened landlords.

None of these groups are pro-Communist. They would be far more willing to unite with the Kuomintang than with the Communists, were the Kuomintang to liberalize its rule and share power with other groups. They have made persistent bids for American friendship and support, but in deference to the Chinese Communists, they have received neither publicity in the American press nor official American recognition in any form. They are not powerful enough to change the political situation through their own efforts. But they can, as they have shown on several occasions, combine with the Communists by supporting their demands for "democracy" and thereby strengthen their position against the Government. The Democratic League is as doubtful as the Communists about the sincerity of Chiang Kai-shek's announcement that the Kuomintang will relinquish one-party dictatorship. Just as the Communists, it has boycotted the National Assembly to be convened in November this year and has subscribed to the Communist plan for a coalition government.

The Chinese Communists on their part are offering strong support to the Democratic League. One leader of the League asserted in August 1944 that the new united front movement against the Chungking Government had been "assured" of the support of the Soviet Russian Government.

It must be emphasized that if the Chinese Communists gain con-

trol of this movement, it is not because the followers of this movement desire to combine with the Communists but rather because they find it impossible to obtain any cooperation from the Kuomintang. Under Communist direction, the movement can be turned into a powerful weapon against the Government. This movement includes one of the most genuinely pro-American elements in China as well as many of the best educated, most intelligent men and women in China. The literary editor of the *Ta Kung Pao*, the "*Manchester Guardian* of China," wrote in July 1944 to an American observer in Chungking: "Sino-American friendship is based upon the genuine love of Americans on the part of our people, not on the thanksgiving attitude of the present Government. The people with no exception hate their government, and recognize it as no stabilizing force but a serious trouble maker here. If you (Americans) go on to strengthen it with your support you will find gradually our people taking you as hypocrites, visionless traders . . . Even if the war is won in spite of all the above you (America) will be regarded the world wide as Lords Simon and Hoare during the Spanish war. And the world's hope for a leadership towards a new peace will easily turn away somewhere else."

There are still good prospects that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can reverse the trend, bringing these dissident groups back into the Government's fold. One of the chief complaints of military leaders who belong to these groups is that they have been denied a share of American military supplies, even though their troops are fighting in the Government's army. In March of this year it was reported that General Ho Ying-ch'in, C-of-C of the Chinese Army, was sincerely endeavoring to weld the troops of General Lung Yun, the Governor of Yunnan, and one of the leaders of the opposition movement in Free China, with Central Government forces stationed in Yunnan. It was also reported that he has been advocating measures which would make available to General Lung a substantial portion of the U.S. arms and equipment.

This is, of course, a correct procedure. If American supplies are distributed to various non-Kuomintang groups by the Chungking Government rather than directly by the American Government representatives in China, the dissident groups will undoubtedly rally behind the Government. There has of late been no report of Lung Yun sponsoring the movement against the Government. If the Government effects an equitable distribution of these supplies to other dis-

sident military groups, it is likely that unity will be established between these groups and the Chungking Government, and that these will give up their support of the Communist-sponsored plan for a coalition government and will decide to join the National Assembly. Similarly, if the Chungking Government, rather than the United States on its own initiative, were to distribute to the Chinese Communists a part of the American supplies sent to China, it is conceivable that they would be more favorably disposed to accept Chiang Kai-shek's plan for a National Assembly and constitutional government as the basis for establishing unity in China.

The Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang, which was held from 5 to 21 May 1945, resolved that a law should be enacted giving legal status to political parties and groups other than the Kuomintang. This is apparently a concession to one of the chief conditions stated by the Chinese Communists and the Democratic League as prerequisite to their participation in the National Assembly. Another important resolution was the abolition within three months of all existing Kuomintang headquarters in the Army. This is a move toward the development of the Chinese Army into a true national army rather than a party army of the Kuomintang.

The Kuomintang Congress confirmed Chiang Kai-shek's promise to convene a National Assembly on 12 November to enforce constitutional government. The coming five months will therefore be decisive, for unity in China depends greatly on the final decision of the Communists as to whether they shall join in the National Assembly. And this decision will be largely determined by their willingness to join their armed forces with those of the Central Government. At the beginning of May Ambassador Hurley conferred with the Generalissimo on the question of unifying the Chinese armed forces opposed to the Japanese. The Generalissimo said that "some progress" was being made with the Communists although things were "not moving as fast as he would like." He promised, however, that the situation would be solved satisfactorily.

Nevertheless, the prospects for a settlement of this all-important question are not promising. The tendency during the past months has not been toward unity, but away from it. The Communists have freely admitted to an official American observer in Yen-an the truth of Kuomintang charges that they keep increasing the scope of the concessions which they demand for a two-party settlement. This supports a conclusion by Congressman Walter H. Judd, who has

spent many years in China, and who re-visited China during the latter part of 1945: "They [the Chinese Communists] do not want unity. What they want is all the advantages of appearing to want unity so they can get arms and sympathy and support from abroad, while at the same time having all the advantages of complete independence." Congressman Judd continues:

If they [the Chinese Communists] can stall along thus until the war in Europe ends, then they can hope for powerful support from Russia. They can try an "October Revolution" in the hope of getting control of all of China. If that fails, they can at least rebel and try to split off North China, including Manchuria—of course, in the name of freedom—and then the new "independent democracy" can invite Russia in to protect it as she is protecting Eastern Europe. The new "North China" can even voluntarily insist, if it desires, on being taken in as one of the United Socialist Soviet Republics.

This observation should be viewed in the light of a statement by Mao Tse-tung during the recently concluded Seventh Congress of the CCP in Yenan. While in 1941 he approved of Soviet Russia's Neutrality Pact with Japan as in the interests of China and "the oppressed nations of the whole world," he now expressed thanks to Stalin for Soviet Russia's denunciation of the same pact. As long as Soviet Russia was fighting Germany, he never urged Soviet help of China, although he stressed that China's hope was with Soviet Russia. However, with a Soviet victory in Europe assured, Mao Tse-tung declared: "We [Chinese Communists] believe that without the participation of the Soviet Union, it is not possible to reach a final and thorough settlement of the Pacific question." In the next sentence he expressed thanks to the United States and Great Britain, especially the former for their efforts "in the common cause of fighting the Japanese aggressors." But he warned them not to let "their diplomacy go against the will of the Chinese people and thereby injure and lose the friendship of the Chinese people." "If any foreign Government," he added, "helps China's reactionary group to oppose the democratic cause of the Chinese people, a gross mistake will have been committed."²⁹

The "democratic cause" here referred to is, of course, the Chinese Communists' version of "Soviet democracy" which they have introduced in their areas of control. This "democracy" is, as we have seen

²⁹ These remarks are contained in "On Coalition Government," SW, IV, 307.—Ed.

in this study, as rigidly controlled by the CCP as is the so-called "dictatorial" system of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang. The American Military Attaché to China, in a study of the Kuomintang-Communist problem, stated in October 1943: "Political intolerance is nothing new in Chinese history. If the [Chinese] Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it will be sternly truer of the Communists if they ever attain power."

Soviet Russia's attitude toward China will undoubtedly play an important part in the decision of the Chinese Communists as to whether or not to join the National Assembly, proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. Dr. T. V. Soong, Acting President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, is expected to visit Moscow on his way home from the San Francisco conference. The diplomatic correspondent of the Kuomintang party organ, the Chungking *Central Daily News*, who is now in San Francisco, has stated that T. V. Soong was invited by Molotov to go to Moscow, "presumably" to discuss a mutual aid agreement between China and Soviet Russia. This has not been confirmed. However, any agreement or understanding between the Chungking Government and Soviet Russia would undoubtedly strengthen the cause of unity in China, and lessen the danger of Soviet Russia and the United States becoming involved in the inter-party struggle in China between the Kuomintang and the CCP.³⁰

³⁰ Such a treaty (The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance) was later signed, on 14 August 1945. The treaty and its ancillary agreements may be found in *China White Paper*, pp. 585-96. The treaty, the KMT hoped, would achieve the goal here described by making it more attractive to Stalin to support the Nationalists than the Communists. In the light of later events, the Sino-Soviet Treaty, like the Yalta Conference which preceded it, became the object of bitter and sustained controversy. The charge that the U.S. had "sold China down the river" stemmed largely from these events.—*Ed.*

Appendix: Summary Prepared by General Peabody

THE PROBLEM

The problem of the Chinese Communists is not merely one of how the Communists should be dealt with; even more difficult has been the problem of determining the facts. "Authorities" on both sides have disputed the most elementary statements of fact.

It was considered by the Military Intelligence Service that this state of affairs constituted an impediment to the effective prosecution of military operations in China and in the Pacific. A major project was therefore initiated at the end of 1944, under which the most competent analysts—both civilian and military—were assigned to the examination of *all* material available, and to the compilation of a report on the Chinese Communist movement. The preparation of the report involved the examination of over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCLUSIONS

Careful study of these materials has led to a number of basic conclusions. Appropriate qualification and detailed authentication for these conclusions is contained in the full report. The most important conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) The "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy. (2) The Chinese Communist Movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Moscow. (3) There is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea and probably North China. (4) A strong and stable China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China. (5) In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and North China from China, it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations.

PRÉCIS OF CONCLUSIONS

High Morale

The Chinese Communists are the best led and most vigorous of present-day organizations in China. Their morale is high. Their policies are sharply defined, and carried out with a devotion which is fanatical.

Policy of Establishing Communism Through "Democracy"

The Chinese Communists emphasize two stages in their revolutionary program: first, the change of the Chinese semi-feudal society into a "bourgeois" (or capitalist) democracy; second, the establishment of communism. The first is their present goal according to their own claims. They insist, however, that the "bourgeois democracy" must have "the support and leadership of the proletariat under Communist guidance." This objective they have achieved in their areas of control; theirs is a one-party controlled "democracy."

"Soviet Democracy"

While the Chinese Communists call their present political system "democracy," the "democracy" which they sponsor is in fact "Soviet democracy" on the pattern of the U.S.S.R. rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a "democracy" more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party than is the so-called "one-party dictatorship" of the Chungking Government controlled by the Kuomintang (People's National Party). This is indicated by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chungking-controlled China. Whenever he fails, as he has in the past four years, to maintain such a balance, he weakens his rule. On the other hand, while minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily suppressed as "traitors." If the Communists' charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever obtain supreme power in China.

Nevertheless, since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially the laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunities than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the areas held by their own armies

than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.

Part of International Communist Movement

The Chinese Communist movement is a part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda policies follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of "Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism."

Desire for U.S. Support Against Japan and the Kuomintang

This does not prevent the Chinese Communists from maintaining a friendly attitude toward the United States. Their attitude toward us and all capitalist democracies is conditioned, however, by the extent to which they can obtain benefits from us in the furtherance of their own revolutionary aims; the subjugation of China under Communist rule and the development of a Communist-controlled "capitalist democracy" in China as a preliminary to the introduction of communism. They would use American support to further their struggle against both Japan and the Chungking Government.

De Facto Independence

The Chinese Communist movement today is not represented merely by a political party; it is represented by what is a state in all but name, possessing territory (the combined area of which is about the size of France or one-fifth of China Proper), a population of probably more than 70,000,000 people, armies, law, and money of its own. The Chinese Communist state is economically primitive, but (at a primitive level) fairly self-sufficient.

Rivalry with the Kuomintang

Failure of the "Entente Cordiale." During the period of the Soviet Russian-Kuomintang *Entente Cordiale*, 1923-1927, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to support the revolutionary, national, democratic program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on

by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.

Development of the "united front" movement. The ensuing civil war, 1927–1937, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the Kuomintang's acceptance of the idea of a "united front" with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in Moscow. It applied to Communists in all countries and involved cooperation between Communists and non-Communist groups and parties in the capitalist democracies, as a means of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threat of fascist aggression and of expanding the influence of the Communists in capitalist democracies.

Under the terms of the united front understanding in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government's Central Army.

The "war within the war." The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang armies in obedience to the Chinese High Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources they were called "traitors" by the Communists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil administrations, called "united front governments," which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital, Yenan, the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being "anti-democratic" and the Kuomintang troops of being "experts in dissension." Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases.

Internecline strife led to a general deterioration of the Chinese war situation. After the United States entered the war against Japan both the Communists and the Kuomintang became more interested in their own status vis-à-vis each other than in fighting Japan. The inter-party struggle became of paramount importance. For the Chinese believed that America guaranteed victory against Japan, and the fruits of this victory would obviously go to the party that won out in the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power.

Role in World War II

In spite of this internecline strife, or quasi-war, the Chinese Communists have contributed to the United Nations war against Japan. By organizing extensive guerrilla territories within areas enclosed by the Japanese Army they have prevented the full Japanese exploitation of North China's resources in foodstuffs, raw materials, and manpower. They have also rescued many American pilots who have been forced down in Communist-controlled areas.

Contrary to the widely advertised report of their sympathizers, the Chinese Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the National Government troops. The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his followers have yielded ground politically and militarily to the Communists in order to avoid an open break; as a Nationalist, Chiang Kai-shek has been primarily interested in the war against Japan.

Military Capacity Small

The Chinese Communists now claim to have an army of 910,000 troops in addition to local militia forces numbering about 2,000,000 men. However, in October 1944 the strength of the Chinese Communists' regular forces was reliably reported as 475,000. The degree to which the increase since October of last year represents an actual increase in fighting capacity depends upon the number of rifles available. Rifles were available for only about 250,000 men in October 1944.

The Alternative Settlements of the Kuomintang-Communist Problem

General. As far as can be seen at present there are three alternatives for a settlement of the internal situation in China: (1) Civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists; a "settlement" which would be disastrous for the Chinese people, even though it might ultimately decide the question of which party shall rule;

(2) institution of a National Assembly to inaugurate a democratic, constitutional form of government in which all parties find representation; (3) division of China into two (or more) separate parts, these parts to be united in a loose "federation" represented by a "coalition government" of all parties. The decisions of this coalition government would be executed independently by the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang. The two parties would continue to maintain their separate armies and administrations.

Many observers believe that neither of the latter two alternatives is feasible. Both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists aspire to supreme control over China. This being the case some observers believe that civil war is unavoidable.

Generalissimo sponsors the National Assembly. Chiang Kai-shek has proposed the National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the re-establishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government. He makes compliance with this demand a prerequisite for any political settlement with the Communists.

Chinese Communists sponsor idea of coalition government. The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the "coalition government" is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established.

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through legal or illegal means. Chiang Kai-shek has refused to accept the idea of a coalition government.

Unity or permanent division of China, the issues at stake. Here the matter rests (3 July 1945). For the time being it is a question of the National Assembly versus the coalition government. The former provides a chance for unifying China by the agreement of the Chinese armed parties to submit to arbitration and law instead of force. The latter would continue into the postwar period the system of territorial division of China between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the maintenance of separate party armies. Real unity cannot be achieved on this basis. Each party insists on its own plan.

International Implications

Common policy of U.S. and U.S.S.R. It is generally believed that a peaceful inter-party settlement in China depends largely upon the extent to which the United States and Soviet Russia can follow a common policy toward China. Were the Soviet Union to decide to give active support to the Chinese Communists, in terms of supplies or military aid, while the United States supports the Chungking Government, the Russians and Americans would be meeting head on.

Uncertainty concerning Soviet aims in China. Present relations between Chungking and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the "reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. There are indications that Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domination (along somewhat the same lines as in Outer Mongolia and in Eastern Europe), in the areas of North China adjacent to Soviet Russia; that is, in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China Proper. A typical statement in this regard is one by a Soviet Russian diplomat in China who emphasized that Soviet Russia is determined that all her border states should be "free from unhealthy combination or linkage with other great powers."

The Chinese Communists' plan for a coalition government would conceivably further this aim in that North China and Manchuria might "legally" become the exclusive spheres of influence of the Chinese Communists and hence come under a regime that would be wholly obedient to Soviet Russia. At the same time the coalition government, which would represent all groups in China, would lend China an outward appearance of unity.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union will try to improve relations with Chungking on the basis of the re-establishment of a "united front" between the Kuomintang and the Chinese

Communists. For it has been Soviet Russia's experience in China that cooperation or a united front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists has always favored the Communists against the Nationalists, no matter what political shading the latter represent, whether reactionary or liberal. By contrast, the Communist cause in China has suffered whenever the Kuomintang has fought the Communists in an all-out civil war. It is possible that this is the explanation for Soviet Russia's apparent willingness to welcome the visit of Dr. T. V. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government. He arrived in Moscow and was received by Stalin on 30 June. An agreement between Moscow and Chungking would have the advantage, for Soviet Russia, of reducing the danger of immediate disagreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

The U.S. and the Situation in China

The post-war peace in the Far East depends on re-establishment of Chinese independence and unity. The type of peace we shall gain by our victory over Japan depends on our success in aiding the Chinese to regain complete independence and to establish unity. For China is the center of the Far East; political, economic, and military relationships in the Far East have always revolved around China. Russia became one of the leading Far Eastern powers by acquiring vast regions from China. Russia's growth as a Far Eastern power has depended greatly upon its success in extending its influence in China. Similarly, Japan grew to a world power by virtue of her territorial acquisitions in Korea and Manchuria. She grew into a world menace after her vast conquests in China Proper in the 1930's.

The independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, including Manchuria, have been key points of U. S. policy and interests in the Far East. During the past eighty-five years Russia, and during the past fifty years Russia and Japan, the two leading military land powers in Asia, have been the chief threats to China's independence. Because of this, a considerable part of the international struggle over China has been centered on creating a balance between these two powers. The sea powers, Great Britain and the United States, have maintained the balance between the two land powers. America's concern in this contest between Russia and Japan for control in China has been demonstrated several times. The rivalry between Russia and Japan has centered on Manchuria and Korea.

With the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will emerge as the sole

military land power in Asia. Necessary as is the defeat of Japan to the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific, the fact remains that her defeat will upset the whole structure of the international balance of power in the Far East which was developed in the decades before 1931. Deprived of her empire in China, and with her cities and industries smashed to pieces, Japan will be back where she started at the dawn of her modern era: a group of relatively worthless islands, populated by fishermen, primitive farmers, and innocuous warriors. The clock will be turned back some eighty years, to the time when the rivalry between Russia and the Western democracies in China began. With the total defeat of Japan, Russia will again emerge as the sole military land power of any account in Asia. But she will be vastly stronger than at any time in the past.

Prevention of a repetition of the "Polish situation" in Manchuria and Korea is essential to post-war stability in the Far East. The problem of post-war peace in the Far East revolves, insofar as the United States is concerned, around two major questions: (1) How can the military-political vacuum in the Far East be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How can the United States promote internal unity in China?

The answer to both questions is vitally affected by the action of Soviet Russia, and by the arrangements in regard to the Far East that we can make with Soviet Russia. If it be assumed that Soviet Russia will join in the war against Japan, the solution of these questions will be greatly affected by the extent to which we can prevent the division of China along the same lines as Europe into an American-British and a Soviet zone of military operations. For the elements of uncertainty as to Soviet Russia's intentions in China and in regard to the Chinese Communists are very similar to those in regard to Eastern Europe during 1943 and 1944. Many of the fears and speculations current at that time, to the effect that Soviet Russia intended to develop Eastern Europe as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification for similar fears in regard to North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Just as Soviet Russia's plans in Eastern Europe have been favored by the absence of American and British forces in these areas, so also would Soviet Russia, if she does plan to create a Soviet sphere of influence in North China, Manchuria and Korea, find herself in a most favorable position if these areas were assigned to her exclusively or even predominantly as a zone of military operations against Japan.

On the other hand, if American forces cooperate on equal terms

with Soviet Russian, Chinese, and British forces in the reconquest and occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea, a peace settlement in complete accord with the terms of the Cairo declaration of 1 December 1943 can much more readily be achieved. For it is clear that if the war were to end with us in control of Japan, and with Chungking-Chinese, American, and British forces in control of Central and South China, while Soviet Russian and Chinese Communist forces held the controlling power in Manchuria and Korea, a peace settlement in regard to these areas might entail a considerable compromise of the terms of the Cairo declaration. In that case, the plan of the Chinese Communists for a "coalition government" might well be the only feasible way of settling the situation in China; North China and probably also Manchuria and Korea would come under the control of native Communists dependent upon Soviet Russian support, and in these areas there would be established the now typical "united front" or "democratic" coalition administrations in which the Communists hold the dominant power. Deprived of the vast raw material resources of North China and Manchuria the present National Government of China would find itself unable to compete with the Communists in the North and to establish a strong and stable state. For this reason it is necessary, for the maintenance of peace in the Far East and for the long range interests of the United States, that the Cairo Declaration be implemented without modification.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

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